Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.4 Actors Shaping Climate Governance ==

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While [[#13.3|Section 13.3]] shows that structural factors condition climate governance, their ultimate importance also depends on whether and how various actors are mobilised ( [[#Hochstetler--2020|Hochstetler 2020]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ). a wide range of regional and local governments as well as non-governmental actors have become increasingly engaged in climate governance, for instance through public-private partnerships and transnational networks ( [[#Jordan--2015|Jordan et al. 2015]] ; [[#Dorsch--2017|Dorsch and Flachsland 2017]] ; [[#Jordan--2018|Jordan et al. 2018]] ) and through the media and litigation, as discussed here.

Climate governance processes result from both slow-moving incremental changes to policy and more rapid bursts of change due to, for example, responses to dramatic weather events, general elections or global climate summits ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Aamodt--2017|Aamodt and Stensdal 2017]] ; [[#Jordan--2020|Jordan and Moore 2020]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). While [[#13.3|Section 13.3]] assessed how entrenched structural factors conditions climate governance developments, this section examines how actors are able to alter climate governance by engaging the climate policy process, undertaking litigation and interacting with media.

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=== 13.4.1 Actors and Agency in the Public Process ===

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A broad array of actors are engaged in shaping mitigation policy processes, including politicians and political parties, corporate actors, citizen groups, indigenous peoples organisations, labour unions and international organisations. Actors aiming to influence the climate-related policymaking process are studied together to understand climate policy dynamics and outcomes ( [[#Bulkeley--2000|Bulkeley 2000]] ; [[#Fisher--2004|Fisher 2004]] ; [[#Jost--2004|Jost and Jacob 2004]] ; [[#Jasny--2015|Jasny et al. 2015]] ; [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher and Leifeld 2019]] ; Jasny and [[#Fisher--2019|]] [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ) and collaboration and influence within climate policy networks ( [[#Ingold--2014|Ingold and Fischer 2014]] ; [[#McAllister--2014|McAllister et al. 2014]] ; [[#Wagner--2018|Wagner and Ylä-Anttila 2018]] ; [[#Kammerer--2021|Kammerer et al. 2021]] ). Most research, however, focuses on one particular type of actor.

Political actors are decision-makers, and also influence whether climate governance is perceived as urgent and appropriate ( [[#Okereke--2019|Okereke et al. 2019]] ; [[#Ferrante--2019|Ferrante and Fearnside 2019]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). They include political parties, legislative assemblies and committees, governmental executives and the political leaders of governmental ministries ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ). They are more likely to pay attention to climate issues when polling indicates high political salience with the public ( [[#Carter--2006|Carter 2006]] , 2014), or when it becomes a contested issue among differing political parties ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Fluctuations in the public’s interest and attention may underpin a disjointed approach in politicians’ engagement ( [[#Willis--2017|Willis 2017]] , 2018). Policy implementation can be hampered if political actors propose frequent policy changes ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ).

Corporate actors often influence policies and their adoption ( [[#Pulver--2013|Pulver and Benney 2013]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ; [[#Goldberg--2020|Goldberg et al. 2020]] ). Corporate actors acting individually or through industry associations, have worked to sway climate policy in different countries ( [[#Falkner--2008|Falkner 2008]] ; [[#Bernhagen--2008|Bernhagen 2008]] ; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Meckling--2011|Meckling 2011]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Their ability varies by country and issue ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Skjærseth--2010|Skjærseth and Skodvin 2010]] ; [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ) and depends on material endowments ( [[#Moe%20Singh--2012|Moe Singh 2012]] ), access to the political system ( [[#Dillon--2018|Dillon et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ), and the ability to shape ideas, values and belief systems ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ). Corporate actors tend to change their climate policy preferences over time, as indicated by longitudinal studies of some European countries ( [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ).

Corporate actors are crucial to policy implementation because they are prominent emitters of the greenhouse gases and owners of carbon-intensive technologies and potential providers of solutions as developers, owners and adopters of low emission practices and technologies ( [[#Falkner--2008|Falkner 2008]] ; [[#Perrow--2015|Perrow and Pulver 2015]] ). Many climate policies and measures rely on businesses’ willingness to exploit newly created economic opportunities, such as support schemes for renewable energy and energy efficiency sector or carbon pricing ( [[#Olsen--2007|Olsen 2007]] ; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Shen--2015|Shen 2015]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank 2019]] ). Some corporate actors provide climate solutions, such as renewable energy deployment, and have successfully influenced climate policy development related to feed-in tariffs, taxations, quotas, or emission trading schemes, in the EU ( [[#Boasson--2019|Boasson 2019]] ), Germany ( [[#Leiren--2018|Leiren and Reimer 2018]] ), the USA ( [[#Stokes--2018|Stokes and Breetz 2018]] ), the Nordic countries ( [[#Kooij--2018|Kooij et al. 2018]] ), China ( [[#Shen--2017|Shen 2017]] ) and Japan ( [[#Li--2019|Li et al. 2019]] ).

