Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 (section)

== 1.4 Societal Responses to Climate Change Risks ==

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AR6 highlights the concept of '''solutions''' , defined as ''effective'' , ''feasible'' and ''just'' means of reducing climate risk, increasing resilience and pursuing other climate-related societal goals. This section introduces key concepts used in this report to assess the goals associated with adaptation, its process and governance, its implementation, M&amp;E and its limits.

The term ‘solutions’ has various synonyms used across this and previous IPCC reports, including options, measures, actions and responses. All denote policies, technologies, processes, investments or other activities undertaken in reaction to or with the intent of addressing some aspect of climate change (Chapter 17). The term ‘solutions’ has drawbacks, suggesting a finality, that is, the problem is solved. Solving climate change in this sense is not likely for the foreseeable future. In addition, the word ‘solutions’ sometimes denotes a narrow set of responses, such as ‘technical solution’, as opposed to more wide-ranging actions that might be involved in a transition to resilience. Nonetheless, AR6 highlights the term ‘solutions’ because, compared to these other terms, when acted upon or incorporated in policy, it denotes effectiveness and some degree of progress at achieving desired goals.

Assessing successful adaptation is, however, difficult (Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT in Chapter 1). WGIII Section 1.6 summarises four broad analytic frameworks—aggregate efficiency, ethics and equity, transition dynamics, and psychology and politics—relevant to mitigation and concludes that failure to integrate understanding across them has been a fundamental reason for inadequate progress to date in reducing GHG emissions. While the four analytic frameworks used in WGIII also all contribute to the understanding of adaptation, an integrated view remains elusive because adaptation differs strongly from mitigation. In particular, the goals of adaptation are harder to define and measure than those for mitigation. The feasibility, effectiveness and success of many adaptation actions depend more strongly on context. A different, often more diffuse, set of actors are involved, and it is often hard to distinguish what activities count as adaptation.

Given these challenges, this report provides an assessment of adaptation solutions based on the attributes '''justice''' , '''feasibility''' and '''effectiveness''' , as shown in Figure 1.7.

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'''Figure 1.7 |''' '''Assessing adaptation solutions and success.''' A solution is defined as an adaptation option which is effective, feasible and conforms to principles of justice. These attributes can be assessed ''ex ante'' during adaptation planning. During implementation, the overall success of a response can be judged via monitoring and evaluation of these attributes. Adaptation unfolds as an iterative learning process of assessment, implementation, monitoring, adjustment and learning. A set of responses is adequate to the extent that they sufficiently reduce climate risk to levels considered tolerable. Adaptation may not fully avoid residual risks, but the more adequate the response, the less residual risk remains. Adaptation also has limits beyond which it is no longer possible to avoid intolerable risks and impacts.

A solution is just when its outcomes, the process of implementing the action and the process of choosing the action respects principles of distributive, procedural and recognitional '''justice''' (Section 1.4.1.1). Any assessment of justice depends on an understanding of potential outcomes of alternative options (Chapter 16), as well as processes of decision making (Chapter 17). Consideration of justice necessarily introduces normative elements into any assessment of what constitutes a solution.

A solution is '''effective''' to the extent it reduces climate risk. Effectiveness can refer to whether an adaptation-related action reduces risk (Section 1.4.1.2; Chapter 16) or the extent to which an action achieves its intended outcomes within a stated time frame (Chapter 17). Effectiveness can also include measures of economic efficiency, assessment of net benefits over costs and the extent to which an action enhances broader and multi-dimensional measures of societal well-being (Section 1.4.1.2). Assessments of effectiveness will often involve uncertainty, which may affect judgements about the comparative effectiveness and justice of alternative options (Chapters 16; 17; Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17). Assessment of effectiveness also involves consideration of maladaptation (Section 1.4.2.4) in which an action, often inadvertently, increases risk or vulnerability for some or all affected individuals or communities.

A solution is '''feasible''' to the extent it is considered possible and desirable, taking into consideration barriers, enablers, synergies and trade-offs (Section 1.4.2). AR6 assesses the feasibility of a wide range of adaptation options (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB in Chapter 18), building on the approach of the SR1.5 report, which uses five dimensions of feasibility: geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, sociocultural, institutional. In addition, feasibility can also refer to a specific set of actions, so that feasibility in any particular situation may depend on specific conditions of governance capacity, financial capacity, public opinion, interest group pressure, and the distribution of political and economic power (Chapter 17). For instance, a particular jurisdiction may find either of two options feasible when implemented alone but might lack the capacity to implement them both at the same time. Feasibility can be a context-dependent and time-varying attribute. Many solutions, for instance those that seek to unlock financing or build public support for certain actions, aim at increasing the feasibility of future adaptation responses (Sections 1.4.2; 1.5).

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=== 1.4.1 What is Equitable, Just and Effective Adaptation? ===

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Articulating the goals of adaptation is an important initial step in the decision-making process ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones et al 2014]] ). Adaptation often involves trade-offs among various options of adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development, as well as judgements based on science, engineering and economics, and questions of distribution and democratic participation ( [[#Jafry--2018|Jafry et al., 2018]] ). Articulating the goals of adaptation at the international, national and local levels thus requires engaging with the concepts of equity, justice and effectiveness ( ''high confidence'' ).

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==== 1.4.1.1 Equitable Adaptation Informed by Concepts of Justice ====

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Assessing climate action involves ethical considerations that the literature often describes as climate justice. The term ‘climate justice,’ however, has been used in different ways in different contexts and by different communities. Grassroot organisations and activists often focus on unequal global power relations, wealth, and interests within communities, within nations, and along the North–South divide, as well as the historical responsibility for climate change ( [[#Chatterton--2013|Chatterton et al., 2013]] ). Some national governments also view climate justice as the right of developing countries to industrialise. Balancing these issues, international climate change negotiations have primarily focused on current capacities and responsibilities for addressing climate change as reflected in the UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ ( [[#Fisher--2015|Fisher, 2015]] ).

Since principles of justice are substantive normative commitments that have been debated for centuries, it would be unrealistic to expect a universal consensus. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement about the core issues. Just normative principles are ones that result in fair and equitable allocation of goods, vulnerabilities and risks ( [[#Caney--2014|Caney, 2014]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2009|Schlosberg, 2009]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2013|Schlosberg, 2013]] ; Jafry et al., 2018)

It is common to distinguish between distributive justice, procedural justice and recognition ( [[#Fraser--1999|Fraser, 1999]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2003|Schlosberg, 2003]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2009|Schlosberg, 2009]] ; [[#Reckien--2017|Reckien et al., 2017]] ; [[#Forsyth--2018|Forsyth, 2018]] ; [[#Olazabal--2021|Olazabal et al., 2021]] ). The first refers to the distribution of burdens and benefits; the second to who decides and participates in decision making; while recognition entails basic respect and robust engagement with and fair consideration of diverse values, cultures, perspectives, and worldviews. Recognition is closely linked to distributive and procedural justice ( [[#Hourdequin--2016|Hourdequin, 2016]] ). Without recognition, actors may not benefit from the two other aspects of justice ( ''medium confidence'' ). Recognition thus represents both a normative principle as well as an underlying cause of unjust distribution and lack of democratic participation ( [[#Svarstad--2020|Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2020]] ). However, recognition is still under-represented in climate justice compared to general scholarship and debate on justice principles ( [[#Chu--2018|Chu and Michael, 2018]] ; [[#Benjaminsen--2021|Benjaminsen et al., 2021]] ).

Three principles of distributive justice are especially relevant to adaptation: ''fairness between individuals'' , ''fairness between states'' and ''fairness between generations'' (Fleurbaey et al., 2014 '')'' . Fairness between individuals means that the distribution of goods, vulnerabilities and risks of climate change should not fall on individuals for arbitrary reasons. It would be arbitrary if, say, a family were disproportionately affected by climate-induced drought by chance alone. Similarly, an adaptation action that protects some and creates risks for others is unfair if the final distribution of burdens and benefits is arbitrary.

The second consideration of distributive justice is ''international justice'' , or fairness between states. An important idea in international climate negotiations has been ''common but differentiated responsibilities'' (CBDR ''')''' and respective capabilities ''',''' stated in Principle 7 in the Rio Declaration (1992), as well as by the Kyoto Protocol (1997). The principle reflects the underlying idea that ''all'' countries must address climate change, but the form of climate action depends on the situation the country finds itself in. Developed countries may find themselves in a position where they can decarbonise more rapidly and ensure financial flows, while the responsibilities of LDCs and SIDS may primarily come in the form of adaptation actions. This means that uneven distribution of wealth and power between (and within) countries is a key driver of climate injustice.

