Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.4.1 Actors and Agency in the Public Process ===

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A broad array of actors are engaged in shaping mitigation policy processes, including politicians and political parties, corporate actors, citizen groups, indigenous peoples organisations, labour unions and international organisations. Actors aiming to influence the climate-related policymaking process are studied together to understand climate policy dynamics and outcomes ( [[#Bulkeley--2000|Bulkeley 2000]] ; [[#Fisher--2004|Fisher 2004]] ; [[#Jost--2004|Jost and Jacob 2004]] ; [[#Jasny--2015|Jasny et al. 2015]] ; [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher and Leifeld 2019]] ; Jasny and [[#Fisher--2019|]] [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ) and collaboration and influence within climate policy networks ( [[#Ingold--2014|Ingold and Fischer 2014]] ; [[#McAllister--2014|McAllister et al. 2014]] ; [[#Wagner--2018|Wagner and Ylä-Anttila 2018]] ; [[#Kammerer--2021|Kammerer et al. 2021]] ). Most research, however, focuses on one particular type of actor.

Political actors are decision-makers, and also influence whether climate governance is perceived as urgent and appropriate ( [[#Okereke--2019|Okereke et al. 2019]] ; [[#Ferrante--2019|Ferrante and Fearnside 2019]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). They include political parties, legislative assemblies and committees, governmental executives and the political leaders of governmental ministries ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ). They are more likely to pay attention to climate issues when polling indicates high political salience with the public ( [[#Carter--2006|Carter 2006]] , 2014), or when it becomes a contested issue among differing political parties ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ). Fluctuations in the public’s interest and attention may underpin a disjointed approach in politicians’ engagement ( [[#Willis--2017|Willis 2017]] , 2018). Policy implementation can be hampered if political actors propose frequent policy changes ( [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ).

Corporate actors often influence policies and their adoption ( [[#Pulver--2013|Pulver and Benney 2013]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ; [[#Goldberg--2020|Goldberg et al. 2020]] ). Corporate actors acting individually or through industry associations, have worked to sway climate policy in different countries ( [[#Falkner--2008|Falkner 2008]] ; [[#Bernhagen--2008|Bernhagen 2008]] ; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Meckling--2011|Meckling 2011]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Their ability varies by country and issue ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Skjærseth--2010|Skjærseth and Skodvin 2010]] ; [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ) and depends on material endowments ( [[#Moe%20Singh--2012|Moe Singh 2012]] ), access to the political system ( [[#Dillon--2018|Dillon et al. 2018]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ), and the ability to shape ideas, values and belief systems ( [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ). Corporate actors tend to change their climate policy preferences over time, as indicated by longitudinal studies of some European countries ( [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Boasson--2015|Boasson 2015]] ; [[#Boasson--2021|Boasson et al. 2021]] ).

Corporate actors are crucial to policy implementation because they are prominent emitters of the greenhouse gases and owners of carbon-intensive technologies and potential providers of solutions as developers, owners and adopters of low emission practices and technologies ( [[#Falkner--2008|Falkner 2008]] ; [[#Perrow--2015|Perrow and Pulver 2015]] ). Many climate policies and measures rely on businesses’ willingness to exploit newly created economic opportunities, such as support schemes for renewable energy and energy efficiency sector or carbon pricing ( [[#Olsen--2007|Olsen 2007]] ; [[#Newell--2010|Newell and Paterson 2010]] ; [[#Shen--2015|Shen 2015]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank 2019]] ). Some corporate actors provide climate solutions, such as renewable energy deployment, and have successfully influenced climate policy development related to feed-in tariffs, taxations, quotas, or emission trading schemes, in the EU ( [[#Boasson--2019|Boasson 2019]] ), Germany ( [[#Leiren--2018|Leiren and Reimer 2018]] ), the USA ( [[#Stokes--2018|Stokes and Breetz 2018]] ), the Nordic countries ( [[#Kooij--2018|Kooij et al. 2018]] ), China ( [[#Shen--2017|Shen 2017]] ) and Japan ( [[#Li--2019|Li et al. 2019]] ).