Fossil fuel industries have been important agenda-setters in many countries, including the USA ( [[#Dunlap--2015|Dunlap and McCright 2015]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ; [[#Downie--2018|Downie 2018]] ), the EU ( [[#Skjærseth--2010|Skjærseth and Skodvin 2010]] ; [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ), Australia ( [[#Ayling--2017|Ayling 2017]] ), China ( [[#Shen--2018|Shen and Xie 2018]] ; [[#Tan--2021|Tan et al. 2021]] ), India ( [[#Schmitz--2017|Schmitz 2017]] ; [[#Blondeel--2018|Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018]] ), and Mexico ( [[#Pulver--2007|Pulver 2007]] ), with differing positions and impacts across countries ( [[#Kim--2016|Kim et al. 2016]] ; [[#Nasiritousi--2017|Nasiritousi 2017]] ). In the US, the oil industry has underpinned emergence of climate scepticism ( [[#Dunlap--2015|Dunlap and McCright 2015]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ), and its spread abroad ( [[#Dunlap--2013|Dunlap and Jacques 2013]] ; [[#Engels--2013|Engels et al. 2013]] ; [[#Painter--2016|Painter and Gavin 2016]] ). Corporate opposition to climate policies is often facilitated by a broad coalition of firms ( [[#Cory--2021|Cory et al. 2021]] ).

Conservative foundations, sometimes financed by business revenues, have funded a diversity of types of groups, including think-tanks, philanthropic foundations, or activist networks to oppose climate policy ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle 2014]] , 2019). However, there is limited knowledge about the conditions under which actors opposed to climate action succeed in shaping climate governance ( [[#Kinniburgh--2019|Kinniburgh 2019]] ; [[#Martin--2021|Martin and Islar 2021]] ).

Some labour unions have developed positions and programmes on climate change ( [[#Snell--2010|Snell and Fairbrother 2010]] ; [[#Stevins--2013|Stevins 2013]] ; [[#Räthzel--2018|Räthzel et al. 2018]] ), formed alliances with other actors in the field of climate policy ( [[#Stevis--2018|Stevis 2018]] ) and participated in domestic policy networks on climate change ( [[#Jost--2004|Jost and Jacob 2004]] ), but we know little about their relative importance or success. In countries with significant fossil fuel resources such as Australia, Norway, and the United States, labour unions, particularly industrial unions, tend to contribute to reducing the ambition of domestic climate policies mainly due to the concern of job losses ( [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Other studies find that the role of labour unions varies across countries ( [[#Glynn--2017|Glynn et al. 2017]] ).

Civil society actors can involve citizens working collectively to change individual behaviours that have climate implications. For example, environmental movements that involve various forms of collective efforts encourage their members to make personal lifestyle changes that reduce their individual carbon footprints ( [[#Ergas--2010|Ergas 2010]] ; [[#Middlemiss--2011|Middlemiss 2011]] ; [[#Haenfler--2012|Haenfler et al. 2012]] ; [[#Cronin--2014|Cronin et al. 2014]] ; [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Büchs--2015|Büchs et al. 2015]] ; [[#Wynes--2018|Wynes et al. 2018]] ). These efforts seek to change individual members’ consumer behaviours by reducing car-use and flying, shifting to non-fossil fuel sources for individual sources of electricity, and eating less dairy or meat ( [[#Cherry--2006|Cherry 2006]] ; [[#Ergas--2010|Ergas 2010]] ; [[#Middlemiss--2011|Middlemiss 2011]] ; [[#Haenfler--2012|Haenfler et al. 2012]] ; [[#Stuart--2013|Stuart et al. 2013]] ; [[#Cronin--2014|Cronin et al. 2014]] ; [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Büchs--2015|Büchs et al. 2015]] ; [[#Wynes--2017|Wynes and Nicholas 2017]] ; [[#Wynes--2018|Wynes et al. 2018]] ; [[#Thøgersen--2021|Thøgersen et al. 2021]] ). Consumer/citizen engagement is sometimes encouraged through governmental directives, such as the ‘renewable energy communities’ granted by the EU renewable energy directive 2018/2001 ( [[#The%20European%20Parliament%20and%20the%20Council%20of%20the%20European%20Union--2018|The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2018]] ). To date, there are only a limited number of case studies that measure the direct effect of participation in these types of movements as it relates to climate outcomes ( [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Vestergren--2018|Vestergren et al. 2018]] , 2019).

