Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-18 (section)

== 18.3 Transitions to Climate Resilient Development ==

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A key finding emerging from the IPCC SR1.5 is the critical role that system transitions play in enabling mitigation pathways consistent with a 1.5°C or less world ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ; [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ).Such transitions are similarly critical for the broader pursuit of CRD, and the various AR6 special reports as well as subsequent literature provide new evidence of why such transitions are needed for CRD, as well as both the opportunities for accelerating system transitions and their limitations for delivering on the goals of CRD.

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=== 18.3.1 System Transitions as a Foundation for Climate Resilient Development ===

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In the AR6, system transitions are defined as ‘ ''the process of changing (the system in focus) from one state or condition to another in a given period of time'' ’ ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ; [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ). In the climate change solution space, system transitions represent an important mechanism for linking and enabling mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development options and actions ( ''very high confidence'' ). SR1.5C identified the need for rapid and far-reaching transitions in four systems—energy, land and terrestrial ecosystems, urban and infrastructure, and industrial systems ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ) (Sections 1.5.1 and 18.1). The SRCCL expanded on this with a focus on terrestrial systems, while SROCC added additional evidence from ocean and cryosphere systems. This section assesses the four system transitions discussed in the SR1.5C assessment in the context of CRD, while also extending the assessment to consider societal transitions as a cross-cutting, fifth transition important for CRD. Literature to support this assessment is also drawn from AR6 regional and sectoral chapters, which is synthesised later in this chapter ( [[#18.5|Section 18.5]] ).

As discussed in Box 18.3 ( [[#Hölscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ), system transitions are linked to system transformation, which is defined as ‘ ''a change in the fundamental attributes of a system including altered goals or values'' ’ (Figure 18.1) ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ). In a systems context, transitions focus on ‘complex adaptive systems; social, institutional and technological change in societal sub-systems’, while transformations are ‘ ''large scale societal change processes … involving social-ecological interactions'' ’ ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ) (Box 18.1). Although system transitions are often identified in the literature as being necessary processes for large-scale transformations ( [[#Roggema--2012|Roggema et al., 2012]] ; [[#Hölscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ), thereby making them a core enabler of CRD, they are not necessarily transformative in themselves.

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==== 18.3.1.1 Energy Systems ====

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Recent observed changes in global energy systems include continued growth in energy demand, led by increased demand for electricity by industry and buildings ( ''very high confidence'' )(Dhakal et al., 2022) . Growth in energy demand has also been driven by increased demand for industrial products, materials, building energy services, floor space and all modes of transportation. This growth in demand, however, has been moderated by improvements in energy efficiency in industry, buildings and transportation sectors ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Dhakal et al., 2022). There is also a trend of moving away from coal towards cleaner fuels, owing to lower natural gas prices and lower cost renewable technologies, and structural changes away from more energy-intensive industry.

Features of sustainable development, such as enhanced energy access, energy security, reductions in air pollution and economic growth, continue to be the dominant influence on the evolution of energy systems and decision making regarding energy investments and portfolios ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Clarke et al., 2022) . To date, climate policy has been comparatively less influential in driving energy transitions globally. Yet there are examples at the local, regional and national level of policy incentivising rapid changes in energy systems ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Clarke et al., 2022) . Many sustainable development priorities have co-benefits in terms of climate mitigation, such as air pollution and conservation policies reducing short-lived climate forcers and sequestering carbon respectively, as well adaptation benefits, such as improved energy access and environmental quality enhancing adaptive capacity ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Clarke et al., 2022) ( [[#de%20Coninck--2018|de Coninck et al., 2018]] ). Alternatively, sustainable development projects can have negative climate implications with, for instance, hydroelectric projects shut down by droughts or floods resulting in greater use of bunker and fuel oil, as well as natural gas.

In addition to sustainable development priorities driving change in energy systems, observed energy system trends have implications for sustainable development (e.g., [[#IEA--2019|IEA et al., 2019]] ). Observed changes in energy system size, rate of growth, composition and operations impact energy access, equity, environmental quality and well-being, with both synergies and trade-offs, including recent improvements in global access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services. For instance, in some countries, such as the USA, there has been a significant shift away from coal as a fuel source for electricity generation in favour of natural gas. More recently, however, renewables have emerged as the dominant form of new electricity generation ( [[#Gielen--2019|Gielen et al., 2019]] ). Similarly, for energy access in developing countries, renewable energy or hybrid distributed generation systems are increasingly being prioritised because of challenges associated with access, costs and environmental impacts from traditional fossil fuel-based energy technologies ( [[#Mulugetta--2019|Mulugetta et al., 2019]] ).

Energy systems have been a historical driver of climate change, but are also adversely affected by climate change impacts, including short-term shocks and stressors from extreme weather as well as long-term shifts in climatic conditions ( ''very high confidence'' ). The potential for such factors is often incorporated into local system designs, operations and response strategies. There have been changes in observed weather and extreme event hazards for the energy system, but to date, many are not attributable solely to anthropogenic climate change (USGCRP, 2017; [[#IPCC--2021a|IPCC, 2021a]] ). Nevertheless, with observed extremes shifting outside of what has been observed historically, existing design criteria and operations may not be optimal for future climate conditions and contingencies (Chapters 2 to 16). Overall, there is limited historical evidence on the efficacy of adaptation responses in reducing vulnerability of energy systems ( ''high agreement'' , ''limited evidence'' ). However, sustainable development trends, such as improving incomes, reducing poverty, and improving health and education have reduced vulnerability (Chapter 16), and improvements in system resiliency to extreme weather events and more efficient water management have occurred that have synergies with adaptation and sustainable development in general.

Available literature indicates that greenhouse gas emissions reductions have been achieved in response to climate actions including financial incentives to promote renewable energy, carbon taxes and emissions trading, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and promotion of energy efficiency standards ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Clarke et al., 2022). Such policies tend to lead to a lower carbon intensity of GDP, due to structural changes in the use of energy and the adoption of new energy technologies. However, other drivers of change are also present and thus ongoing energy transitions and their future evolution are a response to both climatic and non-climatic considerations, with broader sustainable development priorities being a significant driver of change {Clarke, 2022 #4316.}

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==== 18.3.1.2 Urban and Infrastructure Systems ====

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Urban areas and their associated infrastructure are critical targets for CRD processes. This is a function of urban areas being the dominant settlement pattern, with over 55% of the global population living in cities ( [[#World%20Bank--2021|World Bank, 2021]] ). As a consequence, urban areas are also the focal point for energy use, land use change and consumption of natural resources, thereby making them responsible for an estimated 70% of global CO 2 emissions ( [[#Johansson--2012|Johansson et al., 2012]] ; [[#Ribeiro--2019|Ribeiro et al., 2019]] ). The trend towards increasing urbanisation is anticipated to create both challenges and opportunities for sustainable development, as well as climate action ( [[#Güneralp--2017|Güneralp et al., 2017]] ; [[#Li--2019a|Li et al., 2019a]] ).

The built environment is increasingly exposed to climate stresses and more frequent co-occurrences of climate shocks than in the past. This has the potential to increase rates of building and infrastructure degradation and increase damage from extreme weather events. The existing adaptation gaps and everyday risks within many cities, particularly those of the Global South, combined with escalating risk from climate change, makes rapid progress in enhancing urban resilience a high priority for CRD ( [[#Pelling--2018|Pelling et al., 2018]] ; [[#Davidson--2019|Davidson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Lenzholzer--2020|Lenzholzer et al., 2020]] ). Strategic investments in disaster risk reduction, including climate-resilient green infrastructure, updated building codes and land use planning can provide significant long-term cost savings and social benefits. Moreover, evaluating the relative merits of ‘fail safe’ versus ‘safe to fail’ approaches to infrastructure planning can help to identify more design principles that are more robust to the uncertainties of climate change and urbanisation ( [[#Kim--2017a|Kim et al., 2017a]] ; [[#Kim--2019|Kim et al., 2019]] ).

Much of the literature on urban resilience and sustainability focuses on addressing discrete challenges for urban infrastructure subsystems. Climate change has the potential to enhance stress on lifeline infrastructure services such as the provision of electricity, water and wastewater, communications and transportation—subsystems which are often underdeveloped in many regions of the world ( [[#Arku--2021|Arku and Marais, 2021]] ; [[#Sitas--2021|Sitas et al., 2021]] ). For example, a warming and more variable climate can increase stress on electricity grids by reducing transmission efficiency, increasing cooling demand requirements, and by increasing exposure to climate shocks such as heatwaves, floods and storms ( [[#Bartos--2015|Bartos and Chester, 2015]] ; [[#Auffhammer--2017|Auffhammer et al., 2017]] ; [[#Perera--2020|Perera et al., 2020]] ). Accordingly, a significant focus on the energy transition is on achieving the dual goals of reducing the carbon footprint of energy while also increasing resilience of energy supply to current and future threats. For example, renewable energy generation and storage technologies that are modular and distributed and provide enhanced resilience to shocks and stresses from climate change (Venema and [[#Temmer--2017a|Temmer, 2017a]] ).

Similarly, building and maintaining urban water systems that are resilient to climate shocks requires significant changes in water demand, infrastructure and management. Enhancing redundancy in water supply and the flexibility to shift between surface and groundwater options aids adaptation. Decentralised water supply and sanitation options are now feasible and can provide greater resilience than most centralised systems ( [[#Parry--2017|Parry, 2017]] ), provided they have adequate supply ( [[#Leigh--2019|Leigh and Lee, 2019]] ; [[#Rabaey--2020|Rabaey et al., 2020]] ). Water conservation and green infrastructure options for stormwater management are proven approaches for reducing climate risks (Venema and [[#Temmer--2017b|Temmer, 2017b]] ), with adaptation and mitigation co-benefits. Water demand management and rainwater harvesting contribute to climate change mitigation and increase adaptive capacity by increasing resilience to climate change impacts such as drought and flooding ( [[#Paton--2014|Paton et al., 2014]] ; [[#Berry--2015|Berry et al., 2015]] ). In addition, they can contribute to restoring urban ecosystems that offer multiple ecosystem services to citizens ( [[#Berry--2015|Berry et al., 2015]] ) {Lwasa, 2022 #4317} . The context-appropriate development of green spaces, protecting ecosystem services and developing nature-based solutions, can increase the set of available urban adaptation options ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ), while creating opportunities for more complex and dynamic approaches to urban water management ( [[#Franco-Torres--2020|Franco-Torres et al., 2020]] ). For example, the Netherlands’ ‘Room for the River’ policy focuses on not only achieving higher flood resilience, but also improving the quality of riverine areas for human and ecological well-being ( [[#Busscher--2019|Busscher et al., 2019]] ).

An overarching focus of urban sustainability is the reversal of long-standing trends of ecosystem fragmentation and degradation that have resulted in growing separation between human and natural systems within urban environments ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ) (Lwasa et al., 2022). Urban ecosystems and the integration of nature-based solutions and green infrastructure into urban areas can yield benefits that facilitate achievement of the SDGs. There has been growing recognition of urban ecosystems as social, cultural and economic assets that can support economic development while also enhancing resilience to extreme weather events and improving air and water quality ( [[#Shaneyfelt--2017|Shaneyfelt et al., 2017]] ; [[#Matos--2019|Matos et al., 2019]] ). Investing in urban ecosystems and green infrastructure can provide lower-cost solutions to multiple urban development challenges when compared with traditional infrastructure systems ( [[#Terton--2017|Terton, 2017]] ). Relatedly, agriculture, while largely a rural system, is increasingly expanding within urban areas. Urban agriculture enables citizens to fulfil some of their food needs, improving urban resilience to food shortages, enhancing biodiversity and increasing coping capacity during disasters ( [[#Demuzere--2014|Demuzere et al., 2014]] ; [[#Clucas--2018|Clucas et al., 2018]] ) (Lwasa et al., 2022). Strengthening urban agroecosystems therefore increases resilience to supply shocks from climate change impacts and can contribute to community cohesion ( [[#Temmer--2017a|Temmer, 2017a]] ).