Fossil fuel industries have been important agenda-setters in many countries, including the USA ( [[#Dunlap--2015|Dunlap and McCright 2015]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ; [[#Downie--2018|Downie 2018]] ), the EU ( [[#Skjærseth--2010|Skjærseth and Skodvin 2010]] ; [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ), Australia ( [[#Ayling--2017|Ayling 2017]] ), China ( [[#Shen--2018|Shen and Xie 2018]] ; [[#Tan--2021|Tan et al. 2021]] ), India ( [[#Schmitz--2017|Schmitz 2017]] ; [[#Blondeel--2018|Blondeel and Van de Graaf 2018]] ), and Mexico ( [[#Pulver--2007|Pulver 2007]] ), with differing positions and impacts across countries ( [[#Kim--2016|Kim et al. 2016]] ; [[#Nasiritousi--2017|Nasiritousi 2017]] ). In the US, the oil industry has underpinned emergence of climate scepticism ( [[#Dunlap--2015|Dunlap and McCright 2015]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ), and its spread abroad ( [[#Dunlap--2013|Dunlap and Jacques 2013]] ; [[#Engels--2013|Engels et al. 2013]] ; [[#Painter--2016|Painter and Gavin 2016]] ). Corporate opposition to climate policies is often facilitated by a broad coalition of firms ( [[#Cory--2021|Cory et al. 2021]] ).

Conservative foundations, sometimes financed by business revenues, have funded a diversity of types of groups, including think-tanks, philanthropic foundations, or activist networks to oppose climate policy ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle 2014]] , 2019). However, there is limited knowledge about the conditions under which actors opposed to climate action succeed in shaping climate governance ( [[#Kinniburgh--2019|Kinniburgh 2019]] ; [[#Martin--2021|Martin and Islar 2021]] ).

Some labour unions have developed positions and programmes on climate change ( [[#Snell--2010|Snell and Fairbrother 2010]] ; [[#Stevins--2013|Stevins 2013]] ; [[#Räthzel--2018|Räthzel et al. 2018]] ), formed alliances with other actors in the field of climate policy ( [[#Stevis--2018|Stevis 2018]] ) and participated in domestic policy networks on climate change ( [[#Jost--2004|Jost and Jacob 2004]] ), but we know little about their relative importance or success. In countries with significant fossil fuel resources such as Australia, Norway, and the United States, labour unions, particularly industrial unions, tend to contribute to reducing the ambition of domestic climate policies mainly due to the concern of job losses ( [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Other studies find that the role of labour unions varies across countries ( [[#Glynn--2017|Glynn et al. 2017]] ).

Civil society actors can involve citizens working collectively to change individual behaviours that have climate implications. For example, environmental movements that involve various forms of collective efforts encourage their members to make personal lifestyle changes that reduce their individual carbon footprints ( [[#Ergas--2010|Ergas 2010]] ; [[#Middlemiss--2011|Middlemiss 2011]] ; [[#Haenfler--2012|Haenfler et al. 2012]] ; [[#Cronin--2014|Cronin et al. 2014]] ; [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Büchs--2015|Büchs et al. 2015]] ; [[#Wynes--2018|Wynes et al. 2018]] ). These efforts seek to change individual members’ consumer behaviours by reducing car-use and flying, shifting to non-fossil fuel sources for individual sources of electricity, and eating less dairy or meat ( [[#Cherry--2006|Cherry 2006]] ; [[#Ergas--2010|Ergas 2010]] ; [[#Middlemiss--2011|Middlemiss 2011]] ; [[#Haenfler--2012|Haenfler et al. 2012]] ; [[#Stuart--2013|Stuart et al. 2013]] ; [[#Cronin--2014|Cronin et al. 2014]] ; [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Büchs--2015|Büchs et al. 2015]] ; [[#Wynes--2017|Wynes and Nicholas 2017]] ; [[#Wynes--2018|Wynes et al. 2018]] ; [[#Thøgersen--2021|Thøgersen et al. 2021]] ). Consumer/citizen engagement is sometimes encouraged through governmental directives, such as the ‘renewable energy communities’ granted by the EU renewable energy directive 2018/2001 ( [[#The%20European%20Parliament%20and%20the%20Council%20of%20the%20European%20Union--2018|The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2018]] ). To date, there are only a limited number of case studies that measure the direct effect of participation in these types of movements as it relates to climate outcomes ( [[#Saunders--2014|Saunders et al. 2014]] ; [[#Vestergren--2018|Vestergren et al. 2018]] , 2019).