The third consideration of distributive justice relevant to climate adaptation is fairness between generations and the obligation to ensure that future generations are guaranteed at least a minimally decent life ( [[#Jonas--1985|Jonas, 1985]] ; [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-1/Llavador--2010 Llavador et al., 2010] ). For example, youth climate activists and political philosophers have argued that today’s children, as well as generations yet unborn, will be exposed to far greater risks than most living adults so that policymakers should work to avoid shifting all burdens of adaptation to future generations.

Procedural justice addresses the fairness of the processes by which decisions are made and the legitimacy of those making the decisions ( [[#Gutmann--2009|Gutmann and Thompson, 2009]] ; [[#Kitcher--2011|Kitcher, 2011]] ). Criteria include transparency, the application of neutral principles among parties, respect for participants’ rights and inclusive participation in decision making, which often takes the form of participatory processes. Article 6 of the Framework Convention creates a binding commitment on parties to promote public participation in addressing climate change. Increased participation by civil society in climate policy discussion, including new forums such as the Local Communities and Indigenous People’s Platform of the UNFCCC work toward this goal ( [[#UNFCCC--2021|UNFCCC, 2021]] ). Genuine, not merely formal, participation requires communities be well-acquainted with the climate change risks they face and are given a full voice in the process of adaptation planning. Many local communities, especially those most vulnerable to climate change, remain excluded, which is inconsistent with principles of procedural justice. In addition to a normative principle, models of decision making also suggest that diverse, representative decision makers can be expected to make better decisions than more limited groups ( [[#Hong--2004|Hong and Page, 2004]] ; [[#Landemore--2013|Landemore, 2013]] ; [[#Singer--2019|Singer, 2019]] ).

In AR5 WGIII ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ) discussions of justice and ethical concepts were combined with discussions of economic principles while the adaptation chapters did not explicitly discuss climate justice. This report moves beyond AR5 by connecting the assessment of policy choices to normative principles and showing how better outcomes are obtained by choosing just ones.

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==== 1.4.1.2 Equitable and Effective Adaptation Informed by Concepts and Measures of Well-being ====

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Planning and assessment of effective and just adaptation require appropriate measures of both criteria. This report uses both single and multi-criteria measures. Local and regional decision makers employ benefit–cost analysis to efficiently allocate scarce resources among alternative adaptation efforts and among adaptation and other societal needs. Decision makers at national and global levels can employ measures of social welfare to consider trade-offs and synergies among adaptation, mitigation, and development. Such measures can avoid wasteful allocation of resources and help avoid maladaptation. Such measures also prove useful because well-established approaches exist to evaluate such quantities, and because income is highly correlated with a wide range of indicators of social progress and climate change adaptation capacity ( [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ).

Aggregate, monetised economic measures are, however, insufficient to address issues of climate justice fully or to reflect that wide range of worldviews and values that different people bring to questions of climate action and development ( [[#Chambwera--2014|Chambwera et al., 2014]] ). While recent work has enriched the consideration of distributive justice in aggregate social welfare functions ( [[#Adler--2012|Adler, 2012]] ), multi-objective approaches that separately report several biophysical and socioeconomic attributes can prove valuable (Section 17.3.3). Many adaptation measures, in particular those that encompass transformational social changes (Section 1.5), involve complicated trade-offs among multi-dimensional benefits and costs ( [[#Adger--2016|Adger, 2016]] ). Different people commonly value such trade-offs differently, particularly in heterogeneous societies. Multi-objective measures can thus enhance transparency, fairness, legitimacy and participation by highlighting the different outcomes that different people and communities might find important, making the specific trade-offs more transparent and explicit, and avoiding privileging any particular view on the appropriate trade-offs ( [[#Lempert--2018|Lempert et al., 2018]] ; [[#Siders--2019b|Siders, 2019b]] ; [[#Siders--2020|Siders and Keenan, 2020]] ).

The SDGs and Key Representative Risks (Chapter 16) exemplify such multi-criteria measures. In addition, many communities increasingly measure policy outcomes using multi-objective measures, often organised around the concept of well-being and designed to allocate resources and implement policies to advance social progress ( [[#Lee--2015|Lee et al., 2015]] ; [[#City%20of%20Santa%20Monica--2018|City of Santa Monica, 2018]] ). Similarly, the Human Development Index (HDI), which derives from the capabilities approach, combines income (as gross national income, GNI, and parity purchasing power, PPP) with an education and a health indicator and integrates human and socioeconomic factors (Herrero et al., 2012; [[#USEPA--2016|USEPA, 2016]] ; [[#Leal%20Filho--2018|Leal Filho et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nagy--2018|Nagy et al., 2018]] ; [[#UNDP--2018|UNDP, 2018]] ). The inequality-adjusted HDI value, or IHDI, can be interpreted as the level of human development when inequality is accounted for ( [[#UNDP--2018|UNDP, 2018]] ).

The multi-criteria concept of well-being has been increasingly employed as a structured framework for measuring social progress in many areas of public policy ( [[#Lamb--2017|Lamb and Steinberger, 2017]] ) including climate and health (Chapter 7) and, to a lesser extent, in other areas of the climate change adaptation literature ( [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ). Well-being reflects the ability of a person to pursue and realise the goals that they value ( [[#Sen--1985|Sen, 1985]] ). The disaster risk management community employs well-being to evaluate mental health impacts in terms of peoples’ abilities to cope with trauma and loss because of natural disasters ( [[#Berry--2010|Berry et al., 2010]] ; [[#MacDonald--2015|MacDonald et al., 2015]] ; [[#Willox--2015|Willox et al., 2015]] ). The term appears in the literature with concepts such as human security ( [[#Koren--2006|Koren and Butler, 2006]] ; [[#Adger--2010|Adger, 2010]] ; [[#Pasgaard--2017|Pasgaard et al., 2017]] ), subjective well-being or happiness ( [[#Sekulova--2013|Sekulova and van den Bergh, 2013]] ; [[#Rehdanz--2015|Rehdanz et al., 2015]] ; [[#Fanning--2019|Fanning and O’Neill, 2019]] ), welfare ( [[#Gough--2015|Gough, 2015]] ) and living standards or quality of life ( [[#Degorska--2018|Degorska and Degorski, 2018]] ; [[#Rao--2018|Rao and Min, 2018]] ).

Recent work has used quantified measures of well-being and multi-objective decision-support tools to balance among equity and efficiency objectives in disaster risk management (Section 1.5.2; Chapter 17; [[#Markhvida--2020|Markhvida et al., 2020]] ). Rather than focus on the economic value of lost assets, the well-being measure evaluates disaster impacts and recovery policies by considering the fraction of consumption lost at the household level for different income cohorts. Not surprisingly, poor households account for twice as much of the disaster losses when evaluated by effects on well-being rather than by asset losses. The most effective policy responses also differ when using well-being and asset loss-based measures. Ciullo et. al. (2020) compare flood control strategies using multi-objective decision criteria that include both benefit–cost and distributional components, show how the favoured strategy can depend on whether one seeks equitable risk or equitable risk reduction, and propose tools that can help embed both ethical and efficiency considerations in adaptation decisions. Widespread use of such approaches could strengthen consideration of climate justice along with efficiency in the evaluation of climate risks and adaptation (Section 1.5.2; [[#Dryzek--2013|Dryzek et al., 2013]] ).

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=== 1.4.2 Enabling and Governing Adaptation ===

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Adaptation actions taken by individuals, social groups and organisations in response to climate and environmental stimuli depend, in part, on the options they have (see Chapters 16 and 17). Actions previously taken can reduce the scale of responses needed subsequently, increase the options available, reduce barriers to additional action and increase capacity to respond. Successful adaptation sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and SDGs needs to involve actors at many scales and in many sectors, including individuals and households, communities, governments at all levels, private sector businesses, non-governmental organisations, religious groups and social movements. This report highlights the increased range of societal actors engaged in adaptation and the need for multi-level and polycentric governance. The section describes key concepts related to the process of adaptation and assessment of how human choices and exogenous changes can expand and contract the set of available solutions.

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==== 1.4.2.1 Adaptation Process and Expanding the Solution Space ====

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Adaptation actions include those taken with the explicit intention of reducing climate risk, as well as actions taken without reference to climate change, for example, building community resilience irrespective of any particular hazard. Adaptation actions can include those aimed at reducing a specific risk or actions aimed at systemic changes, and also include adjustments to current practices or transformational changes. In addition, the success of adaptation in one place or jurisdiction can depend on activities in other places or jurisdictions.