Overall, the discourse in the literature regarding the future of cities emphasises the importance of viewing cities as more than just their physical infrastructure that can be made more resilient through engineering solutions ( [[#Davidson--2019|Davidson et al., 2019]] ). Rather, urban areas are increasingly conceptualised as complex socio-ecological or socio-technical systems ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Patorniti--2017|Patorniti et al., 2017]] ; [[#Patorniti--2018|Patorniti et al., 2018]] ; [[#Visvizi--2018|Visvizi et al., 2018]] ; [[#Savaget--2019|Savaget et al., 2019]] ). Such frameworks integrate physical, cyber, social and ecological elements of cities in pursuit of resilience and sustainability transitions, and they recognise the role of governance and engagement processes as being central to system change ( [[#Temmer--2017b|Temmer, 2017b]] ). Nevertheless, some authors have cautioned that urban transitions will be associated with synergies as well as trade-offs with respect to sustainable development ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#Maes--2019|Maes et al., 2019]] ; [[#Sharifi--2020|Sharifi, 2020]] ).

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==== 18.3.1.3 Land, Oceans and Ecosystems ====

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Land, oceans and terrestrial ecosystems are in transition globally, with anthropogenic factors including climate change being a major driving force ( ''very high confidence'' ) ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ) (Box 6). Seventy-five percent of the land surface has been significantly altered, 66% of the ocean area is experiencing increasing cumulative impacts and over 85% of wetland areas have been lost ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ). Since 1970, only four out of eighteen recognised ecosystem services assessed have improved in their functioning: agricultural production, fish harvest, bioenergy production and material harvests. The other 14 ecosystem services have declined ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ), raising concerns about the capacity of ecosystems and their services to support sustainable and CRD.

Given the pressures on land, oceans and ecosystems, enhancing resilience to climate change and other pressures of human development is a core priority of transition in these systems. Yet there are a few recorded initiatives that provide evidence of successful improvement in ecosystem resilience ( ''high agreement'' , ''limited evidence'' ). Similarly, although there is significant evidence that a broad range of adaptation initiatives have been pursued across global regions and sectors, including a rapid expansion of nature- or ecosystem-based solutions ( [[#Mainali--2020|Mainali et al., 2020]] ), there is ''limited evidence'' of how these planned climate adaptation efforts have contributed to enhanced ecosystem resilience. Additional research is necessary to evaluate these efforts in terms of their performance and also to identify mechanisms for scaling them up in different contexts. As an example, Paik et al. ( [[#Paik--2020|Paik et al., 2020]] ) record the increased diffusion of salt tolerant rice varieties in the Mekong River Delta, which is at risk of sea level rise and an associated saline intrusion. This is a low-cost adaption to saline ingress, that increases food productivity and reduces the risk of outmigration for this vulnerable agricultural region.

Evidence of the interactions between ecosystems and resilience come from a range of sources including both regional and sectoral examples (Box 18.2; Tables 18.7–18.8. For example, regional examples suggest that the use of land to produce biofuels could increase the resilience of production systems and address mitigation needs (Box 2.2). Nevertheless, the potential of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) to induce maladaptation needs deeper analysis ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2019|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019]] ). Climate Smart Forestry (CSF) in Europe provides an example of the use of sustainable forest management to unlock the EU’s forest sector potential ( [[#Nabuurs--2017|Nabuurs et al., 2017]] ). This is in response to diverse climate impacts ranging from pressure on spruce stocks in Norway and the Baltics, on regional biodiversity in the Mediterranean region, and the opportunity to use afforestation and reforestation to store carbon in forests ( [[#Nabuurs--2019|Nabuurs et al., 2019]] ). CSF considers the full value chain from forest to wood products and energy and uses a wide range of measures to provide positive incentives to firmly integrate climate objectives into the forestry sector. CSF has three main objectives; (i) reducing and/or removing greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) adapting and building forest resilience to climate change; and (iii) sustainably increasing forest productivity and incomes ( [[#Verkerk--2020|Verkerk et al., 2020]] ).

Other solutions focus on specific subsectors. Mutually supportive climate and land policies have the potential to save resources, amplify social resilience, support ecological restoration, and foster engagement and collaboration between multiple stakeholders (IPCC, 2019 f, C.1). Land-based solutions can combat desertification in specific contexts: water harvesting and micro-irrigation, restoring degraded lands using drought-resilient ecologically appropriate plants, agroforestry and other agroecological and ecosystem-based adaptation practices (IPCC, 2019 f, B.4.1). Reducing dust, sandstorms and sand dune movement can lessen the negative effects of wind erosion and improve air quality and health. Depending on water availability and soil conditions, afforestation, tree planting and ecosystem restoration programmes using native and other climate-resilient tree species with low water needs, can reduce sand storms, avert wind erosion and contribute to carbon sinks, while improving micro-climates, soil nutrients and water retention (IPCC, 2019 f, B.4.2).

Coastal blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves, salt marshes and seagrasses, can help reduce the risks and impacts of climate change, with multiple co-benefits. Over 150 countries contain at least one of these coastal blue carbon ecosystems and over 70 contain all three. Successful implementation of measures of carbon storage in coastal ecosystems could assist several countries in achieving a balance between emissions and removal of greenhouse gases. Carbon storage in marine habitats can be up to 1,000 tC ha –1 , higher than most terrestrial ecosystems. Conservation of these habitats would also sustain a wide range of ecosystem services, assist with climate adaptation by improving critical habitats for biodiversity, enhance local fishery production and protect coastal communities from sea level rise (SLR) and storm events ( [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ). Ecosystem-based adaptation is a cost-effective coastal protection tool that can have many co-benefits, including supporting livelihoods, contributing to carbon sequestration and the provision of a range of other valuable ecosystem services ( [[#IPCC--2019b|IPCC, 2019b]] ).

Diversification of food systems is another component of land, ocean and ecosystem transitions that are consistent with CRD. Balanced diets, featuring plant-based foods such as those based on coarse grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal-sourced food produced in a resilient, sustainable and low-greenhouse gas (GHG) emission manner, are major opportunities for adaptation and mitigation and improving human health. By 2050, dietary changes could free several million km 2 of land and provide a mitigation potential of 0.7–8.0 Gt CO 2 -eq yr -1 , relative to Business-As-Usual projections.

For coastal systems, many frameworks for climate resilience and adaptation have been developed since the AR5 ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2014|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014]] ; [[#Settele--2014|Settele et al., 2014]] ) with substantial variations in approach between and within countries and across development status. Few studies have assessed the success of implementing these frameworks owing to the time-lag between implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting ( [[#IPCC--2019g|IPCC, 2019g]] ). As an example, the Nature-Based Climate Solutions for Oceans initiative has the potential to restore, protect and manage coastal and marine ecosystems, adapt to climate change, improve coastal resilience, and enhance their ability to sequester and store carbon ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2019|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019]] ).

Polar regions will be profoundly different in the future. The degree and nature of that difference will depend strongly on the rate and magnitude of global climate change, which will influence adaptation responses regionally and worldwide. Future climate-induced changes in the polar oceans, sea ice, snow and permafrost will drive habitat and biome shifts, with associated changes in the ranges and abundance of ecologically important species ( [[#IPCC--2019g|IPCC, 2019g]] ). Innovative tools and practices in polar resource management and planning show strong potential in improving society’s capacity to respond to climate change. Networks of protected areas, participatory scenario analysis, decision support systems and community-based ecological monitoring that draws on local and Indigenous knowledge and self-assessments of community resilience contribute to strategic plans for sustaining biodiversity and limit risk to human livelihoods and well-being. Experimenting, assessing and continually refining practices while strengthening links with decision making has the potential to ready society for the expected and unexpected impacts of climate change ( [[#IPCC--2019g|IPCC, 2019g]] ).

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==== 18.3.1.4 Industrial Systems ====

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Industrial emissions have been growing faster since 2000 compared with emissions in any other sector, driven by increased extraction and production of basic materials ( [[#Crippa--2019|Crippa et al., 2019]] ; [[#IEA--2019|IEA, 2019]] ) ( ''very high confidence'' ). About one-third of the total emissions are contributed by the industry sector, if indirect emissions from energy use are considered ( [[#Crippa--2019|Crippa et al., 2019]] ). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant decrease in demand for fuels, oil, coal, gas and nuclear energy ( [[#IEA--2020|IEA, 2020]] ). However, there is concern that the rebound in the crisis will reverse this trend ( [[#IEA--2020|IEA, 2020]] ). Accordingly, the literature suggests a combined set of measures is beneficial for facilitation a transition of industrial systems in support of CRD. This includes (i) dematerialisation and decarbonisation of industrial systems, (ii) establishment of supportive governance, policies and regulations, and (iii) implementation of enabling corporate strategies.

Decarbonisation and dematerialisation strategies have been proposed as key drivers for the transition of industrial systems (Fischedick et al., 2014; [[#Worrell--2016|Worrell et al., 2016]] ). The former involves limiting carbon emissions from industrial processes ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA, 2017]] ; [[#Hildingsson--2019|Hildingsson et al., 2019]] ), while the latter involves improving material efficiency, developing circular economies, raw material demand management, environmentally friendly product and process innovations, and environmentally friendly supply chain management ( [[#Worrell--2016|Worrell et al., 2016]] ; [[#Petrides--2018|Petrides et al., 2018]] ).

Recent modelling suggests that stocks of manufactured capital, including buildings, infrastructure, machinery and equipment, stabilise as countries develop and decouple from GDP ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ). For instance, [[#Bleischwitz--2018|Bleischwitz et al. (2018)]] confirmed the occurrence of a saturation effect for materials in four energy-intensive sectors (steel, cement, aluminum and copper) in five industrialised countries (Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA and China). High growth in the supply of materials may still drive global demand for new products in the coming years for developing countries that are still far from saturation levels. Therefore, accelerating industrial transitions to drive the decoupling of industrial emissions from economic growth and facilitate broader transformation in industrial systems can be one component of CRD.

Continued transitions in the industrial sector will be contingent on technological innovation. Although technologies exist to drive emissions in industrial sectors to very low or zero emissions, they require 5–15 years of innovation, commercialisation and intensive policies to ensure uptake ( [[#Åhman--2017|Åhman et al., 2017]] ) ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ). For instance, several options exist to reduce GHG emissions related to steel production process including increasing the share of the secondary route ( [[#Pauliuk--2013|Pauliuk et al., 2013]] ), hydrogen-based direct reduced iron ( [[#Vogl--2018|Vogl et al., 2018]] ), aqueous electrolysis rout ( [[#Cavaliere--2019|Cavaliere, 2019]] ) and plasma process ( [[#Quader--2016|Quader et al., 2016]] ).

Industrial transitions are also contingent upon consumer behaviour in terms of preferences for, and rates of, consumption of industrial products. Sustainable consumption can play an important role in sustainable production ( [[#Allwood--2013|Allwood et al., 2013]] ; [[#Allwood--2019|Allwood et al., 2019]] ). This suggests feedbacks between industrial production and consumption in driving industrial transitions. For example, sustainable consumption could be triggered and/or enabled through sustainable production processes that provide more sustainable options to consumers as well as public or private promotional campaigns that promote those options. Meanwhile, demand from consumers for more sustainable options could help to drive the expansion of markets and innovation among industrial producers to meet that demand. However, some have argued that such promotional campaigns that target consumers do little to incentivize sustainable development and climate action ( [[#Farrell--2015|Farrell, 2015]] ; [[#Grydehøj--2017|Grydehøj and Kelman, 2017]] ).

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==== 18.3.1.5 Societal Systems ====

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This chapter contributes a fifth system transition in addition to the four which have already been introduced by SR1.5: the societal systems transition. While society and people also feature in the other systems transitions, the purpose of defining a fifth transition is to explicitly highlight the challenges associated with changes in behaviour, attitudes, values and consciousness required to achieve CRD. One caveat of considering transitions in societal systems is the limit to which the nature of change is known: transitions accomplish reconfigurations towards a relatively known destination. Historical and current differences between and within nations translate to a multitude of equally valid but diverse priorities for development, for example the understanding of development towards progress as linear has been challenged as being a Western concept by scholars of colonialisation ( [[#Sultana--2019|Sultana et al., 2019]] ). Thus, societal transitions are understood as being intrinsically diverse for the purpose of achieving CRD.

