Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.3.2 Risks to where and how people live: Livelihood systems and migration ===

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There is ''high confidence'' that climate and land change interact with social, economic, political, and demographic factors that affect how well and where people live (Sudmeier-Rieux et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r215|215]]</sup> ; Government Office for Science 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r216|216]]</sup> ; Laczko and Piguet 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r217|217]]</sup> ; Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r218|218]]</sup> ; Raleigh et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r219|219]]</sup> ; Warner and Afifi 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r220|220]]</sup> ; Hugo 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r221|221]]</sup> ; Warner et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r222|222]]</sup> ). There is high evidence and ''high agreement'' that people move to manage risks and seek opportunities for their safety and livelihoods, recognising that people respond to climatic change and land-related factors in tandem with other variables (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r223|223]]</sup> ; Lashley and Warner 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r224|224]]</sup> ; van der Geest and Warner 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r225|225]]</sup> ; Roudier et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r226|226]]</sup> ; Warner and Afifi 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r227|227]]</sup> ; McLeman 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r228|228]]</sup> ; Kaenzig and Piguet 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r229|229]]</sup> ; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r230|230]]</sup> ; Warner 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r231|231]]</sup> ; Cohen and Bradley 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r232|232]]</sup> ; Thomas and Benjamin 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r233|233]]</sup> ). People move towards areas offering safety and livelihoods such as in rapidly growing settlements in coastal zones (Black et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r234|234]]</sup> ; Challinor et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r235|235]]</sup> ; Adger et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r236|236]]</sup> ); burgeoning urban areas also face changing exposure to combinations of storm surges and sea level rise, coastal erosion and soil and water salinisation, and land subsidence (Geisler and Currens 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r237|237]]</sup> ; Maldonado et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r238|238]]</sup> ; Bronen and Chapin 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r239|239]]</sup> ).

There is ''medium confidence'' that livelihood-related migration can accelerate in the short-to-medium term when weather-dependent livelihood systems deteriorate in relation to changes in precipitation, changes in ecosystems, and land degradation and desertification (Abid et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r240|240]]</sup> ; Scheffran et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r241|241]]</sup> ; Fussell et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r242|242]]</sup> ; Bettini and Gioli 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r243|243]]</sup> ; Reyer et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r244|244]]</sup> ; Warner and Afifi 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r245|245]]</sup> ; Handmer et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r246|246]]</sup> ; Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r247|247]]</sup> ; Nawrotzki et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r248|248]]</sup> ; Steffen et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r249|249]]</sup> ; Black et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r250|250]]</sup> ). Slow onset climate impacts and risks can exacerbate or otherwise interact with social conflict corresponding with movement at larger scales (see Section 7.2.3.2). Long-term deterioration in habitability of regions could trigger spatial population shifts (Denton et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r251|251]]</sup> ).

There is medium evidence and ''medium agreement'' that climatic stressors can worsen the complex negative impacts of strife and conflict (Schleussner et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r252|252]]</sup> ; Barnett and Palutikof 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r254|254]]</sup> ; Scheffran et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r255|255]]</sup> ). Climate change and human mobility could be a factor that heightens tensions over scarce strategic resources, a further destabilising influence in fragile states experiencing socio-economic and political unrest (Carleton and Hsiang 2016a <sup>[[#fn:r256|256]]</sup> ). Conflict and changes in weather patterns can worsen conditions for people working in rainfed agriculture or subsistence farming, interrupting production systems, degrading land and vegetation further (Papaioannou 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r257|257]]</sup> ; Adano and Daudi 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r258|258]]</sup> ). In recent decades, droughts and other climatic stressors have compounded livelihood pressures in areas already torn by strife (Tessler et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r259|259]]</sup> ; Raleigh et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r260|260]]</sup> ), such as in the Horn of Africa. Seizing of agricultural land by competing factions, preventing food distribution in times of shortage have, in this region and others, contributed to a triad of food insecurity, humanitarian need, and large movements of people (Theisen et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r261|261]]</sup> ; Mohmmed et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r262|262]]</sup> ; Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r263|263]]</sup> ; von Uexkull et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r264|264]]</sup> ; Gleick 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r265|265]]</sup> ; Maystadt and Ecker 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r266|266]]</sup> ). People fleeing complex situations may return if peaceful conditions can be established. Climate change and development responses induced by climate change in countries and regions are likely to exacerbate tensions over water and land, and its impact on agriculture, fisheries, livestock and drinking water downstream. Shared pastoral landscapes used by disadvantaged or otherwise vulnerable communities are particularly impacted on by conflicts that are likely to become more severe under future climate change (Salehyan and Hendrix 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r267|267]]</sup> ; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r268|268]]</sup> ). Extreme events could considerably enhance these risks, in particular long-term drying trends (Kelley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r269|269]]</sup> ; Cutter et al. 2012a <sup>[[#fn:r270|270]]</sup> ). There is medium evidence and ''medium agreement'' that governance is key in magnifying or moderating climate change impact and conflict (Bonatti et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r271|271]]</sup> ).

There is low evidence and ''medium agreement'' that longer-term deterioration in the habitability of regions could trigger spatial population shifts (Seto 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r272|272]]</sup> ). Heat waves, rising sea levels that salinise and inundate coastal and low-lying aquifers and soils, desertification, loss of geologic sources of water such as glaciers and freshwater aquifers could affect many regions of the world and put life-sustaining ecosystems under pressure to support human populations (Flahaux and De Haas 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r273|273]]</sup> ; Chambwera et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r274|274]]</sup> ; Tierney et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r275|275]]</sup> ; Lilleør and Van den Broeck 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r276|276]]</sup> ).

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