Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

==== 8.3.3.1 The Implications of Vulnerability for Past and Present Livelihood Impacts of Climate Change ====

<div id="h3-15-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Climate change impacts add to livelihood challenges and can further increase inequality and poverty (see [[#8.2.1|Section 8.2.1]] ), whose root causes are social, institutional and governance related. Various regional clusters of high vulnerability (see Figure 8.6) are also influenced by historical processes, such as colonialism and power relations that made people and countries vulnerable ( [[#Schell--2020|Schell et al., 2020]] ). Thus, vulnerability to climate change is not primarily linked to the degree of exposure to climate change impacts, but determined by societal structures and development processes that shape context and individual vulnerability (see [[#8.3.2|Section 8.3.2]] ), and values and lived experiences of climate hazards ( [[#Djoudi--2016|Djoudi et al., 2016]] ; [[#Walker--2021|Walker et al., 2021]] ). Intersectionality approaches are central to grasping differential vulnerability ( [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas et al., 2019]] ) for past and present livelihood impacts of climate change (see Figure 8.3; [[#8.2.2.2|Section 8.2.2.2]] ). Assessing observed local conditions and livelihood impacts and shifts requires us to consider reinforcing social phenomena such as age, gender, class, race and ethnicity, which shape social inequalities and experiences of the world and also intersect with climate hazards and vulnerability ( [[#Walker--2021|Walker et al., 2021]] ).

This understanding helps to clarify how social structures, institutions and governance mechanisms matter to address social causes in addition to climate magnifiers while holding them accountable (see [[#8.5|Section 8.5]] ). For example, low-elevation coastal zones concentrate high levels of poverty in some specific areas: 90% of the world’s rural poor are concentrated in the low-elevation coastal zones of just 15 countries, and this population keeps growing ( [[#Barbier--2015|Barbier, 2015]] ). Yet studies on the economic impacts of climate change and also integrated assessment models typically overlook the distributional effects of these impacts according to vulnerability and exposure and do not sufficiently account for agent and societal heterogeneity ( [[#Balint--2017|Balint et al., 2017]] ; [[#Sovacool--2021|Sovacool et al., 2021]] ).

Since the AR5, ''high confidence'' is attributed to the fact that the, mostly detrimental, climate change impacts and risks are experienced mainly by the poorest people around the world ( [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ; [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al., 2018]] ). There is ''high confidence'' that climate change impacts will put a disproportionate burden on low-income households and thus increase poverty levels ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC, 2014a]] ; [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017]] ).

There is ''robust evidence'' that economic development based on the exploitation of natural resources can significantly increase the vulnerability of communities at the local level. For example, there is a correlation between political arrangements and environmental degradation that brings about both disasters and an increase in disaster risk ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ; [[#Pereira--2020|Pereira et al., 2020]] ), while development is recognised by some as a key element for adaptation ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ).

Maladaptation is an important thread given its relevance to assess ways that well-intentioned development can exacerbate past and existing vulnerabilities and undermine livelihoods (see [[#8.2|Section 8.2.2.1]] ). Evidence shows that some local development projects can undermine resilience and increase the vulnerability of neighbouring communities, leading to maladaptation ( [[#Magnan--2016|Magnan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Schipper--2020|Schipper, 2020]] ; [[#Eriksen--2021|Eriksen et al., 2021]] ). Development projects can also negatively affect the vulnerability and create new ones of the very community where they are implemented ( [[#Burby--2006|Burby, 2006]] ; [[#Magnan--2016|Magnan et al., 2016]] ; [[#Atteridge--2018|Atteridge and Remling, 2018]] ; [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas and Warner, 2019]] ; [[#Work--2019|Work et al., 2019]] ). Maladaptation has also received growing attention since AR5 as a projected future climate risk for vulnerable social groups (see [[#8.4.5.5|Section 8.4.5.5]] ) and in the context of adaptation constraints and trade-offs in climate resilient development (see Sections 8.5.1; 8.6.1) '','' Despite maladaptation, there is however ''robust evidence'' that inclusive and sustainable development at the local level, can reduce vulnerability ( [[#Cannon--2010|Cannon and Müller-Mahn, 2010]] ; [[#Patnaik--2019|Patnaik et al., 2019]] ).

<div id="8.3.3.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="economic-and-non-economic-losses-and-their-relevance-for-poverty-and-livelihoods"></span>