The four systems transitions identified in SR1.5 already include a component of societal change—for example, attitude change is part of public acceptance that facilitates shifts in energy including changing electricity to renewables ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] SR1.5, [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.1|Section 4.3.1.1]] ) and developing nuclear power ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.1|Section 4.3.1.3]] ), and behavioural change is a part of shifting irrigation practices to drive required land and ecosystems transitions ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.3.2|Section 4.3.2.1]] ). Extracting societal transitions also allows for a detailed examination of other societal dimensions that facilitate systems transitions, for example justice issues relating to water and energy access and distribution, and land use. Societal transition, sometimes known as ‘societal transformation’, is an established concept in different literatures, as described below. Transformation and transition are terms often used as synonyms ( [[#Hölscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ), although different schools of thought understand them as sub-components of each other, for example transition driving transformation, or transformation driving transition. For a more detailed discussion on the differences between transition and transformation represented in the literature, see Box 18.1.

Societal transitions for the purpose of this report are understood as the collection of shifts in attitudes, values, consciousness and behaviour required to move towards CRD. This builds on the SR1.5 ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] : 599) definition of societal (social) transformation: ‘A profound and often deliberate shift initiated by communities towards sustainability, facilitated by changes in individual and collective values and behaviours, and a fairer balance of political, cultural, and institutional power in society’. This includes accepting Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (IKLK) as an equally valid form of knowledge as compared with Western, scientific knowledge (see Cross-Chapter Box INDIG) and recognition of the role of shifting gender norms to achieve climate resilience (see Cross-Chapter Box GENDER). Changes associated with societal transitions are not specific to defined systems (e.g., energy, industry, land/ecosystems or urban/infrastructure). Rather, these sectoral systems are embedded within broader societal systems, including for example political systems, economic systems, knowledge systems and cultural systems ( [[#Davelaar--2021|Davelaar, 2021]] ; [[#Turnhout--2021|Turnhout et al., 2021]] ; [[#Visseren-Hamakers--2021|Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2021]] ). Changes that happen in these broader social systems can therefore prompt changes in all systems embedded within them, meaning that societal transition is key to transforming across a range of sectors and topics ( [[#Leventon--2021|Leventon et al., 2021]] ). Furthermore, societal transition requires changes in individual behaviours, but also in the broader conditions that shape these behaviours. These broader conditions are largely related to questions of power, in enforcing dominant political economies and social-technological mindsets ( [[#Stoddard--2021|Stoddard et al., 2021]] ). This section also briefly describes the various trains of research on societal transitions and transformation.

Because of the multiple sectors, interests and scales that are involved in societal transitions, understanding and creating evidence on transitions requires shifting across system boundaries and finding ways to transcend disciplinary silos. Relevant research includes work within the topic of transformation and transitions ( [[#Hölscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ). Transformations literature can be split into multiple sub-concepts and requires engagement with multiple schools of thought ( [[#Feola--2015|Feola, 2015]] ; [[#Feola--2021|Feola et al., 2021]] ). Much focus within transformations research is currently related to biodiversity conservation ( [[#Massarella--2021|Massarella et al., 2021]] ), and transitions work tends towards a focus in urban areas ( [[#Loorbach--2017|Loorbach et al., 2017]] ). Though there is also work in both that is more broadly labelled as sustainability transformations or transitions ( [[#Luederitz--2017|Luederitz et al., 2017]] ). Furthermore, there is likely to be much relevant literature that does not explicitly label itself as transformations or transitions ( [[#Feola--2021|Feola et al., 2021]] ). For example, we could look to political science theories on policy change ( [[#Leventon--2021|Leventon et al., 2021]] ) and historical perspectives on social change. Bridging these divides will require a deeper rethinking in the research community to undo power structures that marginalise diverse knowledge ( [[#Caniglia--2021|Caniglia et al., 2021]] ; [[#Lahsen--2021|Lahsen and Turnhout, 2021]] ).

There are a number of concepts proposed as pathways to creating societal transitions; usually centred around the idea of working with individuals and communities to change their mindsets as a way to change the way they manage their local environments or behave. Transformations work explores how values are pathways towards sustainability, for example by changing values, through making values explicit, through negotiation and by eliciting values ( [[#Horcea-Milcu--2019|Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019]] ). Human nature connections is a further concept that is identified as a way to shift values and behaviours across a range of disciplines ( [[#Ives--2017|Ives et al., 2017]] ). The role of learning and Indigenous knowledge is also explored ( [[#Lam--2020|Lam et al., 2020]] ). These three concepts have had particular salience in discussions around transformations for biodiversity conservation and restoration, related to the IPBES assessment on Values ( [[#Pascual--2017|Pascual et al., 2017]] ; [[#Peterson--2018|Peterson et al., 2018]] ). They largely focus on the need to engage with people’s values, connections and knowledge to better manage the social–ecological system they are in.

Focusing on bottom-up and community-led transformations, there is emphasis on the role of grassroots organisations in transformations. Community actions around specific locations or topics have parallels to the idea of transformative spaces. They are sites of innovative activity ( [[#Seyfang--2007|Seyfang and Smith, 2007]] ). Grassroots organisations can bridge the local and the political scales by politicising actors and creating new interactions between individuals and political processes ( [[#Novák--2021|Novák, 2021]] ). They are a collective approach to pushing for both individual and societal change ( [[#Sage--2021|Sage et al., 2021]] ).

Despite a current lack of empirical evidence, there are numerous frameworks emerging for exploring societal transitions across levels. There is focus on pathways for sustainability transitions, which tends to look at projected, normative scenarios for the future, and explore or back-cast the institutional and societal changes that are required to get there ( [[#Westley--2011|Westley et al., 2011]] ; [[#Sharpe--2016|Sharpe et al., 2016]] ). There is also work that looks at scaling up of smaller sustainability initiatives, through processes of scaling up, scaling out and scaling deep ( [[#Moore--2015|Moore et al., 2015]] ; [[#Lam--2020|Lam et al., 2020]] ). In particular, systems thinking provides an organising framework for bringing together multiple disciplines and perspectives, to understand problem framings, and normative and design aspects of social systems and behaviours ( [[#Foster-Fishman--2007|Foster-Fishman et al., 2007]] ). Within this, [[#Meadows--1999|Meadows (1999)]] framework of leverage points for systems transformation has been operationalised within the sustainability transformations debate ( [[#Abson--2017|Abson et al., 2017]] ). Here, system properties relating to system paradigms and design are leverage points where interventions can create greatest system change; shallower leverage points relate to materials and processes. This framework is increasingly being used across a range of sustainability problems as boundary objects for cross-disciplinary, critical research ( [[#Fischer--2019|Fischer and Riechers, 2019]] ; [[#Leventon--2021|Leventon et al., 2021]] ; [[#Riechers--2021|Riechers et al., 2021]] ).

Analyses of societal transitions have had limited engagement with adaptation questions. The focus of the sub-field of sustainability transitions on a few industrialised nations, mostly in North America and Europe, limited the field’s development to assumptions born from the experiences in those areas. More recent studies have sought to understand sustainability transitions in other countries, especially emerging economies ( [[#Wieczorek--2018|Wieczorek, 2018]] ; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ). In particular, China has received attention from scholars on sustainability transitions ( [[#Huang--2018|Huang et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lo--2019|Lo and Castán Broto, 2019]] ; [[#Castán%20Broto--2020|Castán Broto et al., 2020]] ; [[#Huang--2020|Huang and Sun, 2020]] ). As a result, some pressing issues related to societal transitions for adaptation have received limited attention compared with that paid to other system transitions. However, more recently, scholarship has begun examining transitions that have turned to nature and nature-based solutions. Adaptive transitions are an intermediary step towards sustainability transitions, whereby multiple actions at material and institutional levels are combined towards improving adaptation outcomes ( [[#Pant--2015|Pant et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scarano--2017|Scarano, 2017]] ).

<div id="box-18.5" class="h2-container box-container"></div>

'''Box 18.5 | The Role of Ecosystems in Climate Resilient Development'''
<div id="h2-26-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Ecosystems and their services closely relate to climate resilient development (CRD). Climate change has impacted ecosystems across a range of scales, and those impacts have been exacerbated by other ecological impacts associated with human activities. Ecosystem-based adaptation strategies have been developed and are crucial to CRD. However, knowledge and evidence still missing, and cultural services—in contrast to provision and regulation services as main benefits and supporting services as co-benefits—are less well addressed in the literature.

'''Ecosystems Play a Key Role in CRD'''
A key element of CRD is ensuring that actions taken to mitigate climate change do not compromise adaptation, biodiversity and human needs. Maintaining ecosystem health, linked to planetary health, is an integral part of the goals of CRD. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) defined ecosystem services as ‘ ''the benefits people obtain from ecosystems'' ’, and categorised the services in to provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural services ( [[#Millennium%20Ecosystem%20Assessment--2005|Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005]] ; [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ). The 2019 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) broadened the definition to ‘ ''the contributions, both positive and negative, of living nature to the quality of life for people'' ’, and developed a classification of 18 categories ( [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ).

Table Box 18.5.1 demonstrates how ecosystem services connect to sustainable development goals (SDGs) and CRD. MEA’s provisioning service generally connects to the IPBES’ material services, mostly contributing to the SDG cluster associated with nature’s contribution to people (NCP) ( [[#Millennium%20Ecosystem%20Assessment--2005|Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005]] ; [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ) and to ‘ '''D''' evelopment’ in CRD. MEA’s regulating and supporting services connect to IPBES’ non-material services, contributing to SDG clusters of Nature and Driver of change in nature and NCP and to ‘ '''R''' esilience’ in CRD. MEA’s cultural services connect to IPBES’ non-material services, contributing to SDG clusters of good quality of lift (GQL) and to '''E''' nabling conditions for CRD.

'''Table Box 18.5.1 |''' Ecosystem services (based on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment [MEA] and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services [IPBES] classifications) and their connections to sustainable development goals (SDGs) and climate resilient development (CRD) ( [[#Millennium%20Ecosystem%20Assessment--2005|Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005]] ; [[#IPBES--2019|IPBES, 2019]] ).

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan="2"| '''Ecosystem services'''

! rowspan="2"| '''SDGs'''

! rowspan="2"| '''CRD'''

|-
! '''MEA'''

! '''IPBES'''

|-
| '''P''' rovisioning services

| 11 Energy

12 Food and feed

13 Materials and assistance

14 Medicinal, biochemical and genetic resources

| 1 No poverty

2 Zero hunger

3 Good health and well-being

11 Sustainable cities communities

7 Affordable clean energy

8 Decent work and economic growth

9 Industry, innovation and infrastructure

12 Responsible consumption and production

| '''D''' evelopment

|-
| '''R''' egulating services

| 3 Regulation of air quality

4 Regulation of climate

5 Regulation of ocean acidification

6 Regulation of freshwater quantity, location and timing

7 Regulation of freshwater and coastal water quality

9 Regulation of hazards and extreme events

10 Regulation of organisms detrimental to humans

| 6 Clean water and sanitation

13 Climate action

| rowspan="2"| '''C''' limate adaptation and mitigation

|-
| '''S''' upporting services

| 1 Habitat creation and maintenance

2 Pollination and dispersal of seeds

8 Formation, protection and decontamination of soils and sediments

18 Maintenance of options

| 14 Life below water

15 Life on land

|-
| '''C''' ultural services

| 15 Learning and inspiration

16 Physical and psychological experiences

17 Supporting identities

| 4 Quality education

5 Gender equality

10 Reduce inequality

16 Peace, justice and strong institutions

17 Partnerships for the goals

| '''E''' nabling conditions

|}

'''Climate Change Impacts on Ecosystems and their Services'''
Climate change connects to ecosystem services through two links: climate change and its influence on ecosystems as well as its influence on services ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.2|Section 2.2]] ). The key climatic drivers are changes in temperature, precipitation and extreme events, which are unprecedented over millennia and highly variable by regions (Sections 2.3, 3.2; Cross-Chapter Box EXTREMES in Chapter 2). These climatic drivers influence physical and chemical conditions of the environment and worsen the impacts of non-climate anthropogenic drivers including eutrophication, hypoxia and sedimentation ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-3#3.4|Section 3.4]] ). Such changes have led to changes in terrestrial, freshwater, oceanic and coastal ecosystems at all different levels, from species shifts and extinctions, to biome migration, and to ecosystem structure and processes changes (Sections 2.4, 2.5, 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5). Changes in ecosystems leads to changes in ecosystem services including food and limber prevision, air and water quality regulation, biodiversity and habitat conservation, and cultural and mental support (Sections 2.4, 3.5). Table Box 18.5.2 presents examples of climate change’s impact on ecosystems and their services from other chapters in the WGII report. The degradation of ecosystem services is felt disproportionately by people who are already vulnerable because of historical and systemic injustices, including women and children in low-income households, Indigenous or other minority groups, small-scale producers and fishing communities, and low-income countries (Sections 3.5, 4.3, 5.13).

