Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-17 (section)

== 17.4 Key Barriers and Enablers of the Transition: Synthesising Results ==

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This section provides a deep and broad synthesis of theory ( [[#17.2|Section 17.2]] ) and evidence ( [[#17.3|Section 17.3]] ) in order to identify the conditions that either enable or inhibit transitions to sustainable low-carbon futures. Following the literature on sustainability transitions (Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16), the section finds that there is rarely any one single factor promoting or preventing such transitions. Rather, marked departures from business as usual typically involve several factors, including technological innovations, shifts in markets, concerted efforts by scientists and civil-society organisations to raise awareness of the costs of continued emissions, social movements, policies and governance arrangements, and changes in belief systems and values.

All of this comes together in a co-evolutionary process that has unfolded globally, internationally and locally over several decades ( [[#Hansen--2014|Hansen and Nygaard 2014]] ; [[#Rogge--2017|Rogge et al. 2017]] ; [[#Sorman--2020|Sorman et al. 2020]] ), and that may be guided or facilitated by interventions that target leverage points in the underlying development path ( [[#Burch--2021|Burch and Di Bella 2021]] ; [[#Leventon--2021|Leventon et al. 2021]] ). While transitions necessarily follow context-specific trajectories, more general lessons can be drawn by comparing the empirical details with both system-level and narrower explanations of change.

Sections 17.2 and 17.3 show that transitions often face multiple barriers, including infrastructure lock-in, behavioural, cultural and institutional inertia ( [[#Markard--2020|Markard et al. 2020]] ), trade-offs between transitions and other social or political priorities ( [[#Chu--2016|Chu 2016]] ), cost and a reliable (and growing) supply of renewable-energy technologies and constituent materials ( [[#García-Olivares--2018|García-Olivares et al. 2018]] ). Transitions away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy-based systems, for instance, will require significant land-use decisions to avoid negative trade-offs with biodiversity and food security ( [[#Capellán-Pérez--2017|Capellán-Pérez et al. 2017]] ). Previous sections underline a related need to move beyond focusing on ‘rational’ assessments of the costs and benefits of policies and technologies to involve people at all levels in order to overcome these multiple barriers. A transition to a lower carbon system is unlikely to happen even if models find it technically feasible and cost-effective. Rather, achieving a transition requires breaking locked-in high-carbon technological trajectories, path dependencies and resistance to change from the industries and actors that are benefiting from the current system ( [[#Rogge--2017|Rogge et al. 2017]] ). Lock-in effects may be weaker in sectors and policy areas where fewer technologies exist, potentially opening the door to innovations that embed the climate in broader sustainability objectives (e.g., technologies and innovations that support the integration of food, water and energy goals). Such effects may still happen when there are significant information asymmetries and high-cost barriers to action, as can occur when working across multiple climate and development-related sectors ( [[#Kemp--2017|Kemp and Never 2017]] ).

However, the same conditions that may serve to impede a transition (i.e., organisational structure, behaviour, technological lock-in) can also be ‘flipped’ to enable it ( [[#Burch--2010|Burch 2010]] ; [[#Lee--2017|Lee et al. 2017]] ), while the framing of policies that are relevant to the sustainable development agenda can also create a stronger basis and stronger policy support. The technological developments and broader cultural changes that may generate new social demands on infrastructure to contribute to sustainable development will involve a process of social learning and awareness building ( [[#Naber--2017|Naber et al. 2017]] ; [[#Sengers--2019|Sengers et al. 2019]] ). However, it is also important to note that strong shocks to these systems, including accelerated climate change impacts, economic crises and political changes, may provide crucial openings for accelerated transitions to sustainable systems through fundamental institutional changes ( [[#Broto--2014|Broto et al. 2014]] ). The global COVID-19 pandemic is one such shock that has sparked widespread conversations about recovery that is fundamentally more sustainable, equitable and resilient ( [[#McNeely--2021|McNeely and Munasinghe 2021]] ). Key enabling conditions appear to be individual and collective actions, including leadership and education; financial, material, social and technical drivers that foster innovation; robust national and regional innovation systems that enhance technological diffusion ( [[#Wieczorek--2018|Wieczorek 2018]] ); supportive policy and governance dynamics at multiple levels that permit both agility and coherence ( [[#Göpel--2016|Göpel et al. 2016]] ); measures to recognise and address the challenges to equality inherent in the transition; and long-range, holistic planning that explicitly seeks synergies between climate change and sustainable development while avoiding trade-offs. The sections that follow seek to assess and integrate these key categories of the barriers to and enablers of an accelerated transition to sustainable development pathways.

