Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-15 (section)

=== 15.6.2 Enabling Environments ===

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The Paris Agreement recognised for the first time the key role of aligning financial flows to climate goals. It further emphasises the importance of making financial flows consistent with climate actions and SDGs ( [[#Zamarioli--2021|Zamarioli et al. 2021]] ).This alignment has now to be operated in a specific environment where the scaling-up of climate policies is conditional upon their contribution to post-COVID-19 recovery packages (Sections 15.2.2 and 15.2.3 and Box 15.6). The enabling environments that are to be established account for the structural parameters of the underinvestment in long-term assets. The persistent gap between the ‘propensity to save’ and ‘propensity to invest’ ( [[#Summers--2016|Summers 2016]] ) obstructs the scaling up of climate investments, and it results from a short-term bias of economic and financial decision-making ( [[#Miles--1993|Miles 1993]] ; [[#Bushee--2001|Bushee 2001]] ; [[#Black--2002|Black and Fraser 2002]] ) that returns weighted on short-term risk dominate the investment horizon of financial actors. Overcoming this bias is the objective of an enabling environment apt to ''launch of a self-reinforcing circle of trust'' between project initiators, industry, institutional investors, the banking system, and governments.

The role of government is crucial for creating an enabling environment for climate ( [[#Clark--2018|Clark 2018]] ), and governments are critical in the launching and maintenance of this circle of trust by lowering the political, regulatory, macroeconomic and business risks ( ''high confidence'' ). The issue is not just to progressively enlarge the space of low-carbon investments but to replace one system (fossil fuels energy system) rapidly with another (low-carbon energy system). This is a wave of ‘creative destruction’ with the public support for developing new markets and new entrepreneurship and finance for green products and technologies in a context which requires strong complementarities between Schumpeterian (technological) and Keynesian (demand-related) policies ( [[#Dosi--2017|Dosi et al. 2017]] ). However, it is challenging to overcome the constraint of public budget under the pressure of competing demands and of creditworthy constraints for countries that do not have an easy access to reserve currencies. It is needed to maximise, both at the national and international levels, the leverage ratio of public funds engaged in blended finance for climate change which is currently very low, especially in developing countries ( [[#Attridge--2019|Attridge and Engen 2019]] ).

'''Transparency:''' Policy de-risking measures, such as robust policy design and better transparency, as well as financial de-risking measures, such as green bonds and guarantees, at both domestic and international levels, enhance the attractiveness of clean energy investments ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Steckel--2018|Steckel and Jakob 2018]] ). Organisations such as the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) can help increase capital markets’ climate financing, including private sector, by providing financial markets with information to price climate-related risks and opportunities ( [[#TCFD--2020|TCFD 2020]] ). However, risk disclosures alone would likely be insufficient as long as market failures that inhibit the emergence of low-carbon investment initiatives with positive risk-weighted returns ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Christophers--2017|Christophers 2017]] ; [[#Ameli--2020|Ameli et al. 2020]] ).

'''Central banks and climate change''' '''.''' Central banks in all economies will likely have to play a critical role in supporting the financing of fiscal operations, particularly in a post-COVID-19 world ( ''high confidence'' ). Instruments and institutional arrangements for better international monetary policy coordination will likely be necessary in the context of growing external debt stress and negative credit rating pressures facing both emerging and low-income countries. Central bankers have started examining the implications of disruptive risks of climate change, as part of their core mandate of managing the stability of the financial system ( [[#Chenet--2021|Chenet et al. 2021]] ). Climate-related risk assessments and disclosure, including central banks’ stress testing of climate change risks, can be considered as a first step ( [[#Rudebusch--2019|Rudebusch 2019]] ), although such risk assessments and disclosure may not be enough by themselves to spur increased institutional low-carbon climate finance ( [[#Ameli--2020|Ameli et al. 2020]] ).