<div id="_idContainer026" class="Box_Header-continued"></div>

Box 18.5

'''Table Box 18.5.2 |''' Examples of key risks to ecosystems from climate change and their connections to ecosystem services (ES) in the WGII report and cross-chapter papers (CCPs). (See Table 1 for the description of the categories of ES)

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! rowspan="2"| '''Climate factors'''

! rowspan="2"| '''Key risk'''

! colspan="4"| '''ES'''

|-
! '''P'''

! '''R'''

! '''S'''

! '''C'''

|-
| colspan="6"| '''''Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems''''' '''(Chapters 2, 4, 5; CCP 1; CCP 7; CCP 3; CCP 5)'''

|-
| rowspan="5"| * Increase in average and extreme temperatures
* Changes in precipitation amount and timing
* Increase in aridity
* Increase in frequency and severity of drought
* Increased atmospheric CO 2

| Species extinction and range shifts

| '''X'''

|
| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|-
| Ecosystem structure and process change

| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Ecosystem carbon loss

| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Wildfire

|
| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Water cycle and scarcity

| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| colspan="6"| '''''Ocean and coastal''''' '''(Chapter 3; CCP 1; CCP 6)'''

|-
| rowspan="5"| * Ocean warming
* Marine heatwaves
* Ocean acidification
* Loss of oxygen
* Sea level rise
* Increased atmospheric CO 2
* Extreme events

| Species extinction and range shifts

| '''X'''

|
| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|-
| Ecosystem structure and process change

| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Habitat loss

| '''X'''

|
| '''X'''

|
|-
| Ocean carbon sink less effective

|
| '''X'''

|
|-
| Erosion and land loss

| '''X'''

| '''X'''

|
|-
| colspan="6"| '''''Food, fibre and other ecosystem products''''' '''(Chapter 5)'''

|-
| rowspan="4"| * Global warming
* Water stress
* Extreme events
* Ocean acidification
* Salt intrusion

| Species distribution

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Timing of key biological events change

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Corp productivity and quality decrease

| '''X'''

|
|-
| Diseases and insect

| '''X'''

|
|}

'''Adaptation Practices and Enabling Conditions for CRD'''
Ecosystem protection and restoration, ecosystem-based adaptation (EBA), and nature-based solutions (NBS) can lower climate risk to people and achieve multiple benefits including food and material provision, climate mitigation and social benefits (Sections 2.6, 3.6, 4.6, 5.13, 6.3, 8.6). Table Box 18.5.3 presents some examples of ecosystem adaptation practices reported in WGII sectoral and regional chapters and CCPs, as well as their co-benefits, potential for maladaptation and enabling conditions. Many of the strategies focus on integrated systems (managing for multiple objectives and trade-offs) as well as the fair use of resources. However, there is ''limited evidence'' of the extent to which adaptation is taking place and virtually no evaluation of the effectiveness of adaptation in the scientific literature (Sections 2.6, 3.5). Enabling conditions for the successful implementation ecosystem-based practice include regional and community-based based approaches, multi-stakeholder and multi-level governance approaches, Integration of local knowledge and Indigenous knowledge, finance and social equity (Sections 2.6, 3.6).

'''Table Box 18.5.3 |''' Examples of adaptation practices and their connections to ecosystem services (ES) and climate resilient development pathways (CRDP) in the WGII sectoral and regional chapters and cross-chapter papers (CCPs). (See Table 1 for the description of the categories of ES and CRDP)

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! rowspan="2"| '''Adaptation practices (a''' '''nd –''' '''''exa''''' '''''mples''''' ''')'''

! rowspan="2"| '''Main benefit (and &amp; co-benefit; – trade off; + enabling co''' '''ndition''' '''s; X barrier and potential maladaptation)'''

! colspan="4"| '''ES'''

|-
! '''P'''

! '''R'''

! '''S'''

! '''C'''

|-
| Agroforestry (Table 2.7; Table 5 ES; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.10.4|Section 5.10.4]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.12.5.2|Section 5.12.5.2]] ; Box 5.10; Table 16.2)

* ''Climate Adaptation and Maladaptation in Cocoa and Coffee Production'' (Box 5.7)

| Food provision

# '''&amp;''' Fuel (wood) provision, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, diversification and improved economic incomes, water and soil conservation, and aesthetics

# '''+''' Secure tenure arrangements, supporting Indigenous knowledge, inclusive networks and socio-cultural values, access to information and management skill

# '''X''' Higher water demand; disruption of hydrology; loss of native biodiversity; reduced resilience of certain plants; degraded soil and water quality; improper and increased use of agrochemicals, pesticides and fertilizers

| '''***'''

| '''**'''

|
| '''**'''

|-
| Forest maintenance and restoration (Box 2.2; Table 16.2; Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter 2)

* ''Protected Area Planning in Thailand'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.3|Section 2.6.5.3]] )
* ''Conserving Joshua trees in'' the ''Joshua National Park'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.6|Section 2.6.5.6]] )
* ''Addressing Vulnerability of Peat Swamp Forests in Southeast Asia'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.10|Section 2.6.5.10]] )
* ''Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.6.3|Section 5.6.3.3]] ; Table 16.2)

| Ecosystem conservation

# '''&amp;''' Food provision, fuel provision, job creation, carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation, air quality regulation, water and soil conservation, vector-borne disease control, improved mental health, cultural benefits, natural resources relative conflict prevention

# '''+''' Cooperation of Indigenous peoples and other local communities

# '''X''' Planting large-scale non-native monocultures leads to loss of biodiversity and poor climate change resilience, increased vulnerability to landslide, increased sensitivity of new tree species, reduced resilience of certain plants, high water demand, trees planted damaged buildings during heavy storms, lack of carbon rights in national legislations

| '''**'''

| '''**'''

| '''***'''

| '''**'''

|-
| Traditional practices/Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (IKLK) (Table 2.7; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.6.3|Section 5.6.3]] ; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.1|Section 5.1]] 4.2.2; Table 16.2)

* ''Crop and Livestock Farmers on Observed Changes in Climate in the'' Sahel (Box 5.6)
* ''Karuk Tribe in Northern California'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.6.3.2|Section 5.6.3.2]] )

| Food and material provision

# '''&amp;''' Carbon sequestration

# '''+''' Partnerships between key stakeholders such as researchers, forest managers and local actors, Indigenous and local knowledge

| '''***'''

| '''**'''

|
|-
| Restoring natural fire regimes (Table 2.7)

* ''Protecting Gondwanan wildfire refugia in Tasmania, Australia'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.8|Section 2.6.5.8]] )

| Fire regulation

# '''&amp;''' Biodiversity conservation

|
| '''***'''

|
|-
| Natural flood risk management (Table 2.7)

* ''Natural Flood Management (NFM) in England, UK'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.2|Section 2.6.5.2]] )

| Water security, flood regulation, sediment retention

# '''&amp;''' Biodiversity and ecosystem conservation

|
| '''***'''

| '''**'''

|
|-
| Coastal ecosystem conservation (Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter 2) (Tables 16.2, 2.7)

* ''African Penguin On-Site Adaptation'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5|Section 2.6.5.5]] )

| Coastal protection against sea level rise and storm surges

# '''&amp;''' Fisheries, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, flood regulation, water purification, recreation and cultural benefits

# '''X''' NH 4 emissions, digging channels and sand walls around homes, loss of recreational value of beaches, shifted the flood impacts to poor informal urban settlers, erosion and degraded coastal lands

|
| '''**'''

| '''***'''

| '''**'''

|-
| Eco-tourism within protected areas (Table 2.7)

| Tourism

# '''&amp;''' Habitat protection

| '''***'''

|
| '''**'''

|
|-
| Aquaculture ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.9.4|Section 5.9.4]] ; Table 16.2; Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter 2)

| Food provision

# '''&amp;''' Biodiversity conservation

# '''+''' Farmer incentives, participatory adaptation to context

# '''X''' Lack of financial, technical or institutional capacity; short value chains; productivity varies by system; over-fertilising; deforestation of mangroves; salt intrusion; increased flood vulnerability

| '''***'''

|
| '''*'''

|
|-
| Water–energy–food (WEF) nexus (Box 4.7)

* ''Food Water Energy Nexus in Asia'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-10#10.6.3|Section 10.6.3]] )
* ''New Zealand’s Land, Water and People Nexus under a Changing Climate'' (Box 11.7)

| Water, energy and food provision

# '''X''' Insufficient data, information, and knowledge in understanding the WEF inter-linkages; lack of systematic tools to address trade-offs involved in the nexus

| '''***'''

|
|-
| Urban greening (Tables 2.7, 16.2; Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter 2)

* ''Ecosystem-Based Adaptation in Durban, South Africa'' ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-2#2.6.5.7|Section 2.6.5.7]] )

| Urban flood management, water savings, urban heat island mitigation

# '''&amp;''' Reduced carbon emissions, air and noise regulation, improved mental health, energy savings, recreation and aesthetics

# '''+''' Meaningful partnerships, long-term financial commitments and significant political and administrative

# '''X''' Storage of large quantities of water in the home; water contamination; increased breeding sites for mosquitoes and flies; vectors and diseases; intensified cultivation of marginal lands; clearing of virgin forests for farmland; frequent weeding; increased competition for water and nutrients; reduced soil fertility, invasive species

|
| '''***'''

|
| '''**'''

|}

Box 18.5

Box 18.5

'''Table 18.3 |''' Specific options for facilitating the five system transitions that can support CRD

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Transition'''

! '''Examples'''

! '''Reference'''

|-
| Energy systems

| Fuel switching from coal to natural gas

Expansion of renewable energy technologies

Financial incentives to promote renewable energy

Reduced energy intensity of industry

Improvements in power system resilience and reliability

Increased water use efficiency in electricity generation

Energy demand management strategies

| ( [[#Gielen--2019|Gielen et al., 2019]] ); ( [[#Mulugetta--2019|Mulugetta et al., 2019]] ); ( [[#IEA--2019|IEA et al., 2019]] ); AR6 WGIII Chapter 2

|-
| Urban and infrastructure systems

| Increased investment in physical and social infrastructure

Enhance urban and regional planning

Enhanced governance and institutional capacity supports post-disaster recovery and reconstruction ( [[#Kull--2016|Kull, 2016]] )

| ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ): D3.1)

|-
| Land, oceans and ecosystems

| Expanding access to agricultural and climate services

Strengthening land tenure security and access to land

Empowering women farmers

Improved access to markets

Facilitating payments for ecosystem services

Promotion of healthy and sustainable diets

Enhancing multi-level governance by supporting local management of natural resources

Strengthening cooperation between institutions and actors

Building on local, indigenous and scientific knowledge funding, and institutional support

Monitoring and forecasting

Education and climate literacy and social learning and participation

| (IPCC, 2019 f): C2.1; (IPCC, 2019 f): C4.5; (IPCC, 2019 f): C4

|-
| Industrial systems

| Promote material efficiency and high-quality circularity

Materials demand management (IEA 2019, 2020)

Application of new processes and technologies for GHG emission reduction

Carbon pricing or regulations with provisions on competitiveness to drive innovation and systemic carbon efficiency

