Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-2 (section)

=== 2.4.1 Economic Drivers at Global and Regional Levels ===

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Economic growth (measured as GDP) and its main components – GDP per capita and population growth – remained the strongest drivers of GHG emissions in the last decade, following a long-term trend ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Liddle--2015|Liddle 2015]] ; [[#Malik--2016|Malik et al. 2016]] ; [[#Sanchez--2016|Sanchez and Stern 2016]] ; [[#Chang--2019|Chang et al. 2019]] ; Dong et al. 2019; Liobikiene and Butkus 2019; [[#Liu--2019a|Liu et al. 2019a]] ; [[#Mardani--2019|Mardani et al. 2019]] ; [[#Pan--2019|Pan et al. 2019]] ; [[#Dong--2020|Dong et al. 2020]] ; [[#Parker--2020|Parker and Bhatti 2020]] ; [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ). Globally, GDP per capita remained by far the strongest upward driver, increasing almost in tandem with energy consumption and CO 2 emissions up until 2015, after which some modest decoupling occurred ( [[#Deutch--2017|Deutch 2017]] ; [[#Wood--2018|Wood et al. 2018]] ) ( [[#2.3.3|Section 2.3.3]] ). The main counteracting, yet insufficient, factor that led to emissions reductions was decreased energy use per unit of GDP in almost all regions (–2.0% yr –1 between 2010 and 2019 globally) (see also [[#Lamb--2021b|Lamb et al. 2021b]] ) (Figure 2.16) ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). These reductions in energy intensity are a result of technological innovation, structural changes, regulation, fiscal support, and direct investment, as well as increased economic efficiency in underlying sectors ( [[#Yao--2015|Yao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Sanchez--2016|Sanchez and Stern 2016]] ; [[#Chang--2019|Chang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Dong--2019a|Dong et al. 2019a]] ; [[#Mohmmed--2019|Mohmmed et al. 2019]] ; [[#Stern--2019|Stern 2019]] ; [[#Azhgaliyeva--2020|Azhgaliyeva et al. 2020]] ; [[#Goldemberg--2020|Goldemberg 2020]] ; [[#Gao--2021|Gao et al. 2021]] ; [[#Liddle--2021|Liddle and Huntington 2021]] ; [[#Liu--2019b|Liu et al. 2019b]] ; [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ).

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[[File:8e1b78d741c08125db0c862ae577c8ba IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Figure_2_16.png]]

'''Figure 2.16''' '''|''' '''Trends and drivers of global GHG emissions, including: (a) trends of GHG emissions by sectors 1990–2019; (b) share of total and per capita GHG emissions by world region in 2019; and (c) Kaya decomposition of CO''' 2 '''emissions drivers.''' The Kaya decomposition is based on the equation F = P(G/P)(E/G)(F/E), where F is CO 2 emissions, P is population, G/P is GDP per capita, E/G is the energy intensity of GDP and F/E is the carbon intensity of energy. The indicated annual growth rates are averaged across the years 2010–2019 (in panel (c), these are for fossil fuel CO 2 emissions only, in order to ensure compatibility with underlying energy data). Note that the energy consumption by itself (primary energy supply) is not part of the decomposition, but is listed here for comparison with the Kaya factors. Source: data from [[#Crippa--2021|Crippa et al. (2021)]] , [[#IEA--2021c|IEA (2021c)]] , [[#Minx--2021|Minx et al. (2021)]] .

The decades-long trend that efficiency gains were outpaced by an increase in worldwide GDP (or income) per capita continued unabated in the last 10 years ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Wiedmann--2020|Wiedmann et al. 2020]] ; [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ). In addition, the emissions-reducing effects of energy efficiency improvements are diminished by the energy rebound effect, which has been found in several studies to largely offset any energy savings ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Rausch--2018|Rausch and Schwerin 2018]] ; [[#Colmenares--2020|Colmenares et al. 2020]] ; [[#Stern--2020|Stern 2020]] ; [[#Brockway--2021|Brockway et al. 2021]] ; [[#Bruns--2021|Bruns et al. 2021]] ). The rebound effect is discussed extensively in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.9.2|Section 9.9.2]] .

A significant decarbonisation of the energy system was only noticeable in North America, Europe and Eurasia. Globally, the amount of CO 2 per unit of energy used has practically remained unchanged over the last three decades ( [[#Tavakoli--2018|Tavakoli 2018]] ; [[#Chang--2019|Chang et al. 2019]] ), although it is expected to decrease more consistently in the future ( [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ). Population growth has also remained a strong and persistent upward driver in almost all regions (+1.2% yr –1 globally from 2010 to 2019) (Lamb et al. 2021) (Figure 2.16), although per capita emission levels are very uneven across world regions. Therefore, modest population increases in wealthy countries may have a similar impact on emissions as high population increases in regions with low per capita emission levels.

Developing countries remained major accelerators of global CO 2 emissions growth since 2010, mostly driven by increased consumption and production, in particular in East Asia ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Jiborn--2020|Jiborn et al. 2020]] ). While energy intensity declined to a similar extent in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries over the last 30 years, economic growth has been much stronger in non-OECD countries ( [[#González-Torres--2021|González-Torres et al. 2021]] ). This led to an average annual growth rate of 2.8% of CO 2 emissions in these countries, whereas they decreased by 0.3% yr –1 in OECD countries ( [[#UNEP--2019|UNEP 2019]] ). The majority of developed economies reduced both production-based and consumption-based CO 2 emissions modestly ( [[#Jiborn--2020|Jiborn et al. 2020]] ; [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ). This was due to slower economic growth, increased energy efficiency (less energy per unit of GDP), fuel switching from coal to gas (mostly in North America) ( [[#Wang--2020|Wang et al. 2020]] b), and the use of less and cleaner energy from renewables in Europe (Peters et al. 2017; [[#Karstensen--2018|Karstensen et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chang--2019|Chang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Wood--2019|Wood et al. 2019]] c).

Economic growth as the main driver of GHG emissions is particularly strong in China and India ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Liu--2019b|Liu et al. 2019b]] ; [[#Ortega-Ruiz--2020|Ortega-Ruiz et al. 2020]] ; Z. [[#Wang--2020|Wang et al. 2020]] b; [[#Yang--2020|Yang et al. 2020]] ; [[#Zheng--2020|Zheng et al. 2020]] ; [[#Xia--2021|Xia et al. 2021]] ), although both countries show signs of relative decoupling because of structural changes ( [[#Marin--2019|Marin and Mazzanti 2019]] ). A change in China’s production structure (with relatively less heavy industry and lower-carbon manufacturing) and consumption patterns (i.e., the type of goods and services consumed) has become the main moderating factor of emissions after 2010, while economic growth, consumption levels, and investment remain the dominating factors driving up emissions ( [[#Wang--2019|Wang and Jiang 2019]] ; [[#Jiborn--2020|Jiborn et al. 2020]] ; [[#Zheng--2020|Zheng et al. 2020]] ). In India, an expansion of production and trade as well as a higher energy intensity between 2010 and 2014 caused increased emissions ( [[#Kanitkar--2015|Kanitkar et al. 2015]] ; Wang and Zhou 2020; Z. [[#Wang--2020|Wang et al. 2020]] b).

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