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=== 17.4.1 Behavioural and Lifestyle Changes ===

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Transitions toward more sustainable development pathways are both an individual and a collective challenge, requiring an examination of the role of values, attitudes, beliefs and structures that shape behaviour, and of the dynamics of social movements and education at the local community, regional and global levels. Labelling the carbon included in products, for example, could help the decision-making process and increase awareness and knowledge. Individual action suggests aggregated but uncoordinated actions taken by individuals, whereas collective sustainability actions involve coordination, a process of participation and governance that may ensure more efficient, equitable and effective outcomes. There is evidence that the behaviour of individuals and households are part of a more encompassing collective action ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.4.1|Section 5.4.1]] ).

Indeed, individual actions are necessary but insufficient to deliver transformative mitigation, and it is suggested that this be coupled with collective actions to accelerate the transition to sustainable development ( [[#Dugast--2019|Dugast et al. 2019]] ). Actors with conflicting interests will compete to frame mitigation technologies that either ‘build or erode’ the legitimacy of the technology, contested framing sites that can occur between incumbent and emerging actors or between actors in new but competing spaces ( [[#Rosenbloom--2016|Rosenbloom et al. 2016]] ). How narratives are built around desired development pathways and specific emerging technologies, as well as how local values are integrated into visions of the future, have relevance for how these experiments are managed and enabled to expand ( [[#Horcea-Milcu--2020|Horcea-Milcu et al. 2020]] ; [[#Lam--2020|Lam et al. 2020]] ).

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==== 17.4.1.1 Social Movements and Education ====

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Sustainable development and deep decarbonisation will involve people and communities being connected locally through various means – including globally via the internet and digital technologies ( [[#Bradbury--2015|Bradbury 2015]] ; [[#Scharmer--2018|Scharmer 2018]] ; Scharmer, C, Kaufer 2015) – in ways that form social fields that allow sustainability to unfold ( [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al. 2016]] ), and that prompt other shifts in thinking and behaviour that are consistent with the 1.5°C goal ( [[#O’Brien--2018|O’Brien 2018]] ; [[#Veciana--2018|Veciana and Ottmar 2018]] ). Indeed, social movements serve to develop collective identities, foster collective learning and accelerate collective action ranging from energy justice ( [[#Campos--2020|Campos and Marín-González 2020]] ) ( [[#17.4.5|Section 17.4.5]] ) to restricting fossil fuel extraction and supply ( [[#Piggot--2018|Piggot 2018]] ). This does not apply only to adults: as seen in the ‘Fridays for Future’ marches, the young are also involving themselves politically ( [[#Peterson--2019|Peterson et al. 2019]] ). Many initiatives have started with these marches, including ‘science for future’ and new forms of sustainability science ( [[#Shrivastava--2020|Shrivastava et al. 2020]] ).

It was Theory-U ( [[#Scharmer--2018|Scharmer 2018]] ), building on the work of scholars such as Schein, Lewin and Senge) that inspired a so-called ‘massive open online course’ (MOOC) jointly initiated by the Bhutan Happiness Institute and German Technical Assistance (GIZ) in 2015, since when it has been developed further and adapted to transform business, society and self as one example of how social movements can go together with science and education. It brings together people from different professions, cultures and continents in shared discussions and practices of sustainability. It also included marginalised communities and is shifting towards more sustainable lifestyles in all sectors ( [[#Nikas--2020|Nikas et al. 2020]] ), including climate action.

Moreover, approaches like the ‘Art of Hosting’ ( [[#Sandfort--2015|Sandfort and Quick 2015]] ) and qualitative research methods such as storytelling and first-person research, as well as second-person inquiries, for example (Scharmer, C, Kaufer 2015; [[#Trullen--2004|Trullen and Torbert 2004]] ; Varela 1999), have been employed to bridge differences in cultures and sciences, as well as to forge connections between those working on climate change and sustainable development. Likewise, experiential tools, simulations and role-playing games have been shown to increase knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change, the sense of urgency around action and the desire to pursue further learning ( [[#Ahamer--2013|Ahamer 2013]] ; [[#Eisenack--2013|Eisenack and Reckien 2013]] ; [[#Hallinger--2020|Hallinger et al. 2020]] ; [[#Rooney-Varga--2020|Rooney-Varga et al. 2020]] ).