Citizens with less access to resources and power also participate by challenging nodes of power – policymakers, regulators, and businesses – to change their behaviours and/or accelerate their efforts. Tactics include lobbying, legal challenges, shareholder activism, coop board stewardship, and voting ( [[#Gillan--2007|Gillan and Starks 2007]] ; [[#Schlozman--2012|Schlozman et al. 2012]] ; [[#Viardot--2013|Viardot 2013]] ; [[#Bratton--2015|Bratton and McCahery 2015]] ; [[#Yildiz--2015|Yildiz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Olzak--2016|Olzak et al. 2016]] ). Citizens provide the labour and political will needed to pressure political and economic actors to enact emission-reducing policies, as well as providing resistance to them ( [[#Fox--1998|Fox and Brown 1998]] ; [[#Boli--1999|Boli and Thomas 1999]] ; [[#Oreskes--2012|Oreskes and Conway 2012]] ; [[#McAdam--2017|McAdam 2017]] ).

Other citizen engagement involves a range of more confrontational tactics, such as boycotting, striking, protesting, and direct action targeting politicians, policymakers, and businesses ( [[#Fisher--2005|Fisher et al. 2005]] ; [[#Tarrow--2005|Tarrow 2005]] ; [[#Fisher--2010|Fisher 2010]] ; [[#Saunders--2012|Saunders et al. 2012]] ; [[#Walgrave--2012|Walgrave et al. 2012]] ; [[#Wahlström--2013|Wahlström et al. 2013]] ; [[#Eilstrup-Sangiovanni--2014|Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014]] ; [[#Hadden--2014|Hadden 2014]] , 2015; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chamorel--2019|Chamorel 2019]] ; [[#Cock--2019|Cock 2019]] ; 2019b; [[#Hadden--2019|Hadden and Jasny 2019]] ; [[#Swim--2019|Swim et al. 2019]] ). Climate strikes and other more confrontational forms of climate activism have become increasingly common ( [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Evensen--2019|Evensen 2019]] ; D.A. [[#Fisher--2019|]] [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ; [[#Boulianne--2020|Boulianne et al. 2020]] ; [[#Martiskainen--2020|Martiskainen et al. 2020]] ; [[#de%20Moor--2021|de Moor et al. 2021]] ; [[#Fisher--2021a|Fisher and Nasrin 2021a]] ). Very few studies look specifically at the effect of these tactics on actual climate-related outcomes and more research is needed to understand the climate effects of citizen engagement and activism ( [[#Fisher--2021b|Fisher and Nasrin 2021b]] ).

Citizen engagement has also become common among indigenous groups who tend to have limited structural power but often aim to shape the formation and effects of projects that have implications to climate change. These include opposing extraction and transportation of fossil fuels on their traditional lands (especially in the Americas) ( [[#Bebbington--2013|Bebbington and Bury 2013]] ; [[#Hindery--2013|Hindery 2013]] ; [[#Coryat--2015|Coryat 2015]] ; [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Wood--2017|Wood and Rossiter 2017]] ); large-scale climate mitigation projects that may affect traditional rights ( [[#Brannstrom--2017|Brannstrom et al. 2017]] ; [[#Moreira--2019|Moreira et al. 2019]] ; [[#Zárate-Toledo--2019|Zárate-Toledo et al. 2019]] ); supporting deployment of small-scale renewable energy initiatives ( [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ); seeking to influence the development of REDD+ policies through opposition ( [[#Reed--2011|Reed 2011]] ); and participation in consultation processes and multi-stakeholder bodies ( [[#Bushley--2014|Bushley 2014]] ; [[#Gebara--2014|Gebara et al. 2014]] ; [[#Astuti--2015|Astuti and McGregor 2015]] ; [[#Kashwan--2015|Kashwan 2015]] ; [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ). Indigenous groups have been reported to have had some influence on some climate discussions, particularly forest management and siting of renewable energy ( [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ). Further, more scientific assessments are required on the role of indigenous groups in climate activism and policy ( [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ; [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ).

Activism, including litigation, as well as the tactics of protest and strikes, have played a substantial role in pressuring governments to create environmental laws and environmental agencies tasked with enforcing environmental laws that aimed to maintain clean air and water in countries around the world ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#McCloskey--1991|McCloskey 1991]] ; [[#Schreurs--1997|Schreurs 1997]] ; [[#Rucht--1999|Rucht 1999]] ; [[#Brulle--2000|Brulle 2000]] ; [[#Steinhardt--2016|Steinhardt and Wu 2016]] ; [[#Longhofer--2016|Longhofer et al. 2016]] ; [[#Wong--2018|Wong 2018]] ). Several studies find environmental NGOs have a positive effect on reductions in carbon emissions, whether through effects that operate across countries or ( [[#Frank--2000|Frank et al. 2000]] ; [[#Schofer--2005|Schofer and Hironaka 2005]] ; [[#Jorgenson--2011|Jorgenson et al. 2011]] ; [[#Baxter--2013|Baxter et al. 2013]] ; [[#Longhofer--2017|Longhofer and Jorgenson 2017]] ; [[#Grant--2018|Grant et al. 2018]] ) through impact of NGOs within nations ( [[#Shwom--2011|Shwom 2011]] ; [[#Dietz--2015|Dietz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Grant--2017|Grant and Vasi 2017]] ).