Green quantitative easing (QE) is now being examined as a tool for enabling climate investments ( [[#Dafermos--2018|Dafermos et al. 2018]] ) in which central banks could explicitly conduct a programme of purchases of low-carbon assets ( [[#Aglietta--2015|Aglietta et al. 2015]] ). A green QE programme ‘would have the benefit of providing large amounts of additional liquidity to companies interested’ in green projects ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Campiglio--2018|Campiglio et al. 2018]] ). Green QE would have positive effects for stimulating a low-carbon transition, such as accelerating the development of green bond markets ( [[#Hilmi--2021|Hilmi et al. 2021]] ), encouraging investments and banking reserves, and reducing risks of stranded assets, while it might increase income inequality and financial instability ( [[#Monasterolo--2017|Monasterolo and Raberto 2017]] ). While the short-term effectiveness would not be substantial, the central bank’s purchase of green bonds could have a positive effect on green investment in the long run ( [[#Dafermos--2018|Dafermos et al. 2018]] ). However, the use of green QE needs to be cautious on potential issues, such as undermining the central bank’s independence, affecting the central bank’s portfolio by including green assets with poor financial risk standards, and potential regulatory capture and rent-seeking behaviours ( [[#Krogstrup--2019|Krogstrup and Oman 2019]] ).

Additional monetary policies and macroprudential financial regulation may facilitate the expected role of carbon pricing on boosting low-carbon investments ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#D’Orazio--2019|D’Orazio and Popoyan 2019]] ). Commercial banks may not respond to the price signal and allocate credits to low-carbon investments due to the existence of market failure ( [[#Campiglio--2016|Campiglio 2016]] ). This could support the productivity of green capital goods and encourage green investments in the short term, but might cause financial instability by raising non-performing loans ratio of dirty investments and creating green bubbles ( [[#Dunz--2021|Dunz et al. 2021]] ). Financial supervisors needs to implement stricter guidelines to overcome the greenwashing challenges ( [[#Caldecott--2020|Caldecott 2020]] ).

'''Efficient financial markets and financial regulation.''' An influential efficient financial markets hypothesis ( [[#Fama--1970|Fama 1970]] , 1991, 1997) proceeds from the assumption that in well-developed financial markets, available information at any point of time is already well captured in capital markets with many participants. Despite increasing challenges to the theory ( [[#Sewell--2011|Sewell 2011]] ), especially by repeated episodes of global financial crashes and crises, and other widely noted anomalies, a weaker form of the efficient markets hypothesis may still apply ( ''medium confidence'' ). It is arguable that accumulating scientific evidence of climate impacts is being accompanied by rising levels of climate finance. Banks and institutional investors are also progressively rebalancing their investment portfolios away from fossil fuels and towards low-carbon investments ( [[#IEA--2019b|IEA 2019b]] ; [[#Monasterolo--2020|Monasterolo and de Angelis 2020]] ) '''.''' In the meantime, the world runs the risk of sharp adjustments, crises and irreversible ‘tipping points’ ( [[#Lontzek--2015|Lontzek et al. 2015]] ) sufficiently destabilising climate outcomes. This leads to the policy prescription towards financial regulatory agencies requiring greater and swifter disclosure of information about rising climate risks faced by financial institutions in projects and portfolios and central bank attention to systemic climate risk problems as one possible route of policy action ( [[#Carney--2015|Carney 2015]] ; [[#Dietz--2016|Dietz et al. 2016]] ; [[#Zenghelis--2016|Zenghelis and Stern 2016]] ; [[#Campiglio--2018|Campiglio et al. 2018]] ). However, disclosure requirements of risks and information in private settings remain mostly voluntary and difficult to implement ( [[#Battiston--2017|Battiston et al. 2017]] ; [[#Monasterolo--2017|Monasterolo et al. 2017]] ).

Nevertheless, financial markets are innovating in search of solutions ( [[#15.6.6|Section 15.6.6]] ). Recognising and dealing with stranded fossil fuel assets is also a key area of growing concern that financial institutions are beginning to grapple with. Larger institutions with more patient capital (pensions, insurance) are also increasingly beginning to enter the financing of projects and green bond markets. The case for efficient financial markets in developing countries is worse ( [[#Abbasi--2016|Abbasi and Riaz 2016]] ; [[#Hong--2019|Hong et al. 2019]] ) because of weaker financial institutions ( [[#Hamid--2017|Hamid et al. 2017]] ), heightened credit rationing behaviour ( [[#Bond--2015|Bond et al. 2015]] ), and high risk aversion as most markets are rated as junk, or below/barely investment grade ( [[#Hanusch--2016|Hanusch et al. 2016]] ). Other constraints such as limited long-term financial instruments and underdeveloped domestic capital markets, absence of significant domestic bond markets for investments other than sovereign borrowing, and inadequate term and tenor of financing, make the efficient markets thesis practically inapplicable for most developing countries.

