Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.4.2 Shaping Climate Governance Through Litigation ===

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Outside the formal climate policy processes, climate litigation is another important arena for various actors to confront and interact over how climate change should be governed ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] , 2018; [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Byrnes 2019]] ; [[#Calzadilla--2019|Calzadilla 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ; [[#Wegener--2020|Wegener 2020]] ). Climate litigation is an attempt to control, order or influence the behaviour of others in relation to climate governance, and it has been used by a wide variety of litigants (governments, private actors, civil society and individuals) at multiple scales (local, regional, national and international) ( [[#Osofsky--2007|Osofsky 2007]] ; [[#Lin--2012b|Lin 2012b]] ; [[#Keele--2017|Keele 2017]] ; [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ). Climate litigation has become increasingly common (UNEP2020b), but its prevalence varies across countries ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Lin--2020|Lin and Kysar 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). This is not surprising, given that courts play differing roles across varying political systems and law traditions ( [[#La%20Porta--1998|La Porta et al. 1998]] ).

This sub-section focuses on relevant climate litigation for policies and institutions. Climate litigation is further discussed in Sections 14.5.1.2 (linkages between mitigation and human rights) and [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.5.3|Section 14.5.3]] (cross-country implications and international courts/tribunals).

The vast majority of climate cases have emerged in United States, Australia and Europe, and more recently in developing countries ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ; [[#Kotze--2019|Kotze and du Plessis 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2019|Peel and Lin 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Benjamin 2019]] ; [[#Zhao--2019|Zhao et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ). As of 31 May 2021, 1841 cases of climate change litigation from around the world had been identified. Of these, 1387 were filed before courts in the United States, while the remaining 454 were filed in 39 other countries and 13 international or regional courts and tribunals (including the courts of the European Union). Outside the US, Australia (115), the UK (73) and the EU (58) remain the jurisdictions with the highest volume of cases. The majority of cases, 1006, have been filed since 2015 ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). The number of climate litigation cases in developing countries is also growing. There are at least 58 cases in 18 Global South jurisdictions ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ; [[#Kotze--2019|Kotze and du Plessis 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2019|Peel and Lin 2019]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Benjamin 2019]] ; [[#Zhao--2019|Zhao et al. 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ).

Overall, courts have also played a more active role for climate governance in democratic political systems ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Eskander--2021|Eskander et al. 2021]] ). Whether and to what extent differing law traditions and political systems influence the role and importance of climate litigation has, however, not been examined enough scientifically ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel and Osofsky 2020]] ).

The majority of climate change litigation cases are brought against governments, by civic and non-governmental organisations and corporations ( [[#Eisenstat--2011|Eisenstat 2011]] ; [[#Markell--2012|Markell and Ruhl 2012]] ; [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Fisher--2017|Fisher et al. 2017]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Many, although not all of these cases, seek to ensure that governmental action on climate change is more ambitious, and better aligned with the need to avert or respond to climate impacts identified and predicted by the scientific community ( [[#Markell--2012|Markell and Ruhl 2012]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Climate aligned cases against governments can be divided into two distinct categories: claims challenging the overall effort of a State or its organs to mitigate or adapt to climate change (sometimes referred to as ‘systemic climate litigation’) ( [[#Jackson--2020|Jackson 2020]] ) and claims regarding authorisation of third-party activity ( [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Gerrard--2021|Gerrard 2021]] ; [[#Ghaleigh--2021|Ghaleigh 2021]] ).

Systemic climate litigation that seeks an increase in a country’s ambition to tackle climate change has been a growing trend since the first court victories in the Urgenda case in the Netherlands (see Box 13.8 below) and the Leghari case in Pakistan in 2015. These cases motivated a wave of similar climate change litigation across the world ( [[#Roy--2016|Roy and Woerdman 2016]] ; [[#Ferreira--2016|Ferreira 2016]] ; [[#Peeters--2016|Peeters 2016]] ; [[#Mayer--2019|Mayer 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ; [[#Barritt--2020|Barritt 2020]] ; [[#Sindico--2021|Sindico et al. 2021]] ). Between 2015 and 2021, individuals and communities initiated at least 37 cases (including Urgenda and Leghari) against states ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ), challenging the effectiveness of legislation and policy goals ( [[#Jackson--2020|Jackson 2020]] ; [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). Some cases also seek to shape new legal concepts such as ‘rights of nature’ recognised in the Future Generations case in Colombia ( [[#Savaresi--2019|Savaresi and Auz 2019]] ; [[#Rodríguez-Garavito--2020|Rodríguez-Garavito 2020]] ) and ‘ecological damage’ in the case of Notre Affaire à Tous and others vs France ( [[#Torre-Schaub--2021|Torre-Schaub 2021]] ).

Moreover, there are a number of regulatory challenges to state authorisation of high-emitting projects, which differs from systemic casesagainst states ( [[#Bouwer--2018|Bouwer 2018]] ; [[#Hughes--2019a|Hughes 2019a]] ). For instance, the High Court in Pretoria, South Africa, concluded that climate change is a relevant consideration for approving coal-fired power plants ( [[#Humby--2018|Humby 2018]] ). Similarly, the Federal Court of Australia concluded that the Minister for the Environment owed a duty of care to Australian children in respect to climate impacts when exercising a statutory power to decide whether to authorise a major extension to an existing coal mine ( [[#Peel--2021|Peel and Markey-Towler 2021]] ).