At the same time, other research has documented various forms of backlash against climate policies, both in terms of voting behaviour, as well as other collective efforts ( [[#Hill--2010|Hill et al. 2010]] ; [[#Williamson--2011|Williamson et al. 2011]] ; [[#McAdam--2012|McAdam and Boudet 2012]] ; [[#Wright--2012|Wright and Boudet 2012]] ; [[#Walker--2014|Walker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Boudet--2016|Boudet et al. 2016]] ; [[#Fast--2016|Fast et al. 2016]] ; [[#Krause--2016|Krause et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lyon--2016|Lyon 2016]] ; [[#Mayer--2016|Mayer 2016]] ; [[#Stokes--2016|Stokes 2016]] ; [[#Stokes--2017|Stokes and Warshaw 2017]] ; [[#Muradian--2020|Muradian and Pascual 2020]] ; [[#Stokes--2020|Stokes 2020]] ). In a systematic analysis that includes movements against fossil fuel investments along with those against low-carbon emitting projects around the world, research finds that a quarter of all projects (no matter their targets) were cancelled after facing resistance ( [[#Temper--2020|Temper et al. 2020]] ).

A range of international organisations can be important, particularly in developing countries, for instance by assisting in framing of national climate governance and supporting the design of climate policies through technical assistance projects ( [[#Talaei--2014|Talaei et al. 2014]] ; [[#Ortega%20Díaz--2018|Ortega Díaz and Gutiérrez 2018]] ; [[#Kukkonen--2018|Kukkonen et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bhamidipati--2019|Bhamidipati et al. 2019]] ; [[#Charlery--2019|Charlery and Trærup 2019]] ). Yet for these climate aid initiatives to work effectively requires improved institutional architecture, better appreciation of local contexts, and more inclusive and transparent governance, based on evidence from many multilateral mechanisms like REDD+, CDM, GEF and GCF ( [[#Gomez--2013|Gomez 2013]] ; [[#Arndt--2017|Arndt and Tarp 2017]] ), and bilateral programmes on energy, agriculture and land-use sectors ( [[#Arndt--2017|Arndt and Tarp 2017]] ; [[#Rogner--2018|Rogner and Leung 2018]] ; [[#Moss--2018|Moss and Bazilian 2018]] ).

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=== Box 13.7 | Civic Engagement: The School Strike Movement ===

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On Friday 20 August 2018, Greta Thunberg participated in the first climate school strike. Since then, Fridays for Future – the name of the group coordinating this tactic of skipping school on Fridays to protest inaction on climate change – has spread around the world.

In March 2019, the first ''global'' climate strike took place, turning out more than one million people around the world ( [[#Carrington--2019|Carrington 2019]] ). Six months later in September 2019, young people and adults responded to a call to participate in climate strikes as part of the ‘Global Week for Future’ surrounding the UN Climate Action Summit ( [[#Thunberg--2019|Thunberg 2019]] ), and the number of participants globally jumped to an estimated six million people ( [[#Taylor--2019|Taylor et al. 2019]] ). Although a handful of studies have reported on who was involved in these strikes, how they were connected, and their messaging ( [[#Marris--2019|Marris 2019]] ; [[#Wahlström--2019|Wahlström et al. 2019]] ; [[#Evensen--2019|Evensen 2019]] ; D. [[#Fisher--2019|]] [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ; Boulianne et al. 2020; [[#Bevan--2020|Bevan et al. 2020]] ; [[#Han--2020|Han and Ahn 2020]] ; [[#Holmberg--2020|Holmberg and Alvinius 2020]] ; [[#Jung--2020|Jung et al. 2020]] ; [[#Martiskainen--2020|Martiskainen et al. 2020]] ; Thackeray et al. 2020; [[#Trihartono--2020|Trihartono et al. 2020]] ; [[#de%20Moor--2021|de Moor et al. 2021]] ; [[#Fisher--2021b|Fisher and Nasrin 2021b]] ), its consequences in terms of political outcomes and emissions reductions have yet to be fully understood ( [[#Fisher--2021b|Fisher and Nasrin 2021b]] ).