The results from these research communities reveal how experiential learning takes place and how it encourages bonding between people, society and nature. This can be achieved by going jointly and consciously into nature ( [[#Gioacchino--2019|Gioacchino 2019]] ), by creating spaces for intensive-dialogue sessions with colleagues ( [[#Goldman-Schuyler--2017|Goldman-Schuyler et al. 2017]] ) and forming, for example, a very practical u.lab hub, which involves following the MIT-u.lab course with a local community and is accompanied scientifically ( [[#Pomeroy--2018|Pomeroy and Oliver 2018]] ). Others have pointed to social networks such as the ‘transition initiative’ ( [[#Hopkins--2010|Hopkins 2010]] ), eco-village networks ( [[#Barani--2018|Barani et al. 2018]] ), civil-society movements ( [[#Seyfang--2007|Seyfang and Smith 2007]] ) and intentional communities ( [[#Grinde--2018|Grinde et al. 2018]] ; [[#Veciana--2018|Veciana and Ottmar 2018]] ) as ways of generating the shared understandings that are central to inner and outer transitions, as well as the broader development of social movements. In some cases, these networks build on principles like permaculture to encourage people to ‘observe and interact’, ‘produce no waste’ and ‘design from patterns to details’, not only in agriculture and gardening, but also in sustainable businesses and technologies to reduce CO 2 emissions (Ferguson and Lovell 2014; [[#Lessem--2018|Lessem 2018]] ).

A related line of inquiry involves education for sustainable development (ESD). This builds on the UNESCO programme, ‘ESD for 2030’, and involves core values like peace culture, valuing cultural diversity and living global citizenship. One of the core insights from research on ESC is lifelong education continuing outside the classroom, a lifelong learning process that involves sustained actions by all ages and social segments ( [[#Hume--2015|Hume and Barry 2015]] ) and achieving collaboration ( [[#Munger--2012|Munger and Riemer 2012]] ). Some authors have pointed to good levels of communication either directly or through the internet as the key to facilitating this learning ( [[#Sandfort--2015|Sandfort and Quick 2015]] ). Others have noted that transformative learning – that is, deepening the learning process – is critical because it helps to induce both shared awareness and collective actions ( [[#Brundiers--2010|Brundiers et al. 2010]] ; [[#Singleton--2015|Singleton 2015]] ; [[#Wamsler--2018|Wamsler and Brink 2018]] ).

A final area of work points to the importance of moving toward the knowledge production that underpins awareness-raising ( [[#Pelling--2015|Pelling et al. 2015]] ). The accumulation of applied knowledge is leading increasingly to the co-design of participatory research with local stakeholders who are investigating and transforming their own situations in line with climate action and sustainable development ( [[#Wiek--2012|Wiek et al. 2012]] ; [[#Abson--2017|Abson et al. 2017]] ; [[#Fazey--2018|Fazey et al. 2018]] ).

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==== 17.4.1.2 Habits, Values and Awareness ====

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Many of the cases that explore transitions to sustainable development point to ingrained habits, values and awareness levels as the most persistent yet least visible barriers to a transition. For example, in the transport sector, individuals can quickly become accustomed to personal vehicles, making it difficult for them to transition to sustainable, low-carbon modes of public transport. Demand for high-carbon transportation may also be locked-in, and habits reinforced, if low-cost housing (for instance) is not sufficiently served by more sustainable (i.e., mass transit, safe cycling and walking infrastructure) transportation options ( [[#Mattioli--2020|Mattioli et al. 2020]] ).

This is made all the more challenging because car-manufacturing ‘incumbents’ utilise information campaigns directed at the public, pursue lobbying and consulting with policymakers, and set technical standards that privilege the status quo and prevent the entry of more sustainable innovations ( [[#Smink--2015|Smink et al. 2015]] ; [[#Turnheim--2019|Turnheim and Nykvist 2019]] ). Tools such as congestion pricing, however, have been shown to be effective in motivating the switch from single-occupancy vehicle use to public transit, thus improving air quality and reducing traffic delays in dense city centres ( [[#Baghestani--2020|Baghestani et al. 2020]] ).

Complicating the problem further is that even well-intentioned top-down programmes initiated by an external actor may in some cases ultimately hinder transformative change ( [[#Breukers--2017|Breukers et al. 2017]] ). For instance, in Delhi, India, attempts to introduce ostensibly more sustainable bus rapid transit (BRT) systems failed in part due to an arguably top-down approach that had limited public support. It may nonetheless be difficult to win public support ( [[#Bachus--2018|Bachus and Vanswijgenhoven 2018]] ), and even grassroots initiatives may themselves be contested and dynamic, making it difficult to generate the collective push to drive a bottom-up transition forward ( [[#Hakansson--2018|Hakansson 2018]] ).

However, dominant, top-down approaches and local, grassroots ‘alternative’ approaches and values do overlap and interact. For example, in Manchester, UK, dominant and alternative discourses interact with each other to create sustainable transformations through re-scaling (decentralising) energy generation, creating local engagement with sustainability, supporting green infrastructure to reduce costs, reclaiming local land, transforming industrial infrastructure and creating examples of sustainable living ( [[#Hodson--2017|Hodson et al. 2017]] ).