Adaptation actions span a vast range of activities. Successful adaptation generally requires a portfolio of actions, often implemented by multiple actors in different sectors, often in different places and over time (Section 17.2.2). Useful taxonomies include categorising such actions around representative key risks (Figure 17.3), and by human systems and scenarios of adaptation extent for four components of adaptation (depth, scope, speed and limits) (Table 16.2). As shown in Chapter 17, for instance, ecosystem-based adaptation, hardening buildings and physical barriers, and changes to zoning and planned retreat can reduce risks to coastal socio-ecological systems. Restoration and protection of forests, enhancing ecosystem connectivity through corridors and ecosystem-based adaptation can reduce risks to terrestrial and ocean ecosystems. Increased use of grey, green and blue infrastructure and upgrading design standards, city plans and more redundancy in power systems and other networks can reduce risks associated with critical infrastructure. Insurance and diversified or changed livelihoods can reduce risks to living standards and equity. Improved health-care systems, disaster management and early warning can reduce risks to human health. Better management of land, soil and fisheries, and changing diets and reducing food waste can reduce risks to food security. Improved water efficiency and policies to reduce demand can reduce risks to water security.

Previous IPCC reports have described in detail adaptation for individual actors as an iterative risk management process of scoping (identifying risks, vulnerabilities, objectives and decision-making criteria), analysis (identifying options, assessing risks, evaluating trade-offs) and implementation (implementing chosen options, monitoring, and reviewing and learning) ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones et. al. 2014]] ). This AR6 report expands the focus to consider adaptation processes with multiple actors and a richer temporal dimension in which actions taken at one time can expand or contract the set of feasible, effective and just options available at another time, thereby increasing or decreasing the ability of adaptation to reduce risks (Section 17.1). This AR6 report also expands the focus to include decision processes the implement both adaptation and mitigation (Chapter 18), as well as heightened attention to M&amp;E, which is a key prerequisite for successful iterative risk management and achieving effective and just adaptation outcomes at local to global levels (Sections 1.4.3; 17.5.2). The challenges of implications for adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development outcomes result from decision-making process at different levels ( [[#Von-Stechow--2015|Von Stechow et al., 2015]] ; [[#Bertram--2016|Bertram et al., 2016]] ). Overcoming these challenges often requires significant learning and innovative ways of linking science, practice and policy at all scales ( [[#Shaw--2014|Shaw and Kristjanson, 2014]] ).

Two concepts—enabling conditions and catalysing conditions—help frame this report’s assessment of factors that over time can help expand the set of available solutions (Section 17.4). Enabling conditions enhance the feasibility of adaptation and mitigation options (AR6 Glossary, [[#IPCC--2021b|IPCC, 2021b]] ). Enablers include finance, technological innovation, strengthening policy instruments, institutional capacity, multi-level governance and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles. Chapter 17 (see also WGIII Figure 1.4) identifies three broad categories of enabling conditions: (Section 17.4): governance, finance and knowledge. Catalysing conditions motivate and accelerate the adaptation decision-making process, leading to more frequent and more substantial adaptation (Chapter 17). While enablers make adaptation more feasible and effective, catalysing conditions provide an impetus for action. These later conditions include a sense of urgency (Section 17.4.5.1), system shocks, such as those from natural disasters, policy entrepreneurs and social movements.

The concept of the '''solution space''' provides a framework for assessing how the options available for adaptation for any particular community are not constant over time and can depend on the past, current and future choices of many actors. The solution space is defined as the space within which opportunities and constraints determine why, how, when and who adapts to climate risks ( [[#Haasnoot--2020|Haasnoot et al., 2020]] ). The concept aims to capture the dynamic inter-temporal, spatial and jurisdictional interconnections among adaptation actions. A larger solution space indicates people and organisations with more options for adapting to and reducing their risk from climate change. Both human choices and exogenous changes in human and natural systems affect the future solution space. For instance, changes such as the magnitude and rate of climate change may shrink the space. Economic growth can generate more resources that expand the solution space as can implemented adaptation actions such as pilot projects, awareness raising and changes in laws and regulations.

AR5 used the concept of solution space in its SPM Figure 8 ( [[#IPCC--2014c|IPCC, 2014c]] ). Several AR6 chapters, in particular Chapters 13, 14 and 18, use the concept to address challenges salient in AR6. In any assessment of solutions, what is feasible, effective and just depends not only on the potential solution itself but the particular biophysical and societal context in which it might occur (Section 17.5; [[#Wise--2014|Wise et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ). Solutions can also be space and time dependent because the biophysical and societal context can change over space and time (Section 18.1.4). In addition, the large gap that exists between current climate action and that needed to meet policy goals suggests that decision makers may not only seek to implement available solutions but seek to actively expand the set of solutions (Chapters 17; 18). Finally, as used in this report, the concept of solution does not fully engage with questions of ‘by whom?’ and ‘for whom?’ In many cases solutions would necessarily be implemented by multiple, independent actors interacting with varying degrees of cooperation and competition (Sections 1.5.2).

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==== 1.4.2.2 Governing Adaptation ====

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Governance and governing refer to the structures, processes and actions through which private and public actors interact to address societal goals. This includes formal and informal institutions and the associated norms, rules, laws and procedures for deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring policies and measures at any geographic or political scale, from global to local. Governance systems and the specific societal institutions through which they are organised are crucial to the feasibility and success of climate change adaptation, both in terms of its effectiveness in reducing climate risk and vulnerability, as well as equity (including climate justice), with respect to incremental as well as transformational adaptation. This is why AR6 WGII pays even more attention than previous assessments to governance as an important enabling condition, and to the wide range of new actors beyond governments involved in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating adaptation action. The assessments in subsequent chapters of AR6 WGII show that successful and equitable collective adaptation efforts at different levels and scales, based on key principles of iterative risk management, require strong, usually multi-level. governance systems. Multi-level governance refers to the dispersion of governance across multiple levels of jurisdiction and decision making, including global, regional, national and local, as well as trans-regional and trans-national levels (see also WG III Chapter 1). The concept emphasises that modern governance generally consists of, and is more flexible, when there are linkages of governance processes across different scales and levels. Multi-level governance is widely regarded as crucial, particularly for transformational adaptation, defined as ‘adapting to climate change resulting in significant changes in structure or function that go beyond adjusting existing practices including approaches that enable new ways of decision making on adaptation’ (IPCC SR1.5, [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; see also Section 1.5). The assessment in subsequent chapters also shows that public governance arrangements and institutions support most adaptation for addressing the main climate risks, though the importance of the private sector and community organisations in adaptation is increasing. It also shows that polycentric governance tends to benefit adaptation.

The empirical literature on adaptation governance has advanced strongly since AR5. It shows that stronger general governance capabilities are usually associated with more ambitious adaptation plans and more effective implementation of such plans ( [[#UNEP--2014|UNEP, 2014]] ; [[#Chen--2016|Chen et al., 2016]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2019b|Keskitalo and Preston, 2019b]] : 24; [[#ND-GAIN--2019|ND-GAIN, 2019]] ; [[#Oberlack--2017|Oberlack, 2017]] ; [[#Oberlack--2018|Oberlack and Eisenack, 2018]] ; [[#Woodruff--2019|Woodruff and Regan, 2019]] ; [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP, 2018]] ; UNEP et al., 2021). Governance capabilities are, to a significant degree, but not exclusively, a function of available financial resources and technology. They are also a function of social capital and societal institutions, including well-functioning local, regional and national governments, and collaboration among these governmental actors and non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector. The literature also points to governance conditions that are likely to enable transformational adaptation (Maor et al., 2017; see also Sections 1.4.4; 1.5; Chapter 17).

Existing comparative data for adaptive capacity worldwide is at a rather coarse level of temporal and spatial resolution. It can, nonetheless, provide a very general picture of rates of change in adaptive capacity at the national scale, and differences between countries. Further empirical research is needed to identify the most important predictors of variation across countries and time, though the available data suggests that differing national income and education levels play a major role in accounting for differences in adaptive capacity ( [[#Andrijevic--2020|Andrijevic et al., 2020]] ). Spatially more resolved (sub-national) data is needed because a large body of case study research suggests that there is strong variation within countries, particularly the large ones (e.g., India, China, Brazil, United States) (Chapter 16; see also [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau and Verrall, 2021]] and Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT). Moreover, higher degrees of adaptive capacity do not mean that adaptation action will follow automatically, nor that it will succeed in terms of equity and effectiveness in reducing vulnerability to climate change and enhancing well-being. How differences across and within countries in climate risk exposure translate into adaptation action, contingent on differences in adaptive capacity, can to some extent be inferred from case studies, but this remains to be studied at a larger, comparable and generalisable scale.