Low-cost, long-term financing mechanisms to enable investment and reduce risk

Better planning of transport infrastructure

Labour market training and transition support

Electricity market reform

Regulations—standards and labelling, material efficiency

Mandating technologies and targets

Green taxes and carbon pricing, preferential loans and subsidies

Voluntary action agreements, expanded producer responsibilities

Information programmes: monitoring, evaluation, partnerships, and research and development

Government provisioning of services—government procurements, technology push and market-pull

| ( [[#Åhman--2017|Åhman et al., 2017]] ; [[#Bataille--2018|Bataille et al., 2018]] ; [[#Material--2019|Material, 2019]] ); ( [[#Tanaka--2011|Tanaka, 2011]] ; [[#Schwarz--2020|Schwarz et al., 2020]] ); ( [[#Ciwmb--2003|Ciwmb, 2003]] ); ( [[#Romero%20Mosquera--2019|Romero Mosquera, 2019]] ); ( [[#Tanaka--2011|Tanaka, 2011]] ); ( [[#Ryan--2011|Ryan et al., 2011]] ; [[#Boyce--2018|Boyce, 2018]] ); ( [[#Taylor--2008|Taylor, 2008]] ); ( [[#UNEP--2018b|UNEP, 2018b]] ); ( [[#Kaza--2018|Kaza et al., 2018]] ); ( [[#Söderholm--2012|Söderholm and Tilton, 2012]] ); ( [[#Bataille--2018|Bataille et al., 2018]] ); ( [[#Ghisetti--2017|Ghisetti et al., 2017]] ); ( [[#Taylor--2008|Taylor, 2008]] ; Fischedick et al., 2014; [[#Hansen--2019|Hansen and Lema, 2019]] ); ( [[#Crippa--2019|Crippa et al., 2019]] ; [[#IEA--2019|IEA, 2019]] ); ( [[#Cavaliere--2019|Cavaliere, 2019]] ; [[#IEA--2020|IEA, 2020]] ); Vogl et al. (2018); ( [[#Pauliuk--2013|Pauliuk et al., 2013]] ; [[#Quader--2016|Quader et al., 2016]] )

|-
| Societal systems

| Inclusive governance

Empowerment of excluded stakeholders, especially women and youth

Transforming economies

Finance and technology aligned with local needs

Overcoming uneven consumption and production patterns

Allowing people to live a life in dignity and enhancing their capabilities

Involving local governments, enterprises and civil society organisations across different scales

Reconceptualising development around well-being rather than economic growth ( [[#Gupta--2017|Gupta and Pouw, 2017]] ),

Rethinking, prevailing values, ethics and behaviour

Improving decision making processes that incorporate diverse values and world views

Creating space for negotiating diverse interests and preferences

| ( [[#Fazey--2018b|Fazey et al., 2018b]] ; [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien, 2018]] ; [[#Patterson--2018|Patterson et al., 2018]] ); (MRFCJ, 2015; [[#Dumont--2019|Dumont et al., 2019]] ); ( [[#Popescu--2017|Popescu et al., 2017]] ; David [[#Tàbara--2018|Tàbara et al., 2018]] ); ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015|de Coninck and Sagar, 2015]] ; [[#IEA--2015|IEA, 2015]] ; [[#Parikh--2018|Parikh et al., 2018]] ); ( [[#Dearing--2014|Dearing et al., 2014]] ; [[#Häyhä--2016|Häyhä et al., 2016]] ; [[#Raworth--2017|Raworth, 2017]] ); ( [[#Klinsky--2018|Klinsky and Winkler, 2018]] ); ( [[#Hajer--2015|Hajer et al., 2015]] ; [[#Labriet--2015|Labriet et al., 2015]] ; [[#Hale--2016|Hale, 2016]] ; [[#Pelling--2016|Pelling et al., 2016]] ; [[#Kalafatis--2017|Kalafatis, 2017]] ; [[#Lyon--2018|Lyon, 2018]] ); ( [[#Holden--2017|Holden et al., 2017]] ); ( [[#Cundill--2014|Cundill et al., 2014]] ; [[#Butler--2016|Butler et al., 2016]] ; [[#Ensor--2016|Ensor, 2016]] ; [[#Fazey--2016|Fazey et al., 2016]] ; [[#Gorddard--2016|Gorddard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Aipira--2017|Aipira et al., 2017]] ; Chung [[#Tiam%20Fook--2017|Tiam Fook, 2017]] ; [[#Maor--2017|Maor et al., 2017]] ); ( [[#O’Brien--2015|O’Brien and Selboe, 2015]] ; [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al., 2016]] ; [[#DeCaro--2017|DeCaro et al., 2017]] ; [[#Harris--2018|Harris et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lahn--2018|Lahn, 2018]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ); Sections 5.6.1 and 5.5.3.1

|}

<div id="18.3.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="accelerating-transitions"></span>
=== 18.3.2 Accelerating Transitions ===

<div id="h2-12-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Successfully implementing climate actions and managing trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development ( [[#18.2.4|Section 18.2.4]] ) has important time considerations that imply significant urgency, making substantive progress in system transitions critical for CRD. Both the SDGs and the Sendai Framework, for example, have target dates of 2030. Meanwhile, the Paris Agreement sets specific time horizons for NDCs and the SR1.5 indicated that limiting warming to 1.5°C would similarly require substantial climate action by 2030 ( [[#IPCC--2018a|IPCC, 2018a]] ). While the literature is unambiguous regarding the need for significant system transitions to achieve CRD ( [[#18.1.3|Section 18.1.3]] ), the current pace of global emissions reductions, poverty alleviation and development of equitable systems of governance is incommensurate with these policy time tables ( [[#Rogelj--2010|Rogelj et al., 2010]] ; [[#Burke--2016|Burke et al., 2016]] ; [[#Oleribe--2016|Oleribe and Taylor-Robinson, 2016]] ; [[#Kriegler--2018|Kriegler et al., 2018]] ; [[#Frank--2019|Frank et al., 2019]] ; [[#Sadoff--2020|Sadoff et al., 2020]] ). As noted previously in the AR5, ‘ ''delaying action in the present may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in the future'' ’ ( [[#Denton--2014|Denton et al., 2014]] : 1123). Accordingly, significant acceleration in the pace of system transitions is necessary to enable the implementation of mitigation, adaptation and sustainable development initiatives consistent with CRD ( ''very high confidence'' ).

Studies since the AR5 directly address the issue of how to accelerate transitions within the broader system transitions, sustainability transitions and socio-technical transitions literature ( [[#Frantzeskaki--2017|Frantzeskaki et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gliedt--2018|Gliedt et al., 2018]] ; [[#Gorissen--2018|Gorissen et al., 2018]] ; [[#Johnstone--2018|Johnstone and Newell, 2018]] ; [[#Kuokkanen--2019|Kuokkanen et al., 2019]] ; [[#Markard--2020|Markard et al., 2020]] ). Such literature explores several core themes to facilitate acceleration, which are aligned with the discussion later in this chapter on arenas of engagement for CRD ( [[#18.4.3|Section 18.4.3]] ). One dominant theme is accelerating the implementation of sustainability or low-carbon policies that target specific sectors or industries ( [[#Bhamidipati--2019|Bhamidipati et al., 2019]] ). For example, Altenburg and Rodrik ( [[#Altenburg--2017|Altenburg and Rodrik, 2017]] ) discuss green industrial polices including taxes, mandated technology phase outs and the removal of subsidies as means of constraining polluting industries. Kivimaa et al. ( [[#Kivimaa--2018|Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018]] ; [[#Kivimaa--2019a|Kivimaa et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Kivimaa--2019b|Kivimaa et al., 2019b]] ; [[#Kivimaa--2020|Kivimaa et al., 2020]] ) and Vihemäki et al. (2020) discuss low-carbon transitions in buildings, noting the important role that intermediaries play in facilitating policy reform. [[#Nikulina--2019|Nikulina et al. (2019)]] identify mechanisms for facilitating policy change in personal mobility including political leadership, combining carrots and sticks to incentivise behavioural change and challenging current policy frameworks. These various examples reflect a fragmented approach to system transitions, suggesting a large portfolio of such transition initiatives would be required to accelerate change or more fundamental and cross-cutting policy drivers are needed ( ''high agreement'' , ''limited evidence'' ). Policies that seek to promote social justice and equity, for example, could ultimately catalyse a broader range of sustainability and climate actions than policies designed to address a specific sector or class of technology ( [[#Delina--2018|Delina and]] [[#Sovacool--2018|Sovacool, 2018]] ; [[#White--2020|White, 2020]] ).

In contrast with formal government policies, a second theme in accelerating transitions is that of civic engagement (see also [[#18.4.3|Section 18.4.3]] ), which is reported to be an important opportunity for driving transitions forward ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ). [[#Ehnert--2018|Ehnert et al. (2018)]] describe local organisations and civic engagement in policy processes as an important engine for sustainability activities in European states. Similarly, [[#Ruggiero--2021|Ruggiero et al. (2021)]] note the potential to use civic organisations to appeal to local identities in order to mobilise citizens to pursue energy transition initiatives among communities in the Baltic Sea region. Gernert et al. (2018) attribute such influence to the ability of grassroots movements to bypass traditional social and political norms and thereby experiment with new behaviours and processes. Moreover, civic engagement is also the foundation for collective action including protest and civil disobedience ( [[#Welch--2018|Welch and Yates, 2018]] , [[#18.5.3|Section 18.5.3.7]] ). However, [[#Haukkala--2018|Haukkala (2018)]] observes that while green-transition coalitions in Finland could be an agent of change driving energy transitions, the diversity of views among the various grassroots actors could make consensus building difficult, thereby slowing transition initiatives.

A third theme is that of innovation, generally, and sustainability-oriented innovation, specifically ( [[#de%20Vries--2016|de Vries et al., 2016]] ; [[#Geradts--2019|Geradts and Bocken, 2019]] ; [[#Loorbach--2020|Loorbach et al., 2020]] ), which creates opportunities for overcoming existing transition barriers ( ''very high confidence'' ). For example, [[#Valta--2020|Valta (2020)]] describes the role of innovation ecosystems—partnerships among companies, investors, governments and academics—in accelerating innovation (see also [[#World%20Economic%20Forum--2019|World Economic Forum, 2019]] ). Burch et al. ( [[#Burch--2016|Burch et al., 2016]] ) describe the role of small- and medium-sized business entrepreneurship in promoting rapid innovation. Innovation extends beyond pure technology considerations to consider innovation in practices and social organisation ( [[#Li--2018|Li et al., 2018]] ; [[#Psaltoglou--2018|Psaltoglou and Calle, 2018]] ; [[#Repo--2020|Repo and Matschoss, 2020]] ). [[#Zivkovic--2018|Zivkovic (2018)]] , for example, discusses ‘innovation labs’ as accelerators for addressing so-called wicked problems such as climate change through multi-stakeholder groups. Meanwhile, [[#Chaminade--2020|Chaminade and Randelli (2020)]] describe a case study where structural preconditions and place-based agency were important drivers of transitions to organic viticulture in Tuscany, Italy.

The fourth theme is that of transition management ( [[#Goddard--2018|Goddard and Farrelly, 2018]] ), particularly vis-à-vis, disruptive technologies ( [[#Iñigo--2016|Iñigo and Albareda, 2016]] ; [[#Kuokkanen--2019|Kuokkanen et al., 2019]] ) or broader societal disruptions ( [[#Brundiers--2020|Brundiers, 2020]] ; [[#Davidsson--2020|Davidsson, 2020]] ; [[#Hepburn--2020|Hepburn et al., 2020]] ; [[#Schipper--2020b|Schipper et al., 2020b]] ). Recent literature has given attention to how actors can use disruptive events, such as disasters, as a window of opportunity for accelerating changes in policies, practices and behaviours ( ''high agreement'' , ''medium evidence'' ) ( [[#Brundiers--2018|Brundiers, 2018]] ; [[#Brundiers--2018|Brundiers and Eakin, 2018]] ). This is consistent with concepts in resilience thinking around ‘building back better’ after disasters ( [[#Fernandez--2019|Fernandez and Ahmed, 2019]] ). For example, Hepburn et al. discuss fiscal recovery packages for COVID-19 as a means of accelerating climate action, with a particular influence on clean physical infrastructure, building efficiency retrofits, investment in education and training, natural capital investment, and clean research and development ( [[#Andrijevic--2020b|Andrijevic et al., 2020b]] ).