Climate change litigation has also been brought against corporations by regional or local governments and non-governmental organisations ( [[#Wilensky--2015|Wilensky 2015]] ; [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al. 2018]] ; [[#Foerster--2019|Foerster 2019]] ). One type of private climate change litigation alleges climate change-related damage and seeks compensation from major carbon polluters ( [[#Ganguly--2018|Ganguly et al. 2018]] ; [[#Wewerinke-Singh--2020|Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 2020]] ). The litigators claim that major oil producers are historically responsible for a significant portion of global greenhouse gas emissions ( [[#Heede--2014|Heede 2014]] ; [[#Frumhoff--2015|Frumhoff et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ekwurzel--2017|Ekwurzel et al. 2017]] ; [[#Stuart-Smith--2021|Stuart-Smith et al. 2021]] ). These cases rely on advancements in climate science, specifically climate attribution ( [[#Marjanac--2017|Marjanac et al. 2017]] ; [[#Marjanac--2018|Marjanac and Patton 2018]] ; [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Minnerop--2020|Minnerop and Otto 2020]] ; [[#Burger--2020b|Burger et al. 2020b]] ; [[#Stuart-Smith--2021|Stuart-Smith et al. 2021]] ). It is alleged that major carbon emitters had knowledge and awareness of climate change and yet took actions to confound or mislead the public about climate science ( [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ). Strategic climate change litigation has also been used to hold corporations to specific human rights responsibilities ( [[#Savaresi--2019|Savaresi and Auz 2019]] ; [[#Savaresi--2021|Savaresi and Setzer 2021]] ) (Box 13.8).

In addition to direct cases targeting high emitters, litigation is also now being used to argue against financial investments in the fossil fuel industry ( [[#Franta--2017|Franta 2017]] ; [[#Colombo--2021|Colombo 2021]] ). In May 2021, the Hague District Court of the Netherlands issued a ground-breaking judgment holding energy company Royal Dutch Shell (RDS) legally responsible for greenhouse gas emissions from its entire value chain (Macchi and Zeben 2021). Claims have also been brought against banks, pension funds and investment funds for failing to incorporate climate risk into their decision-making, and to disclose climate risk to their beneficiaries ( [[#Wasim--2019|Wasim 2019]] ; [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ; [[#Bowman--2020|Bowman and Wiseman 2020]] ). These litigation cases also impact on the financial market without directly involving specific financial institutions into the case ( [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ) but somehow aim to change their risk perceptions and attitude on high carbon activities ( [[#Griffin--2020|Griffin 2020]] ).

The outcomes of climate litigation can affect the stringency and ambitiousness of climate governance ( [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ; [[#Eskander--2021|Eskander et al. 2021]] ). In the United States, pro-regulation litigants more commonly win in relation to renewable energy and energy efficiency cases, and more frequently lose in relations to coal-fired power plant cases ( [[#McCormick--2018|McCormick et al. 2018]] ). Outside the US, more than half (58%) of litigation have outcomes that are aligned with climate action ( [[#Setzer--2021|Setzer and Higham 2021]] ). But these cases can also have impacts outside of the legal proceedings before, during and after the case has been brought and decided ( [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ). These impacts include changes in the behaviour of the parties ( [[#Peel--2015|Peel and Osofsky 2015]] ; [[#Pals--2021|Pals 2021]] ), public opinion ( [[#Hilson--2019|Hilson 2019]] ; [[#Burgers--2020|Burgers 2020]] ), financial and reputational consequences for involved actors ( [[#Solana--2020|Solana 2020]] ), and impact on further litigation ( [[#Barritt--2020|Barritt 2020]] ). Individual cases have also attracted considerable media attention, which in turn can influence how climate policy is perceived ( [[#Nosek--2018|Nosek 2018]] ; [[#Barritt--2019|Barritt and Sediti 2019]] ; [[#Hilson--2019|Hilson 2019]] ; [[#Paiement--2020|Paiement 2020]] ). While there is evidence to show the influence of some key cases on climate agenda-setting ( [[#Wonneberger--2021|Wonneberger and Vliegenthart 2021]] ), it is still unclear the extent to which climate litigation actually results in new climate rules and policies ( [[#Peel--2018|Peel and Osofsky 2018]] ; [[#Setzer--2019|Setzer and Vanhala 2019]] ; [[#Peel--2020|Peel and Osofsky 2020]] ) and to what degree this holds true for all cases ( [[#Jodoin--2020|Jodoin et al. 2020]] ). However, there is now increasing academic agreement that climate litigation has become a powerful force in climate governance [[#UNEP--2020b|UNEP 2020b]] ; [[#Burgers--2020|Burgers 2020]] ). In general, litigations can be applied to constrain both public and private entities, and to shape structural factors mentioned in [[#13.3|Section 13.3]] , such as the beliefs and institutions around climate governance.

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