Governance capacity constitutes an important enabling condition not only because it facilitates the (efficient) organisation and implementation of adaptation action, but also because it contributes to learning. The latter is central to the process of adaptation as information regarding current and future climate conditions continues to evolve, as does understanding of appropriate response options and the actors involved. In addition, norms, values and practices may change in response to changing conditions ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones et al., 2014]] ). Much learning by individuals, communities and organisations is unplanned ( [[#National%20Research%20Council--2009|National Research Council, 2009]] ), as is much current adaptation ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2020|Berrang-Ford, 2020]] ), which can reduce near-term costs and administrative complexity, but may prove maladaptive (Section 1.4.2.4). Iterative risk management (Section 1.2.1.1) and related concepts such as risk governance ( [[#Renn--2008|Renn, 2008]] ) describe a planned learning process of ongoing assessment, action and reassessment. Iterative risk management can be as simple as scheduling future updates of assessments and plans, as with the 5-year updates of the global stocktake after 2023 called for in the Paris Agreement, or encompass more elaborate learning processes, such as dynamic adaptive pathways ( [[#Haasnoot--2019b|Haasnoot et al., 2019b]] ; Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17) which include specific near-term actions, specific trends to monitor and specific contingency actions to take depending on the future conditions observed. While often more effective at meeting goals, such planned learning processes may pose implementation and governance challenges ( [[#Metzger--2021|Metzger et al., 2021]] )

Mainstreaming adaptation into existing governance structures and associated organisations and their investments, policies and practices can contribute to expanding the solution space and support efforts at transformative adaptation. For instance, urban planning can support adaptation by mainstreaming adaptation into city plans, such as land use planning, procuring resilient infrastructure and transportation, supporting health and social services, promoting community-based adaptation, and protecting and integrating biodiversity and ecosystem services into city planning (Section 17.4.3). Mainstreaming adaptation also shows many shortcomings, such as diminishing the visibility of dedicated, stand-alone adaptation approaches ( [[#Persson--2016|Persson et al., 2016]] ), unequal distribution of adaptation efforts, diluting responsibilities for implementation ( [[#Nalau--2016|Nalau et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2019|Reckien et al., 2019]] ), exhibiting disconnects between planning, investment and implementation, having limited policy coherence ( [[#Friend--2014|Friend et al., 2014]] ; [[#Bizikova--2015|Bizikova et al., 2015]] ; [[#England--2018|England et al., 2018]] ; [[#Koch--2018|Koch, 2018]] ) and failing to adequately balance overlapping and/or competing policy objectives ( [[#Vij--2018|Vij et al., 2018]] ).

Finally, governing adaptation in ways that maximise the solution space and facilitate learning can help avoid maladaptation. Maladaptation refers to potentially adverse effects of certain forms of adaptation action, such as increased GHG emissions or increased vulnerability to climate change and diminished welfare of certain parts of a population now or in the future ( [[#Anguelovski--2016|Anguelovski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2016|Keskitalo and Pettersson, 2016]] ; [[#Veldkamp--2017|Veldkamp et al., 2017]] ; [[#Zimmermann--2018|Zimmermann et al., 2018]] ; [[#Benzie--2018|Benzie et al., 2018]] ; [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; [[#Munia--2018|Munia et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nadin--2018|Nadin and Roberts, 2018]] ; [[#Prabhakar--2018|Prabhakar et al., 2018]] ). Maladaptation is an example of response risk, which is increasingly highlighted in both AR6 WGII and WGIII (Section 1.3.1.2; see also IPCC Risk Guidance, Reisinger, 2020). One example is that adaptation action may set paths that limit the choices of future generations to adapt. This last characteristic refers to the lock-in effects of improperly designed and costly infrastructures that affect the ability of future generations to amend.

Maladaptation can result from many potential barriers, including administrative, human, financial and technical resource constraints ( [[#Hassanali--2017|Hassanali, 2017]] ; [[#Pardoe--2018|Pardoe et al., 2018]] ; [[#Singh--2018|Singh et al., 2018]] ); lack of transparency and/or capacity in governance ( [[#Friend--2014|Friend et al., 2014]] ); unreliable information on climate impacts and the lack of key policy guidelines ( [[#Pilato--2018|Pilato et al., 2018]] ); entrenched institutional, legal and technical obstacles ( [[#Gao--2018|Gao, 2018]] ) and low literacy, including environmental and scientific literacy ( [[#Wright--2014|Wright et al., 2014]] ); exclusion of vulnerable groups ( [[#Forsyth--2018|Forsyth, 2018]] ); governance fragmentation (that is, a fragmentation of laws, regulations, and policy requirements); and limited cross-sectoral collaboration, meaning that there is limited coordination and that top-down planning approaches are not connected to local dynamics ( [[#Archer--2014|Archer et al., 2014]] ; Pardoe et al., 2018). This report draws attention to maladaptation challenges recognising that not all adaptation-related responses reduce risks (Chapter 16). Besides, maladaptation is the opposite of successful adaptation, which is associated with reduction of climate risks and vulnerabilities for humans and ecosystems, increased well-being and co-benefits with other sustainable development objectives. (Chapter 17)

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'''Box 1.2 | Financing as an example of enabler'''
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According to the UNFCCC, adaptation finance includes public, private and alternative sources of finance for supporting adaptation actions, whereby adaptation and resilience are often used interchangeably in this context. Adaptation finance constitutes a crucial enabling condition and shaper of the solution space, depending on other enabling conditions, such as proper planning, implementation and governance, which are also the triggers for investments and finance to flow, ensuring positive adaptation outcomes. Details of adaptation finance can be found in Chapter 17 (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17; Section 17.4). The adaptation and resilience options offer multiple benefits, including avoiding risks and losses, economic growth and well-being, as well as social and environmental benefits ( [[#Agrawal--2015|Agrawal and Lemos, 2015]] ; [[#Bayleyegn--2018|Bayleyegn et al., 2018]] ; [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20Adaptation--2019|Global Commission on Adaptation, 2019]] ). Hence, the rate of return on adaptation is large; for example, there is a huge potential of net benefits, that is USD 7.1 trillion while investing USD 1.8 trillion globally in climate resilience and adaptation options, such as early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure, improved dryland agriculture crop production, global mangrove protection and building resilience of water resources ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20Adaptation--2019|Global Commission on Adaptation, 2019]] ). These net benefits resulted primarily from reducing future losses and risk, increasing productivity and innovation, and social and environmental benefits. Despite significant uncertainty and concerns over undue focus on efficiency (monetary), benefit-cost estimates often ignore important issues of non-economic values, effectiveness of risk reduction and climate justice (procedural/distributional).

The current public and private financial flows to adaptation are much smaller than needed (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17). Only a small portion of overall adaptation finance needs is likely to be covered by public sector finance. Private sector investment thus needs to play a crucial role. Hence, tracking adaptation finance flows is important for enabling effective planning and prioritisation of investments, assessing whether needs are being met, and ensuring accountability towards funding commitments, such as the USD 100 billion promised to developing countries per year by 2020 under the Paris Agreement ( [[#Donner--2016|Donner et al., 2016]] ). Since AR5, significant progress has been made in tracking adaptation finance flows through UNFCCC channels, multi-lateral development banks and bilateral finance (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17), but large information gaps on adaptation finance via national public finance, commercial lenders, investors, asset managers and insurers, company finance, and individuals and households remain. That these financial flows do not occur suggests misaligned incentives and other governance challenges that could be addressed as part of a response to climate change (Chapter 17). Across regions and sectors, financial constraints have been identified as the most common and important determinants leading to limits to adaptation (Chapter 16).

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'''Box 1.3 | Nature-based solutions'''
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Nature-based solutions (NbS) (Section 2.6; Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2) provides an example of how innovative ideas can expand the climate solution space ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; [[#Seddon--2019|Seddon et al., 2019]] ). A commonly used definition of NbS is that of The World Conservation Union (IUCN), which defines it as ‘actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems, that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits’ ( [[#Cohen-Shacham--2016|Cohen-Shacham et al., 2016]] ). In the context of IPCC, it focuses on NbS which deliver climate change adaptation or mitigation benefits. NbS generally benefits biodiversity and supports its role in both climate mitigation and adaptation. While the carbon-sequestering mitigation role of increasing forest and tree cover has dominated much of the earlier discussions, the role of NbS in promoting adaptation of natural ecosystems and human societies to climate change is being increasingly emphasised. The details of different categories of ecosystem services in the ocean or on land, including biodiversity, food provision, other provisioning services (e.g., medicinal and commercial products), and regulating and cultural services are described in Chapters 2 and 3.

Forest restoration would certainly contribute substantially towards climate-proofing and achievement of several SDGs as well as the Paris Agreement. There is increasing evidence that diverse, native tree species plantations are more likely to be resilient to climate change in contrast to fast-growing monocultures, ( [[#Hulvey--2013|Hulvey et al., 2013]] ) often of exotic species. At the same time, other natural ecosystems such as savannas, grasslands, peatlands, wetlands and mangroves have considerable value in acting as carbon sinks as well as providing other ecosystem services such as hydrological regulation, coastal protection, maintaining biodiversity and contributing to human livelihoods especially pastoralists and fishermen ( [[#Veldman--2015|Veldman et al., 2015]] ; [[#Conant--2017|Conant et al., 2017]] ; [[#Leifeld--2018|Leifeld and Menichetti, 2018]] ; [[#Seddon--2019|Seddon et al., 2019]] ). Coastal and marine ecosystems including wetlands and mangroves have featured prominently in studies of NbS in climate adaptation and mitigation potential for ‘blue carbon’ sequestration ( [[#Inoue--2019|Inoue, 2019]] ; Sections 3.6.2.1; 6.3.3; Cross-Chapter Paper 2.3.2.3). Agroecological practices such as agroforestry, intercropping, rotational grazing, organic manuring, and integrating livestock production with cropping etc can also consider as NbS which contribute to both climate mitigation and adaptation ( [[#Altieri--2017|Altieri and Nicholls, 2017]] ; [[#Webb--2017|Webb et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bezner%20Kerr--2019|Bezner Kerr et al., 2019]] ; [[#Leakey--2020|Leakey, 2020]] ; Box 5.10).

