Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 (section)

==== 1.3.2.3 Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge ====

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While scientific knowledge is vital, IK and LK are also necessary for understanding and acting effectively on climate risk ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ; [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] , SROCC Chapter 1; see also Section 2.4). '''Indigenous knowledge''' refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long histories of interaction with their natural surroundings ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ). '''Local knowledge''' is defined as the understandings and skills developed by individuals and populations, specific to the places where they live ( [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ). These definitions relate to the debates on the world’s cultural diversity ( [[#UNESCO--2018a|UNESCO, 2018a]] ), which are increasingly connected to climate change debates ( [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] ). However, there is agreement that, in the same way that there is not a unique definition of Indigenous Peoples because it depends on self-determination (see below), there is not a single definition of neither IK and LK. Therefore, contextualisation is greatly needed. IK and LK will shape perceptions which are vital to managing climate risk in day-to-day activities and longer-term actions.

Such experience-based and practical knowledge is obtained over generations through observing and working directly within various environments. Knowledge may be place based and rooted in local cultures, especially when it reflects the beliefs of long-settled communities who have strong ties to their natural environments ( [[#Orlove--2010|Orlove et al., 2010]] ). Other times, knowledge may be embedded in institutions or oral traditions that mobilise them across contexts, for example, as migrant populations bring their knowledge across different regions, and have global relevance. Scientific insights often confirm IK and LK ( [[#Ignatowski--2013|Ignatowski and Rosales, 2013]] ), but IK and LK also provides specific, alternative ways to understand environmental change. This includes tacit and embodied aspects of knowledge ( [[#Mellegård--2020|Mellegård and Boonstra, 2020]] ) that may be crucial to foster local action and that are not easily captured in scientific knowledge (including cultural indicators, scales and interconnectedness between ecosystems). Multiple knowledge systems (i.e. IK, LK, disciplinary knowledge, technical expertise) may coevolve in iterative and interactive processes whereby they influence each other. However, at the same time, they may have specific characteristics so that they cannot be reduced to each other or subsumed by each other, and they all have relevance to understanding the interactions between society and climate ( [[#Bremer--2019|Bremer et al., 2019]] ).

Moreover, IK and LK may be particularly relevant to ensuring that climate action does not cause further harm, and also addresses historical injustices committed against Indigenous Peoples and other marginalised social groups, recognising them as active agents of their own change ( [[#Nursey-Bray--2019|Nursey-Bray et al., 2019]] ). There are between 370 and 500 million people in at least 90 countries belonging to about 5,000 different ethnic groups that are classified as ‘Indigenous’ ( [[#Sangha--2019|Sangha et al., 2019]] ). Although there is no single, universal definition of Indigenous Peoples, core criterion within both the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ( [[#UN--2007|UN, 2007]] ) include: (a) self-determination and (b) the recognition that Indigenous Peoples as distinct social and cultural groups that retain collective ancestral ties to the lands they inhabited or to the lands from which they have been displaced. Indigenous Peoples attribute cultural and spiritual values to land, environmental features and landscapes ( [[#ILO--2013|ILO, 2013]] ; [[#ILO--2019|ILO, 2019]] ). Indigenous Peoples suffer disproportionally. For example, they are three times more likely to live in extreme poverty than non-Indigenous Peoples; they are also more likely to suffer discrimination and violence ( [[#UN--2020|UN, 2020]] ). At the same time, Indigenous Peoples have long led climate change and environmental protection agendas.

Indigenous Peoples have been faced with adaptation challenges for centuries and have developed coping strategies in changing environments ( [[#Coates--2004|Coates, 2004]] ). Along with other local groups, they hold relevant knowledge about the environment and environmental change, the impact of those changes on ecosystems and livelihoods, and possible effective adaptive responses (see Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18). Therefore, the participation of Indigenous Peoples in climate change decisions and the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge in the IPCC assessment process should be of high priority (following recommendations in [[#UNESCO--2018b|UNESCO, 2018b]] , and [[#UN--2020|UN, 2020]] ). Furthermore, the participation of scientifically trained climate specialists with indigenous backgrounds is valuable to the work of IPCC because the assessment must reflect a diverse range of views and expertise (for examples of IK, see Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18). Article 31 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) supports the inclusion of IK and LK in the IPCC assessment process, calling for the use of IK and LK to be protected and validated by Indigenous Peoples themselves and their inclusion as active participants in the assessment ( [[#Klenk--2017|Klenk et al., 2017]] ). Paying special attention to the mechanism whereby some forms of knowledge have been excluded in previous reports—such as the use of technical knowledge or acronyms, or the deployment of discipline-specific validation mechanism—is a first step towards developing an inclusive assessment that reflects a wide range of voices.