Although digital activism makes it easier to connect globally, it is unclear how digital technology will affect the youth climate movement, and its effects on carbon emissions. Research suggests that online activism is likely to involve a more limited range of participants and perspectives ( [[#Bennett--2013|Bennett 2013]] ; [[#Elliott--2018|Elliott and Earl 2018]] ). Digital tactics could also mean that groups are less embedded in communities and less successful at creating durable social ties, factors that have been found to lead to longer term engagement ( [[#Tufekci--2017|Tufekci 2017]] ; [[#Rohlinger--2018|Rohlinger and Bunnage 2018]] ; [[#Shirky--2010|Shirky 2010]] ).

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=== 13.4.2 Shaping Climate Governance Through Litigation ===

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Outside the formal climate policy processes, climate litigation is another important arena for various actors to confront and interact over how climate change should be governed ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] , 2018; [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Byrnes 2019]] ; [[#Calzadilla--2019|Calzadilla 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ; [[#Wegener--2020|Wegener 2020]] ). Climate litigation is an attempt to control, order or influence the behaviour of others in relation to climate governance, and it has been used by a wide variety of litigants (governments, private actors, civil society and individuals) at multiple scales (local, regional, national and international) ( [[#Osofsky--2007|Osofsky 2007]] ; [[#Lin--2012b|Lin 2012b]] ; [[#Keele--2017|Keele 2017]] ; [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ). Climate litigation has become increasingly common (UNEP2020b), but its prevalence varies across countries ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Lin--2020|Lin and Kysar 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). This is not surprising, given that courts play differing roles across varying political systems and law traditions ( [[#La%20Porta--1998|La Porta et al. 1998]] ).

This sub-section focuses on relevant climate litigation for policies and institutions. Climate litigation is further discussed in Sections 14.5.1.2 (linkages between mitigation and human rights) and [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.5.3|Section 14.5.3]] (cross-country implications and international courts/tribunals).

The vast majority of climate cases have emerged in United States, Australia and Europe, and more recently in developing countries ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ; [[#Kotze--2019|Kotze and du Plessis 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2019|Peel and Lin 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Benjamin 2019]] ; [[#Zhao--2019|Zhao et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ). As of 31 May 2021, 1841 cases of climate change litigation from around the world had been identified. Of these, 1387 were filed before courts in the United States, while the remaining 454 were filed in 39 other countries and 13 international or regional courts and tribunals (including the courts of the European Union). Outside the US, Australia (115), the UK (73) and the EU (58) remain the jurisdictions with the highest volume of cases. The majority of cases, 1006, have been filed since 2015 ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). The number of climate litigation cases in developing countries is also growing. There are at least 58 cases in 18 Global South jurisdictions ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ; [[#Kotze--2019|Kotze and du Plessis 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2019|Peel and Lin 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Benjamin 2019]] ; [[#Zhao--2019|Zhao et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ).

Overall, courts have also played a more active role for climate governance in democratic political systems ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Eskander--2021|Eskander et al. 2021]] ). Whether and to what extent differing law traditions and political systems influence the role and importance of climate litigation has, however, not been examined enough scientifically ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel and Osofsky 2020]] ).

The majority of climate change litigation cases are brought against governments, by civic and non-governmental organisations and corporations ( [[#Eisenstat--2011|Eisenstat 2011]] ; [[#Markell--2012|Markell and Ruhl 2012]] ; [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Fisher--2017|Fisher et al. 2017]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Many, although not all of these cases, seek to ensure that governmental action on climate change is more ambitious, and better aligned with the need to avert or respond to climate impacts identified and predicted by the scientific community ( [[#Markell--2012|Markell and Ruhl 2012]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Climate aligned cases against governments can be divided into two distinct categories: claims challenging the overall effort of a State or its organs to mitigate or adapt to climate change (sometimes referred to as ‘systemic climate litigation’) ( [[#Jackson--2020|Jackson 2020]] ) and claims regarding authorisation of third-party activity ( [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Gerrard--2021|Gerrard 2021]] ; [[#Ghaleigh--2021|Ghaleigh 2021]] ).