'''Table 18.2 |''' Emissions pathway regional characteristics from WGIII scenarios database for pathways associated with different global warming levels (1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C and 4°C). Sample sizes: ''n'' = 2, 120–126, 56, and 26 emissions pathways for 1.5°C, 2°C, 3°C and 4°C global warming levels, respectively. Sample size ranges indicate that the sample size varies by variable due to differences in model reporting. Sample size varies by warming level due to model infeasibilities and differences in model reporting.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
| '''Variable'''

| '''Peak global warming to 2100'''

| colspan="2"| '''Asia'''

| colspan="2"| '''Latin America'''

| colspan="2"| '''Middle East/Africa'''

| colspan="2"| '''OECD'''

| colspan="2"| '''Reforming economies'''

| '''''n'''''

|-
| rowspan="4"| Peak CO 2 emissions year

| 1.5°C

| colspan="2"| 2020

| colspan="2"| 2010

| colspan="2"| 2020

| colspan="2"| 2010

| colspan="2"| 2015

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| colspan="2"| 2015 to 2030

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2035

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2030

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2020

| colspan="2"| 2015 to 2030

| 126

|-
| 3°C

| colspan="2"| 2020 to 2080

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2030 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2020

| colspan="2"| 2015 to 2100

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| colspan="2"| 2025 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2070 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2010 to 2100

| colspan="2"| 2040 to 2100

| 26

|-
| rowspan="2"| '''Variable'''

| rowspan="2"| '''Peak global warming to 2100'''

| colspan="2"| '''Asia'''

| colspan="2"| '''Latin America'''

| colspan="2"| '''Middle East/Africa'''

| colspan="2"| '''OECD'''

| colspan="2"| '''Reforming economies'''

|
|-
| '''2030'''

| '''2050'''

| '''2030'''

| '''2050'''

| '''2030'''

| '''2050'''

| '''2030'''

| '''2050'''

| '''2030'''

| '''2050'''

| '''''n'''''

|-
| rowspan="4"| Net CO 2 emissions (% change from 2010)

| 1.5°C

| −18 to −24%

| −73 to −69%

| −61 to −57%

| −94 to −92%

| −26 to −1%

| −65 to −50%

| −50 to −46%

| −91 to −90%

| −42 to −41%

| −92 to −91%

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| −31 to 38%

| −89 to −33%

| −62 to 31%

| −98 to −3%

| −30 to 67%

| −73 to −1%

| −51 to −13%

| −97 to −59%

| −52 to 32%

| −105 to −30%

| 126

|-
| 3°C

| 10 to 50%

| −5 to 49%

| −58 to 16%

| −132 to 50%

| 7 to 84%

| 33 to 101%

| −44 to 2%

| −67 to −12%

| −18 to 33%

| −37 to 41%

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| 26 to 76%

| 37 to 103%

| −49 to 5%

| −41 to 22%

| 19 to 121%

| 78 to 225%

| −34 to −8%

| −53 to −7%

| −13 to 38%

| 0 to 53%

| 26

|-
| rowspan="4"| Energy consumption growth (% change from 2010)

| 1.5°C

| 48 to 48%

| 49 to 62%

| 23 to 27%

| 26 to 39%

| 40 to 46%

| 55 to 62%

| −15 to −12%

| −43 to −28

| −21 to −15%

| −41 to −34%

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| 17 to 90%

| 16 to 130%

| 3 to 72%

| 12 to 160%

| 18 to 82%

| 43 to 145%

| −16 to 10%

| −35 to 11%

| −15 to 37%

| −33 to 29%

| 125

|-
| 3°C

| 43 to 80%

| 70 to 129%

| −9 to 74%

| 17 to 170%

| 21 to 82%

| 79 to 174%

| −16 to 13%

| −29 to 21%

| −3 to 37%

| −15 to 86%

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| 47 to 91%

| 73 to 175%

| 19 to 65%

| 34 to 137%

| 46 to 95%

| 91 to 197%

| −9 to 3%

| −21 to 18%

| −8 to 18%

| −4 to 27%

| 26

|-
| rowspan="4"| Fossil energy use growth (% change from 2010

| 1.5°C

| 7 to 8%

| −34 to 34%

| −9 to −6%

| −53 to −46%

| 15 to 25%

| −23 to −20%

| −42 to −38%

| −81 to −76%

| −38 to −34%

| −81 to −80%

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| −33 to 64%

| −73 to 14%

| −20 to 65%

| −78 to 61%

| −6 to 71%

| −78 to 61%

| −47 to −8%

| −81 to −32%

| −51 to 31%

| −85 to −5%

| 121

|-
| 3°C

| 15 to 70%

| 29 to 89%

| −20 to 65%

| 3 to 124%

| 7 to 79%

| 31 to 158%

| −37 to 3%

| −57 to 3%

| −24 to 32%

| −30 to 43%

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| 38 to 88%

| 59 to 149%

| 10 to 63%

| 21 to 149%

| 41 to 115%

| 103 to 247%

| −26 to −5%

| −45 to −1%

| 14 to 18%

| −5 to 32%

| 26

|-
| rowspan="4"| Electricity consumption growth (% change from 2010)

| 1.5°C

| 159 to 165%

| 330 to 417%

| 91 to 93%

| 275 to 338%

| 119 to 132%

| 500 to 588%

| 3 to 12%

| 32 to 86%

| 28 to 30%

| 67 to 116%

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| 41 to 231%

| 120 to 580%

| 34 to 127%

| 140 to 489%

| 64 to 172%

| 177 to 801%

| −2 to 33%

| 18 to 143%

| −1 to 112%

| 36 to 187%

| 120

|-
| 3°C

| 57 to 198%

| 126 to 472%

| 34 to 129%

| 140 to 348%

| 75 to 175%

| 260 to 600%

| −3 to 39%

| 10 to 128%

| 3 to 112%

| 38 to 221%

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| 107 to 208%

| 203 to 478%

| 47 to 123%

| 156 to 320%

| 84 to 200%

| 332 to 586%

| 1 to 33%

| 20 to 88%

| 36 to 83%

| 78 to 143%

| 26

|-
| rowspan="4"| Growth in electricity share of energy consumption (% change from 2010)

| 1.5°C

| 76 to ‘79%

| 188 to 219%

| 53 to 56%

| 198 to 215%

| 56 to 60%

| 288 to 324%

| 22 to 27%

| 132 to 160%

| 54 to 61%

| 182 to228%

| 2

|-
| 2°C

| −6 to 79%

| 13 to 240%

| 9 to 85%

| 43 to 238%

| 13 to 94%

| 77 to 386%

| −7 to 42%

| 22 to 182%

| −8 to 75%

| 7 to 262%

| 120

|-
| 3°C

| −2 to 76%

| 6 to 158%

| 7 to 85%

| 37 to 180%

| 13 to 94%

| 70 to 204%

| 14 to 39%

| 8 to 112%

| −4 to 57%

| 7 to 127%

| 56

|-
| 4°C

| 29 to 72%

| 41 to 150%

| 20 to 46%

| 37 to 103%

| 26 to 57%

| 70 to 149%

| 9 to 33%

| 22 to 79%

| 26 to 58%

| 43 to 102%

| 26

|}

<div id="cross-chapter-box-gender" class="h2-container box-container"></div>

'''Cross-Chapter Box GENDER | Gender, Climate Justice and Transformative Pathways'''
<div id="h2-27-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Authors: Anjal Prakash (India), Cecilia Conde (Mexico), Ayansina Ayanlade (Nigeria), Rachel Bezner Kerr (Canada/USA), Emily Boyd (Sweden), Martina A Caretta (Sweden), Susan Clayton (USA), Marta G. Rivera Ferre (Spain), Laura Ramajo Gallardo (Chile), Sharina Abdul Halim (Malaysia), Nina Lansbury (Australia), Oksana Lipka (Russia), Ruth Morgan (Australia), Joyashree Roy (India), Diana Reckien (the Netherlands/Germany), E. Lisa F. Schipper (Sweden/UK), Chandni Singh (India), Maria Cristina Tirado von der Pahlen (Spain/USA), Edmond Totin (Benin), Kripa Vasant (India), Morgan Wairiu (Solomon Islands), Zelina Zaiton Ibrahim (Malaysia).

Contributing Authors: Seema Arora-Jonsson (Sweden/India), Emily Baker (USA), Graeme Dean (Ireland), Emily Hillenbrand (USA), Alison Irvine (Canada), Farjana Islam (Bangladesh/ UK), Katriona McGlade (UK/Germany), Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong (Ghana), Nitya Rao (UK/India), Federica Ravera (Italy), Emilia Reyes (Mexico), Diana Hinge Salili (Fiji), Corinne Schuster-Wallace (Canada), Alcade C. Segnon (Benin), Divya Solomon (India), Shreya Some (India), Indrakshi Tandon (India), Sumit Vij (India), Katharine Vincent (UK/South Africa), Margreet Zwarteveen (the Netherlands)

'''Key Messages'''
* Gender and other social inequities (e.g., racial, ethnic, age, income, geographic location) compound vulnerability to climate change impacts ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate justice initiatives explicitly address these multi-dimensional inequalities as part of a climate change adaptation strategy (Box 9.2: Vulnerability Synthesis: Differential Vulnerability by Gender and Age in Chapter 9).
* Addressing inequities in access to resources, assets and services, as well as participation in decision making and leadership is essential to achieving gender and climate justice ( ''high confidence'' ).
* Intentional long-term policy and programme measures and investments to support shifts in social rules, norms and behaviours are essential to address structural inequalities and support an enabling environment for marginalised groups to effectively adapt to climate change ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Equity and Justice box in Chapter 17).
* Climate adaptation actions are grounded in local realities so understanding links with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 is important to ensure that adaptive actions do not worsen existing gender and other inequities within society (e.g., leading to maladaptation practices) ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' [Section 17.5.1]
* Adaptation actions do not automatically have positive outcomes for gender equality. Understanding the positive and negative links of adaptation actions with gender equality goals, (i.e., SDG 5), is important to ensure that adaptive actions do not exacerbate existing gender-based and other social inequalities [Section 16.1.4.4]. Efforts are needed to change unequal power dynamics and to foster inclusive decision making for climate adaptation to have a positive impact for gender equality ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.''
* There are very few examples of successful integration of gender and other social inequities in climate policies to address climate change vulnerabilities and questions of social justice ( ''very high confidence'' ).

'''Gender, Climate Justice and Climate Change'''
This Cross-Chapter Box highlights the intersecting issues of gender, climate change adaptation, climate justice and transformative pathways. A gender perspective does not centre only on women or men but examines structures, processes and relationships of power between and among groups of men and women and how gender, particularly in its non-binary form, intersects with other social categories such as race, class, socioeconomic status, nationality or education to create multi-dimensional inequalities ( [[#Hopkins--2019|Hopkins, 2019]] ). A gender transformative approach aims to change structural inequalities. Attention to gender in climate change adaptation is thus central to questions of climate justice that aim for a radically different future ( [[#Bhavnani--2019|Bhavnani et al., 2019]] ). As a normative concept highlighting the unequal distribution of climate change impacts and opportunities for adaptation and mitigation, climate justice ( [[#Wood--2017|Wood, 2017]] ; [[#Jafry--2018|Jafry et al., 2018]] ; [[#Chu--2019|Chu and Michael, 2019]] ; [[#Shi--2020a|Shi, 2020a]] ) calls for transformative pathways for human and ecological well-being. These address the concentration of wealth, unsustainable extraction and distribution of resources ( [[#Schipper--2020a|Schipper et al., 2020a]] ; [[#Vander%20Stichele--2020|Vander Stichele, 2020]] ) as well as the importance of equitable participation in environmental decision making for climate justice ( [[#Arora-Jonsson--2019|Arora-Jonsson, 2019]] ).