There are concerns about large-scale conversion of non-forest land into forest plantations for the sole purpose of increasing carbon sinks through bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) ( [[#Heck--2018|Heck et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hanssen--2020|Hanssen et al., 2020]] ; Cross-Chapter Box in Chapter 2), which may actually result in negative carbon sink ( [[#Jackson--2002|Jackson et al., 2002]] ; [[#Mureva--2018|Mureva et al., 2018]] ) and significant loss of overall biodiversity ( [[#Abreu--2017|Abreu et al., 2017]] ). Such large-scale afforestation may also lead to the dispossession of previous users, such as smallholders and pastoralists. Hence, when NbS include forest plantations or other large-scale conversion of land use, there is a risk that they result in maladaptation and malmitigation, including climate injustice ( [[#Seddon--2019|Seddon et al., 2019]] ; [[#Cousins--2021|Cousins, 2021]] ).

Much of the conceptual framework for NbS has come from initiatives to bring environmental, social and economic dimensions to the same level of importance, particularly in the context of a highly urbanised society (Section 6.3.3; [[#Faivre--2017|Faivre et al., 2017]] ; [[#Nesshöver--2017|Nesshöver et al., 2017]] ). Emphasis has been placed on urban storm water management (Section 2.6.5.2) and heat mitigation using measures, such as sustainable drainage systems, urban forests, parks and green roof-tops, apart from coastal defences using NbS (Section 13.6.2.3) This has triggered much debate on how distinct the concept of NbS is in relation to other similar concepts, such as ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) approaches (Section 9.11.4.2). There are calls for an assessment framework for proving the ‘effectiveness and efficiency’ of NbS in providing superior ecosystem and societal benefits (Calliari et al., 2019). Instead, EbA can be treated as a subset of NbS (Chapter 2). However, the time frame of EbA is also an important consideration; thus, grassland and forest restoration would operate at different time scales, while mangrove restoration can promote adaptation only at local to national scales, depending on the extent and nature of coastlines ( [[#Taillardat--2018|Taillardat et al., 2018]] ). Given the complex nature of plant and animal species adapting to climate change through dispersal and migration to more suitable habitat, this also means that landscape-scale approaches, as opposed to purely protected areas, are needed to promote adaptation, conserve and sustainably use biodiversity, and sustain livelihoods ( [[#Vos--2008|Vos et al., 2008]] ; [[#Sukumar--2016|Sukumar et al., 2016]] ).

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'''Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT | Adaptation science'''
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Authors: Johanna Nalau (Australia/Finland), Lauren Rickards (Australia), Tabea Lissner (Germany), Katharine J. Mach (USA), Lisa Schipper (Sweden/UK), Chandni Singh (India), William Solecki (USA), Adelle Thomas (Bahamas) and Edmond Totin (Benin)

High-level statements:

* Adaptation knowledge consists of a diverse set of sources including academic research, applied analysis, and practice and experience with projects and policy on the ground.
* Adaptation science encompasses both research ‘on adaptation’, documenting and analysing experiences of adaptation, and ‘for adaptation’, aiming to advance the planning and implementation of adaptation.
* The nature of adaptation research is diversifying and examines different approaches from local case studies to more global, transboundary, comparative and interactive perspectives, although critical conceptual and empirical gaps remain in defining effectiveness in adaptation and measuring adaptation progress.

This cross-chapter box complements the reviews of specific adaptation knowledge, content and progress described throughout WGII by providing a higher-level analysis of the shifting characteristics of and trends in '''adaptation research''' and its evolution over time.

The characteristics and diversity of adaptation knowledge

The knowledge base on adaptation has matured significantly since AR5. Whereas adaptation research was primarily academic during the 1990s and 2000s, it now includes a proliferation of on-the-ground experience of how to adapt to climate change, increasingly documented in reports and papers. Furthermore, academic research on adaptation has diversified significantly. Understanding the characteristics and diversity of this knowledge base is key for it to effectively inform decision making and action on adaptation.

Academic work on adaptation now spans an increasing number of disciplines and countries and is published across diverse academic outlets and disciplines, with 28.5% annual average increase in adaptation specific publications ( [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau and Verrall, 2021]] ). This expands the range of considerations and perspectives within adaptation research and increases the challenge of identifying and synthesising all relevant research on adaptation in reviews or assessments ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2015|Berrang-Ford et al., 2015]] ; [[#Webber--2016|Webber, 2016]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh et al., 2020]] ; [[#Sietsma--2021|Sietsma et al., 2021]] ). Also, large bodies of research and knowledge exist that support climate adaptation ideas, theoretical development and practical implementation, but are not explicitly framed as climate change adaptation ( [[#Dupuis--2013|Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2019a|Keskitalo and Preston, 2019a]] ). Therefore, debates still emerge about what actually counts as ‘adaptation’ ( [[#Dupuis--2013|Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013]] ), and what knowledge is being assessed and measured for this purpose.

IPCC assessment reports combine two complementary approaches to adaptation research: that which is ‘on’ or ‘about’ adaptation and that which is ‘for adaptation’. Both are needed because research ‘on adaptation’ helpfully investigates the phenomenon and processes of adaptation (e.g., via analyses of others’ adaptation practices and efforts), while research ‘for adaptation’ generates knowledge that can enable the planning and implementation of adaptation (e.g., action research as part of an adaptive capacity-building process) ( [[#Swart--2014|Swart et al., 2014]] ).

One of the contributions of research ‘on adaptation’ is to track and debate the broader trends, core characteristics and overall assumptions embedded in adaptation knowledge. This reflexive turn about the foundational assumptions is itself one emerging trend in adaptation research (e.g., [[#Preston--2013|Preston et al., 2013]] ; [[#Nalau--2015|Nalau et al., 2015]] ; [[#Juhola--2016|Juhola, 2016]] ; [[#Atteridge--2017|Atteridge and Remling, 2017]] ). This signals the influence of more social science in adaptation research and increased awareness of the practical value of being transparent and critically reflective about the content, topics, frames and approaches that researchers use ( [[#Lacey--2015|Lacey et al., 2015]] ; [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau et al., 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ). For example, different conceptions of adaptation contribute to different definitions of ‘adaptation success’, different ideas about what ‘effective’ adaptation practice looks like and, thus, different conclusions about what is and is not working well ( [[#Berrang-Ford--2019|Berrang-Ford et al., 2019]] ; [[#Dilling--2019|Dilling et al., 2019]] ; [[#Magnan--2020|Magnan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Owen--2020|Owen, 2020]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ; Section 17.5.1.1). This diversity adds richness and options, but also poses challenges in constructing a conventional evidence base for decision and policymaking. Adaptation researchers are increasingly expected to offer clear and confident advice on adaptation success, yet are also increasingly aware of how context-specific and contested success is (see also [[#Lacey--2015|Lacey et al., 2015]] on ethics).

Grey literature on adaptation is also proliferating, typically authored by organisations funding and implementing adaptation. This literature often documents a range of adaptation strategies (Sections 9.8.3; 10.4.6.4; 14.4.3.3; 17.2.1.) and lived experiences of adaptation efforts, including helping give voice to marginalised groups, and highlighting the importance of IK and LK (Sections 4.7.5.4; 15.6.4; Box 9.2; Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18; [[#Nunn--2016|Nunn et al., 2016]] ; [[#Petzold--2020|Petzold et al., 2020]] ). However, most of the lessons learned through implementation of adaptation projects and programmes are still not captured in academic or even grey literature and thus remain less systematically analysed. Crucially, the large gaps in documentation of adaptation knowledge mean that a lack of published evidence about a given issue does not necessarily reflect its absence in real life—a qualification about adaptation research that readers of AR6 should appreciate.

The evolution of adaptation research trends

In the 1990s, climate change adaptation was constrained as a specific topic of inquiry by the dominant focus on mitigation of GHG emissions and the related assumption that successful mitigation would render unnecessary the need for adaptation beyond what human and natural systems could inherently manage ( [[#Pielke--1998|Pielke, 1998]] ; [[#Schipper--2006|Schipper, 2006]] ; [[#Schipper--2009|Schipper and Burton, 2009]] ). Several key developments in the 1990s included IPCC’s 2nd report (1996) and the establishment of several key journals including ''Climatic Change'' (1978), ''Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies to Global Change'' (1996) and the ''Global Environmental Change'' journal that strengthened more dedicated focus on climate change related research.