'''Markets, finance and creative destruction.''' Branches of macro-innovation theory could be grouped into two principal classes ( [[#Mercure--2016|Mercure et al. 2016]] ): ‘equilibrium – optimisation’ theories that treat innovators as rational perfectly informed agents and reaching equilibrium under market price signals; and ‘non-equilibrium’ theory where market choices are shaped by history and institutional forces and the role of public policy is to intervene in processes, given a historical context, to promote a better outcome or new economic trajectory. The latter suggests that new technologies might not find their way to the market without price or regulatory policies to reduce uncertainty on expected economic returns. A key issue is the perception of risk by investors and financial institutions. The financial system is part of complex policy packages involving multiple instruments (cutting subsidies to fossil fuels, supporting clean energy innovation and diffusion, levelling the institutional playing field and making risks transparent) ( [[#Polzin--2017|Polzin 2017]] ) and the needed big systemic push ( [[#Kern--2016|Kern and Rogge 2016]] ) requires it takes on the role of ‘institutional innovation intermediaries’ ( [[#Polzin--2016|Polzin et al. 2016]] ).

As far as climate finance is concerned, public R&amp;D support had large cross-border knowledge spill-overs indicating that openness to trade was important, capacity expansion had positive effects on learning-by-doing on innovation over time, and that feed-in-tariffs (FiTs), in particular, had positive impacts on technology diffusion ( [[#Grafström--2017|Grafström and Lindman 2017]] ) (Box 16.4). The FiTs programme has been associated with rapid increase in early renewables capacity expansion across the world by reducing market risks in financing and stability in project revenues ( [[#Menanteau--2003|Menanteau et al. 2003]] ; [[#Jacobsson--2009|Jacobsson et al. 2009]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.9.5|Section 9.9.5]] ). Competitive auctions where the bidder with the lowest price or other criteria is selected for government’s call for tender are increasingly being utilised as an alternative to FITs due to their strengths of flexibility, potential for real price discovery, ability to ensure greater certainty in price and quantity, and capability to guarantee commitments and transparency ( [[#IRENA%20and%20CEM--2015|IRENA and CEM 2015]] ).

Outside of renewable energy, scattered but numerous examples are available on the role of innovative public policy to spur and create new markets and technologies ( [[#Arent--2017|Arent et al. 2017]] ): (i) proactive role of the state in energy transitions (e.g., the retirement of all coal-fired power plants in Ontario, Canada, between 2007 and 2014 ( [[#Kern--2016|Kern and Rogge 2016]] ; [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool 2016]] )); (ii) too early exit and design problems not considering the market acceptability and financing issues (e.g., energy-efficient retrofitting in housing in UK ( [[#Rosenow--2016|Rosenow and Eyre 2016]] ), low or negative returns in reality versus engineering estimates in weatherisation programmes in US ( [[#Fowlie--2018|Fowlie et al. 2018]] )); and (iii) energy performance contracting for sharing the business risks and profits and improving energy efficiency (energy service companies ( [[#Bertoldi--2017|Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss 2017]] ; [[#Qin--2017|Qin et al. 2017]] ) and utility energy service contracts in the USA ( [[#Clark--2018|Clark 2018]] )).

'''Crowding out.''' Literature has discussed the risks of low effectiveness of public interventions and of a crowding out effect of climate-targeted public support to other innovation sectors ( [[#Buchner--2013|Buchner et al. 2013]] ). However, much academic literature suggests no strong evidence of crowding out. ( [[#Deleidi--2020|Deleidi et al. 2020]] ). Examining the effect of public investment on private investment into renewables in 17 countries over 2004–2014, showed that the concept of crowding out or in does not apply well to sectoral studies and found that public investments positively support private investments in general.