Systemic climate litigation that seeks an increase in a country’s ambition to tackle climate change has been a growing trend since the first court victories in the Urgenda case in the Netherlands (see Box 13.8 below) and the Leghari case in Pakistan in 2015. These cases motivated a wave of similar climate change litigation across the world ( [[#Roy--2016|Roy and Woerdman 2016]] ; [[#Ferreira--2016|Ferreira 2016]] ; [[#Peeters--2016|Peeters 2016]] ; [[#Mayer--2019|Mayer 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ; [[#Barritt--2020|Barritt 2020]] ; [[#Sindico--2021|Sindico et al. 2021]] ). Between 2015 and 2021, individuals and communities initiated at least 37 cases (including Urgenda and Leghari) against states ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ), challenging the effectiveness of legislation and policy goals ( [[#Jackson--2020|Jackson 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Some cases also seek to shape new legal concepts such as ‘rights of nature’ recognised in the Future Generations case in Colombia ( [[#Savaresi--2019|Savaresi and Auz 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ) and ‘ecological damage’ in the case of Notre Affaire à Tous and others vs France ( [[#Torre-Schaub--2021|Torre-Schaub 2021]] ).

Moreover, there are a number of regulatory challenges to state authorisation of high-emitting projects, which differs from systemic casesagainst states ( [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Hughes--2019a|Hughes 2019a]] ). For instance, the High Court in Pretoria, South Africa, concluded that climate change is a relevant consideration for approving coal-fired power plants ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ). Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia concluded that the Minister for the Environment owed a duty of care to Australian children in respect to climate impacts when exercising a statutory power to decide whether to authorise a major extension to an existing coal mine ( [[#Peel--2021|Peel and Markey-Towler 2021]] ).

Climate change litigation has also been brought against corporations by regional or local governments and non-governmental organisations ( [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al. 2018]] ; [[#Foerster--2019|Foerster 2019]] ). One type of private climate change litigation alleges climate change-related damage and seeks compensation from major carbon polluters ( [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al. 2018]] ; [[#Wewerinke-Singh--2020|Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020]] ). The litigators claim that major oil producers are historically responsible for a significant portion of global greenhouse gas emissions ( [[#Heede--2014|Heede 2014]] ; [[#Frumhoff--2015|Frumhoff et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ekwurzel--2017|Ekwurzel et al. 2017]] ; [[#Stuart-Smith--2021|Stuart-Smith et al. 2021]] ). These cases rely on advancements in climate science, specifically climate attribution ( [[#Marjanac--2017|Marjanac et al. 2017]] ; [[#Marjanac--2018|Marjanac and Patton 2018]] ; [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Minnerop--2020|Minnerop and Otto 2020]] ; [[#Burger--2020b|Burger et al. 2020b]] ; [[#Stuart-Smith--2021|Stuart-Smith et al. 2021]] ). It is alleged that major carbon emitters had knowledge and awareness of climate change and yet took actions to confound or mislead the public about climate science ( [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ). Strategic climate change litigation has also been used to hold corporations to specific human rights responsibilities ( [[#Savaresi--2019|Savaresi and Auz 2019]] ; [[#Savaresi--2021|Savaresi and Setzer 2021]] ) (Box 13.8).

In addition to direct cases targeting high emitters, litigation is also now being used to argue against financial investments in the fossil fuel industry ( [[#Franta--2017|Franta 2017]] ; [[#Colombo--2021|Colombo 2021]] ). In May 2021, the Hague District Court of the Netherlands issued a ground-breaking judgment holding energy company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) legally responsible for greenhouse gas emissions from its entire value chain (Macchi and Zeben 2021). Claims have also been brought against banks, pension funds and investment funds for failing to incorporate climate risk into their decision-making, and to disclose climate risk to their beneficiaries ( [[#Wasim--2019|Wasim 2019]] ; [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ; [[#Bowman--2020|Bowman and Wiseman 2020]] ). These litigation cases also impact on the financial market without directly involving specific financial institutions into the case ( [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ) but somehow aim to change their risk perceptions and attitude on high carbon activities ( [[#Griffin--2020|Griffin 2020]] ).

The outcomes of climate litigation can affect the stringency and ambitiousness of climate governance ( [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Eskander--2021|Eskander et al. 2021]] ). In the United States, pro-regulation litigants more commonly win in relation to renewable energy and energy efficiency cases, and more frequently lose in relations to coal-fired power plant cases ( [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ). Outside the US, more than half (58%) of litigation have outcomes that are aligned with climate action ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). But these cases can also have impacts outside of the legal proceedings before, during and after the case has been brought and decided ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ). These impacts include changes in the behaviour of the parties ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Pals--2021|Pals 2021]] ), public opinion ( [[#Hilson--2019|Hilson 2019]] ; [[#Burgers--2020|Burgers 2020]] ), financial and reputational consequences for involved actors ( [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ), and impact on further litigation ( [[#Barritt--2020|Barritt 2020]] ). Individual cases have also attracted considerable media attention, which in turn can influence how climate policy is perceived ( [[#Nosek--2018|Nosek 2018]] ; [[#Barritt--2019|Barritt and Sediti 2019]] ; [[#Hilson--2019|Hilson 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ). While there is evidence to show the influence of some key cases on climate agenda-setting ( [[#Wonneberger--2021|Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021]] ), it is still unclear the extent to which climate litigation actually results in new climate rules and policies ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel and Osofsky 2020]] ) and to what degree this holds true for all cases ( [[#Jodoin--2020|Jodoin et al. 2020]] ). However, there is now increasing academic agreement that climate litigation has become a powerful force in climate governance [[#UNEP--2020b|UNEP 2020b]] ; [[#Burgers--2020|Burgers 2020]] ). In general, litigations can be applied to constrain both public and private entities, and to shape structural factors mentioned in [[#13.3|Section 13.3]] , such as the beliefs and institutions around climate governance.