The AR4 was the first IPCC report to explicitly discuss the value of IK and LK in adaptation and mitigation processes. AR5 recognised the importance of creating synergies across disciplines in the production of knowledge, acknowledging the importance of ‘non-scientific’ sources such as IK, which may not follow discipline conventions but nevertheless reflects the outcomes of learning across generations ( [[#Burkett--2014|Burkett et al., 2014]] ). This also explains the importance of including IK and LK and diverse stakeholder interests and values in local decision making processes ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones et al., 2014]] ). Such processes should be done in partnership with IK and LK knowledge holders and, when possible, be led by them ( [[#Inuit%20Tapiriit%20Kanatami--2018|Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018]] ). Recent IPCC reports have included distinct sections dedicated to IK and LK (e.g., [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ). The IPCC Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) includes a section on ‘Local and Indigenous knowledge for addressing land degradation’ (2019a) and the IPCC Special Report on Ocean and Cryosphere (SROCC) describes LK as ‘what non-Indigenous communities, both rural and urban, use on a daily and lifelong basis,’ a type of knowledge which is recognised as ‘multi-generational, embedded in community practices and cultures, and adaptive to changing conditions’ (2019b). The IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C emphasised the high vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples to climate change. It stated that disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, including Indigenous Peoples and certain local communities, are at disproportionately higher risk of suffering adverse consequences with global warming of 1.5°C and beyond ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ). The report also assessed evidence in relation to the importance of including IK and LK in adaptation options, explaining their role in early warning systems and arguing that they are part of a range of approaches to catalyse wide-scale values and are consistent with adapting to and limiting global warming to 1.5°C ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ).

Since AR5, several academic publications have directly addressed the challenges of including IK and LK in climate research ( [[#Ford--2016|Ford et al., 2016]] ; [[#Yeh--2016|Yeh, 2016]] ; [[#David-Chavez--2018|David-Chavez and Gavin, 2018]] ) and demonstrated its value in building resilience to extreme events related to climate change ( [[#Janif--2016|Janif et al., 2016]] ; [[#Olazabal--2021|Olazabal et al., 2021]] ). For instance, IK and LK has proved useful in land management methods that reduce wildfire risk ( [[#Nepstad--2006|Nepstad et al., 2006]] ; Cook et al., 2012; [[#Welch--2013|Welch et al., 2013]] ; Mistry et al., 2016). Since IK is traditionally communicated through storytelling and oral history, there are practical challenges to integrating it into an assessment that prioritises scientific knowledge. There is a need for increased critical engagement towards the co-production of knowledge ( [[#Ford--2016|Ford et al., 2016]] ). Scholars now recognise the ontological and epistemological differences in approaches, understandings and effects of climate change ( [[#Yeh--2016|Yeh, 2016]] ). One common strategy has been assessing Indigenous observations of climate change alongside scientific data ( [[#Klein--2014a|Klein et al., 2014a]] ) as a means to bridge the gap between scientific inquiry and Indigenous knowledge systems ( [[#Fernández-Llamazares--2017|Fernández-Llamazares et al., 2017]] ). The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the CBD have helped illustrate how to bridge multiple knowledge systems, particularly those conceived from different ontologies. Rather than viewing IK as a single source of knowledge to be compared with scientific data, recent scholarship suggests assessments, such as the IPCC, directly involve Indigenous researchers ( [[#Yumagulova--2019|Yumagulova et al., 2019]] ) to ensure ethical and equitable engagement with IK. Such partnership with and leadership of Indigenous Peoples on climate research is also consistent with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (e.g., [[#Bawaka%20Country--2015|Bawaka Country et al., 2015]] ; [[#Inuit%20Tapiriit%20Kanatami--2018|Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2018]] ; Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18).

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'''Cross-Chapter Box PALEO | Vulnerability and Adaptation to Past Climate Changes'''
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Authors: Wolfgang Kiessling (Germany, Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Paper 1), Timothy A. Kohler (USA, Chapter 14), Wolfgang Cramer (France, Chapter 1, Cross-Chapter Paper 4), Gusti Anshari (Indonesia, Chapter 2), Jo Skeie Hermansen (Norway, CA Chapter 1), Darrell S. Kaufman (USA, WG 1, Chapter 2), Guy Midgley (South Africa, Chapter 16), Nussaïbah Raja (Mauritius, CA Chapter 3), Daniela N. Schmidt (UK/Germany, Chapter 13), Nils Chr. Stenseth (Norway, Chapter 1), Sukumar Raman (India, Chapter 1)

