Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

=== 13.4.3 Media as Communicative Platforms for Shaping Climate Governance ===

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Media is another platform for various actors to present, interpret and shape debates around climate change and its governance ( [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ). The media coverage of climate change has grown steadily since 1980s ( [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff et al. 2019]] ), but the level and type of coverage differs over time and from country to country ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al. 2013]] ; [[#Schäfer--2014|Schäfer and Schlichting 2014]] ). Media can be a useful conduit to build public support to accelerate mitigation action, but may also be utilised to impede decarbonisation endeavours ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell 2016b]] ; [[#Carmichael--2017|Carmichael et al. 2017]] ; [[#Carmichael--2018|Carmichael and Brulle 2018]] ). Different media systems in different regions and countries and with unique cultural and political traditions also affect how climate change is communicated ( [[#Eskjær--2013|Eskjær 2013]] ).

A broad variety of media platforms cover climate change issues, including traditional news media, such as newspapers and broadcasting, digital social media ( [[#Walter--2018|Walter et al. 2018]] ), creative narratives such as climate fiction and films ( [[#Svoboda--2016|Svoboda 2016]] ); humour and entertainment media ( [[#Brewer--2015|Brewer and McKnight 2015]] ; [[#Skurka--2018|Skurka et al. 2018]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff and Osnes 2019]] ); and strategic communications campaigns ( [[#Hansen--2008|Hansen and Machin 2008]] ; [[#Hoewe--2017|Hoewe and Ahern 2017]] ). Media coverage can have far-reaching consequences on policy processes, but we know less about its relative importance compared to other policy shaping factors ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Liu--2011|Liu et al. 2011]] ; [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#Hmielowski--2014|Hmielowski et al. 2014]] ).

Popular culture images, science fictions and films of ecological catastrophe can dramatically and emotively convey the dangers of climate change ( [[#Bulfin--2017|Bulfin 2017]] ). The overall accuracy of the media coverage on climate change has improved from 2005 to 2019 in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA ( [[#McAllister--2021|McAllister et al. 2021]] ). Moreover, coverage of climate science is increasing. One study (MeCCO) has tracked media coverage of climate change from over 127 sources from 59 countries in North and Latin America, Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania ( [[#Boykoff--2021|Boykoff et al. 2021]] ). It shows the number of media science stories in those sources grew steadily from 47,376 per annum to 86,587 per annum between 2017 and 2021 across print, broadcast, digital media and entertainment ( [[#Boykoff--2021|Boykoff et al. 2021]] ).

However, increasing media coverage does not always lead to more accurate coverage of climate change mitigation, as it can also spur diffusion of misinformation ( [[#Boykoff--2013|Boykoff and Yulsman 2013]] ; [[#van%20der%20Linden--2015|van der Linden et al. 2015]] ; [[#Whitmarsh--2017|Whitmarsh and Corner 2017]] ; [[#Fahy--2018|Fahy 2018]] ; [[#Painter--2019|Painter 2019]] ). In addition, media professionals have at times drawn on the norm of representing both sides of a controversy, bearing the risk of the disproportionate representation of scepticism of anthropogenic climate change despite the convergent agreement in climate science that humans contribute to climate change, ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Freudenburg--2010|Freudenburg and Muselli 2010]] ; [[#Boykoff--2013|Boykoff 2013]] ; [[#Painter--2016|Painter and Gavin 2016]] ; [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ; [[#McAllister--2021|McAllister et al. 2021]] ). This occurs despite increasing consensus among journalists regarding the basic scientific understanding of climate change ( [[#Brüggemann--2017|Brüggemann and Engesser 2017]] ).