Many foundational papers on key concepts central to adaptation were published in the 1990s and early 2000s onwards ( [[#Burton--1992|Burton, 1992]] ; [[#Smit--1993|Smit, 1993]] ; [[#Smithers--1997|Smithers and Smit, 1997]] ; [[#Parry--1998|Parry and Carter, 1998]] ; [[#Fankhauser--1999|Fankhauser et al., 1999]] ; [[#Smit--1999|Smit et al., 1999]] ; [[#Pittock--2000|Pittock and Jones, 2000]] ; [[#Klein--2003|Klein, 2003]] ; [[#Adger--2005|Adger et al., 2005]] ), while adaptation began to gain more prominence in IPCC’s 3rd assessment (2001) and 4th assessment (2007). For example, the Canada Climate Programme report ( [[#Smit--1993|Smit, 1993]] ) set out many of the principles of adaptation and was highly influential charting these concepts in IPCC’s 3rd Assessment Report ( [[#Schipper--2009|Schipper and Burton, 2009]] ). These papers and IPCC reports remain key foundations of climate adaptation science literature ( [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau and Verrall, 2021]] ).

Helping to differentiate adaptation from mitigation during this period was a focus on theoretical principles and a framing of adaptation as local and context specific, in contrast to mitigation’s global character ( [[#Nalau--2015|Nalau et al., 2015]] ; [[#Westoby--2020|Westoby et al., 2020]] ), leading to locally oriented adaptation research and practice, including the rise of community-based adaptation ( [[#Kirkby--2017|Kirkby et al., 2017]] ). Since AR5, however, adaptation has extended beyond the local, recognising the ‘borderless’ character of many climate change risks and vulnerabilities ( [[#Benzie--2019|Benzie and]] [[#Persson--2019|Persson, 2019]] ) and framing adaptation and global adaptation governance as a global public good ( [[#Persson--2019|Persson, 2019]] ). Encompassing this expanded scale is challenging for adaptation research compared to treating adaptation as a local issue, which fits more easily with social research methods. Adaptation now works across scales ( [[#Biesbroek--2013|Biesbroek et al., 2013]] ; [[#Dzebo--2015|Dzebo and Stripple, 2015]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2019a|Keskitalo and Preston, 2019a]] ) and attends simultaneously to both the opportunities and risks arising from climate change ( [[#Juhola--2016|Juhola, 2016]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2019a|Keskitalo and Preston, 2019a]] ). This suggests that empirical adaptation research should incorporate multi-scalar research designs and methods.

A strong focus has been and remains on case studies of adaptation practice, but adaptation science literature reviews have become common. Recent systematic reviews cover topics such as adaptation effectiveness ( [[#Owen--2020|Owen, 2020]] ), public participation and engagement ( [[#Hügel--2020|Hügel and Davies, 2020]] ), the role of LK ( [[#Klenk--2017|Klenk et al., 2017]] ), adaptive capacity ( [[#Mortreux--2017|Mortreux and Barnett, 2017]] ; [[#Siders--2019a|Siders, 2019a]] ; [[#Mortreux--2020|Mortreux et al., 2020]] ), evolution of adaptation science ( [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau and Verrall, 2021]] ), empirical adaptation research in the Global South ( [[#Vincent--2021|Vincent and Cundill, 2021]] ), how cities are adapting ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ), how decisions can be made ( [[#Siders--2021|Siders and Pierce, 2021]] ), IK ( [[#Petzold--2020|Petzold et al., 2020]] ) and SIDS ( [[#Robinson--2020|Robinson, 2020]] ). Review papers have developed common methodologies for how to undertake robust reviews in adaptation research ( [[#Ford--2015|Berrang-Ford et al., 2015]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2019a|Lesnikowski et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Singh--2020|Singh et al., 2020]] ), and noted an existing imbalance as the majority of the literature still originates from the Global North compared to Global South ( [[#Robinson--2020|Robinson, 2020]] ; [[#Nalau--2021|Nalau and Verrall, 2021]] ; [[#Sietsma--2021|Sietsma et al., 2021]] ).

At the same time, adaptation research is also challenged by increasing attention to transformational adaptation, which refers to fundamental changes going beyond existing practices, including new approaches to adaptation decision making (Section 1.5). Whereas AR5 noted transformational adaptation as an area of future research ( [[#Klein--2014b|Klein et al., 2014b]] ), it has continued to grow in profile since then. Rather than a future or fringe consideration—for example, an extreme action necessitated by the limits of incremental adaptation— transformational adaptation is increasingly an option that decision makers are considering today. This increasing attention to transformational adaptation is driven by a growing recognition of climate risks and impacts, as well as the need for urgent, systemic action as laid out in the IPCC’s recent special reports ( [[#IPCC--2018c|IPCC, 2018c]] ). Yet what incremental and transformational adaptation look like, how they relate in practice and how to appropriately choose incremental or transformational options is uncertain and increasingly debated ( Section 17.2.2.3; [[#Termeer--2016|Termeer et al., 2016]] ; [[#Few--2017|Few et al., 2017]] ; [[#Vermeulen--2018|Vermeulen et al., 2018]] ; [[#Magnan--2020|Magnan et al., 2020]] ; [[#Wilson--2020|Wilson et al., 2020]] ). One of the main challenges is now to generate empirical evidence and policy relevant insights on transformational adaptation (e.g., [[#Jakku--2016|Jakku et al., 2016]] ). Transformative approaches are especially being discussed in the context of COVID-19 ( [[#Schipper--2020|Schipper et al., 2020]] ; Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7).

Increasingly reflective adaptation research

Another characteristic of recent adaptation research is a stronger focus on ethics, justice and power ( [[#Byskov--2021|Byskov et al., 2021]] ; [[#Coggins--2021|Coggins et al., 2021]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ). Researchers and practitioners are increasingly impatient to address the root causes of vulnerability and use inclusive climate adaptation processes to generate effective adaptation responses for marginalised and misrecognised groups ( [[#Tschakert--2013|Tschakert et al., 2013]] ; [[#Eriksen--2015|Eriksen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scoones--2015|Scoones et al., 2015]] ; [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Wisner--2016|Wisner, 2016]] ). Increasingly ambitious, normative adaptation research often challenges technological solutions that simply reinforce the existing ''status quo'' ( [[#Nightingale--2019|Nightingale et al., 2019]] , p. 2) and calls for ‘socially just pathways for change’. Here work on adaptation overlaps with mitigation, transitions and other large-scale social change, encouraging the move towards more systemic, integrated approaches that discern between options according to multiple criteria (Goldman et al., 2018).

Fundamental questions about equity and justice in adaptation include gender and intersectionality (see Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18; Section 1.4.1.1; Chapter 18;) and broader critiques of who participates in processes of adaptation planning and implementation, who receives investments, who and what benefits from them, who makes key decisions regarding adjustments through time ( [[#Taylor--2014|Taylor et al., 2014]] ; [[#Boeckmann--2016|Boeckmann and Zeeb, 2016]] ; [[#Nightingale--2019|Nightingale et al., 2019]] ; [[#Pelling--2019|Pelling and Garschagen, 2019]] ; [[#Byskov--2021|Byskov et al., 2021]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ) and how climate justice intersects with other justice agendas. Attention is also turning to relations and tensions between different adaptation approaches, scales, constraints, limits, losses, enablers and outcomes ( [[#Barnett--2015|Barnett et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pelling--2015|Pelling et al., 2015]] ; [[#Mechler--2016|Mechler and Schinko, 2016]] ; [[#Crichton--2017|Crichton and Esteban, 2017]] ; [[#Gharbaoui--2017|Gharbaoui and Blocher, 2017]] ; Deshpande et al., 2018; [[#McNamara--2019|McNamara and Jackson, 2019]] ). Evident here is an ongoing, serious knowledge gap around the long-term repercussions of adaptation interventions. There is growing awareness of the need to address the potential for maladaptation (Sections 1.4.2.4; 5.13.3; 15.5.1; 17.5.2; Chapter 4). Concerns about maladaptation have led to renewed calls to open the ‘black box’ of decision making to examine the influence of power relationships, politics and institutional culture ( [[#Biesbroek--2013|Biesbroek et al., 2013]] ; [[#Eriksen--2015|Eriksen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Goldman--2018|Goldman et al., 2018]] ), including the power–adaptation linkage itself ( [[#Woroniecki--2019|Woroniecki et al., 2019]] ), external factors outside the decision-making process ( [[#Eisenack--2014|Eisenack et al., 2014]] ) and the influence of leadership on adaptation processes and outcomes ( [[#Meijerink--2014|Meijerink et al., 2014]] ; [[#Vignola--2017|Vignola et al., 2017]] ).