'''Support climate action via carbon pricing, taxes, and emission trading systems.''' Literature and evidence suggest that futures markets regarding climate are incomplete because they do not price in externalities ( [[#Scholtens--2017|Scholtens 2017]] ). As a result, low-carbon investments do not take place to socially and economically optimal levels, and the correct market signals would involve setting carbon prices high enough or equivalent trading in reduced carbon emissions by regulatory action to induce sufficient and faster shift towards low-carbon investments ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Aghion--2016|Aghion et al. 2016]] ). Nonetheless, durable carbon pricing in economic and political systems must be implemented and approached combining related elements to both price and quantity ( [[#Grubb--2014|Grubb 2014]] ).

The introduction of fiscal measures, such as carbon taxes, or market-based pricing, such as emission trading schemes, to reflect carbon pricing have benefits and drawbacks that policymakers need to consider, taking account of both country-specific conditions and policy characteristics. Carbon tax can be a simpler and easier way to implement carbon pricing, especially in developing countries, because countries can utilise the existing fiscal tools and do not need concrete enabling conditions as market-based frameworks ( ''high confidence'' ). The reallocation of revenues from carbon taxes can be used for low-carbon investments, supporting poorer sections of society and fostering technological change ( [[#High-Level%20Commission%20on%20Carbon%20Prices--2017|High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices 2017]] ). In combination with other policies, such as subsidies and public R&amp;D on resource-saving technologies, properly designed carbon taxes can facilitate the shift towards low-carbon, resource-efficient investments ( [[#Bovari--2018|Bovari et al. 2018]] ; [[#Naqvi--2018|Naqvi and Stockhammer 2018]] ; [[#Dunz--2021|Dunz et al. 2021]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-9#9.9.3|Section 9.9.3]] ). The effectiveness of carbon pricing has been supported by various evidence. EU ETS has cut emissions by 42.8% in the main sectors covered ( [[#European%20Commission--2021a|European Commission 2021a]] ), and China had achieved emissions reductions and energy conservation through its pilot ETS between 2013 and 2015 ( [[#Zhang--2019|Zhang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Hu--2020|Hu et al. 2020]] ). Institutional learning, administrative prudence, appropriate carbon revenue management and stakeholder engagement are key ingredients for successful ETS regimes ( [[#Narassimhan--2018|Narassimhan et al. 2018]] ).

The presence of carbon prices can promote low-carbon technologies and investments ( [[#Best--2018|Best and Burke 2018]] ), and price signals, including carbon taxation, provide powerful and efficient incentives for households and firms to reduce CO 2 emissions ( [[#IMF--2019|IMF 2019]] ). The expansion of carbon prices is dependent on country-specific fiscal and social policies to hedge against regressive impacts on welfare, competitiveness, and employment ( [[#Michaelowa--2018|Michaelowa et al. 2018]] ). Such impacts need to be offset using the proceeds of carbon taxes or auctioned emission allowances to reduce distortive taxation ( [[#Bovenberg--1994|Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994]] ; [[#Goulder--1995|Goulder 1995]] ; [[#de%20Mooij--2000|de Mooij 2000]] ; [[#Chiroleu-Assouline--2014|Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha 2014]] ) and fund compensating measures for the population sections that are most adversely impacted ( [[#Combet--2010|Combet et al. 2010]] ; [[#Jaccard--2012|Jaccard 2012]] ; [[#Klenert--2018|Klenert et al. 2018]] ). This is more difficult for developing countries with a large share of energy-intensive activities, fossil fuel exporting countries and countries which have lower potential to mitigate impacts due to lower wages or existing taxes ( [[#Lefèvre--2018|Lefèvre et al. 2018]] ).

