Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

=== 8.3.3 Livelihood Impacts, Shifting Livelihoods and the Challenges for Equity and Sustainability in the Context of Climate Change ===

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This section complements the global and regional assessment of vulnerability in the previous section with a more precise assessment of observed local conditions and livelihood impacts and shifts. First, the section reviews linkages between vulnerability and livelihood impacts of climate change broadly. Second, it examines the range of observed disproportionate impacts according to economic (e.g., income) and non-economic (e.g., cultural) impacts of climate change. Third, it examines current risks of adaptation limits and compounding effects across social groups and associated livelihood shifts.

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==== 8.3.3.1 The Implications of Vulnerability for Past and Present Livelihood Impacts of Climate Change ====

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Climate change impacts add to livelihood challenges and can further increase inequality and poverty (see [[#8.2.1|Section 8.2.1]] ), whose root causes are social, institutional and governance related. Various regional clusters of high vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) are also influenced by historical processes, such as colonialism and power relations that made people and countries vulnerable ( [[#Schell--2020|Schell et al., 2020]] ). Thus, vulnerability to climate change is not primarily linked to the degree of exposure to climate change impacts, but determined by societal structures and development processes that shape context and individual vulnerability (see [[#8.3.2|Section 8.3.2]] ), and values and lived experiences of climate hazards ( [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Walker--2021|Walker et al., 2021]] ). Intersectionality approaches are central to grasping differential vulnerability ( [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas et al., 2019]] ) for past and present livelihood impacts of climate change (see Figure 8.3; [[#8.2.2.2|Section 8.2.2.2]] ). Assessing observed local conditions and livelihood impacts and shifts requires us to consider reinforcing social phenomena such as age, gender, class, race and ethnicity, which shape social inequalities and experiences of the world and also intersect with climate hazards and vulnerability ( [[#Walker--2021|Walker et al., 2021]] ).

This understanding helps to clarify how social structures, institutions and governance mechanisms matter to address social causes in addition to climate magnifiers while holding them accountable (see [[#8.5|Section 8.5]] ). For example, low-elevation coastal zones concentrate high levels of poverty in some specific areas: 90% of the world’s rural poor are concentrated in the low-elevation coastal zones of just 15 countries, and this population keeps growing ( [[#Barbier--2015|Barbier, 2015]] ). Yet studies on the economic impacts of climate change and also integrated assessment models typically overlook the distributional effects of these impacts according to vulnerability and exposure and do not sufficiently account for agent and societal heterogeneity ( [[#Balint--2017|Balint et al., 2017]] ; [[#Sovacool--2021|Sovacool et al., 2021]] ).

Since the AR5, ''high confidence'' is attributed to the fact that the, mostly detrimental, climate change impacts and risks are experienced mainly by the poorest people around the world ( [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that climate change impacts will put a disproportionate burden on low-income households and thus increase poverty levels ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] ).

There is ''robust evidence'' that economic development based on the exploitation of natural resources can significantly increase the vulnerability of communities at the local level. For example, there is a correlation between political arrangements and environmental degradation that brings about both disasters and an increase in disaster risk ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ; [[#Pereira--2020|Pereira et al., 2020]] ), while development is recognised by some as a key element for adaptation ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ).

Maladaptation is an important thread given its relevance to assess ways that well-intentioned development can exacerbate past and existing vulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods (see [[#8.2|Section 8.2.2.1]] ). Evidence shows that some local development projects can undermine resilience and increase the vulnerability of neighbouring communities, leading to maladaptation ( [[#Magnan--2016|Magnan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Schipper--2020|Schipper, 2020]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). Development projects can also negatively affect the vulnerability and create new ones of the very community where they are implemented ( [[#Burby--2006|Burby, 2006]] ; [[#Magnan--2016|Magnan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Atteridge--2018|Atteridge and Remling, 2018]] ; [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas and Warner, 2019]] ; [[#Work--2019|Work et al., 2019]] ). Maladaptation has also received growing attention since AR5 as a projected future climate risk for vulnerable social groups (see [[#8.4.5.5|Section 8.4.5.5]] ) and in the context of adaptation constraints and trade-offs in climate resilient development (see Sections 8.5.1; 8.6.1) '','' Despite maladaptation, there is however ''robust evidence'' that inclusive and sustainable development at the local level, can reduce vulnerability ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ; [[#Patnaik--2019|Patnaik et al., 2019]] ).

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==== 8.3.3.2 Economic and Non-economic Losses and their Relevance for Poverty and Livelihoods ====

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Economic losses include income and physical assets and non-economic losses include mortality, mobility and mental well-being losses from climate change (see [[#8.3.4|Section 8.3.4]] ). The IPCC WGII AR5 ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ) primarily associated L&amp;Ds with extreme weather events and economic impacts, and treated it primarily as a future risk. New evidence provides insights into present-day L&amp;Ds from slow-onset impacts (e.g., sea level rise) ( [[#Adamo--2021|Adamo et al., 2021]] ) and non-economic losses (e.g., cultural impacts, emotional and psychological distress) ( [[#McNamara--2021b|McNamara et al., 2021b]] ) which previously received much less attention. AR5 had more focus on L&amp;Ds in high-income regions than in regions most at risk, such as SIDS and least developed countries (LDCs) ( [[#van%20der%20Geest--2020|van der Geest and Warner, 2020]] ).

Impacts of climate change are affecting the economic and non-economic dimensions of people’s lives, including subsistence practices of communities that are experiencing decreases in agriculture productivity and quality, water stress, increases in pests and diseases, disruption to culture, and emotional and psychological distress, to cite just a few ( [[#Savo--2016|Savo et al., 2016]] ). For example, the cumulative effects of slow-onset events threaten food security especially among the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean—regions which face the largest gender gap in terms of food security globally ( [[#Zuñiga--2021|Zuñiga et al., 2021]] ). In general for Global South countries, the global average temperature warming (including the Paris target of 1.5°C) means substantially higher warming and including higher frequency and magnitude of extreme events, that will result in significant impacts on societal vulnerability ( [[#Aitsi-Selmi--2016|Aitsi-Selmi and Murray, 2016]] ; [[#Djalante--2019|Djalante, 2019]] ).

Measuring losses from climate change impacts in terms of poverty and inequality can be difficult, and part of the lack of assessments of non-economic L&amp;D can be attributed to the limited observational climate data on poor countries and population impacted, which are mostly concentrated in the Southern Hemisphere ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ).This is also due to the challenges posed by the limited data available for assessing attribution ( [[#Cramer--2014|Cramer et al., 2014]] ; Harrington and [[#Otto--2020|Otto, 2020]] ; [[#Otto--2020a|Otto et al., 2020a]] ) and lack of a comprehensive set of adaptation metrics ( [[#Otto--2020b|Otto et al., 2020b]] ). Economic L&amp;Ds from climate change are often assessed and reported after disasters or within crises, however, non-economic losses from climate change are often overlooked as is their relevance for poverty and livelihoods. For those who experience both economic and non-economic losses, the impacts of climate change are very real and profound ( [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ) Particularly in low-income and most vulnerable regions, it is not the absolute economic loss, but the combination of economic and especially non-economic losses that need to receive higher attention and need to inform adaptation strategies.

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