Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.3.2 Political Systems ===

<div id="h2-6-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

The effectiveness of domestic climate governance will significantly rely on how well it fits with the features of the countries’ specific political systems ( ''limited evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Schmitz--2017|Schmitz 2017]] ; [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ). Political systems have developed over generations and constitute a set of formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, bureaucratic structures, political executives, legislative assemblies and political parties ( [[#Egeberg--1999|Egeberg 1999]] ; [[#Pierson--2004|Pierson 2004]] ). Different political systems create differing conditions for climate governance to emerge and evolve, but because political systems are so politically and historically entrenched they are not likely to change quickly even though this could facilitate domestic climate mitigation efforts ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Duit--2008|Duit and Galaz 2008]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). In addition, variations in governance capacities also affect climate policy making and implementation ( [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Nahm 2018]] ).

Broader public participation and more open contestation spaces tend to nurture more encompassing climate policies, facilitate stronger commitments to international agreements ( [[#Bättig--2009|Bättig and Bernauer 2009]] ; [[#Böhmelt--2016|Böhmelt et al. 2016]] ), achieve more success in decoupling economic growth from CO 2 emissions ( [[#Lægreid--2018|Lægreid and Povitkina 2018]] ), reduce more CO 2 emissions ( [[#Clulow--2019|Clulow 2019]] ; [[#von%20Stein--2020|von Stein 2020]] ), and maintain lower deforestation rates ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Buitenzorgy--2011|Buitenzorgy and Mol 2011]] ). States with less public participation and contestation space can also develop ambitious climate emission reduction targets and institutions ( [[#Zimmer--2015|Zimmer et al. 2015]] ; [[#Eckersley--2016|Eckersley 2016]] ; [[#Han--2017|Han 2017]] ; [[#Engels--2018|Engels 2018]] ), but the drivers and effects of climate policies within less open and liberal political contexts has not yet been sufficiently investigated.

Election systems based on proportional representation tend to have lower emissions, higher energy efficiency, higher renewable energy deployment, and more climate friendly investment than systems where leadership candidates have to secure a majority of the votes to be elected ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Fredriksson--2004|Fredriksson and Millimet 2004]] ; [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ). Such systems better enable voters supporting ambitious climate positions to influence policymaking ( [[#Harrison--2010|Harrison and Sundstrom 2010]] ; [[#Willis--2018|Willis 2018]] ), place less political risks on legislators from additional costs incurred from climate actions on voters ( [[#Finnegan--2018|Finnegan 2018]] , 2019), and strengthen credible commitments to climate policy ( [[#Lockwood--2021b|Lockwood 2021b]] ). Similarly, rules that govern the relationship between governments and civic societies in decision-making have also been shown to matter in climate governance. Corporatist societies, where economic groups are formally involved in public policy making, have better climate-related outcomes (lower CO 2 emissions and higher low-carbon investments) than liberal-pluralist countries, where a larger array of non-governmental organisations compete for informal influence, often through lobbying ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Liefferink--2009|Liefferink et al. 2009]] ; [[#Jahn--2016|Jahn 2016]] ; [[#Finnegan--2018|Finnegan 2018]] ).

Political parties with similar ideological roots in different countries (for instance social democratic or conservative parties) may have different positions on climate governance across countries ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Nevertheless, on average, a higher share of green parties in a parliament is associated with lower greenhouse gas emissions ( [[#Neumayer--2003|Neumayer 2003]] ; [[#Jensen--2011|Jensen and Spoon 2011]] ; [[#Mourao--2019|Mourao 2019]] ), and left-wing parties tend to adopt more pro-climate policy positions ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Carter--2013|Carter 2013]] ; [[#Tobin--2017|Tobin 2017]] ; [[#Farstad--2018|Farstad 2018]] ; [[#Ladrech--2019|Ladrech and Little 2019]] ). There is also evidence, however, that conservative parties in some countries support climate measures ( [[#Båtstrand--2015|Båtstrand 2015]] ) and consensus can be achieved on climate actions across the political spectrum ( [[#Thonig--2021|Thonig et al. 2021]] ). At the same time, it seems harder to get support for new climate governance initiatives in systems where many political groups can block decision due to many veto points, for instance in systems with bicameralism (the legislature is divided into two separate assemblies) and/or in federalist governments (where regions have national political representation, e.g. USA and Brazil) ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Madden--2014|Madden 2014]] ; [[#von%20Stein--2020|von Stein 2020]] ) although federal systems hold out the possibility of sub-national action when federal agreement is limited ( [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ). There remains a limited literature on the role of green parties and veto points in developing countries ( [[#Haynes--1999|Haynes 1999]] ; [[#Kernecker--2019|Kernecker and Wagner 2019]] ).

In any political system, climate policy adoption and implementation may be obstructed by corrupt practices ( [[#Rafaty--2018|Rafaty 2018]] ; [[#Fredriksson--2016|Fredriksson and Neumayer 2016]] ) that entail an abuse of entrusted power for private gain ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Treisman--2000|Treisman 2000]] ). Evidence shows that CO 2 emissions levels can be affected by corruption, either through the direct negative effect of corruption on law enforcement, including in the forestry sector ( [[#Sundström--2016|Sundström 2016]] ), or through the negative effect of corruption on countries’ income ( [[#Welsch--2004|Welsch 2004]] ).These early findings are reinforced by studies of a global sample of countries ( [[#Cole--2007|Cole 2007]] ) and from across the developing world (Sahli and Rejeb 2015; [[#Bae--2017|Bae et al. 2017]] ; [[#Wang--2018b|Wang et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Ridzuan--2019|Ridzuan et al. 2019]] ; [[#Habib--2020|Habib et al. 2020]] ). Corruption also disrupts public support of climate policies by affecting the levels of trust ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Harring--2013|Harring 2013]] ; [[#Fairbrother--2019|Fairbrother et al. 2019]] ; [[#Davidovic--2020|Davidovic and Harring 2020]] ), which then impact on the compliance of climate policies. More research is required to further understand the causal mechanisms between corrupt practices and emissions.

<div id="13.3.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="ideas-values-and-belief-systems"></span>