Citizens with less access to resources and power also participate by challenging nodes of power – policymakers, regulators, and businesses – to change their behaviours and/or accelerate their efforts. Tactics include lobbying, legal challenges, shareholder activism, coop board stewardship, and voting ( [[#Gillan--2007|Gillan and Starks 2007]] ; [[#Schlozman--2012|Schlozman et al. 2012]] ; [[#Viardot--2013|Viardot 2013]] ; [[#Bratton--2015|Bratton and McCahery 2015]] ; [[#Yildiz--2015|Yildiz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Olzak--2016|Olzak et al. 2016]] ). Citizens provide the labour and political will needed to pressure political and economic actors to enact emission-reducing policies, as well as providing resistance to them ( [[#Fox--1998|Fox and Brown 1998]] ; [[#Boli--1999|Boli and Thomas 1999]] ; [[#Oreskes--2012|Oreskes and Conway 2012]] ; [[#McAdam--2017|McAdam 2017]] ).

Other citizen engagement involves a range of more confrontational tactics, such as boycotting, striking, protesting, and direct action targeting politicians, policymakers, and businesses ( [[#Fisher--2005|Fisher et al. 2005]] ; [[#Tarrow--2005|Tarrow 2005]] ; [[#Fisher--2010|Fisher 2010]] ; [[#Saunders--2012|Saunders et al. 2012]] ; [[#Walgrave--2012|Walgrave et al. 2012]] ; [[#Wahlström--2013|Wahlström et al. 2013]] ; [[#Eilstrup-Sangiovanni--2014|Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Bondaroff 2014]] ; [[#Hadden--2014|Hadden 2014]] , 2015; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Chamorel--2019|Chamorel 2019]] ; [[#Cock--2019|Cock 2019]] ; 2019b; [[#Hadden--2019|Hadden and Jasny 2019]] ; [[#Swim--2019|Swim et al. 2019]] ). Climate strikes and other more confrontational forms of climate activism have become increasingly common ( [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Evensen--2019|Evensen 2019]] ; D.A. [[#Fisher--2019|]] [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ; [[#Boulianne--2020|Boulianne et al. 2020]] ; [[#Martiskainen--2020|Martiskainen et al. 2020]] ; [[#de%20Moor--2021|de Moor et al. 2021]] ; [[#Fisher--2021a|Fisher and Nasrin 2021a]] ). Very few studies look specifically at the effect of these tactics on actual climate-related outcomes and more research is needed to understand the climate effects of citizen engagement and activism ( [[#Fisher--2021b|Fisher and Nasrin 2021b]] ).

Citizen engagement has also become common among indigenous groups who tend to have limited structural power but often aim to shape the formation and effects of projects that have implications to climate change. These include opposing extraction and transportation of fossil fuels on their traditional lands (especially in the Americas) ( [[#Bebbington--2013|Bebbington and Bury 2013]] ; [[#Hindery--2013|Hindery 2013]] ; [[#Coryat--2015|Coryat 2015]] ; [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Wood--2017|Wood and Rossiter 2017]] ); large-scale climate mitigation projects that may affect traditional rights ( [[#Brannstrom--2017|Brannstrom et al. 2017]] ; [[#Moreira--2019|Moreira et al. 2019]] ; [[#Zárate-Toledo--2019|Zárate-Toledo et al. 2019]] ); supporting deployment of small-scale renewable energy initiatives ( [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ); seeking to influence the development of REDD+ policies through opposition ( [[#Reed--2011|Reed 2011]] ); and participation in consultation processes and multi-stakeholder bodies ( [[#Bushley--2014|Bushley 2014]] ; [[#Gebara--2014|Gebara et al. 2014]] ; [[#Astuti--2015|Astuti and McGregor 2015]] ; [[#Kashwan--2015|Kashwan 2015]] ; [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ). Indigenous groups have been reported to have had some influence on some climate discussions, particularly forest management and siting of renewable energy ( [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ). Further, more scientific assessments are required on the role of indigenous groups in climate activism and policy ( [[#Jodoin--2017|Jodoin 2017]] ; [[#Claeys--2017|Claeys and Delgado Pugley 2017]] ; [[#Thornton--2017|Thornton and Comberti 2017]] ).