Embedding local values in higher-level policy frameworks is also significant for forest communities in Nepal and Uganda. Even so, policy intermediaries are not confident that these values will be advanced due largely to an emphasis on carbon accounting and the distribution of benefits ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al. 2018]] ). In this case, however, norm entrepreneurs were able to promote the importance of local values through the formation of grassroots associations, media campaigns and international support networks ( [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al. 2018]] ).

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=== 17.4.2 Technological and Social Innovation ===

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Individuals and organisations, like institutional entrepreneurs, can function to build transformative capacity through collective action ( [[#Brodnik--2018|Brodnik and Brown 2018]] ). The transition from a traditional water-management system to the Water Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) model in Melbourne offers an illustration of how whole systems can be changed in an urban system.

Private-sector entrepreneurs also play an important role in fostering and accelerating transitions to sustainable development ( [[#Burch--2016|Burch et al. 2016]] ; [[#Ehnert--2018a|Ehnert et al. 2018a]] ; [[#Dale--2017|Dale et al. 2017]] ). Sustainable entrepreneurs (SEs), for instance, are described as those who participate in the development of an innovation while simultaneously being rooted in the incumbent energy-intensive system. SE actors who have developed longer-term relationships, both formal and informal, with the public authorities can have considerable influence on developing novel renewable-energy technologies ( [[#Gasbarro--2017|Gasbarro et al. 2017]] ). Institutions and policies that nurture the activities of sustainable entrepreneurs, in particular small- and medium-sized enterprises ( [[#Burch--2016|Burch et al. 2016]] ), can facilitate and strengthen transitions toward more sustainable development pathways, as can more fundamental adjustments to underlying business models, rather than relying only on incremental adjustments in the efficiency with which resources are used ( [[#Burch--2021|Burch and Di Bella 2021]] ).

The creation and growth of sustainable energy and clean-tech clusters enable economic development and transformation on regional scales. Such clusters can put pressure on incumbent technologies and rules to accelerate energy transitions. Successful clusters are nurtured by multi-institutional and multi-stakeholder actors building institutional support networks, facilitating collaboration between sectors and actors, and promoting learning and social change. Notably, regional economic clusters generate a buzz, which can have a strong influence on public acceptance, support and enthusiasm for socio-technical transitions ( [[#McCauley--2012|McCauley and Stephens 2012]] ).

In Norway, many incumbent energy firms have already expanded their operations into the alternative-energy sector as both producers and suppliers (who often follow the lead of producers). Producers are responding to perceptions of larger-scale changes in the energy landscape (e.g., the green shift), along with uncertainties in their own sectors, and innovation can spill across actors in multiple sectors ( [[#Koasidis--2020|Koasidis et al. 2020]] ). While these firms are expanding out of self-interest, the expansion provides more legitimacy to new forms of technology and enables transfers of knowledge and resources to be introduced within this developing niche ( [[#Steen--2017|Steen and Weaver 2017]] ). Many large, well-established firms are pursuing sustainability agendas and opting for transparency with regard to their greenhouse gas emissions ( [[#Kolk--2008|Kolk et al. 2008]] ; [[#Guenther--2016|Guenther et al. 2016]] ), supply-chain management ( [[#Formentini--2016|Formentini and Taticchi 2016]] ) and sustainable technology or service development ( [[#Dangelico--2016|Dangelico et al. 2016]] ).

Experiments with the transition open up pathways that can lead to energy transitions on broader scales. Experiments can build capacity by developing networks and building bridges between diverse actors, leveraging capital from government funds, de-risking private- and public-sector investment, and acting as hubs for public education and engagement ( [[#Rosenbloom--2018|Rosenbloom et al. 2018]] ).

Material barriers and spatial dynamics ( [[#Coenen--2012|Coenen et al. 2012]] ; [[#Hansen--2015|Hansen and Coenen 2015]] ) are other critical obstacles to innovation: often, infrastructure and built environments change more slowly than policies and institutions due to the inherently long lifespans of fixed assets ( [[#Turnheim--2019|Turnheim and Nykvist 2019]] ). The example of transport infrastructure in Ontario, Canada, illustrates the need to integrate climate change into these infrastructural decisions in the very short term to combat the risk of being left with unsustainable planning features long into the future, especially combustion engines, significant road networks and suburbanisation ( [[#Birch--2016|Birch 2016]] ).