All of these developments indicate that adaptation research is not only more reflexive about some of its central assumptions, methodologies and tools ( [[#Biesbroek--2013|Biesbroek et al., 2013]] ; [[#Conway--2014|Conway and Mustelin, 2014]] ; [[#Nalau--2015|Nalau et al., 2015]] ; [[#Nightingale--2015a|Nightingale, 2015a]] ; [[#Porter--2015|Porter et al., 2015]] ; [[#Eriksen--2015|Eriksen et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lubell--2019|Lubell and Niles, 2019]] ; [[#Woroniecki--2019|Woroniecki et al., 2019]] ; [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ), but also cognisant of the need to critically consider its underpinning goals, purpose and impact in the world.

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<span id="monitoring-and-evaluation-of-adaptation"></span>
=== 1.4.3 Monitoring and Evaluation of Adaptation ===

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M&amp;E encompasses a broad range of activities serving multiple purposes, including tracking progress of adaptation efforts over time, understanding equity and effectiveness of adaptation options and outcomes, and informing ongoing adaptation processes (Section 17.5.2.1). While monitoring and evaluation are often referred to jointly as ‘M&amp;E,’ monitoring usually refers to continuous information gathering, whereas evaluation denotes more comprehensive assessments of effectiveness and equity, often resulting in recommendations for decision makers (Sections 17.5.1.1; 17.5.1.7). In some literatures M&amp;E refers solely to efforts undertaken after implementation. In other literatures, M&amp;E refers both to efforts conducted before and after implementation. As shown in Figure 1.8, M&amp;E is essential to the process of iterative risk management, both in terms of adaptation assessment prior to implementation and M&amp;E of implemented adaptation measures. AR6 highlights that M&amp;E after implementation is much less common than adaptation assessment prior to implementation (Section 17.5.2.1; [[#Berrang-Ford--2020|Berrang-Ford, 2020]] ).

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[[File:54e0dcb506b10fdcca978fbba749c74e IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_008.png]]

'''Figure 1.8 |''' '''Adaptation assessment prior to implementation and M&amp;E during and after implementation.''' Both systematic assessment of adaptation needs and options and M&amp;E of implemented adaptation are key to iterative climate risk management and to achieving effective and equitable adaptation. Most assessments to date have referred to aspects prior to implementation. There is much less systematic evidence on adaptation action, and even less evidence on adaptation outcomes and impacts and their implications for climate change impacts, risks, vulnerabilities and resilience. Figure 17.9 provides more detail on M&amp;E.

Tracking adaptation planning and policies : Since AR5, interest in M&amp;E for tracking progress in adaptation has grown substantially at the local, national and global level. The Paris Agreement calls for a global stocktake every 5 years starting in 2023 (Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in Chapter 17). It also encourages states to monitor and evaluate their adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions and provides guidance on communicating information about adaptation to the international community ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b|UNFCCC, 2015b]] , Article 7.9d; [[#UNFCCC--2018a|UNFCCC, 2018a]] , Decision 9/CMA.1; [[#UNFCCC--2018b|UNFCCC, 2018b]] , Decision 18/CMA.1).

Since AR5, a large number of case studies on individual local to national level adaptation measures have been published (see [[#Chambwera--2014|Chambwera et al., 2014]] ; [[#Keskitalo--2019b|Keskitalo and Preston, 2019b]] ), as well as comparative studies across countries over multiple years ( [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2020|Biesbroek and Delaney, 2020]] ). The existing literature now allows for at least preliminary conclusions about where and why we observe adaptation efforts, as described in the sectoral, regional and synthesis chapters of this report.

While case studies provide context-specific insights, global inventories are essential for tracking global progress on adaptation ( [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP, 2018]] ; UNEP et al., 2021; Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS). Until recently, the dominant approach surveyed National Communications to the UNFCCC to measure the amount of adaptation planning activity worldwide ( [[#Gagnon-Lebrun--2007|Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala, 2007]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ). More recent assessments have focused also on the quality of local and national adaptation planning to better characterise its potential merits, shortcomings and effects ( [[#Woodruff--2019|Woodruff and Regan, 2019]] ; UNEP et al., 2021) and have compiled inventories of adaptation projects ( [[#Leiter--2021|Leiter, 2021]] ) and local adaptation policies ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2019b|Lesnikowski et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Olazabal--2019|Olazabal et al., 2019]] ; see also Section 6.4.6). Chapters 16 and 17 of this report offer an initial synthesis, but efforts to compile a comprehensive global, empirical inventory of climate change adaptation remain in an early phase (e.g., [[#Tompkins--2010|Tompkins et al., 2010]] ; [[#Berrang-Ford--2011|Berrang-Ford et al., 2011]] ; [[#GEF--2011|GEF, 2011]] ; [[#Ford--2015|Ford et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2016|Lesnikowski et al., 2016]] ; [[#Fankhauser--2017|Fankhauser, 2017]] ; [[#Leiter--2021|Leiter, 2021]] ; [[#Tompkins--2018|Tompkins et al., 2018]] ).

Improving effectiveness : Information regarding the effectiveness of adaptation remains scarce (UNEP et al., 2021), which hinders efforts to improve adaptation practice. A recent comprehensive review found that only 2.3% of the close to 1700 articles identified by the Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative as documenting implemented adaptation provide evidence of risk reduction (Chapter 16; [[#Berrang-Ford--2020|Berrang-Ford, 2020]] ). However, there is limited but emerging evidence of the use of M&amp;E by different actors to assess adaptation progress (Section 17.5.1).

Existing case studies use varying criteria for assessing effectiveness, complicating comparisons. Judgements regarding successful adaptation are contingent on the chosen scale and perspective (success for whom?) ( [[#Adger--2005|Adger et al., 2005]] ; [[#Dilling--2019|Dilling et al., 2019]] ) and on the level of risk, that is increasing climate risks may cause previously successful adaptation to become insufficient. Rather than a binary outcome (successful or unsuccessful), adaptation can be viewed on a continuum from successful adaptation to maladaptation (Section 17.5.2). Assessments of adaptation success need to account for distributional effects and differential vulnerability, as well as consider connections across different scales and complex interactions with other change processes (Section 17.5.1). Recent literature has begun to identify how adaptation can better achieve its intended objectives ( [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). For instance, inclusive M&amp;E can legitimise and validate M&amp;E and foster commitment and learning.

Informing ongoing adaptation : Iterative risk management involves an ongoing cycle of assessment, action, learning and response in which M&amp;E plays a central, enabling role (Section 1.2.1.1). Assessing the risk reduction provided by adaptation, both planned and implemented, often requires projections of anticipated future climate, socioeconomic conditions, and the effectiveness and implications for justice of each option (Section 17.4.4). Understanding the potential for maladaptation may also require such assessments (Section 1.4.2). Processes, such as adaptive pathways, that involve anticipating future responses (Boxes 11.4; 11.6; Sections 11.7; 17.3) entail monitoring to detect early warning of approaching thresholds or changes in the solution space (e.g., more rapid than expected sea level rise or new social acceptance of managed retreat) that suggest the need or opportunity to adjust or expand current adaptation efforts ( [[#Haasnoot--2021|Haasnoot et al., 2021]] ).

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=== 1.4.4 Limits to Adaptation ===

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The effectiveness of adaptation efforts also depends on the constraints and limits that human and natural systems face when confronted with increasingly higher levels of climate risks. The concept of adaptation limits strongly affects any appropriate balance among adaptation and mitigation actions in the sense that less mitigation makes adaptation harder or even infeasible. '''Adaptation limits''' refer to the point at which an actor’s objectives (or system needs) cannot be secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions (Annex II: Glossary). Adaptation limits can be soft or hard. '''Soft adaptation limits''' occur when options may exist but are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks through adaptive actions and '''hard adaptation limits''' occur when no adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks. Intolerable risks are those which fundamentally threaten a private or social norm—threatening, for instance, public safety, continuity of traditions, a legal standard or a social contract—despite adaptive action having been taken ( [[#Dow--2013|Dow et. al. 2013]] ). Intolerable risks threaten core social objectives associated with health, welfare, security or sustainability (WGII AR5 Chapter 16, [[#Klein--2014b|Klein et al., 2014b]] ). Through the lens of resilience, hard limits represent the range of change or disturbance beyond which a system cannot maintain its essential function, identity and structure. Soft limits represent the range of change or disturbance of a system which can be sustained over time by innovation or policy changes. The level of GHG emissions reduction, adaptation and risk management measures are the key factors determining if and when adaptation limits are reached.