Understanding how Earth’s biota have responded to past climate dynamics is essential to understanding current and future climate-related risks, as well as the adaptive capacity and vulnerabilities of ecosystems and the human livelihoods depending on them. Here we assess climate impacts on long geological time scales (Cross-Chapter Box PALEO in Chapter 1, Figure PALEO.1), as well as for the last 70 kyr of ''Homo sapiens'' ’ existence (Cross-Chapter Box PALEO in Chapter 1, Figure PALEO.2). Climate responses of natural and human systems are intertwined through the physiological limits of wild animals, livestock, plants and humans, subject to a slow evolutionary dynamic ( [[#Poertner--2021|Pörtner, 2021]] ; Sections 2.6.1; 3.3).

Climate has always changed, often with severe effects on nature, including species loss

Observations provided by the historical, archaeological, and palaeontological records, together with paleoclimatic data, demonstrate that climatic variability has high potential to affect biodiversity and human society ( ''high confidence'' ). The evolution of the Earth’s biota has been punctuated by global biodiversity crises often triggered by rapid warming ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure PALEO.1; [[#Bond--2017|Bond and Grasby, 2017]] ; [[#Benton--2018|Benton, 2018]] ; [[#Foster--2018|Foster et al., 2018]] ;). These so-called hyperthermal events were marked by rapid warming of &gt;1°C, which coincided with global disturbances of the carbon and water cycles, and by reduced oxygen and pH in seawater ( [[#Foster--2018|Foster et al., 2018]] ; [[#Clapham--2019|Clapham and Renne, 2019]] ). Magnitudes of global temperature shifts in hyperthermal events were sometimes greater than those predicted for the current century but extended over longer periods of time. Rates inferred from paleo records that are coarsely resolved are inevitably lower than those from direct observations during recent decades, and caution must be exercised when describing the rate of recent temperature changes as unprecedented (Kemp et al., 2015). Mass extinctions, each with greater than 70% marine species extinctions, occurred when the magnitude of temperature change exceeded 5.2°C ( [[#Song--2021|Song et al., 2021]] ), albeit species extinctions occurred at lower magnitudes of warming ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Adaptation options to rapid climate change are limited

Responses of biota to rapid climate change have included range shifts ( ''very high confidence'' ), phenotypic plasticity ( ''high confidence'' ), evolutionary adaptation ( ''medium confidence'' ), and species extinctions, including mass extinctions ( ''very high confidence'' ). While knowledge about the relative roles of these processes in promoting survival during times of climate change is still limited ( [[#Nogués-Bravo--2018|Nogués-Bravo et al., 2018]] ), they have influenced the evolutionary trajectories of species and entire ecosystems ( ''high confidence'' ), and also the course of human history ( ''medium confidence'' ). The combined ecological and evolutionary responses to ancient rapid warming events ranged from extinction of 81% of marine animal species and 70% of terrestrial tetrapod species on land at the end of the Permian period (~ 252 million years ago, Ma) ( [[#Smith--2005|Smith and Botha, 2005]] ; [[#Stanley--2016|Stanley, 2016]] ) to low rates of species extinctions but biome- and range shifts on land and in the ocean at the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM, ~ 56 Ma) (Figure PALEO.1; [[#Ivany--2018|Ivany et al., 2018]] ; [[#Fraser--2020|Fraser and Lyons, 2020]] ; [[#Huurdeman--2021|Huurdeman et al., 2021]] ). Temperature and deoxygenation were key drivers of past biotic responses in the oceans ( [[#Gibbs--2016|Gibbs et al., 2016]] ; [[#Penn--2018|Penn et al., 2018]] ; Section 3.3) ( ''high confidence'' ), whereas on land the interplay between temperature and precipitation is less well established in ancient hyperthermals ( [[#Frank--2021|Frank et al., 2021]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Climate-driven extinction risk increased by up to 40% when a short-term climate change added to a long-term trend in the same direction, for example when a long-term warming trend was followed by rapid warming ( [[#Mathes--2021|Mathes et al., 2021]] ).

Organismic traits associated with extinctions during ancient climate changes help identify present-day vulnerabilities and conservation priorities ( [[#Barnosky--2017|Barnosky et al., 2017]] ; [[#Calosi--2019|Calosi et al., 2019]] ; [[#Reddin--2020|Reddin et al., 2020]] ; Chapters 2; 3; Cross-Chapter Paper 1). Marine invertebrates and fishes are at greater extinction risk in response to warming than terrestrial ones because of reduced availability of thermal refugia in the sea ( [[#Pinsky--2019|Pinsky et al., 2019]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Terrestrial plants showed reduced extinction during past rapid warming compared to animals ( ''high confidence'' ), although they readily adjusted their ranges and reorganised vegetation types ( [[#Yu--2015|Yu et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lindström--2016|Lindström, 2016]] ; [[#Heimhofer--2018|Heimhofer et al., 2018]] ; [[#Slater--2019|Slater et al., 2019]] ; [[#Huurdeman--2021|Huurdeman et al., 2021]] ).