Non-carbon price instruments, such as market-oriented regulation and public programmes involving low-carbon infrastructure, may be preferable in developing countries where market and regulatory failure and political economy constraints are more prevalent ( [[#Finon--2019|Finon 2019]] ). While carbon pricing was suggested by many economists and researchers (Nordhaus 2015; [[#Pahle--2018|Pahle et al. 2018]] ), overcoming the political and regulatory barriers would be necessary for the further implementation of an effective carbon pricing scheme nationally and internationally. Without strong political support, the effectiveness of carbon pricing would be limited to least-cost movements ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ).

'''Role of domestic financing sources.''' Efforts to address climate change can be scaled up through the mobilisation of domestic funds ( [[#Fonta--2018|Fonta et al. 2018]] ). Publicly organised and supported low-carbon infrastructures through resurrected national development banks may be justified ( [[#Mazzucato--2016|Mazzucato and Penna 2016]] ). It is important to efficiently allocate the public financing, and State Investment Banks (SIBs) can take up key roles (i) to provide capital to assist with overcoming financial barriers, (ii) to signal and direct investments towards green projects, and (iii) to attract private investors by taking up a de-risking role. Also, they can become a first mover by investing in new and innovative technologies or business models ( [[#Geddes--2018|Geddes et al. 2018]] ). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) can also have an overall positive effect on renewables investments, outweighing any effect of crowding out private competitors ( [[#Prag--2018|Prag et al. 2018]] ). Green investment banks can assist in the green transition by developing valuable expertise in implementing effective public interventions to overcome investment barriers and mobilise private investment in infrastructure ( [[#OECD--2015c|OECD 2015c]] ). De-risking measures may reduce investment risks, but lacking research and data availability hinders designing such measures ( [[#Dietz--2016|Dietz et al. 2016]] ). Local governments’ efforts to de-risk by securitisation might have negative effects by narrowing the scope for a green developmental state and encouraging privatisation of public services ( [[#Gabor--2019|Gabor 2019]] ).

'''The potential role of coordinated multilateral initiatives.''' There is a growing awareness of the low leverage ratio of public to private capital in climate blended finance ( [[#Blended%20Finance%20Taskforce--2018b|Blended Finance Taskforce 2018b]] ) and of a ‘glass ceiling’, caused by a mix of agencies’ inertia and perceived loss of control over the use of funds, on the use of public guarantees by MDBs to increase it ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Gropp--2014|Gropp et al. 2014]] ; [[#Schiff--2017|Schiff and Dithrich 2017]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee et al. 2018]] ). Many proposals have emerged for multilateral guarantee funds: Green Infrastructure Funds ( [[#de%20Gouvello--2010|de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010]] ; Studart and Gallagher 2015), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Enhanced Green MIGA) ( [[#Déau--2018|Déau and Touati 2018]] ), guarantee funds to bridge the infrastructure investment gap ( [[#Arezki--2016|Arezki et al. 2016]] ), and multi-sovereign guarantee mechanisms ( [[#Dasgupta--2019|Dasgupta et al. 2019]] ). The obstacle of limited fiscal space for economic recovery and climate actions in low-income and some emerging economies can be overcome only in a multilateral setting. Several multilateral actions are being envisaged: G20’s suspension of official bilateral debt payments, IMF’s adoption of new SDRs allocation ( [[#IMF--2021b|IMF 2021b]] ). However, any form of unconventional debt relief will generate development and climate benefits only if they credibly target bridging the countries’ infrastructure gap with low-carbon climate-resilient options.

Of interest in multilateral settings is a credibility-enhancing effect provided by reciprocal gains for both the donor and the host country. Guarantor countries can compensate the public cost of their commitments with the fiscal revenues of induced exports. As to the host countries, they would benefit from new capital inflows and the grant equivalents of reduced debt service which might potentially go far beyond USD100 billion yr –1 ( [[#Hourcade--2021a|Hourcade et al. 2021a]] ). A second interest would be to support a learning process about agreed-upon assessment and monitoring methods using clear metrics. Developing standardised and science-based assessment methods at low transaction costs is essential to strengthen the credibility of green investments and the emergence of a pipeline of high-quality bankable projects which can be capitalised in the form of credible assets and supported with transparent and credible domestic spending. Multi-sovereign guarantees would provide a quality backing to developing countries and allow for expanding developing countries’ access to capital markets at a lower cost and longer maturities, overcome the Basel III’s liquidity impediment and the EU’s Solvency II directive on liquidity ( [[#Blended%20Finance%20Taskforce--2018b|Blended Finance Taskforce 2018b]] ), and accelerate the recognition of climate assets by investors seeking safe investment havens ( [[#Hourcade--2021b|Hourcade et al. 2021b]] ). They would also strengthen the efficacy of climate disclosure through high grades climate assets and minimise the risks of ‘greening’ of the portfolios by investing in ‘carbon neutral’ activities and not in low-carbon infrastructures. Finally, they would free up grant capacities for SDGs and adaptation that mostly involve non-marketable activities by crowding in private investments for marketable mitigation activities.

