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==== 9.4.2.1 Governance Barriers ==== <div id="h3-5-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div> Overcoming governance barriers is a precondition to ensure successful adaptation and CRD ( [[#Pasquini--2015|Pasquini et al., 2015]] ; [[#Owen--2020|Owen, 2020]] ). Despite the ambitious climate targets across African countries and renewed commitments in recent years ( [[#Zheng--2019|Zheng et al., 2019]] ; [[#Ozor--2020|Ozor and Nyambane, 2020]] ), governance barriers include, among others, slow policy implementation progress ( [[#Shackleton--2015|Shackleton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Taylor--2016|Taylor, 2016]] ), incoherent and fragmented approaches ( [[#Zinngrebe--2020|Zinngrebe et al., 2020]] ; [[#Nemakonde--2021|Nemakonde et al., 2021]] ), inadequate governance systems to manage climate finance ( [[#Granoff--2016|Granoff et al., 2016]] ; [[#Banga--2019|Banga, 2019]] ), poor stakeholder participation ( [[#Sherman--2014|Sherman and Ford, 2014]] ), gender inequalities ( [[#Andrijevic--2020|Andrijevic et al., 2020]] ), unaligned development and climate agendas ( [[#Musah-Surugu--2019|Musah-Surugu et al., 2019]] ; [[#Robinson--2020|Robinson, 2020]] ), elite capture of climate governance systems ( [[#Kita--2019|Kita, 2019]] ), hierarchical and complex state bureaucracy ( [[#Meissner--2016|Meissner and Jacobs, 2016]] ; [[#Biesbroek--2018|Biesbroek et al., 2018]] ) and weak, non-existent or fragmented sub-national institutions ( [[#Paterson--2017|Paterson et al., 2017]] ; [[#Musah-Surugu--2019|Musah-Surugu et al., 2019]] ). Further, adaptation planning involves cross-cutting themes, multiple actors and institutions with different objectives, jurisdictional authority and levels of power and resources, yet there is often a lack of coordination, clear leadership or governance mandates ( [[#Shackleton--2015|Shackleton et al., 2015]] ; [[#Leck--2018|Leck and Simon, 2018]] ) and unequal power relations between African countries and developed countries can hinder progress on governance of financial markets, budget allocations and technology transfer to address addressing climate technology gaps in Africa ( [[#Rennkamp--2015|Rennkamp and Boyd, 2015]] ; [[#Olawuyi--2018|Olawuyi, 2018]] ). Policy implementation can be slow due to the absence of support mechanisms and dependency on funding by international partners ( [[#Leck--2015|Leck and Roberts, 2015]] ; [[#Ozor--2020|Ozor and Nyambane, 2020]] ). In many countries, commitment to climate policy objectives is low ( [[#Naess--2015|Naess et al., 2015]] ), particularly in light of competing development imperatives and post-COVID-19 recovery efforts ( [[#Caetano--2020|Caetano et al., 2020]] ), although COVID-19 recovery efforts offer significant opportunities for health, economic and climate resilience co-benefits (Sections 9.4.3; 9.11.5; Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). Another challenge relates to long-term planning and decision making which is hampered by uncertainty related to future socioeconomic and GHG emissions scenarios ( [[#Coen--2021|Coen, 2021]] ), political cycles and short-term political appointment terms ( [[#Pasquini--2015|Pasquini et al., 2015]] ). Lack of community agency in climate governance affects the capacity for citizen-led climate interventions in Africa ( [[#Antwi-Agyei--2015|Antwi-Agyei et al., 2015]] ; [[#Mersha--2016|Mersha and Van Laerhoven, 2016]] ). This is attributed partly to low civic education, limited participation power of citizens and tokenism due to perceived lack of immediate benefits ( [[#Odei%20Erdiaw-Kwasie--2020|Odei Erdiaw-Kwasie et al., 2020]] ), as well as low rates of climate change literacy in many regions ( [[#9.4.3|Section 9.4.3]] ; [[#Simpson--2021a|Simpson et al., 2021a]] ). Participation in climate policy also extends to the private sector, which has been relatively uninvolved in adaptation discussions to date ( [[#Crick--2018|Crick et al., 2018]] ). Africa requires substantial resources and support to adapt to the unavoidable consequences of climate change, a pertinent climate justice concern for governments. However, the mechanisms needed to redress current power imbalances, structural and systemic inequality are often absent ( [[#Saraswat--2016|Saraswat and Kumar, 2016]] ; see [[#9.11.4|Section 9.11.4]] ) and policies that underpin environmental justice concerns, including distributive justice, participation, recognition and capability ( [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Chu--2017|Chu et al., 2017]] ) are also needed. <div id="9.4.2.2" class="h3-container"></div> <span id="good-governance"></span>
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