Population range shifts including migrations are common adaptations to climate changes across multiple time scales and ecological systems in the past and in response to current warming ( ''high confidence'' ). Poleward expansions and retractions ( [[#Redding--2018|Reddin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Williams--2018|Williams et al., 2018]] ; [[#Fordham--2020|Fordham et al., 2020]] ) as well as migration upslope and downslope in response to warming and cooling were common adaptations ( [[#Ortega-Rosas--2008|Ortega-Rosas et al., 2008]] ; [[#Iglesias--2018|Iglesias et al., 2018]] ;). During warming periods, diversity loss was common near the equator ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Kiessling--2012|Kiessling et al., 2012]] ; [[#Kröger--2017|Kröger, 2017]] ; [[#Yasuhara--2020|Yasuhara et al., 2020]] ), while diversity gains and forest expansion occurred in high latitudes ( [[#Brovkin--2021|Brovkin et al., 2021]] ). Comparison of contemporary shells and skeletons with historical collections in museums ( [[#Barnes--2011|Barnes et al., 2011]] ) and the analysis of skeletons of long-lived organisms ( [[#Cantin--2010|Cantin et al., 2010]] ) indicate significant climate-induced change in organismic growth rates today ( ''high agreement, medium confidence'' ).

Humankind has responded to regional climate variability within a narrow Holocene climatic envelope

Early human evolution (beginning ~2.1 Ma) occurred in a highly variable climate characterised by glacial-interglacial cycles. This variability may have favoured key hominin adaptations such as bipedality, increased brain size, complex sociality, and more diverse tools ( [[#Potts--1998|Potts, 1998]] ; [[#Potts--2020|Potts et al., 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ), but extinctions of five species of ''Homo'' have also been attributed partly to climate change ( [[#Raia--2020|Raia et al., 2020]] ) ( ''low confidence'' ). The ‘out-of-Africa’ dispersal of anatomically modern humans may have been driven by climate variability ( [[#Timmermann--2016|Timmermann and Friedrich, 2016]] ; Tierney et al., 2017) ( ''medium confidence, low agreement'' ). Most late Pleistocene megafaunal extinctions are attributed to direct and indirect human impacts ( [[#Sandom--2014|Sandom et al., 2014]] ), although some were likely accelerated by climate change ( [[#Wan--2017|Wan and Zhang, 2017]] ; Westaway et al., 2017; [[#Carotenuto--2018|Carotenuto et al., 2018]] ; [[#Saltré--2019|Saltré et al., 2019]] ) ( ''low confidence'' ).

The emergence of agriculture (~10.2 ka) in southwest Asia was associated with stable (within ±1°C global mean annual on multi-century time scale; WGI Chapter 2) warm and moist conditions (Richerson et al., 2001; [[#Rohling--2019|Rohling et al., 2019]] ; [[#Palmisano--2021|Palmisano et al., 2021]] ). Variability in resource availability and agricultural production, entrained by climatic variability, is implicated in the disruption and decline of numerous past human societies ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#d’Alpoim%20Guedes--2018|d’Alpoim Guedes and Bocinsky, 2018]] ; [[#Cookson--2019|Cookson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Jones--2019|Jones, 2019]] ; [[#Park--2019|Park et al., 2019]] ). These crises are partially caused by regional climate anomalies including Holocene ‘Rapid Climate Change Events’ ( [[#Rohling--2019|Rohling et al., 2019]] ) not visible in the globally averaged conditions shown in Figure PALAEO.2. Such anomalies affected human population size ( [[#Clark--2019|Clark et al., 2019]] ; [[#Kuil--2019|Kuil et al., 2019]] ; [[#Riris--2019|Riris and Arroyo-Kalin, 2019]] ), health ( [[#Campbell--2020|Campbell and Ludlow, 2020]] ) and social stability/conflict ( [[#Büntgen--2011|Büntgen et al., 2011]] ; [[#Kohler--2014|Kohler et al., 2014]] ), and triggered migrations ( [[#D’Andrea--2011|D’Andrea et al., 2011]] ; [[#Schwindt--2016|Schwindt et al., 2016]] ; [[#Chiotis--2018|Chiotis, 2018]] ; [[#Prei--2018|Pei et al., 2018]] ) or retarded them ( [[#Betti--2020|Betti et al., 2020]] ; FAQ 14.2). Populations have also been impacted by sea level change in coastal areas ( [[#Turney--2007|Turney and Brown, 2007]] ; Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3).