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=== 17.4.3 Financial Systems and Economic Instruments ===

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Market-oriented policies, such as carbon taxes and green finance, can promote low-carbon technology and encourage both private and public investment in enabling transitions. Policies that are currently being tested include loan guarantees for renewable-energy investments in Mali, policy insurance to reduce credit defaults within the feed-in tariff regime in Germany, or pledged funding to fully finance or partner private firms in order to advance renewable-energy projects ( [[#Roy--2018|Roy et al. 2018]] a). However, there may be some limitations in using carbon pricing alone (rather than in combination with flexible regulations and incentives) where market failures hinder low-carbon investments ( [[#Campiglio--2016|Campiglio 2016]] ; [[#World%20Bank--2019|World Bank 2019]] ) and high political costs are incurred (Van Der Ploeg 2011).

Many forms of transformational change to energy systems are not possible when financial systems still privilege investing in unsustainable, carbon-intensive sectors. One of the root causes of the failure of traditional financial systems is the undervaluation of natural capital and unsettled property-right issues that are associated with it. The exclusion of proper rents for scarcities or for global and local externalities, including climate change, can undermine larger-scale changes to energy systems ( [[#Clark--2018|Clark et al. 2018]] ). But even smaller-scale low-carbon energy and infrastructure projects can fail to get off the ground if uncertainty and investment risk discourage project planning and bank-lending programmes ( [[#Bolton--2016|Bolton et al. 2016]] ). The EU’s previous actions regarding the ‘shareholder maximisation norm’ and non-binding measures have created path dependencies, limiting its flexibility in creating sustainable financial legislation. However, the Sustainable Finance Initiative and the Single Market may prove to be ‘policy hotspots’ in encouraging sustainable finance ( [[#Ahlström--2019|Ahlström 2019]] ). Taking advantage of these hotspots may be crucial in overcoming path dependencies and setting new ones in motion.

One possible positive turn in this regard is the acceleration in investing in the environment (impact and ESG) globally: for instance, there is evidence that some institutional investors are divesting from coal, potentially auguring well for the future ( [[#Richardson--2017|Richardson 2017]] ). The encouragement of governance and policy reforms that could facilitate similar expansions of investment in sustainable firms and sectors ( [[#Clark--2018|Clark et al. 2018]] ; [[#Owen--2018|Owen et al. 2018]] ) could contribute to the dynamic feedback that gives a transition lift and injects momentum into it. Also, the degrowth movement, with its focus on sustainability over profitability, has the potential to speed up transformations using alternative practices such as fostering the exchange of non-monetary goods and services if large numbers of stakeholders want to invest in these areas ( [[#Chiengkul--2017|Chiengkul 2017]] ).

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=== 17.4.4 Institutional Capacities and Multi-level Governance ===

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Capable institutions and multi-level governance often support the inter-agency coordination and stakeholder coalitions that drive sustainable transitions. Such institutions and governance arrangements are frequently required to formulate and implement the multi-sectoral policies that spur the adoption and scaling of innovative solutions to climate change and other sustainable development challenges. For example, such institutional and governance conditions have helped support the industrial policies that will be needed to spread renewables through the creation of domestic supply chains ( [[#Zenghelis--2020|Zenghelis 2020]] ) or to pilot CDR methods ( [[#Quarton--2020|Quarton and Samsatli 2020]] ).

However, government agencies with climate and other remits do not always work well together: the absence of coordination and consensus-building mechanisms can further deepen inter-agency conflicts that stall a transition. These challenges appear not only within but also between levels of decision-making. Studies of developing megacities, for instance, have found the lack of mechanisms promoting vertical cross-level integration to be a sizeable constraint on decarbonisation ( [[#Canitez--2019|Canitez 2019]] ). Differences in perspectives across non-state actors can similarly frustrate transitions in areas such as green buildings ( [[#Song--2020|Song et al. 2020]] ).

Here coordination complicates matters: coalition-building may require mutually reinforcing changes to institutions and policies. For example, decentralised renewable energy has made progress in Argentina, but consumer electricity subsidies give agencies and firms supporting conventional energy an advantage over those promoting renewable energy. Similarly, the lack of concrete guidance in green finance policies can deprive government agencies and other stakeholders of the information needed to balance ecological and financial goals ( [[#Wang--2016|Wang and Zhi 2016]] ). Many of these challenges can be particularly formidable in developing countries, where agencies lack sufficient financial and other capacities. A lack of government funds to cover ongoing maintenance costs along with resource shortages in rural locations can pose constraints on sustainable energy ( [[#Schaube--2018|Schaube et al. 2018]] ).

Building inter-agency or multiple stakeholders is frequently challenging because of the mutually reinforcing interactions between institutions and ideas. The imperceptible embedding of long-standing development paradigms (such as ‘grow now, clean up later’) in agency rules and standard operating procedures can make changes to governance arrangements challenging. This is partly because these rules and procedures can also shape the interests of key decision-makers (e.g., the head of an environmental agency). For some, this suggests a need to look not just at changing prevailing ideas and interests, but also at broader institutional and governance arrangements ( [[#Kern--2011|Kern 2011]] ).

