Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.3.3 Ideas, Values and Belief Systems ===

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Ideas, values and beliefs affect climate governance by shaping people’s perceptions, attitude, and preferences on specific policy and governance issues ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#McCright--2016b|McCright et al. 2016b]] ; [[#Schifeling--2019|Schifeling and Hoffman 2019]] ; [[#Leipold--2019|Leipold et al. 2019]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). While these are often entrenched, they can also change, for instance when facing growing exposures to climate risks, stronger scientific evidence, and dominant public or political discourse ( [[#Mayer--2017|Mayer et al. 2017]] ; [[#Diehl--2021|Diehl et al. 2021]] ). While change tend to be incremental, the pace of change may vary substantially across countries and specific climate issue areas.

However, new norms sometimes only influence political discussion and not actual governance. For instance, more ambitious climate emission reduction targets may not lead to more effective mitigation actions or policy instruments. Put another way, words do not replace actions ( [[#Geden--2016|Geden 2016]] ).

Different sets of beliefs can shape climate-related policies, targets, and instruments ( [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). First, beliefs link climate governance with social justice concerns; policies, targets and instruments may therefore reflect justice issues ( [[#Fuller--2016|Fuller and McCauley 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al. 2017]] ; [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#Routledge--2018|Routledge et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bäckstrand--2006|Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006]] , 2019). Second, climate mitigation may be seen as primarily a market correction issue and mitigation compatible with economic growth, as exemplified by ecological modernisation ( [[#Mol--2009|Mol et al. 2009]] ; [[#Bäckstrand--2006|Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006]] , 2019), climate capitalism ( [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ), market logics ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ) or a global commons approach ( [[#Bernstein--2019|Bernstein and Hoffmann 2019]] ). Third, climate governance may be understood relative to policies on technological innovation and progress, often conceptualised as social-technical transformations ( [[#Geels--2017a|Geels et al. 2017a]] ).

Significant variation in ideas, values and beliefs related to climate governance are detected across and within regions, countries, societies, organisations, and individuals ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ; [[#Knox-Hayes--2016|Knox-Hayes 2016]] ; [[#Wettestad--2018|Wettestad and Gulbrandsen 2018]] ). These factors provide the context for climate policymaking and include differences in countries’ histories ( [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ; [[#Aamodt--2020|Aamodt and Boasson 2020]] ); the political culture and regulatory traditions in governing environmental and energy issues ( [[#Tosun--2018|Tosun 2018]] ; [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ); and even bureaucrats’ educational background ( [[#Rickards--2014|Rickards et al. 2014]] ). Structural factors in a country, such as deeply held value systems, are not changed rapidly, just as political systems or natural endowments, are not changed rapidly. Consequently, climate policy and governance is more effective if it takes into account these deep-rooted values and beliefs.

Differences in dominant individual preferences may also be important. The factors that shape individual ideas, values and beliefs about climate governance include trust in politicians, the state and other people in general ( [[#Drews--2016|Drews and van den Bergh 2016]] ; [[#Harring--2019|Harring et al. 2019]] ; [[#Huber--2020|Huber et al. 2020]] ), fairness beliefs, variation in political orientation (left leaning more concerned), and class ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Schmitz--2018|Schmitz et al. 2018]] ; [[#Inglehart--2017|Inglehart and Norris 2017]] ).

Levels of climate change concern on the individual level have increased in most countries ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ), and vary with gender (females are more concerned), and place of residence (urban residents are more concerned) ( [[#Shwom--2015|Shwom et al. 2015]] ; [[#McCright--2016a|McCright et al. 2016a]] ; [[#Ziegler--2017|Ziegler 2017]] ). The higher educated in developing countries tend to be more concerned ( [[#Lee--2015|Lee et al. 2015]] ) while individuals working in polluting industries tend to oppose forceful climate governance ( [[#Bechtel--2019|Bechtel et al. 2019]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ).

Shifts in mainstream ideas, values and beliefs can underpin changes in climate policy choices and policy outcomes ( ''limited evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Schleich--2018|Schleich et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ). For example, emission trading schemes are welcomed as a new regulatory instrument in China in the context of its market-oriented reforms and ideological shift in the past decades ( [[#Lo--2013|Lo 2013]] ). Based on the study of 167 nation-states and 95 sub-national jurisdictions with carbon pricing, researchers find that that high public belief in climate science underpin adoption of systems that produce a rather high carbon price ( [[#Levi--2020|Levi et al. 2020]] ). These public opinions need to be identified and leveraged in supporting specific policy choices or changes ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ). Policy support tends to be greater if people believe effective measures are being taken by other actors, including other households ( [[#Bostrom--2018|Bostrom et al. 2018]] ; [[#Marlon--2019|Marlon et al. 2019]] ), and other countries and at the international level ( [[#Schleich--2018|Schleich et al. 2018]] ).

On the other hand, anti-climate ideas or beliefs may arise due to the introduction of more constraining or ambitious climate policies, for example protests in reaction to toll roads in Norway, which increase the cost of driving, or protests in France against increasing carbon taxes ( [[#Grossman--2019|Grossman 2019]] ; [[#Wanvik--2021|Wanvik and Haarstad 2021]] ). The policy implication is that vulnerable or effected groups should be considered when introducing policy change, and that participation, transparency, and good communication all helps to reduce climate-related discontent.

Survey-based studies of public perceptions on hypothetical policy instruments or activities, such as carbon taxes or energy infrastructure, suggest that linking climate policy to other economic and social reforms can increase public support for climate governance ( [[#Carattini--2019|Carattini et al. 2019]] ; [[#Bergquist--2020|Bergquist et al. 2020]] ). People and politicians tend to underestimate other peoples’ and politicians’ willingness to support mitigation policies ( [[#Hurlstone--2014|Hurlstone et al. 2014]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ), but if actors are informed about other actors actual perceptions and behaviours this may reduce the tendency to underestimate climate governance support ( [[#Mildenberger--2019|Mildenberger and Tingley 2019]] ).

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