Editing IPCC:AR6/SYR/SPM (section)

== A. Current Status and Trends ==

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=== Observed Warming and its Causes ===

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'''A.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850-1900 in 2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals '''''(high confidence).''''' Links to longer report 2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2'''
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A.1.1 Global surface temperature was 1.09°C [0.95 to 1.20] °C [[#footnote-052|5]] higher in 2011-2020 than 1850-1900 [[#footnote-051|6]] , with larger increases over land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83] °C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01] °C). Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21 st century (2001-2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10] °C higher than 1850-1900. Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years ''(high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.1.1, Figure 2.1

A.1.2 The ''likely'' range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850-1900 to 2010-2019 [[#footnote-050|7]] is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. Over this period, it is ''likely'' that well-mixed greenhouse gases (GHGs) contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C [[#footnote-049|8]] , and other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to +0.2°C. Links to longer report 2.1.1, Figure 2.1

A.1.3 Observed increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions from human activities over this period. Historical cumulative net CO '''2''' emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO '''2''' of which more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989, and about 42% occurred between 1990 and 2019 ''(high confidence)'' . In 2019, atmospheric CO '''''2''''' concentrations (410 parts per million) were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years ''(high confidence)'' , and concentrations of methane (1866 parts per billion) and nitrous oxide (332 parts per billion) were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years ''(very high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.1.1, Figure 2.1

A.1.4 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59 ± 6.6 GtCO '''2''' -eq [[#footnote-048|9]] in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO '''2''' -eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO '''2''' -eq) higher than in 1990, with the largest share and growth in gross GHG emissions occurring in CO '''2''' from fossil fuels combustion and industrial processes (CO '''2''' -FFI) followed by methane, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010-2019 were higher than in any previous decade on record, while the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 (1.3% year -1 ) was lower than that between 2000 and 2009 (2.1% year -1 ). In 2019, approximately 79% of global GHG emissions came from the sectors of energy, industry, transport, and buildings together and 22% [[#footnote-047|10]] from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Emissions reductions in CO 2 -FFI due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. ''(high confidence)'' Links to longer report 2.1.1

A.1.5 Historical contributions of CO 2 emissions vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO 2 -FFI and net CO 2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO 2 -LULUCF). In 2019, around 35% of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO 2 -eq per capita [[#footnote-046|11]] (excluding CO 2 -LULUCF) while 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO 2 -eq per capita; of the latter a substantial share lacks access to modern energy services. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO 2 -eq and 4.6 tCO 2 -eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO 2 -eq), excluding CO 2 -LULUCF. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, while the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. ''(high confidence)'' Links to longer report 2.1.1, Figure 2.2

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=== Observed Changes and Impacts ===

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'''A.2 Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people '''''(high confidence)''''' . Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected '''''(high confidence)''''' . [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1, Table 2.1, Figures 2.2 and 2.3'''
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A.2.1 It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr -1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr -1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr -1 between 2006 and 2018 ''(high confidence)'' . Human influence was ''very likely'' the main driver of these increases since at least 1971. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has further strengthened since AR5. Human influence has ''likely'' increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s, including increases in the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts ''(high confidence)'' . [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Figure 3.4

A.2.2 Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Human and ecosystem vulnerability are interdependent. Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity [[#footnote-045|12]] and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability. ''(high confidence)'' [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2, 4.4

A.2.3 Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric, and coastal and open ocean ecosystems ''(high confidence)'' . Hundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes ''(high confidence)'' with mass mortality events recorded on land and in the ocean ''(very high confidence)'' . Impacts on some ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain ''(medium confidence)'' and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw ''(high confidence)'' . ''[[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2, Figure 2.3''

A.2.4 Climate change has reduced food security and affected water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals ''(high confidence)'' . Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally ''(medium confidence)'' , with related negative impacts mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts in some high latitude regions ''(high confidence)'' . Ocean warming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production from fisheries and shellfish aquaculture in some oceanic regions ''(high confidence)'' . Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least part of the year due to a combination of climatic and non-climatic drivers ''(medium confidence)'' . ''[[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2, Figure 2.3''