Accurate transference of the climate science has been undermined significantly by climate change counter-movements, particularly in the USA ( [[#McCright--2000|McCright and Dunlap 2000]] , 2003; [[#Jacques--2008|Jacques et al. 2008]] ; [[#Brulle--2012|Brulle et al. 2012]] ; [[#Boussalis--2016|Boussalis and Coan 2016]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Carmichael--2017|Carmichael et al. 2017]] ; [[#Carmichael--2018|Carmichael and Brulle 2018]] ; [[#Boykoff--2019|Boykoff and Farrell 2019]] ; [[#Almiron--2019|Almiron and Xifra 2019]] ) in both legacy and new/social media environments through misinformation ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#van%20der%20Linden--2017|van der Linden et al. 2017]] ), including about the causes and consequences of climate change ( [[#Brulle--2014|Brulle 2014]] ; [[#Farrell--2016a|Farrell 2016a]] ; [[#Farrell--2016b|Farrell 2016b]] ; [[#Supran--2017|Supran and Oreskes 2017]] ). Misinformation can rapidly spread through social media ( [[#Walter--2018|Walter et al. 2018]] ). Together with the proliferation of suspicions of ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, some traditional and social media contents have fuelled polarisation and partisan divides on climate change in many countries ( [[#Feldman--2017|Feldman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Hornsey--2018|Hornsey et al. 2018]] ), which can further deter development of new and ambitious climate policy ( [[#Tindall--2018|Tindall et al. 2018]] ). Further, the ideological stance of media also influences the intensity and content of media coverage, in developed and developing countries alike ( [[#Dotson--2012|Dotson et al. 2012]] ; [[#Stoddart--2015|Stoddart and Tindall 2015]] ).

Who dominates the debate on media, and how open the debate can be varies significantly across countries ( [[#Takahashi--2011|Takahashi 2011]] ; [[#Poberezhskaya--2015|Poberezhskaya 2015]] ) based on participants’ material and technological power. Fossil fuel industries have unique access to mainstream media ( [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ) via advertisements, shaping narratives of media reports, and exerting political influence in countries like Australia and the USA ( [[#Holmes--2018|Holmes and Star 2018]] ; [[#Karceski--2020|Karceski et al. 2020]] ). For social media, novel technical tools, such as automated bots, are emerging to shape climate change discussion on major online platforms such as Twitter ( [[#Marlow--2021|Marlow et al. 2021]] ). Open debates can underpin the adoption of more ambitions climate policy ( [[#Lyytimäki--2011|Lyytimäki 2011]] ). Media coverage on energy saving, patriotism, and social justice in the countries like USA and the UK have helped connect mitigation of climate change with other concerns, thereby raising support to climate action ( [[#Leiserowitz--2006|Leiserowitz 2006]] ; [[#Trope--2007|Trope et al. 2007]] ; [[#Doyle--2016|Doyle 2016]] ; [[#Corner--2017|Corner and Clarke 2017]] ; [[#Whitmarsh--2017|Whitmarsh and Corner 2017]] ; [[#Markowitz--2018|Markowitz and Guckian 2018]] ). Further, media coverage of climate change mitigation has influenced public opinions through discussions on political, economic, scientific and cultural themes about climate change ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Irwin--1996|Irwin and Wynne 1996]] ; [[#Smith--2000|Smith 2000]] ; [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ; [[#O’Neill--2015|O’Neill et al. 2015]] ).

Common challenges in reporting climate change exist around the world ( [[#Schmidt--2013|Schmidt et al. 2013]] ; [[#Schäfer--2021|Schäfer and Painter 2021]] ), but particularly so in the developing countries, due to lower capacities, lack of journalists’ training in complex climate subjects, and lack of access to clear, timely and understandable climate-related resources and images in newsrooms ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Harbinson--2006|Harbinson 2006]] ; [[#Shanahan--2009|Shanahan 2009]] ; [[#Broadbent--2016|Broadbent et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lück--2018|Lück et al. 2018]] ). Ugandan journalist Patrick Luganda has said, ‘Those most at risk from the impacts of climate change typically have had access to the least information about it through mass media.’ ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff, 2011]] ), indicating that information availability and capacity is a manifestation of global climate (in)justice.

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