Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Cross-Chapter-Paper-3 (section)

==== CCP3.2.2.5 Climate Change, Migration and Conflict ====

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Dryland populations pursuing traditional land-based livelihood options are generally mobile due to a highly fluctuating resource base (Box CCP 3.1). Many rural dwellers in drylands also move to urban areas for seasonal work, which can have positive impacts in terms of remittances. While reasons for migration vary and can be positive or negative, oppression and human rights abuses, lack of livelihood opportunities and food insecurity tend to be among the main push factors, while emerging opportunities at the rural–urban nexus present lucrative pull factors (Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). In a survey in Libya in 2016, 80% of migrants interviewed said they had left home because of economic hardship ( [[#Hochleithner--2018|Hochleithner and Exner, 2018]] ), which in drylands under water scarcity linked to climate change, would be exacerbated.

Causes of migration and violent conflict need to be seen in a wider historical, agrarian, political, economic and environmental context, in a multi-scalar perspective integrating levels of analysis from the local to the global ( [[#Glick%20Schiller--2015|Glick Schiller, 2015]] ). Quantitative studies tend to conclude that climate change has so far not significantly impacted migration including in drylands ( [[#Owain--2018|Owain and Maslin, 2018]] ), although with some disagreement ( [[#Lima--2016|Lima et al., 2016]] ; [[#Missirian--2017|Missirian and Schlenker, 2017]] ). In a study of the climate change–migration–conflict interface, [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al. (2019)]] found limited empirical evidence supporting a link between climatic shocks, conflict and asylum-seeking for the period 2006–2015 from 157 countries. The authors found evidence of such a link for the period 2010–2012 relating to some countries affected by the Arab Spring and concluded that the impact of climate on conflict and migration is limited to specific time periods and contexts.

The same lack of general causality is largely concluded on the specific link between climate change and conflict ( [[#Buhaug--2014|Buhaug et al., 2014]] ; [[#Buhaug--2015|Buhaug et al., 2015]] ; [[#von%20Uexkull--2016|von Uexkull et al., 2016]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ), but a minority of quantitative studies argue for a stronger causal association ( [[#Hsiang--2013|Hsiang et al., 2013]] ). [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al. (2019)]] found considerable agreement among experts that climate variability and change have influenced the risk of organised armed conflict within countries, but they also agreed that other factors, such as state capacity and level of socioeconomic development, played a much larger role. These factors also play a role in determining adaptation possibilities and in shaping the enabling environment ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8#8.5.2|Section 8.5.2]] ).

Qualitative case studies tend to frame conflict and migration within a larger political, economic and historical context. A number of studies from African drylands find that land dispossession is a key driver of both migration and conflict resulting from large-scale resource extraction or land encroachment, often associated with processes of elite capture and marginalisation ( [[#Benjaminsen--2009|Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009]] ; [[#Benjaminsen--2009|Benjaminsen et al., 2009]] ; [[#Cross--2013|Cross, 2013]] ; [[#Glick%20Schiller--2015|Glick Schiller, 2015]] ; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Bezner Kerr, 2017; [[#Obeng-Odoom--2017|Obeng-Odoom, 2017]] ; [[#Bergius--2020|Bergius et al., 2020]] ). By undermining livelihoods, exacerbating poverty and setting rural population groups adrift, land dispossession in the Sahel may lead to increased migration to urban areas, to rural sites of non-farm employment (e.g., mines) ( [[#Chevrillon-Guibert--2019|Chevrillon-Guibert et al., 2019]] ) or out of the country. In addition, it may lead to other types of reactions including violent resistance ( [[#Oliver-Smith--2010|Oliver-Smith, 2010]] ; [[#Cavanagh--2015|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2015]] ; [[#Hall--2015|Hall et al., 2015]] ) as already seen in the Sahel in terms of the emergence of jihadist armed groups ( [[#Benjaminsen--2019|Benjaminsen and Ba, 2019]] ). Major drivers of the current crisis in Mali include decades of bureaucratic mismanagement and widespread corruption, the spill-over of jihadist groups from Algeria after the civil war there in the 1990s and the current civil war in Libya. Climate change has played a marginal role as a driver of conflicts in the Sahel ( [[#Benjaminsen--2012|Benjaminsen et al., 2012]] ; [[#Benjaminsen--2019|Benjaminsen and Hiernaux, 2019]] ) but has potential to exacerbate the situation in the future with regards to migration and conflict ( [[#Owain--2018|Owain and Maslin, 2018]] ).

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