A.2.5 In all regions increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity ''(very high confidence)'' . The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases ''(very high confidence)'' and the incidence of vector-borne diseases ''(high confidence)'' have increased. In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are associated with increasing temperatures ''(high confidence)'' , trauma from extreme events ''(very high confidence)'' , and loss of livelihoods and culture ''(high confidence)'' . Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, Asia, North America ''(high confidence)'' , and Central and South America ''(medium confidence)'' , with small island states in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size ''(high confidence)'' . [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2, Figure 2.3

A.2.6 Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages [[#footnote-044|13]] to nature and people that are unequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors. Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism. Individual livelihoods have been affected through, for example, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, human health and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity. ''(high confidence)'' [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1.2

A.2.7 In urban areas, observed climate change has caused adverse impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure. Hot extremes have intensified in cities. Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events [[#footnote-043|14]] , with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and negative impacts to well-being. Observed adverse impacts are concentrated amongst economically and socially marginalised urban residents. ''(high confidence)'' Links to longer report 2.1.2

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'''Figure SPM.1: (a)''' Climate change has already caused widespread impacts and related losses and damages on human systems and altered terrestrial, freshwater and ocean ecosystems worldwide. Physical water availability includes balance of water available from various sources including ground water, water quality and demand for water. Global mental health and displacement assessments reflect only assessed regions. Confidence levels reflect the assessment of attribution of the observed impact to climate change. '''(b)''' Observed impacts are connected to physical climate changes including many that have been attributed to human influence such as the selected climatic impact-drivers shown. Confidence and likelihood levels reflect the assessment of attribution of the observed climatic impact-driver to human influence. '''(c)''' Observed (1900-2020) and projected (2021-2100) changes in global surface temperature (relative to 1850-1900), which are linked to changes in climate conditions and impacts, illustrate how the climate has already changed and will change along the lifespan of three representative generations (born in 1950, 1980 and 2020). Future projections (2021-2100) of changes in global surface temperature are shown for very low (SSP1-1.9), low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5), high (SSP3-7.0) and very high (SSP5-8.5) GHG emissions scenarios. Changes in annual global surface temperatures are presented as ‘climate stripes’, with future projections showing the human-caused long-term trends and continuing modulation by natural variability (represented here using observed levels of past natural variability). Colours on the generational icons correspond to the global surface temperature stripes for each year, with segments on future icons differentiating possible future experiences. [[#box-spm-1|Box SPM.1]] Links to longer report 2.1, 2.1.2, Figure 2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Cross-Section Box.2, 3.1, Figure 3.3, 4.1, 4.3

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=== Current Progress in Adaptation and Gaps and Challenges ===

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'''A.3 Adaptation planning and implementation has progressed across all sectors and regions, with documented benefits and varying effectiveness. Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist, and will continue to grow at current rates of implementation. Hard and soft limits to adaptation have been reached in some ecosystems and regions. Maladaptation is happening in some sectors and regions. Current global financial flows for adaptation are insufficient for, and constrain implementation of, adaptation options, especially in developing countries '''''(high confidence)''''' . Links to longer report 2.2, 2.3'''
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A.3.1 Progress in adaptation planning and implementation has been observed across all sectors and regions, generating multiple benefits ''(very high confidence).'' Growing public and political awareness of climate impacts and risks has resulted in at least 170 countries and many cities including adaptation in their climate policies and planning processes ''(high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.2.3

A.3.2 Effectiveness [[#footnote-042|15]] of adaptation in reducing climate risks [[#footnote-041|16]] is documented for specific contexts, sectors and regions ''(high confidence).'' Examples of effective adaptation options include: cultivar improvements, on-farm water management and storage, soil moisture conservation, irrigation, agroforestry, community-based adaptation, farm and landscape level diversification in agriculture, sustainable land management approaches, use of agroecological principles and practices and other approaches that work with natural processes ''(high confidence)'' . Ecosystem-based adaptation [[#footnote-040|17]] approaches such as urban greening, restoration of wetlands and upstream forest ecosystems have been effective in reducing flood risks and urban heat ''(high confidence)'' . Combinations of non-structural measures like early warning systems and structural measures like levees have reduced loss of lives in case of inland flooding ''(medium confidence)'' . Adaptation options such as disaster risk management, early warning systems, climate services and social safety nets have broad applicability across multiple sectors ''(high confidence).'' Links to longer report 2.2.3

A.3.3 Most observed adaptation responses are fragmented, incremental [[#footnote-039|18]] , sector-specific and unequally distributed across regions. Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist across sectors and regions, and will continue to grow under current levels of implementation, with the largest adaptation gaps among lower income groups. ''(high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.3.2