Activism, including litigation, as well as the tactics of protest and strikes, have played a substantial role in pressuring governments to create environmental laws and environmental agencies tasked with enforcing environmental laws that aimed to maintain clean air and water in countries around the world ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#McCloskey--1991|McCloskey 1991]] ; [[#Schreurs--1997|Schreurs 1997]] ; [[#Rucht--1999|Rucht 1999]] ; [[#Brulle--2000|Brulle 2000]] ; [[#Steinhardt--2016|Steinhardt and Wu 2016]] ; [[#Longhofer--2016|Longhofer et al. 2016]] ; [[#Wong--2018|Wong 2018]] ). Several studies find environmental NGOs have a positive effect on reductions in carbon emissions, whether through effects that operate across countries or ( [[#Frank--2000|Frank et al. 2000]] ; [[#Schofer--2005|Schofer and Hironaka 2005]] ; [[#Jorgenson--2011|Jorgenson et al. 2011]] ; [[#Baxter--2013|Baxter et al. 2013]] ; [[#Longhofer--2017|Longhofer and Jorgenson 2017]] ; [[#Grant--2018|Grant et al. 2018]] ) through impact of NGOs within nations ( [[#Shwom--2011|Shwom 2011]] ; [[#Dietz--2015|Dietz et al. 2015]] ; [[#Grant--2017|Grant and Vasi 2017]] ).

At the same time, other research has documented various forms of backlash against climate policies, both in terms of voting behaviour, as well as other collective efforts ( [[#Hill--2010|Hill et al. 2010]] ; [[#Williamson--2011|Williamson et al. 2011]] ; [[#McAdam--2012|McAdam and Boudet 2012]] ; [[#Wright--2012|Wright and Boudet 2012]] ; [[#Walker--2014|Walker et al. 2014]] ; [[#Boudet--2016|Boudet et al. 2016]] ; [[#Fast--2016|Fast et al. 2016]] ; [[#Krause--2016|Krause et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lyon--2016|Lyon 2016]] ; [[#Mayer--2016|Mayer 2016]] ; [[#Stokes--2016|Stokes 2016]] ; [[#Stokes--2017|Stokes and Warshaw 2017]] ; [[#Muradian--2020|Muradian and Pascual 2020]] ; [[#Stokes--2020|Stokes 2020]] ). In a systematic analysis that includes movements against fossil fuel investments along with those against low-carbon emitting projects around the world, research finds that a quarter of all projects (no matter their targets) were cancelled after facing resistance ( [[#Temper--2020|Temper et al. 2020]] ).

A range of international organisations can be important, particularly in developing countries, for instance by assisting in framing of national climate governance and supporting the design of climate policies through technical assistance projects ( [[#Talaei--2014|Talaei et al. 2014]] ; [[#Ortega%20Díaz--2018|Ortega Díaz and Gutiérrez 2018]] ; [[#Kukkonen--2018|Kukkonen et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bhamidipati--2019|Bhamidipati et al. 2019]] ; [[#Charlery--2019|Charlery and Trærup 2019]] ). Yet for these climate aid initiatives to work effectively requires improved institutional architecture, better appreciation of local contexts, and more inclusive and transparent governance, based on evidence from many multilateral mechanisms like REDD+, CDM, GEF and GCF ( [[#Gomez--2013|Gomez 2013]] ; [[#Arndt--2017|Arndt and Tarp 2017]] ), and bilateral programmes on energy, agriculture and land-use sectors ( [[#Arndt--2017|Arndt and Tarp 2017]] ; [[#Rogner--2018|Rogner and Leung 2018]] ; [[#Moss--2018|Moss and Bazilian 2018]] ).

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