Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-4 (section)

=== 4.3.6 Observed Impacts on Water-Related Conflicts ===

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According to AR5, violent conflict increases vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Field--2014a|Field et al., 2014a]] ) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Furthermore, the IPCC SRCCL ( [[#Hurlbert--2019|Hurlbert et al., 2019]] ) concluded with ''medium confidence'' that climatic stressors can exacerbate the negative impacts of conflict.

Since AR5, only a few studies focused specifically on the association between observed changes in the hydrological cycle linked to climate change and conflicts ( [[#Zografos--2014|Zografos et al., 2014]] ; [[#Dinar--2015|Dinar et al., 2015]] ) ''.'' Some studies associate conflicts with local abundance of water ( [[#Salehyan--2014|Salehyan and Hendrix, 2014]] ; [[#Selby--2014|Selby and Hoffmann, 2014]] ; [[#de%20Juan--2015|de Juan, 2015]] ), mainly because of political mobilisation around abundant waters and the need for developing new rules of allocation among competing users. Others provide evidence that the increase in water availability in some areas compared with a decrease in other surrounding areas can affect the risk of a conflict in a region ( [[#de%20Juan--2015|de Juan, 2015]] ) ( ''low to medium confidence'' ). However, the large majority acknowledges reduction of water availability due to climate change as having the potential to exacerbate tensions ( [[#de%20Stefano--2017|de Stefano et al., 2017]] ; [[#Waha--2017|Waha et al., 2017]] ), especially in regions and within groups dependent on agriculture for food production ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ). Particularly representative is the case of Syria, where drought aggravated existing water and agricultural insecurity ( [[#Kelley--2015|Kelley et al., 2015]] ). However, whether drought caused civil unrest in Syria remains highly debated ( [[#Gleick--2014|Gleick, 2014]] ; [[#Kelley--2017|Kelley et al., 2017]] ; [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ash--2019|Ash and Obradovich, 2019]] ). Additionally, there is no consensus on the causal association between observed climate changes and conflict ( [[#Hsiang%20Solomon--2013|Hsiang Solomon et al., 2013]] ; [[#Burke--2015|Burke et al., 2015]] ; [[#Selby--2019|Selby, 2019]] ). However, evidence suggests that changes in rainfall patterns amplify existing tensions ( [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ); examples include Syria, Iraq ( [[#Abbas--2016|Abbas et al., 2016]] ; [[#von%20Lossow--2016|von Lossow, 2016]] ) and Yemen ( [[#Mohamed--2017|Mohamed et al., 2017]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). There is also ''medium evidence'' that in some regions of Africa (e.g., Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo), there are links between observed water stress and individual attitude for participating in violence, particularly for the least resilient individuals ( [[#von%20Uexkull--2020|von Uexkull et al., 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). A reverse association from conflict to climate impacts has also been observed ( [[#Buhaug--2016|Buhaug, 2016]] ). For example, conflict-affected societies cannot address climate-change impacts due to other associated vulnerabilities such as poverty, food insecurity and political instability.

For transboundary waters, the probability of inter-state conflict can both increase and decrease ( [[#Dinar--2019|Dinar et al., 2019]] ) depending on climatic variables (e.g., less precipitation) and other socioeconomic and political factors, such as low levels of economic development and political marginalisation ( [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ). Climate change concerns also play a role in stimulating cooperative efforts, as in the case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River Basin ( [[#Mirumachi--2015|Mirumachi, 2015]] ; [[#Link--2016|Link et al., 2016]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ). More generally, there is some evidence that when hydrological conditions change in transboundary river basins, formal agreements (e.g., water treaties or river basin organisations) can enhance cooperation ( [[#de%20Stefano--2017|de Stefano et al., 2017]] ; [[#Dinar--2019|Dinar et al., 2019]] ) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Still, more cooperation does not necessarily reduce the risk of conflict, especially when water variability increases beyond a certain threshold ( ''low evidence, medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Dinar--2015|Dinar et al., 2015]] ; [[#Dinar--2019|Dinar et al., 2019]] ).

In summary, there is no consensus on the causal association between observed climate change and conflicts. Still, evidence exists that those tensions can be amplified depending on climatic variables and other concomitant socioeconomic and political factors.

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