However, institutional and governance reforms can be more than a technical exercise. Political, economic and other power relations can lock-in dominant institutional and economic structures, making the integration of climate and sustainable development agendas exceedingly difficult. For example, though there have been recent reforms, the initial lack of early progress in Australia’s energy transition is partly attributable to institutions of political economy being oriented to providing steady supplies of affordable fossil fuels ( [[#Warren--2016|Warren et al. 2016]] ).

This suggests that it is important to look closely at the pre-existing political economic system as well as the institutional context and capacities in assessing the prospects for transitions to sustainability. Furthermore, this is how existing institutions interact with ideas that often strengthen lock-ins. To illustrate, studies have shown that the status-quo orientations of leaders (including decision-makers’ disciplinary backgrounds, world views and perceptions of risk) ( [[#Willis--2018|Willis 2018]] ), as well as the organisational culture and management paradigms within which they operate, affect the speed and ambitions of climate policies ( [[#Rickards--2014|Rickards et al. 2014]] ).

Some studies have focused on factors that can break institutional and ideational lock-ins ( [[#Arranz--2017|Arranz 2017]] ), while others have found that intentional higher-level (or, in the language of socio-technical transitions, ‘landscape’) pressures can be the destabilising force needed to move transitions forward ( [[#Falcone--2015|Falcone and Sica 2015]] ). Often the state or national government (as the sovereign that determines how resources are used and allocated) can play a key role in destabilising incumbent energy regimes, a role that is significantly strengthened by public support ( [[#Arranz--2017|Arranz 2017]] ; [[#Avelino--2016|Avelino et al. 2016]] ). However, this role is not limited to government insiders. In some contexts, regime outsiders have also played a pivotal role in destabilising regimes by combining persuasive narratives that gain market influence ( [[#Arranz--2017|Arranz 2017]] ). Carbon-intensive luxury goods and services for wealthy consumers, for instance, especially if applied at the ‘acceleration’ phase of a transition, can help transform long-term social practices and behaviour and dissolve the ‘structural imperative for growth’ ( [[#Wiedmann--2020|Wiedmann et al. 2020]] ). In a similar fashion, environmental taxes can remove ‘locked-in’ technology and place pressure on dominant regimes to become more sustainable ( [[#Bachus--2018|Bachus and Vanswijgenhoven 2018]] ).

In many contexts, it is not multiple institutional and policy variables that come together to break unsustainable inertias. In South Korea, where the state was an initiator and enabler of change, the clean-energy transition took much longer than anticipated due to private-sector resistance. However, when policymakers focused on incorporating adaptive learning and flexibility into their decision-making, public- and private-sector interests gradually converged and joined with top-down policymaking to drive the transition forward ( [[#Lee--2019|Lee et al. 2019]] ). Thus, a political strategy can help align the interests and institutions needed to break lock-ins.

This becomes clear in studies that show that political coalitions can affect the speed of transitions ( [[#Hess--2014|Hess 2014]] ). These same studies show that incumbent industry coalitions are now competing with ‘green’ coalitions in terms of campaign spending over environmentally friendly ballot proposals ( [[#Hess--2014|Hess 2014]] ). Another way of shifting political-economic incentives is by offering a realistic exit strategy for incumbents, like interventions that provide long-term incentives for renewable-energy firms ( [[#de%20Gooyert--2016|de Gooyert et al. 2016]] ; [[#Hamman--2019|Hamman 2019]] ).

Overall, the previous subsection suggests that complementary policies and institutions that simultaneously integrate across multiple sectors and scales and also alter political economic structures that lock in a carbon-intensive energy system are more likely to move a sustainable transition forward ( [[#Burch--2010|Burch 2010]] ). Yet, despite a trend in climate governance towards greater integration and inclusivity and certain other novel governance approaches, traditional approaches to governance and a tendency to incrementalism remain dominant ( [[#Holscher--2019|Holscher et al. 2019]] ). Building the governance arrangements and capacities that prioritise climate change across all sectors and scales while destabilising entrenched interests and putting pressure on existing norms, rules and practices is still needed in many contexts ( [[#Holscher--2019|Holscher et al. 2019]] ).

At least three themes require further research in the scholarship on the governance of transitions: (i) the role of coalitions in supporting and hindering acceleration; (ii) the role of feedback, through which policies may shape actor preferences, which in turn create stronger policies; and (iii) the role of broader contexts (political economies, institutions, cultural norms, and technical systems) in creating conditions for acceleration ( [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ). Importantly, these themes may serve as both barriers to and opportunities for transitions (ibid.).

