Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-4 (section)

=== 4.3.7 Observed Impacts on Human Mobility and Migration ===

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AR5 ( [[#Adger--2014|Adger and Pulhin, 2014]] ) found links between climate change and migration in general ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ), but provided no assessment of climate-induced hydrological changes and migration specifically. Likewise, SRCCL ( [[#Mirzabaev--2019|Mirzabaev et al., 2019]] ; Olsson et al., 2020) and SROCC ( [[#Hock--2019b|Hock et al., 2019b]] ) noted that migration is complex and that migration decisions and outcomes are influenced by a combination of social, demographic, economic, environmental and political factors and contexts (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). This chapter confirms this evidence, focusing on climate-induced hydrological changes.

Climate-induced hydrological changes can, through slow-onset (e.g., drought) or rapid-onset (e.g., flood) events, influence human mobility and migration through effects on the economy and livelihoods ( [[#Adger--2018|Adger et al., 2018]] ). There is ''medium confidence'' that climate-induced hydrological changes have affected bilateral migration ( [[#Backhaus--2015|Backhaus et al., 2015]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2016|Cattaneo and Peri, 2016]] ; [[#Falco--2019|Falco et al., 2019]] ). However, there is ''medium evidence'' and ''low agreement'' on the effects on the movements of refugees globally ( [[#Missirian--2017|Missirian and Schlenker, 2017]] ; [[#Owain--2018|Owain and Maslin, 2018]] ; [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Schutte--2021|Schutte et al., 2021]] ) ''.''

There is ''robust evidence'' that floods and droughts have, mainly through adverse impacts on agriculture ( [[#Mastrorillo--2016|Mastrorillo et al., 2016]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2017|Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 2017]] ; [[#Bergmann--2021|Bergmann et al., 2021]] ; [[#Zouabi--2021|Zouabi, 2021]] ) ( [[#4.6.2|Section 4.6.2]] ), both increased and decreased the risk of temporary or permanent migration ( [[#Obokata--2014|Obokata et al., 2014]] ; [[#Afifi--2016|Afifi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ; [[#Murray-Tortarolo--2021|Murray-Tortarolo and Salgado, 2021]] ; [[#Wesselbaum--2021|Wesselbaum, 2021]] ). However, migration effects depend on the nature of the hydrological change, for example, whether it is a slow-onset or rapid-onset event ( [[#Kaczan--2020|Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020]] ), the perception of change ( [[#Koubi--2016|Koubi et al., 2016]] ; [[#de%20Longueville--2020|de Longueville et al., 2020]] ) or the socioeconomic situation of the affected communities ( [[#Ocello--2015|Ocello et al., 2015]] ; [[#Afifi--2016|Afifi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Thiede--2016|Thiede et al., 2016]] ) ( ''robust evidence; medium agreement'' ).

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that an average of 12 million new displacements happen each year due to droughts and floods alone. By the end of 2020, there were 7 million people displaced due to natural disasters, including drought and floods ( [[#IDMC--2020|IDMC, 2020]] ). Furthermore, household water insecurity has also been singled out as a driver of migration, given its physical, mental health and socioeconomic effects ( [[#Stoler--2021|Stoler et al., 2021]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

More research is needed to understand better the contexts in which climate-induced hydrological changes affect the likelihood of migration or alter existing patterns ( [[#Obokata--2014|Obokata et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gray--2016|Gray and Wise, 2016]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2019|Cattaneo et al., 2019]] ).

In summary, climate-induced hydrological changes can increase and decrease the likelihood of migration ( ''robust evidence, medium agreement'' ). The outcome is determined mainly by the socioeconomic, political and environmental context ( ''medium confidence'' ).

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