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<span id="box-13-.-8-an-example-of-systemic-climate-litigation-urgenda-vs-state-of-the-netherlands"></span>
=== Box 13.8 | An Example of Systemic Climate Litigation: Urgenda vs State of the Netherlands ===

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The judgement in ''Urgenda vs State of the Netherlands'' established the linkage between a state’s international duty, domestic actions, and human rights commitments as to the recommendations of IPCC’s AR5 ( [[#Burgers--2019|Burgers and Staal 2019]] ; [[#Antonopoulos--2020|Antonopoulos 2020]] ). It was the first to impose a specific emissions reduction target on a state ( [[#de%20Graaf--2015|de Graaf and Jans 2015]] ; [[#%20Cox--2016|Cox 2016]] ; [[#Loth--2016|Loth 2016]] ). The District Court of The Hague ordered the Dutch Government to reduce emissions by at least 25% by the end of 2020. Following the decision of the district court of The Hague in 2015 the Dutch government announced that it would adopt additional measures to achieve the 25% emissions reduction target by 2020 ( [[#Mayer--2019|Mayer 2019]] ). The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2018 and the Supreme Court in 2019. Since the first judgment in 2015 significant changes in the climate policy environment have been reported, the results of which have included the introduction of a Climate Act and the decision to close all remaining coal fired power plants by 2030 ( [[#Verschuuren--2019|Verschuuren 2019]] ; [[#Wonneberger--2021|Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021]] ).

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=== 13.4.3 Media as Communicative Platforms for Shaping Climate Governance ===

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Media is another platform for various actors to present, interpret and shape debates around climate change and its governance ( [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ). The media coverage of climate change has grown steadily since 1980s ( [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff et al. 2019]] ), but the level and type of coverage differs over time and from country to country ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al. 2013]] ; [[#Schäfer--2014|Schäfer and Schlichting 2014]] ). Media can be a useful conduit to build public support to accelerate mitigation action, but may also be utilised to impede decarbonisation endeavours ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell 2016b]] ; [[#Carmichael--2017|Carmichael et al. 2017]] ; [[#Carmichael--2018|Carmichael and Brulle 2018]] ). Different media systems in different regions and countries and with unique cultural and political traditions also affect how climate change is communicated ( [[#Eskjær--2013|Eskjær 2013]] ).

A broad variety of media platforms cover climate change issues, including traditional news media, such as newspapers and broadcasting, digital social media ( [[#Walter--2018|Walter et al. 2018]] ), creative narratives such as climate fiction and films ( [[#Svoboda--2016|Svoboda 2016]] ); humour and entertainment media ( [[#Brewer--2015|Brewer and McKnight 2015]] ; [[#Skurka--2018|Skurka et al. 2018]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff and Osnes 2019]] ); and strategic communications campaigns ( [[#Hansen--2008|Hansen and Machin 2008]] ; [[#Hoewe--2017|Hoewe and Ahern 2017]] ). Media coverage can have far-reaching consequences on policy processes, but we know less about its relative importance compared to other policy shaping factors ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Liu--2011|Liu et al. 2011]] ; [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#Hmielowski--2014|Hmielowski et al. 2014]] ).

Popular culture images, science fictions and films of ecological catastrophe can dramatically and emotively convey the dangers of climate change ( [[#Bulfin--2017|Bulfin 2017]] ). The overall accuracy of the media coverage on climate change has improved from 2005 to 2019 in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA ( [[#McAllister--2021|McAllister et al. 2021]] ). Moreover, coverage of climate science is increasing. One study (MeCCO) has tracked media coverage of climate change from over 127 sources from 59 countries in North and Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania ( [[#Boykoff--2021|Boykoff et al. 2021]] ). It shows the number of media science stories in those sources grew steadily from 47,376 per annum to 86,587 per annum between 2017 and 2021 across print, broadcast, digital media and entertainment ( [[#Boykoff--2021|Boykoff et al. 2021]] ).