Research on gender and climate change demonstrates that an understanding of gendered relations is central to addressing the issue of climate change. This is because gender relations mediate experiences with climate change, whether in relation to water ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ) (see also Sections 4.7, 4.3.3, 4.6.4, 5.3), forests ( [[#Arora-Jonsson--2019|Arora-Jonsson, 2019]] ), agriculture ( [[#Carr--2014|Carr and Thompson, 2014]] ; [[#Balehey--2018|Balehey et al., 2018]] ; [[#Garcia--2020|Garcia et al., 2020]] ) (see also Chapter 4, [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.4|Section 5.4]] ), marine systems ( [[#Mcleod--2018|Mcleod et al., 2018]] ; [[#Garcia--2020|Garcia et al., 2020]] ) (see also [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.9|Section 5.9]] ) or urban environments ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al., 2018]] ; Susan [[#Solomon--2021|Solomon et al., 2021]] ) (see also Chapter 6). Climate change has direct negative impacts on women’s livelihoods due to their unequal control over and access to resources (e.g., land, credit) and because they are often the ones with the least formal protection ( [[#Eastin--2018|Eastin, 2018]] ) (see also Box 9.2 in Chapter 9). Women represent 43% of the agricultural labour force globally, but only 15% of agricultural landholders ( [[#OECD--2019b|OECD, 2019b]] ). Gendered and other social inequities also exist with non-land assets and financial services ( [[#OECD--2019b|OECD, 2019b]] ) often due to social norms, local institutions and inadequate social protection ( [[#Collins--2019b|Collins et al., 2019b]] ). Men may experience different adverse impacts due to gender roles and expectations ( [[#Bryant--2015|Bryant and Garnham, 2015]] ; [[#Gonda--2017|Gonda, 2017]] ). These impacts can lead to irreversible losses and damages from climate change across vulnerability hotspots ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.3|Section 8.3]] ).

Participation in environmental decision making tends to favour certain social groups of men, whether in local environmental committees, international climate negotiations ( [[#Gay-Antaki--2018|Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018]] ) or the IPCC ( [[#Nhamo--2018|Nhamo and Nhamo, 2018]] ). Addressing climate justice reinforces the importance of considering the legacy of colonialism on developing regional and local adaptation strategies. Scholars have criticised climate programmes for setting aside forestland that poor people rely on and appropriating the labour of women in the Global South without compensatory social policy or rights; where women are expected to work with non-timber forest products to compensate for the lack of logging and for global climate goals, but where their work of social reproduction and care is paid little attention ( [[#Westholm--2015|Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2015]] ; [[#Arora-Jonsson--2016|Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016]] ). A global ecologically unequal exchange, biopiracy, damage from toxic exports or the disproportionate use of carbon sinks and reservoirs by high-income countries enhance the negative impacts of climate change. Women in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) also endure the harshest impacts of the debt crisis due to imposed debt measures in their countries ( [[#Appiah--2018|Appiah and Gbeddy, 2018]] ; [[#Fresnillo%20Sallan--2020|Fresnillo Sallan, 2020]] ). The austerity measures derived as conditionalities for fiscal consolidation in public services increases gender-based violence ( [[#Castañeda%20Carney--2020|Castañeda Carney et al., 2020]] ) and brings additional burdens for women in the form of increasing unpaid care and domestic work ( [[#Bohoslavsky--2019|Bohoslavsky, 2019]] ).

<div id="_idContainer031" class="Box_Header-continued"></div>

Cross-Chapter Box GENDER

'''Gendered Vulnerability'''
Land, ecosystem and urban transitions to climate resilient development need to address gender and other social inequities to meet sustainability and equity goals, otherwise, marginalised groups may continue to be excluded from climate change adaptation. In the water sector, increasing floods and droughts and diminishing groundwater and runoff have gendered effects on both production systems and domestic use (Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.3). Climate change is reducing the quantity and quality of safe water available in many regions of the world and increasing domestic water management responsibilities ( ''high confidence'' ). In regions with poor drinking water infrastructure, it is forcing, primarily women and girls, to walk long distances to access water, and limiting time available for other activities, including education and income generation ( [[#Eakin--2014|Eakin et al., 2014]] ; [[#Kookana--2016|Kookana et al., 2016]] ; [[#Yadav--2018|Yadav and Lal, 2018]] ). Water insecurity and the lack of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure have resulted in psychosocial distress and gender-based violence, as well as poor maternal and child health and nutrition ( [[#Collins--2019a|Collins et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Wilson--2019|Wilson et al., 2019]] ; [[#Geere--2020|Geere and Hunter, 2020]] ; [[#Islam--2020|Islam et al., 2020]] ; [[#Mainali--2020|Mainali et al., 2020]] ) (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.4.4) ( ''high confidence'' ). Climate-related extreme events also affect women’s health—by increasing the risk of maternal and infant mortality, disrupting access to family planning and prevention of mother to child transmission regimens for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) positive pregnant women (UNDRR, 2019) (see also Section 7.2). Women and the elderly are also disproportionately affected by heat events (Sections 7.1.7.2.1, 7.1.7.2.3, 13.7.1).

Extreme events impact food prices and reduce food availability and quality, especially affecting vulnerable groups, including low-income urban consumers, wage labourers and low-income rural households who are net food buyers ( [[#Green--2013|Green et al., 2013]] ; [[#Fao--2016|Fao, 2016]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.12|Section 5.12]] ). Low-income women, ethnic minorities and Indigenous communities are often more vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition from climate change impacts, as poverty, discrimination and marginalisation intersect in their cases ( [[#Vinyeta--2016|Vinyeta et al., 2016]] ; [[#Clay--2018|Clay et al., 2018]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.12|Section 5.12]] ). Increased domestic responsibilities of women and youth, due to migration of men, can increase their vulnerability due to their reduced capacity for investment in off-farm activities and reduced access to information ( [[#Sugden--2014|Sugden et al., 2014]] ; [[#O’Neil--2017|O’Neil et al., 2017]] ) (Sections 4.3, 4.6) ( ''high confidence'' ).

In the forest sector, the increased frequency and severity of drought, fires, pests and diseases, and changes to growing seasons, has led to reduced harvest revenues, fluctuations in timber supply and availability of wood ( [[#Lamsal--2017|Lamsal et al., 2017]] ; [[#Fadrique--2018|Fadrique et al., 2018]] ; [[#Esquivel-Muelbert--2019|Esquivel-Muelbert et al., 2019]] ). Climate programmes in the Global South such as REDD+ have led to greater social insecurity and the conservation of the forests have led to more pressure on women to contribute to household incomes, but without enough supporting market access mechanisms or social policy ( [[#Westholm--2015|Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2015]] ; [[#Arora-Jonsson--2016|Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016]] ). In countries in the Global North, reduced harvestable wood and revenues have led to employment restructuring that has important gendered effects and negatively affects community transition opportunities ( [[#Reed--2014|Reed et al., 2014]] ).

'''Integrating Gender in Climate Policy and Practice'''
Climate change policies and programmes across regions reveal wide variation in the degree and approach to addressing gender inequities (see Table SMCCB GENDER.2). In most regions where there are climate change policies that consider gender, they inadequately address structural inequalities resulting from climate change impacts, or how gender and other social inequalities can compound risk ( ''high confidence'' ). Experiences show that it is more frequent to address specific gender inequality gaps in access to resources. Regionally, Central and South American countries ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-12#12.5.8|Section 12.5.8]] ) have a range of gender-sensitive or gender-specific policies such as the intersectoral coordination initiative Gender and Climate Change Action Plans (PAGcc), adopted in Perú, Cuba, Costa Rica and Panamá ( [[#Casas%20Varez--2017|Casas Varez, 2017]] ), or the Gender Environmental policy in Guatemala that has a focus on climate change ( [[#Bárcena-Martín--2021|Bárcena-Martín et al., 2021]] ). However, countries often have limited commitment and capacity to evaluate the impact of such policies ( [[#Tramutola--2019|Tramutola, 2019]] ). In North and South America, policies have failed to address how climate change vulnerability is compounded by the intersection of race, ethnicity and gender ( [[#Radcliffe--2014|Radcliffe, 2014]] ; [[#Vinyeta--2016|Vinyeta et al., 2016]] ) (see also [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.6.3|Section 14.6.3]] ). Gender is rarely discussed in African national policies or programmes beyond the initial consultation stage ( [[#Holvoet--2014|Holvoet and Inberg, 2014]] ; [[#Mersha--2019|Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019]] ), although there are gender and climate change action strategies in countries such as Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (Mozambique and IUCN, 2014; Zambia and IUCN, 2017). European climate change adaptation strategies and policies are weak on gender and other social equity issues ( [[#Allwood--2014|Allwood, 2014]] ; [[#Boeckmann--2014|Boeckmann and Zeeb, 2014]] ; [[#Allwood--2020|Allwood, 2020]] ), while in Australasia, there is a lack of gender-responsive climate change policies. In Asia, there are several countries that recognise gendered vulnerability to climate change ( [[#Jafry--2016|Jafry, 2016]] ; [[#Singh--2021b|Singh et al., 2021b]] ), but policies tend to be gender-specific, with a focus on targeting women, for example in the national action plan on climate change as in India ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ) or in national climate change plan as in Malaysia ( [[#Susskind--2020|Susskind et al., 2020]] ).

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Cross-Chapter Box GENDER

'''Potential for Change and Solutions'''
The sexual division of labour, systemic racism and other social structural inequities lead to increased vulnerabilities and climate change impacts for social groups such as women, youth, Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Their marginal positions not only affect their lives negatively but their work in maintaining healthy environments is ignored and invisible in policy affecting their ability to work towards sustainable adaptation and aspirations in the SDGs ( [[#Arora-Jonsson--2019|Arora-Jonsson, 2019]] ). However, attention to the following has the potential to bring about change:

Creation of new, deliberative policymaking spaces that support inclusive decision making processes and opportunities to (re)negotiate pervasive gender and other social inequalities in the context of climate change for transformation ( [[#Tschakert--2016|Tschakert et al., 2016]] ; [[#Harris--2018|Harris et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ziervogel--2019|Ziervogel, 2019]] ; [[#Garcia--2020|Garcia et al., 2020]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ).

Increased access to reproductive health and family planning services, which contributes to climate change resilience and socioeconomic development through improved health and well-being of women and their children, including increased access to education, gender equity and economic status ( [[#Onarheim--2016|Onarheim et al., 2016]] ; [[#Starbird--2016|Starbird et al., 2016]] ; Lopez-Carr, 2017; [[#Hardee--2018|Hardee et al., 2018]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.4|Section 7.4]] ) ( ''high confidence'' ).

Engagement with women’s collectives is important for sustainable environments and better climate decision making whether at the global, national or local levels ( [[#Westholm--2018|Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2018]] ; [[#Agarwal--2020|Agarwal, 2020]] ). The work of such collectives in maintaining their societies and environments and in resisting gendered and community violence is unacknowledged ( [[#Jenkins--2017|Jenkins, 2017]] ; [[#Arora-Jonsson--2019|Arora-Jonsson, 2019]] ) but is indispensable especially when combined with good leadership, community acceptance and long-term economic sustainability ( [[#Chu--2018|Chu, 2018]] ; [[#Singh--2019|Singh, 2019]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.6.4|Section 4.6.4]] ). Networking by gender experts in environmental organisations and bureaucracies has also been important for ensuring questions of social justice ( [[#Arora-Jonsson--2018|Arora-Jonsson and Sijapati, 2018]] ).

Investment in appropriate reliable water supplies, storage techniques and climate-proofed WASH infrastructure as key adaptation strategies that reduce both burdens and impacts on women and girls ( [[#Alam--2011|Alam et al., 2011]] ; [[#Woroniecki--2019|Woroniecki, 2019]] ) (Sections 4.3.3, 4.6.44).

Improved gender-sensitive early warning system design and vulnerability assessments to reduce vulnerabilities, prioritising effective adaptation pathways to women and marginalised groups ( [[#Mustafa--2019|Mustafa et al., 2019]] ; [[#Tanner--2019|Tanner et al., 2019]] ; [[#Werners--2021|Werners et al., 2021]] ).