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==== 15.6.2.1 The Public-Private and Mobilisation Narrative and Current Initiatives ====

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Financing by development finance institutions and development banks aims to address market failures and barriers related to limited access to capital as well as provide direct and indirect subsidisation by accepting higher risk, longer loan tenors and/or lower pricing. Many development and climate projects in developing and emerging countries have traditionally been supported with concessional loans by development finance institutions and/or international financial institutions (DFIs/IFIs). With an increasing number of sectors becoming viable and increasing complaints of private sector players with regard to crowding out ( [[#Bahal--2018|Bahal et al. 2018]] ), a stronger separation and crowding in of commercial financing at the project/asset level is targeted. MDBs and IFIs were crucial for opening and growth in the early years of the green bonds, which represent a substantial share of issuances ( [[#CBI--2019a|CBI 2019a]] ). Drivers of an efficient private sector involvement are stronger incentives to have projects delivered on time and in budget as well as market competition ( [[#Hodge--2018|Hodge et al. 2018]] ). It remains key that the private sector mobilisation goes hand in hand with institutional capacity building as well as strong sectoral development in the host country, as a strong, knowledgeable public partner with the ability to manage the private sector is a dominating success factor for public-private cooperation ( [[#WEF--2013|WEF 2013]] ; [[#Yescombe--2017|Yescombe 2017]] ; [[#Hodge--2018|Hodge et al. 2018]] ).

Limited research is available on the efficiency of mobilisation of the private sector at the various levels and/or the theory of change attached to the different approaches as applied in classical public-private partnerships. Also, transparency on current flows and private involvement at the various levels is limited with no differentiation being made in reporting (e.g., GCF co-financing reporting). Limited prioritisation and agreement on prioritisation of sectors and/or project categories being ready and/or preferred for direct private sector involvement might become a challenge in the coming years ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Sudmant--2017a|Sudmant et al. 2017a]] ; [[#Sudmant--2017b|Sudmant et al. 2017b]] ).

Public guarantees have been increasingly proposed to expand climate finance, especially from the private sector, with scarce public finance, by reducing the risk premium of the low-carbon investment opportunities ( [[#de%20Gouvello--2010|de Gouvello and Zelenko 2010]] ; [[#Emin--2014|Emin et al. 2014]] ; Studart and Gallagher 2015; [[#Schiff--2017|Schiff and Dithrich 2017]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee et al. 2018]] ; [[#Steckel--2018|Steckel and Jakob 2018]] ). They have the advantage of a broad coverage including the ‘macro’ country risks and to tackle the up-front risks during the preparation, bidding and development phases of the project lifecycle that deter project initiators, especially for capital-intensive and immature options. Insurances are also powerful de-risking instruments ( [[#Déau--2018|Déau and Touati 2018]] ) but they entitle the issuer to review claims concerning events and cannot cope with up-front costs. Contractual arrangements like power purchase agreements are powerful instruments to reduce market risks through a guaranteed price but they weigh on public budgets. Risk-sharing that brings together public agencies, firms, local authorities, private corporates, professional cooperatives, and institutional financiers can reduce costs ( [[#UNEP--2011|UNEP 2011]] ), and support the deployment of innovative business models ( [[#Déau--2018|Déau and Touati 2018]] ). Combined with emission taxes they can contribute to reducing credit rationing of immature and risky low-carbon technologies ( [[#Haas--2020|Haas and Kempa 2020]] ).

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