Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

==== 8.3.2.3 The Effect of Higher Levels of Global Warming for Most Vulnerable Regions and Specific Livelihoods ====

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Evidence exists that threats to land-based livelihoods and risks of undernutrition increase significantly with higher levels of global warming ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2019a|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019a]] ). With global warming of 1.5°C or less, impacts of climate change on livelihoods are still significant, for example, for West Africa and the Sahel there will be an estimated reduction of the area suitable for maize production of about 40%. The consequences of global warming of up to 3°C would mean a high risk of undernutrition for entire regions (see [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2019a|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019a]] ) that are already classified as most vulnerable (see Figure 8.6). That means the consequences of significant warming are a particular challenge for regional hotspots of vulnerability. Small changes in crop productivity, already observed due to increasing droughts, floods or changes in rainfall patterns, could lead to severe health risks and undernutrition. This is because of existing precarious living conditions and the limited capacities that people and institutions have to build and enhance coping and adaptive capacities at the level of individual households, communities and state institutions (see [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP, 2018]] ; [[#Birkmann--2021a|Birkmann et al., 2021a]] ). The risk of loss of life, displacement and adverse health consequences due to climate change in these most vulnerable regions (such as Micronesia, South Asia, West Africa—see Figures 8.5; 8.6) is higher compared to regions classified as having medium or low vulnerability ( [[#Birkmann--2022|Birkmann et al., 2022]] ). Nevertheless, other regions and countries classified as less vulnerable, for example in Asia, are experiencing disasters and have a relative high share of the observed global fatalities or losses, when considering non-climatic natural hazards ( [[#CRED%20and%20UNDRR--2020a|CRED and UNDRR, 2020a]] ; see also [[#8.3.2.1|Section 8.3.2.1]] ). In addition, changing climatic hazard and exposure patterns have to be considered. However, the agreement of major global index systems on exposure is significantly lower compared to vulnerability ( [[#Garschagen--2021|Garschagen et al., 2021]] ).

Moreover, the assessment reveals that in most vulnerable regions a double burden of existing destabilised livelihood conditions and additional climatic hazards is already visible and largely influences societal impacts of climate change. For example, flooding along the White Nile in Uganda and South Sudan hit vulnerable communities that were displaced due to conflicts and were thus uprooted again by flooding ( [[#IDMC--2020|IDMC, 2020]] ). Societal impacts and future risks of climate change to societies need to incorporate information about vulnerability and exposure—including capacities of people to cope and adapt ( [[#Wisner--2016|Wisner, 2016]] ; Cardona et al., 2020). There is increasing evidence that individual and societal capacities to cope and adapt also depend on how governmental and national institutions can support people at risk (see [[#8.6|Section 8.6]] ). For example, climate information services depend on a functioning weather service. Likewise, social safety nets as an adaptation strategy require financial resources, which are often absent for most people in highly vulnerable regions. In addition, examples of national programmes that target most vulnerable groups, such as the free basic service programme in South Africa, show that next to the adaptation to individual hazards, strategies exist that aim to reduce systemic human vulnerability (see GovSA, 2021).

At the same time, there is scientific evidence that more intense and frequent climate-influenced hazards (e.g., storms, flooding, droughts, heat stress) can undermine decade-long poverty reduction efforts, particularly in most vulnerable regions ( [[#Mysiak--2016|Mysiak et al., 2016]] ; [[#Formetta--2019|Formetta and Feyen, 2019]] ; [[#Laborde--2020b|Laborde et al., 2020b]] ; [[#Lakner--2020|Lakner et al., 2020]] ). There is ''high agreement'' that, with global warming of about 3°C, such undermining of poverty reduction efforts will intensify and more regions will face development setbacks due to the spatial and temporal expansion of climate hazards, including the further erosion of capital that enables people to develop adaptive capacities ( ''high confidence'' ) (see [[#8.5|Section 8.5]] ). Such trends can further exacerbate poverty traps (see [[#8.2|Section 8.2.2]] ). According to a World Bank report, between 32 and 132 million people could fall into extreme poverty by 2030 due to the impacts of climate change ( [[#Jafino--2020|Jafino et al., 2020]] ). Models estimate that at 3°C warming and under Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) 1, there would be an additional 245 million people exposed to poverty. Under SSP2 this number would increase to 904 million additional people exposed to poverty (SSP2) and under SSP3 (with significant challenges for equity) about 1918 million additional people could be exposed to poverty in the year 2050 ( [[#Byers--2018|Byers et al., 2018]] ).

Overall, the assessments above underscore that adaptation and risk reduction require not only information about changing climatic conditions, but also assessments that capture the development contexts and structural inequality that determine and influence human vulnerability. Strategies that reduce poverty and inequality and that improve the access of people to basic services need to become a higher priority in adaptation and development planning in order to avoid more than 3 billion people currently and even more in the future being exposed to severe adverse consequences of climate change. Reducing vulnerability to climate change is therefore indispensable for climate justice and just transitions ( ''high confidence'' ).

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