Established effective social protection, including both cash and food transfers, such as the universal public distribution system (PDS) for cereals in India, or pensions and social grants in Namibia, that have been demonstrated to contribute towards relieving immediate pressures on survival and support processes at the community level, including climate effects ( [[#Kattumuri--2017|Kattumuri et al., 2017]] ; [[#Lindoso--2018|Lindoso et al., 2018]] ; [[#Rao--2019a|Rao et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Carr--2020|Carr, 2020]] ).

Strengthened adaptive capacity and resilience through integrated approaches to adaptation that include social protection measures, disaster risk management and ecosystem-based climate change adaptation ( ''high confidence'' ), particularly when undertaken within a gender-transformative framework ( [[#Gumucio--2018|Gumucio et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bezner%20Kerr--2019|Bezner Kerr et al., 2019]] ; [[#Deaconu--2019|Deaconu et al., 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2, Sections 5.12, 5.14).

For example, gender-transformative and nutrition-sensitive agroecological approaches strengthen adaptive capacities and enable more resilient food systems by increasing leadership for women and their participation in decision making and a gender-equitable domestic work ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Gumucio--2018|Gumucio et al., 2018]] ; [[#Bezner%20Kerr--2019|Bezner Kerr et al., 2019]] ; [[#Deaconu--2019|Deaconu et al., 2019]] ) (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2, Sections 5.12, 5.14)

New initiatives, such as the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program, represent an integrated approach to resilience that promotes coordination among social protection, disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Accompanying measures include health, education, nutrition and family planning, among others ( [[#Daron--2021|Daron et al., 2021]] ).

'''Climate Change Adaptation and SDG 5'''
Adaptation actions may reinforce social inequities, including gender, unless explicit efforts are made to change ( [[#Nagoda--2017|Nagoda and]] [[#Nightingale--2017|Nightingale, 2017]] ; [[#Garcia--2020|Garcia et al., 2020]] ) ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Participation in climate action increases if it is inclusive and fair ( [[#Huntjens--2016|Huntjens and Zhang, 2016]] ). [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al. (2018)]] assessed links among various SDGs and mitigation options. Adaptation actions are grounded in local realities, especially in terms of their impacts, so understanding links with the goals of SDG 5 becomes more important to make sure that adaptive actions do not worsen prevalent gender and other social inequities within society ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement)'' . In the IPCC 1.5°C Special Report, [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al. (2018)]] assessed links between various SDGs and mitigation options, adaptation options were not considered. The current SDG 13 climate action targets do not specifically mention gender as a component for action, which makes it even more imperative to link SDG 5 targets and other gender-related targets to adaptive actions under SDG 13 to ensure that adaptation projects are synergistic rather than maladaptive ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.3.2|Section 16.3.2.6]] , Table 16.6) (Susan [[#Solomon--2021|Solomon et al., 2021]] ; Roy et al., Submitted).

This assessment is based on a systematic rapid review of scientific publications ( [[#McCartney--2017|McCartney et al., 2017]] ; [[#Liem--2020|Liem et al., 2020]] ) published on adaptation actions in nine sectors from 2014 to 2020 (see Table SMCCB GENDER.1) (Roy et al., Submitted)(Roy et al., Submitted)(Roy et al., Submitted)and how they integrated gender perspectives impacting gender equity. The assessment is based on over 17,000 titles and abstracts that were initially found through keyword search and were reviewed. Finally, 319 relevant papers on case studies, regional assessments and meta-reviews were assessed. Gender impact was classified by various targets under SDG 5. Following the approach taken in [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al. (2018)]] and ( [[#Hoegh-Guldberg--2019|Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019]] ), the linkages were classified into synergies (positive impacts or co-benefits) and trade-offs (negative impacts) based on the evidence obtained from the literature review which is finally used to develop net impact (positive or negative) scores (see Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 and Supplementary Material).

'''Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 |''' Inter-relations between SDG5 (gender equality) and adaptation initiatives in nine major sectors

[[File:77dd0b9888a893499a7ce9634cc84a53 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Chapter18_Table_CCB_Gender.png]]
Potential net synergies and trade-offs between a sectoral portfolio of adaptation actions and SDG 5 are shown. Colour codes showing the relative strength of net positive and net negative impacts and confidence levels. The strength of net positive and net negative connections across all adaptation actions within a sector are aggregated to show sector-specific links. The links are only one-sided on how adaptation action is linked to gender equality (SDG 5) targets and not vice versa. 22 adaptation options were assessed in ecosystem-based actions, 10 options in technological/infrastructure/information, 17 in institutional and 13 in behavioural/cultural. The assessment presented here is based on literature presenting impacts on gender equality and equity of various adaptation actions implemented in various local contexts and in regional climate change policies (Table SMCCB GENDER.2).

Adaptation actions being implemented in each sector in different local contexts can have positive (synergies) or negative (trade-offs) effects with SDG 5. This can potentially lead to net positive or net negative connections at an aggregate level. How they are finally realised depends on how they are implemented, managed and combined with various other interventions, in particular, place-based circumstances. Ecosystem-based adaptation actions and terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems have higher potential for net positive connections ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ) (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 and Supplementary Material). Adaptation in terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems has the strongest net positive links with all SDG 5 targets ( ''medium evidence'' , ''low agreement'' ). For example, community-based natural resource management increases the participation of women, especially when they are organised into women’s groups ( [[#Pineda-López--2015|Pineda-López et al., 2015]] ; [[#de%20la%20Torre-Castro--2017|de la Torre-Castro et al., 2017]] ) (Supplementary Material). For poverty, livelihood and sustainable development sectors, adaptation actions have generated more net negative scores ( ''limited evidence'' , ''low agreement'' ) (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1). For example, patriarchal institutions and structural discriminations curtail access to services or economic resources as compared with men, including less control over income, fewer productive assets and lack of property rights, as well as less access to credit, irrigation, climate information and seeds which devaluate women’s farm-related adaptation options ( [[#Adzawla--2019|Adzawla et al., 2019]] ; [[#Friedman--2019|Friedman et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ullah--2019|Ullah et al., 2019]] ) (Supplementary Material).

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Cross-Chapter Box GENDER

Among the adaptation actions, ecosystem-based actions have the strongest net positive links with SDG 5 targets (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1, Table SMCCB GENDER.1). In the health, well-being and changing communities’ sector, this is with ''robust evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' , while in all other sectors there is ''medium evidence'' and ''low agreement'' . Net negative links are most prominent in institutional adaptation actions (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1). For example, in mountain ecosystems, changes in gender roles in response to climatic and socioeconomic stressors is not supported by institutional practices, mechanisms and policies that remain patriarchal ( [[#Goodrich--2019|Goodrich et al., 2019]] ). Additionally, women often have less access to credit for climate change adaptation practices, including post-disaster relief, for example, to deal with salinisation of water or flooding impacts (Hossain and Zaman 2018). Lack of coordination among different city authorities can also limit women’s contribution in informal settlements towards adaptation. Women are typically under-represented in decision making on home construction and planning and home-design decisions in informal settlements, but examples from Bangladesh show they play a significant role in adopting climate-resilient measures (e.g., the use of corrugated metal roofs and partitions which is important in protection from heat) ( [[#Jabeen--2014|Jabeen, 2014]] ; [[#Jabeen--2015|Jabeen and Guy, 2015]] ; [[#Araos--2017|Araos et al., 2017]] ; Susan [[#Solomon--2021|Solomon et al., 2021]] ).

'''Towards Climate-Resilient, Gender-Responsive Transformative Pathways'''
The climate change adaptation and gender literature call for research and adaptation interventions that are ‘gender-sensitive’ ( [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ; [[#Thompson-Hall--2016|Thompson-Hall et al., 2016]] ; [[#Kristjanson--2017|Kristjanson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Pearce--2018a|Pearce et al., 2018a]] ) and ‘gender-responsive’, as established in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement ( [[#UNFCCC--2015|UNFCCC, 2015]] ). In addition, attention is drawn to the importance of ‘mainstreaming’ gender in climate/development policy ( [[#Alston--2014|Alston, 2014]] ; [[#Rochette--2016|Rochette, 2016]] ; [[#Mcleod--2018|Mcleod et al., 2018]] ; [[#Westholm--2018|Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2018]] ). Many calls have been made to consider gender in policy and practice ( [[#Ford--2015|Ford et al., 2015]] ; [[#Jost--2016|Jost et al., 2016]] ; [[#Rochette--2016|Rochette, 2016]] ; [[#Thompson-Hall--2016|Thompson-Hall et al., 2016]] ; [[#Kristjanson--2017|Kristjanson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Mcleod--2018|Mcleod et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lau--2021|Lau et al., 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021b|Singh et al., 2021b]] ). Rather than merely emphasising the inclusion of women in patriarchal systems, transforming systems that perpetuate inequality can help to address broader structural inequalities not only in relation to gender, but also other dimensions such as race and ethnicity ( [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Pearse--2017|Pearse, 2017]] ; [[#Gay-Antaki--2020|Gay-Antaki, 2020]] ). Adaptation researchers and practitioners play a critical role here and can enable gender-transformative processes by creating new, deliberative spaces that foster inclusive decision making and opportunities for renegotiating inequitable power relations ( [[#Tschakert--2016|Tschakert et al., 2016]] ; [[#Ziervogel--2019|Ziervogel, 2019]] ; [[#Garcia--2020|Garcia et al., 2020]] ).

To date, empirical evidence on such transformational change is sparse, although there is some evidence of incremental change (e.g., increasing women’s participation in specific adaptation projects, mainstreaming gender in national climate policies). Even when national policies attempt to be more gendered, there is criticism that they use gender-neutral language or include gender analysis without proposing how to alter differential vulnerability ( [[#Mersha--2019|Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019]] ; [[#Singh--2021b|Singh et al., 2021b]] ). More importantly, the mere inclusion of women and men in planning does not necessarily translate to substantial gender-transformative action, for example in National Adaptation Programmes of Action across sub-Saharan Africa ( [[#Holvoet--2014|Holvoet and Inberg, 2014]] ; [[#Nyasimi--2018|Nyasimi et al., 2018]] ) and national and sub-national climate action plans in India ( [[#Singh--2021b|Singh et al., 2021b]] ). Importantly, there is often an overemphasis on the gender binary (and household headship as an entry point), which masks complex ways in which marginalisation and oppression can be augmented due to the interaction of gender with other social factors and intra-household dynamics ( [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Thompson-Hall--2016|Thompson-Hall et al., 2016]] ; [[#Rao--2019a|Rao et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Lau--2021|Lau et al., 2021]] ; [[#Singh--2021b|Singh et al., 2021b]] ).

Climate justice and gender transformative adaptation can provide multiple beneficial impacts that align with sustainable development. Addressing poverty (SDG 1), energy poverty (SDG 7), WaSH (SDG 6), health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4) and hunger (SDG 2)––along with inequalities (SDG 5 and SDG 10)—improves resilience to climate impacts for those groups that are disproportionately affected (women, low-income and marginalised groups). Inclusive and fair decision making can enhance resilience (SDG 16; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-13#13.4|Section 13.4.4]] ), although adaptation measures may also lead to resource conflicts (SDG 16; [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-13#13.7|Section 13.7]] ). Nature-based solutions attentive to gender equity also support ecosystem health (SDGs 14 and 15) ( [[#Dzebo--2019|Dzebo et al., 2019]] ). Gender and climate justice will be achieved when the root causes of global and structural issues are addressed, challenging unethical and unacceptable use of power for the benefit of the powerful and elites ( [[#MacGregor--2014|MacGregor, 2014]] ; [[#Wijsman--2019|Wijsman and Feagan, 2019]] ; [[#Vander%20Stichele--2020|Vander Stichele, 2020]] ). Justice and equality need to be at the centre of climate adaptation decision-making processes. A transformative pathway needs to include the voice of the disenfranchised ( [[#MacGregor--2020|MacGregor, 2020]] ; [[#Schipper--2020a|Schipper et al., 2020a]] ).

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