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=== 17.4.5 Equity in a Just Transition ===

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Energy justice, although increasingly being emphasised ( [[#Pellegrini-Masini--2020|Pellegrini-Masini et al. 2020]] ), has been under-represented in the literature on sustainability and in debates on energy transitions, and it remains a contested term with multiple meanings ( [[#Green--2020|Green and Gambhir 2020]] ). Energy justice includes affordability, sustainability, equality (accessibility for current and future households) and respect (ensuring that innovations do not impose further burdens on particular groups) ( [[#Fuso%20Nerini--2019|Fuso Nerini et al. 2019]] ). Furthermore, it suggests that a just transition is a shared responsibility among countries that are making more rapid progress towards net-negative emissions and those economies that are focused on pressing development priorities related to improved health, well-being and prosperity ( [[#van%20den%20Berg--2020|van den Berg et al. 2020]] ).

Looking at climate change from a justice perspective means placing the emphasis on (i) the protection of vulnerable populations from the impacts of climate change; (ii) mitigating the effects of the transformations themselves, including easing the transition for those whose livelihoods currently rely on fossil fuel-based sectors; and (iii) envisaging an equitable decarbonised world. Neglecting issues of justice risks a backlash against climate action generally, particularly from those who stand to lose from such actions ( [[#Patterson--2018|Patterson et al. 2018]] ), and it will also have implications for the pace, scale and quality of the transition. Explicit interventions to promote sustainability transitions that integrate local spaces into the whole development process are necessary but not sufficient in creating a just transition ( [[#Breukers--2017|Breukers et al. 2017]] ; [[#Ehnert--2018b|Ehnert et al. 2018b]] ).

Renewable energy transitions in rural, impoverished locations can simultaneously reinforce and disrupt local power structures and inequalities. Policy interventions to help the most impoverished individuals in a community gain access to the new energy infrastructure are critical in ensuring that existing inequalities are not reinforced. Individuals who are empowered by energy development projects can influence the onward extension of sustainable energy to other communities ( [[#Ahlborg--2017|Ahlborg 2017]] ). In Denmark in the 1970s, for example, grassroots windmill cooperatives opened a pathway to the creation of one of the world’s largest wind-energy markets. The unique dynamics of grassroots-led changes mean that new technologies and low-carbon initiatives develop strong foundations by being designed, tested and improved in the early stages with reference to the socio-political contexts in which they will grow later ( [[#Ornetzeder--2013|Ornetzeder and Rohracher 2013]] ).

Intersectional theory can shine a light on the hidden costs of resource extraction, as well as renewable-energy development (see, for instance, ( [[#Chatalova--2017|Chatalova and Balmann 2017]] ), which go beyond environmental or health risks to include the socio-cultural impacts on both communities adjacent to these sites and those who work in them ( [[#Daum--2018|Daum 2018]] ). Indeed, development decisions often do not properly integrate the burdens and risks placed on marginalised groups, such as indigenous peoples, while risk assessments tend to reinforce existing power imbalances by failing to differentiate between how benefits and risks might impact on certain groups ( [[#Healy--2019|Healy et al. 2019]] ; [[#Kojola--2019|Kojola 2019]] ). In some cases, such as the deployment of small-scale solar power in Tanzania by a non-profit organisation, an explicit gender lens on the impacts of energy poverty revealed the significant socio-economic benefits of improving access to renewable energy ( [[#Gray--2019|Gray et al. 2019]] ).

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=== 17.4.6 Holistic Planning and the Nexus Approach ===

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Poor sectoral coordination and institutional fragmentation have triggered a wide range of unsustainable uses of resources and threatened the long-term sustainability of food, water and energy security ( [[#Rasul--2016|Rasul 2016]] ). Greater policy coherence among the three sectors is critical to moving to a sustainable and efficient use of resources ( [[#United%20Nations--2019|United Nations 2019]] ), given that political ambition, values, the energy mix, infrastructure and innovation capacities collectively shape transition outcomes ( [[#Neofytou--2020|Neofytou et al. 2020]] ). Capacity- and coalition-building, particularly among sub-national and non-state actors (e.g., non-governmental organisations) is a particularly important enabler of greater coherence ( [[#Bernstein--2018|Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018]] ). The nexus approach, a systems-based methodology that focuses attention on the many ways in which natural resources are deeply interwoven and mutually interdependent, can strengthen coordination and help to avoid maladaptive pathways ( [[#Cremades--2016|Cremades et al. 2016]] ).