A.3.4 There is increased evidence of maladaptation in various sectors and regions ''(high confidence)'' . Maladaptation especially affects marginalised and vulnerable groups adversely ''(high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.3.2

A.3.5 Soft limits to adaptation are currently being experienced by small-scale farmers and households along some low-lying coastal areas ''(medium confidence)'' resulting from financial, governance, institutional and policy constraints ''(high confidence)'' . Some tropical, coastal, polar and mountain ecosystems have reached hard adaptation limits ''(high confidence).'' Adaptation does not prevent all losses and damages, even with effective adaptation and before reaching soft and hard limits ''(high confidence)'' . Links to longer report 2.3.2

A.3.6 Key barriers to adaptation are limited resources, lack of private sector and citizen engagement, insufficient mobilization of finance (including for research), low climate literacy, lack of political commitment, limited research and/or slow and low uptake of adaptation science, and low sense of urgency. There are widening disparities between the estimated costs of adaptation and the finance allocated to adaptation ''(high confidence)'' . Adaptation finance has come predominantly from public sources, and a small proportion of global tracked climate finance was targeted to adaptation and an overwhelming majority to mitigation ''(very high confidence)'' . Although global tracked climate finance has shown an upward trend since AR5, current global financial flows for adaptation, including from public and private finance sources, are insufficient and constrain implementation of adaptation options, especially in developing countries ''(high confidence)'' . Adverse climate impacts can reduce the availability of financial resources by incurring losses and damages and through impeding national economic growth, thereby further increasing financial constraints for adaptation, particularly for developing and least developed countries ''(medium confidence).'' Links to longer report 2.3.2, 2.3.3

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'''Box SPM.1 The use of scenarios and modelled pathways in the AR6 Synthesis Report'''

Modelled scenarios and pathways [[#footnote-038|19]] are used to explore future emissions, climate change, related impacts and risks, and possible mitigation and adaptation strategies and are based on a range of assumptions, including socio-economic variables and mitigation options. These are quantitative projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Global modelled emission pathways, including those based on cost effective approaches contain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, and have to be assessed with the careful recognition of these assumptions. Most do not make explicit assumptions about global equity, environmental justice or intra-regional income distribution. IPCC is neutral with regard to the assumptions underlying the scenarios in the literature assessed in this report, which do not cover all possible futures. [[#footnote-037|20]] Links to longer report Cross-Section Box.2

WGI assessed the climate response to five illustrative scenarios based on Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) [[#footnote-036|21]] that cover the range of possible future development of anthropogenic drivers of climate change found in the literature. High and very high GHG emissions scenarios (SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 [[#footnote-035|22]] ) have CO '''2''' emissions that roughly double from current levels by 2100 and 2050, respectively. The intermediate GHG emissions scenario (SSP2-4.5) has CO '''2''' emissions remaining around current levels until the middle of the century. The very low and low GHG emissions scenarios (SSP1-1.9 and SSP1-2.6) have CO '''2''' emissions declining to net zero around 2050 and 2070, respectively, followed by varying levels of net negative CO '''2''' emissions. In addition, Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) [[#footnote-034|23]] were used by WGI and WGII to assess regional climate changes, impacts and risks. In WGIII, a large number of global modelled emissions pathways were assessed, of which 1202 pathways were categorised based on their assessed global warming over the 21st century; categories range from pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with more than 50% likelihood (noted &gt;50% in this report) with no or limited overshoot (C1) to pathways that exceed 4°C (C8). Links to longer report Cross-Section Box.2 (Box SPM.1, Table 1)

Global warming levels (GWLs) relative to 1850-1900 are used to integrate the assessment of climate change and related impacts and risks since patterns of changes for many variables at a given GWL are common to all scenarios considered and independent of timing when that level is reached. Links to longer report Cross-Section Box.2

'''Box SPM.1, Table 1:''' Description and relationship of scenarios and modelled pathways considered across AR6 Working Group reports. Links to longer report Cross-Section Box.2, Figure 1

[[File:31f60039cc2180cbcd65493b8a746162 IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM_Box_Table_1.png]]
\* See footnote 27 for the SSPx-y terminology.

\** See footnote 28 for the RCPy terminology.

\*** Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C global warming by up to about 0.1°C, high overshoot by 0.1°C-0.3°C, in both cases for up to several decades.