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==== 1.4.4.1 Limits to Adaptation and Relation to Transformation ====

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A species’ ability to adapt may be significantly impacted by the dynamics of interactions between the ecosystems and species, so that a species may reach its limit to adapt even in a gradually changing environment, leading to sudden changes in range fragmentation ( [[#Radchuk--2019|Radchuk et al., 2019]] ). As human interventions affect the ability of species and ecosystems to adapt, a deeper understanding on ecosystems and species interactions and evolution in response to climate change is important in order to reduce future biodiversity losses ( [[#Nadeau--2019|Nadeau and Urban, 2019]] ). Soft limits are usually associated with human systems whereas hard limits are more proximate for natural systems due to inability to adapt to biophysical changes (Chapter 16) ( ''medium confidence'' ). Many human and natural systems are near their soft adaptation limits for instance, terrestrial and aquatic species and ecosystems, coastal communities, water security, crop production, and human health (Chapters 2;3; 4; 5; 7; 16; [[#Dow--2013|Dow et al., 2013]] ).

The concept of limits to adaptation is dynamic in terms of the temporal, spatial and contextual dimensions of climate change risks, impacts and responses (Chapter 17; [[#Storch--2018|Storch, 2018]] ). Adaptation limits depend on a complex function of interactions between social, ecological, technological and climatic elements, which appear to have thresholds beyond which adaptation can be infeasible and represent limits to adaptation. Such thresholds are endogenous to society and hence contingent on ethics, knowledge, attitudes, culture, governance, institutions and policies ( [[#Abrahamson--2009|Abrahamson et al., 2009]] ; [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ). Since AR5, the evidence on limits to adaptation has been advanced across regions and sectors. Many adaptation constraints (financial, governance, institutional and policy, etc.) lead to soft adaptation limits (see Chapter 16 for detailed evidence on constraints and adaptation limits). The ability of actors to overcome these constraints including social constraints to behavioural changes, depends on additional adaptation implementation. ( [[#Abrahamson--2009|Abrahamson et al., 2009]] ; [[#Juan--2011|Juan, 2011]] ; [[#Di%20Virgilio--2019|Di Virgilio et al., 2019]] ). Thus, socioeconomic, technological, governance and institutional systems or policies can be changed or transformed in responses to the different dimension of adaptation limits to climate change and extreme events.

When a limit (soft) is reached, then intolerable risks and impacts may occur, and additional adaptations (incremental or transformational) are required.to reduce or avoid these risks and impacts (Chapters 16; 17). IPCC SR1.5 defined incremental adaptation that maintains the essence and integrity of a system or process at a given scale, whereas transformational adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a socio-ecological system in anticipation of climate change and its impacts. When incremental adaptation is insufficient to avoid intolerable risks, transformational adaptation may be able to extend the potential to sustain human and natural systems ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17; [[#Klein--2014b|Klein et al., 2014b]] ). Transformational adaptation can allow a system to extend beyond its soft limits and prevent soft limits from becoming hard limits. This report provides evidence of assessing transformational adaptation in terms of scope, depth, speed and limits to adaptation (Chapter 16).

This report assesses adaptation limits (soft and hard) and residual risks for some actors and systems (Chapter 16). '''Residual risk''' is the risk that remains following adaptation and risk reduction efforts (SROCC). Residual risk is also used as other terms such as ‘residual impacts’, ‘residual loss and damage’ and ‘residual damage’. As noted in AR5 WGII ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] , b), the residual risk is larger or smaller depending on a society’s choices about the appropriate level of adaptation and its ability to achieve an appropriate level. The intersection of inequality and poverty presents significant adaptation limits, resulting in residual impacts for vulnerable groups, including women, youth, elderly, ethnic and religious minorities, Indigenous People and refugees (Section 8.4.5). An appropriate level of adaptation, which ideally reflects a balance between the desired level of risk and the actions needed to achieve that level of risk, depends on the solution space, the society’s views on climate justice, the tolerance for climate-related risks, the society’s tolerance for the costs and other impacts of the actions needed to reduce risk. IPCC’s special reports stated that residual risks rise with increasing global temperatures from 1.5°C to 2°C (SR 1.5) and emerge from irreversible forms of land degradation (SRCCL). Among other risks, this report evidenced that, at risk to coastal flooding from sea level rise, nature-based adaptation measures (e.g., coral reefs, mangroves, marshes) reach hard limits beginning at 1.5 ° C of global warming (Chapter 16). Residual risks may lead to exceeding the limits of adaptation, hence, this report underscores on the role of decision making on transformational adaptation for dealing with residual risk as well as soft and hard adaptation limits (Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17). Section 1.5 addresses transformational adaptation in the context of climate resilient development pathways since such adaptation is inseparable from mitigation and sustainable development.

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==== 1.4.4.2 Emerging Importance of Loss and Damage ====

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The concept of '''Loss and Damage''' (with capitalised letters, L&amp;D) refers to the discussion point under the UNFCCC, which is to ‘address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’. Lowercase letters of '''losses and damages''' refer broadly to harm from (observed) impacts and (projected) risks ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ). The IPCC report uses the latter for its assessment on loss and damage which may provide useful information for the former. L&amp;D associated with climate change has gained importance supported by the robust scientific evidence on anthropogenic climate change amplifying the frequency, intensity and duration of climate-related hazards ( [[#Mechler--2019|Mechler et al., 2019]] ). Loss and damage associated with those residual losses and damages that are felt beyond the adaptation actions taken imply a sense of limits to adaptation at a given time and within a spatial context ( [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ). IPCC’s SRCCL also underlined the unavoidable loss and damage due to changes in tropical and extratropical cyclones and marine heatwaves, where adaptation and resilience limits are being exceeded for the people and ecosystems (Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17; [[#IPCC--2019a|IPCC, 2019a]] ).

Loss and damage has emerged as an important topic in international climate policy ( [[#Surminski--2015|Surminski and Lopez, 2015]] ; [[#Roberts--2016|Roberts and Pelling, 2016]] ; [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ). It originated in assessing compensation for SIDS, related to sea level rise impacts. It has since become formalised under the UNFCCC, through the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism ( [[#UNFCCC--2013|UNFCCC, 2013]] ) and Article 8 of the Paris Agreement ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b|UNFCCC, 2015b]] ). The Warsaw International Mechanism promotes the implementation of comprehensive risk management approaches, improves understanding of slow onset events, non-economic losses and human mobility (migration, displacement), and enhances action and support, including finance, technology and capacity building to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, particularly on vulnerable and developing countries ( [[#UNFCCC--2021|UNFCCC, 2021]] ). Different actors have defined loss and damage differently in reference to climate change impacts and responses ( [[#Surminski--2015|Surminski and Lopez, 2015]] ; [[#Roberts--2016|Roberts and Pelling, 2016]] ; [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ; [[#McNamara--2019|McNamara and Jackson, 2019]] ). These understandings include the following: (a) an adaptation and mitigation perspective linking all human-induced climate change impacts to potential loss and damage and a mandate to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference; (b) a risk management perspective emphasising interconnections among disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and humanitarian efforts; (c) a limits to adaptation perspective focused on residual loss and damage beyond adaptation and mitigation; and (d) an existential perspective highlighting inevitable harm and unavoidable transformation for some people and systems. This report assesses the growing literature on loss and damage across sectors and regions linking with adaptation constraints and limits, GWL and incremental and or transformational adaptation to climate risks (Section 8.3.4; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17; Box 10.7).

To assess the projected losses and damages, residual risks also need to be taken into account. The loss and damage associated with the future climate change impacts, beyond the limits to adaptation, is an area of increasing focus, although yet to be fully developed in terms of methods of assessment. This includes non-economic losses and damages, as well as identifying means to avoid and reduce both economic (loss of asset, infrastructure, land etc.) and non-economic (loss of societal beliefs and values, cultural heritage, biodiversity and ecosystem services) losses and damages ( [[#Fankhauser--2014|Fankhauser and Dietz, 2014]] ; [[#Andrei--2015|Andrei et al., 2015]] ). There is increasing evidence of economic and non-economic losses due to climate extremes and slow onset events under observed increases in global temperatures (Section 8.3.4; [[#Coronese--2019|Coronese et al., 2019]] ; Grinsted et al., 2019; [[#Kahn--2019|Kahn et al., 2019]] ), however assessment of non-economic losses and damages is lacking and needs more attention (Serdeczny et al., 2016; [[#Tschakert--2019|Tschakert et al., 2019]] ). The aggregate losses and damages would be higher if non-economic values are considered in such assessment ( [[#Laurila-Pant--2015|Laurila-Pant et al., 2015]] ; [[#McShane--2017|McShane, 2017]] ). To reduce or avoid loss and damage, there is a need for robust conceptual framework and analysis, focusing on future losses rather than past losses ( [[#Preston--2017|Preston, 2017]] ). This should have an emphasis on avoiding versus addressing loss and damage and the role of justice ( [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ), clarity on detection and attribution (Sections 8.2.1; 8.3.3), effectiveness of risk management and adaptation (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB in Chapter 18; Section 1.4), the concepts of risk transfer, liability and financing (Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17; Section 17.4.2) and the role of transformation (Section 1.5).

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