However, increasing media coverage does not always lead to more accurate coverage of climate change mitigation, as it can also spur diffusion of misinformation ( [[#Boykoff--2013|Boykoff and Yulsman 2013]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al. 2015]] ; [[#Whitmarsh--2017|Whitmarsh and Corner 2017]] ; [[#Fahy--2018|Fahy 2018]] ; [[#Painter--2019|Painter 2019]] ). In addition, media professionals have at times drawn on the norm of representing both sides of a controversy, bearing the risk of the disproportionate representation of scepticism of anthropogenic climate change despite the convergent agreement in climate science that humans contribute to climate change, ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Freudenburg--2010|Freudenburg and Muselli 2010]] ; [[#Boykoff--2013|Boykoff 2013]] ; [[#Painter--2016|Painter and Gavin 2016]] ; [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ; [[#McAllister--2021|McAllister et al. 2021]] ). This occurs despite increasing consensus among journalists regarding the basic scientific understanding of climate change ( [[#Brüggemann--2017|Brüggemann and Engesser 2017]] ).

Accurate transference of the climate science has been undermined significantly by climate change counter-movements, particularly in the USA ( [[#McCright--2000|McCright and Dunlap 2000]] , 2003; [[#Jacques--2008|Jacques et al. 2008]] ; [[#Brulle--2012|Brulle et al. 2012]] ; [[#Boussalis--2016|Boussalis and Coan 2016]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Carmichael--2017|Carmichael et al. 2017]] ; [[#Carmichael--2018|Carmichael and Brulle 2018]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff and Farrell 2019]] ; [[#Almiron--2019|Almiron and Xifra 2019]] ) in both legacy and new/social media environments through misinformation ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2017|van der Linden et al. 2017]] ), including about the causes and consequences of climate change ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle 2014]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell 2016b]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ). Misinformation can rapidly spread through social media ( [[#Walter--2018|Walter et al. 2018]] ). Together with the proliferation of suspicions of ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, some traditional and social media contents have fuelled polarisation and partisan divides on climate change in many countries ( [[#Feldman--2017|Feldman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Hornsey--2018|Hornsey et al. 2018]] ), which can further deter development of new and ambitious climate policy ( [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ). Further, the ideological stance of media also influences the intensity and content of media coverage, in developed and developing countries alike ( [[#Dotson--2012|Dotson et al. 2012]] ; [[#Stoddart--2015|Stoddart and Tindall 2015]] ).

Who dominates the debate on media, and how open the debate can be varies significantly across countries ( [[#Takahashi--2011|Takahashi 2011]] ; [[#Poberezhskaya--2015|Poberezhskaya 2015]] ) based on participants’ material and technological power. Fossil fuel industries have unique access to mainstream media ( [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ) via advertisements, shaping narratives of media reports, and exerting political influence in countries like Australia and the USA ( [[#Holmes--2018|Holmes and Star 2018]] ; [[#Karceski--2020|Karceski et al. 2020]] ). For social media, novel technical tools, such as automated bots, are emerging to shape climate change discussion on major online platforms such as Twitter ( [[#Marlow--2021|Marlow et al. 2021]] ). Open debates can underpin the adoption of more ambitions climate policy ( [[#Lyytimäki--2011|Lyytimäki 2011]] ). Media coverage on energy saving, patriotism, and social justice in the countries like USA and the UK have helped connect mitigation of climate change with other concerns, thereby raising support to climate action ( [[#Leiserowitz--2006|Leiserowitz 2006]] ; [[#Trope--2007|Trope et al. 2007]] ; [[#Doyle--2016|Doyle 2016]] ; [[#Corner--2017|Corner and Clarke 2017]] ; [[#Whitmarsh--2017|Whitmarsh and Corner 2017]] ; [[#Markowitz--2018|Markowitz and Guckian 2018]] ). Further, media coverage of climate change mitigation has influenced public opinions through discussions on political, economic, scientific and cultural themes about climate change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Irwin--1996|Irwin and Wynne 1996]] ; [[#Smith--2000|Smith 2000]] ; [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ).

Common challenges in reporting climate change exist around the world ( [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al. 2013]] ; [[#Schäfer--2021|Schäfer and Painter 2021]] ), but particularly so in the developing countries, due to lower capacities, lack of journalists’ training in complex climate subjects, and lack of access to clear, timely and understandable climate-related resources and images in newsrooms ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Harbinson--2006|Harbinson 2006]] ; [[#Shanahan--2009|Shanahan 2009]] ; [[#Broadbent--2016|Broadbent et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lück--2018|Lück et al. 2018]] ). Ugandan journalist Patrick Luganda has said, ‘Those most at risk from the impacts of climate change typically have had access to the least information about it through mass media.’ ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff, 2011]] ), indicating that information availability and capacity is a manifestation of global climate (in)justice.

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