A major shift is required in the decision-making process in the direction of taking a holistic view, developing institutional mechanisms to coordinate the actions of diverse actors and strengthening complementarities and synergies ( [[#Nikas--2020|Nikas et al. 2020]] ; [[#Rasul--2016|Rasul 2016]] ). Currently, nexus approaches have moved from purely conceptual arguments to application and implementation. ( [[#Liu--2018|Liu et al. 2018]] ) suggest the need for a systematic procedure and provide perspectives on future directions. These include expanding nexus frameworks that take into account interaction linkages with the SDGs, incorporating overlooked drivers and regions, diversifying nexus toolboxes and making these strategies central to policymaking and governance in integrating and implementing the SDGs.

In respect of processes, ( [[#Seyfang--2012|Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012]] ) found a lack of realistic and achievable expectations among both members (internally) and the wider public (externally), which hampers the acceleration of transitions. This movement could concentrate strategically on developing and promoting short-term steps towards shared long-term visions, including clearly identifiable goals and end-points. Sustainability science must link research on problem structures with a solutions-oriented approach that seeks to understand, conceptualise and foster experiments in how socio-technical innovations for sustainability develop, are diffused and are scaled up ( [[#Miller--2014|Miller et al. 2014]] ).

Various strategies and processes have been explored that might facilitate the translation of barriers into enablers, thus accelerating transitions to sustainable development. Common themes include frequent monitoring and system evaluation to reveal the barriers in the first place, the collaborative co-creation and envisioning of pathways toward sustainable development, ambitious goal-setting, the strategic tackling of sources of path dependence or inertia, iterative evaluations of progress and risk management, adaptive management and building in opportunities for agile course-correction at multiple levels of governance ( [[#Burch--2014|Burch et al. 2014]] ; [[#Halbe--2015|Halbe et al. 2015]] ). Given the political infeasibility of stable, long-term climate policies, the better choice may be to embrace uncertainty in specific policies but entrench the low-carbon transition as the overarching goal. Framing climate policy too narrowly, rather than taking a more holistic, sustainable development-oriented approach, may tie success to single policies, rather than allowing for system-wide change.

Decarbonisation may be encouraged by embedding the transition in a broader socio-economic agenda, focusing on constructing social legitimacy to justify the transformation, encouraging municipalities with a material interest in the transition and reforming institutions to support the long-term transition goals ( [[#Rosenbloom--2019|Rosenbloom et al. 2019]] ). In jurisdictions where climate and energy policy have been integrated and harmonised, such as the UK, progress has been made in transitioning to sustainable energy ( [[#Warren--2016|Warren et al. 2016]] ).

Developing countries that are rich in fossil fuels now have an opportunity to reset their development trajectories by focusing on those opportunities that will offer resilient development in land-use change, low-carbon energy generation and not least more efficient resource-planning ( [[#UNDRR--2019|UNDRR 2019]] ). Resource-rich developing countries can choose an alternative pathway by deciding to monetise carbon capital and diversifying away from the high-carbon aspects of risk. Countries rich in hydrocarbons can diversify their energy mix and maximise their renewable-energy potential. For instance, Namibia, a net importer of electricity, is seeking to reduce its current dependence on hydrocarbons by promoting solar energy. The government has issued permits allowing independent power producers (IPPs) to sell directly to consumers, thus ending the monopoly hitherto enjoyed by the state utility company NamPower ( [[#Kruger--2019|Kruger et al. 2019]] ).

Cities are important spaces where the momentum to achieve low-carbon transitions can be built ( [[#Burch--2010|Burch 2010]] ; [[#Holscher--2019|Holscher et al. 2019]] ; [[#Shaw--2014|Shaw et al. 2014]] ), especially where centralised energy structures and national governance and politics are posing deep-rooted challenges to change ( [[#Dowling--2018|Dowling et al. 2018]] ; [[#Meadowcroft--2011|Meadowcroft 2011]] ). Cities can enter networks and partnerships with other cities and multi-level actors, spaces that are important for capacity-building and accelerating change ( [[#Dale--2020|Dale et al. 2020]] ; [[#Heikkinen--2019|Heikkinen et al. 2019]] ; [[#Westman--2021|Westman et al. 2021]] ).

Addressing the uncertainties and complexities associated with locally, regionally and nationally sustainable development pathways requires creative methods and participatory processes. These may include powerful visualisations that make the implications of climate change (and decarbonisation) clear locally ( [[#Shaw--2014|Shaw et al. 2014]] ; [[#Sheppard--2011|Sheppard et al. 2011]] ), other visual aids or ‘progress wheels’ that effectively communicate the relevant contexts ( [[#Glaas--2019|Glaas et al. 2019]] ), storytelling and mapping, and both analogue and digital games ( [[#Mangnus--2019|Mangnus et al. 2019]] ).

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