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=== Current Mitigation Progress, Gaps and Challenges ===

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'''A.4 Policies and laws addressing mitigation have consistently expanded since AR5. Global GHG emissions in 2030 implied by nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced by October 2021 make it '''''likely''''' that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century and make it harder to limit warming below 2°C. There are gaps between projected emissions from implemented policies and those from NDCs and finance flows fall short of the levels needed to meet climate goals across all sectors and regions. '''''(high confidence)''''' Links to longer report 2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Table 2.2'''
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A.4.1 The UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement are supporting rising levels of national ambition. The Paris Agreement, adopted under the UNFCCC, with near universal participation, has led to policy development and target-setting at national and sub-national levels, in particular in relation to mitigation, as well as enhanced transparency of climate action and support ''(medium confidence)'' . Many regulatory and economic instruments have already been deployed successfully ''(high confidence)'' . In many countries, policies have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and accelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some cases reduced or removed emissions ''(high confidence)'' . Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to several Gt CO 2 -eq yr -1 [[#footnote-033|24]] of avoided global emissions ''(medium confidence)'' . At least 18 countries have sustained absolute production-based GHG and consumption-based CO 2 reductions [[#footnote-032|25]] for longer than 10 years. These reductions have only partly offset global emissions growth ''(high confidence)'' ''. Links to longer report 2.2.1, 2.2.2''

A.4.2 Several mitigation options, notably solar energy, wind energy, electrification of urban systems, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand-side management, improved forest- and crop/grassland management, and reduced food waste and loss, are technically viable, are becoming increasingly cost effective and are generally supported by the public. From 2010-2019 there have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (85%), wind energy (55%), and lithium-ion batteries (85%), and large increases in their deployment, e.g., &gt;10x for solar and &gt;100x for electric vehicles (EVs), varying widely across regions. The mix of policy instruments that reduced costs and stimulated adoption includes public R&amp;D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and demand-pull instruments such as deployment subsidies to attain scale. Maintaining emission-intensive systems may, in some regions and sectors, be more expensive than transitioning to low emission systems. ''(high confidence)'' Links to longer report 2.2.2, Figure 2.4

A.4.3 A substantial ‘emissions gap’ exists between global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 [[#footnote-031|26]] and those associated with modelled mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot or limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) assuming immediate action ''(high confidence)'' . This would make it ''likely'' that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century ''(high confidence)'' . Global modelled mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot or limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) assuming immediate action imply deep global GHG emissions reductions this decade ''(high confidence)'' (see SPM Box 1, Table 1, B.6) [[#footnote-030|27]] . Modelled pathways that are consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030 and assume no increase in ambition thereafter have higher emissions, leading to a median global warming of 2.8 [2.1 to 3.4] °C by 2100 ''(medium confidence).'' Many countries have signalled an intention to achieve net zero GHG or net zero CO 2 by around mid-century but pledges differ across countries in terms of scope and specificity, and limited policies are to date in place to deliver on them. Links to longer report 2.3.1, Table 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 3.1, 4.1

A.4.4 Policy coverage is uneven across sectors ''(high confidence)'' . Policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions in 2030 than emissions implied by NDCs, indicating an ‘implementation gap’ ''(high confidence)'' . Without a strengthening of policies, global warming of 3.2 [2.2 to 3.5] °C is projected by 2100 ''(medium confidence). [[#box-spm-1|Box SPM.1]] [[#figure-spm-5|Figure SPM.5]] Links to longer report 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 3.1.1, Figure 2.5''

A.4.5 The adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most developing countries, particularly least developed ones, due in part to limited finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity ''(medium confidence)'' . The magnitude of climate finance flows has increased over the last decade and financing channels have broadened but growth has slowed since 2018 ''(high confidence)'' . Financial flows have developed heterogeneously across regions and sectors ''(high confidence)'' . Public and private finance flows for fossil fuels are still greater than those for climate adaptation and mitigation ''(high confidence)'' . The overwhelming majority of tracked climate finance is directed towards mitigation, but nevertheless falls short of the levels needed to limit warming to below 2°C or to 1.5°C across all sectors and regions (see C7.2) ''(very high confidence)'' . In 2018, public and publicly mobilised private climate finance flows from developed to developing countries were below the collective goal under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation ''(medium confidence). Links to longer report 2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.3''

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