Evidence for widespread droughts ~4.2 ka, lasting for several centuries in some regions, has been tentatively linked to declines of the Akkadian Empire ( [[#Weiss--2017|Weiss, 2017]] ; [[#Carolin--2019|Carolin et al., 2019]] ), the Indus Valley ( [[#Giosan--2018|Giosan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Sengupta--2020|Sengupta et al., 2020]] ), and the Egyptian Old Kingdom and Yangtze River Valley ( [[#Ran--2019|Ran and Chen, 2019]] ). Deteriorating climates often exacerbate accumulating weaknesses in social systems to which population growth and urban expansion contribute ( [[#Knapp--2016|Knapp and Manning, 2016]] ; [[#Lawrence--2021|Lawrence et al., 2021]] ; [[#Scheffer--2021|Scheffer et al., 2021]] ). The rather narrow climatic niche favoured by human societies over the last 6000 years is poised to move on the Earth’s surface at speeds unprecedented in this time span ( [[#IPCC--2021a|IPCC, 2021a]] ), with consequences for human well-being and migration that could be profound under high-emission scenarios ( [[#Xu--2020|Xu et al., 2020]] ). This will overturn the long-lasting stability of interactions between humans and domesticated plants and animals as well as challenge the habitability for humans in several world regions ( [[#Horton--2021|Horton et al., 2021]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Climate change destroys unique natural archives and important cultural heritage sites

Climate change not only impacts past ecosystems and societies but also the remains they have left. The progressive loss of archaeological and historical sites and natural archives of paleo environmental data (WGI Chapter 2) constitutes often-overlooked impacts of climate change (Cross-Chapter Box SLR in Chapter 3; [[#Anderson--2017|Anderson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Hollesen--2018|Hollesen et al., 2018]] ; [[#Climate%20Change%20Cultural%20Heritage%20Working%20Group%20International--2019|Climate Change Cultural Heritage Working Group International, 2019]] ). These archives include peat bogs and coastal archives lost to sea level rise, droughts and fires, degradation through permafrost thaw, and dissolution. The ancient cultural diversity documented by such sites is an important resource for future adaptation ( [[#Rockman--2020|Rockman and Hritz, 2020]] ; [[#Burke--2021|Burke et al., 2021]] ). Since many of these sites constitute anchors for IK, their loss is not just data lost to science, it also interrupts intergenerational transmission of knowledge (Green et al., 2009).

[[File:73db2a1a7f8e7e3435caeaa91d226015 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_Cross-Chapter_Box_PALEO_1.png]]

'''Figure Cross-Chapter Box PALEO.1 |''' '''Biological responses to six well-known ancient rapid warming events (hyperthermals) over the last 300 million years.''' Temperature anomalies (mean temperature difference to pre-industrial 1850–1900, solid orange curve) derived from climate modelling (300–66 Ma) ( [[#Haywood--2019|Haywood et al., 2019]] ) and deep-sea proxy data (66–0.1 Ma) ( [[#Hansen--2013|Hansen et al., 2013]] ). Temperature peaks underneath the grey bars indicate well-known hyperthermals with temperature anomalies derived from temperature-sensitive proxy data ( [[#Foster--2018|Foster et al., 2018]] ). Error bars indicate uncertainties in peak warming events (ranges in the literature). Insets show observed impacts to the biosphere. Q, Quaternary.

[[File:fab8f3f937abe3f8b83bd4a753405ce1 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_Cross-Chapter_Box_PALEO_2.png]]

'''Figure Cross-Chapter Box PALEO.2 |''' '''Humankind is embarking on a trajectory beyond the global temperatures experienced since at least the advent of agriculture.''' Global surface temperature change for the last 70,000 years (relative to 1850–1900; data from WGI Chapter 2) alongside projections (with 5–95% range; WGI Chapter 4) and major events in human societies. Global climatic parameters do not always capture regional variability of importance to specific societies. The ‘Orbis Spike’ represents a pronounced dip in atmospheric CO 2 from the Law Dome ice core (Antarctica) ( [[#MacFarling%20Meure--2006|MacFarling Meure et al., 2006]] ) marking the globalisation in biota and trade of the Columbian Exchange and population declines and afforestation in the Americas. This, and the 1964 14 C peak, have been suggested as possible markers for the onset of the Anthropocene (Lewis and Maslin, 2015). Population trends from United Nations (2019).

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