Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/SPM (section)

== B. Recent Developments and Current Trends ==

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'''B.1 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions [[#footnote-070|6]] have continued to rise during the period 2010-2019, as have cumulative net CO 2 emissions since 1850. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade, but the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 was lower than that between 2000 and 2009. ( high confidence ) Expand [[#figure-spm-1|Figure SPM.1]] Links to chapters Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 2.1, 2.2, Figure TS.2'''
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'''B.1.1''' Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions were 59 ± 6.6 GtCO 2 -eq [[#footnote-069|7]] , [[#footnote-068|8]] in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO 2 -eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO 2 -eq) higher than in 1990. The annual average during the decade 2010–2019 was 56 ± 6.0 GtCO 2 -eq, 9.1 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 higher than in 2000–2009. This is the highest increase in average decadal emissions on record. The average annual rate of growth slowed from 2.1% yr –1 between 2000 and 2009 to 1.3% yr –1 between 2010 and 2019. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.1) {Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 2.1, 2.2, Figure TS.2}

'''B.1.2''' Growth in anthropogenic emissions has persisted across all major groups of GHGs since 1990, albeit at different rates. By 2019, the largest growth in absolute emissions occurred in CO 2 from fossil fuels and industry followed by CH 4 , whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases, starting from low levels in 1990 ( ''high confidence'' ). Net anthropogenic CO 2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO 2 -LULUCF) are subject to large uncertainties and high annual variability, with ''low confidence'' even in the direction of the long-term trend. [[#footnote-067|9]] (Figure SPM.1) {Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, 2.2, Figure TS.2}

'''B.1.3''' Historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO 2 ( ''high confidence'' ). Of these, more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989 [1400 ± 195 GtCO 2 ], and about 42% between 1990 and 2019 [1000 ± 90 GtCO 2 ]. About 17% of historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions since 1850 occurred between 2010 and 2019 [410 ± 30 GtCO 2 ]. [[#footnote-066|10]] By comparison, the current central estimate of the remaining carbon budget from 2020 onwards for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% has been assessed as 500 GtCO 2 , and as 1150 GtCO 2 for a probability of 67% for limiting warming to 2°C. Remaining carbon budgets depend on the amount of non-CO 2 mitigation (±220 GtCO 2 ) and are further subject to geophysical uncertainties. Based on central estimates only, cumulative net CO 2 emissions between 2010 and 2019 compare to about four-fifths of the size of the remaining carbon budget from 2020 onwards for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, and about one-third of the remaining carbon budget for a 67% probability to limit global warming to 2°C. Even when taking uncertainties into account, historical emissions between 1850 and 2019 constitute a large share of total carbon budgets for these global warming levels. [[#footnote-065|11]] , [[#footnote-064|12]] Based on central estimates only, historical cumulative net CO 2 emissions between 1850 and 2019 amount to about four-fifths 12 of the total carbon budget for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (central estimate about 2900 GtCO 2 ), and to about two thirds 12 of the total carbon budget for a 67% probability to limit global warming to 2°C (central estimate about 3550 GtCO 2 ). {Figure 2.7, 2.2, Figure TS.3, WGI Table SPM.2}

'''B.1.4''' Emissions of CO 2 -FFI dropped temporarily in the first half of 2020 due to responses to the COVID-19 pandemic ( ''high confidence'' ), but rebounded by the end of the year ( ''medium confidence'' ). The annual average CO 2 -FFI emissions reduction in 2020 relative to 2019 was about 5.8% [5.1–6.3%], or 2.2 [1.9–2.4] GtCO 2 ( ''high confidence'' ). The full GHG emissions impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be assessed due to a lack of data regarding non-CO 2 GHG emissions in 2020. {Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, Figure 2.6, 2.2, Box TS.1, Box TS.1 Figure 1}

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'''Figure SPM.1 | Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions (''' '''GtCO''' 2 '''-eq''' '''y''' '''r''' –1 ''') 1990–2019.''' Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions include CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO 2 -FFI); net CO 2 from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO 2 -LULUCF) 9 ; methane (CH 4 ); nitrous oxide (N 2 O); and fluorinated gases (HFCs, PFCs, SF 6 , NF 3 ). 6 '''Panel a''' shows aggregate annual global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by groups of gases from 1990 to 2019 reported in GtCO 2 -eq converted based on global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100-AR6) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group I (Chapter 7). The fraction of global emissions for each gas is shown for 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2019; as well as the aggregate average annual growth rate between these decades. At the right side of Panel a, GHG emissions in 2019 are broken down into individual components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by the error bars: CO 2 -FFI ±8%; CO 2 -LULUCF ±70%; CH 4 ±30%; N 2 O ±60%; F-gases ±30%; GHG ±11%. Uncertainties in GHG emissions are assessed in Supplementary Material 2.2. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO 2 -LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. '''Panel b''' shows global anthropogenic CO 2 -FFI, net CO 2 -LULUCF, CH 4 , N 2 O and F-gas emissions individually for the period 1990–2019, normalised relative to 100 in 1990. Note the different scale for the included F-gas emissions compared to other gases, highlighting its rapid growth from a low base. Shaded areas indicate the uncertainty range. Uncertainty ranges as shown here are specific for individual groups of greenhouse gases and cannot be compared. The table shows the central estimate for: absolute emissions in 2019; the absolute change in emissions between 1990 and 2019; and emissions in 2019 expressed as a percentage of 1990 emissions. {2.2, Figure 2.5, Supplementary Material 2.2, Figure TS.2}

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'''B.2 Net anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased since 2010 across all major sectors globally. An increasing share of emissions can be attributed to urban areas. Emissions reductions in CO 2 from fossil fuels and industrial processes (CO 2 -FFI), due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. ( high confidence ) Expand Links to chapters 2.2, 2.4, 6.3, 7.2, 8.3, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2'''
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'''B.2.1''' In 2019, approximately 34% (20 GtCO 2 -eq) of total net anthropogenic GHG emissions came from the energy supply sector, 24% (14 GtCO 2 -eq) from industry, 22% (13 GtCO 2 -eq) from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), 15% (8.7 GtCO 2 -eq) from transport and 6% (3.3 GtCO 2 -eq) from buildings. [[#footnote-063|13]] If emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that use the final energy, 90% of these indirect emissions are allocated to the industry and buildings sectors, increasing their relative GHG emissions shares from 24% to 34%, and from 6% to 16%, respectively. After reallocating emissions from electricity and heat production, the energy supply sector accounts for 12% of global net anthropogenic GHG emissions. ( ''high confidence'' ) {Figure 2.12, 2.2, 6.3, 7.2, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2, Figure TS.6}

'''B.2.2''' Average annual GHG emissions growth between 2010 and 2019 slowed compared to the previous decade in energy supply (from 2.3% to 1.0%) and industry (from 3.4% to 1.4%), but remained roughly constant at about 2% yr –1 in the transport sector ( ''high confidence'' ). Emissions growth in AFOLU, comprising emissions from agriculture (mainly CH 4 and N 2 O) and forestry and other land use (mainly CO 2 ) is more uncertain than in other sectors due to the high share and uncertainty of CO 2 -LULUCF emissions ( ''medium confidence'' ). About half of total net AFOLU emissions are from CO 2 -LULUCF, predominantly from deforestation [[#footnote-062|14]] ( ''medium confidence'' ). {Figure 2.13, 2.2, 6.3, 7.2, Figure 7.3, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2, TS.3}

'''B.2.3''' The global share of emissions that can be attributed to urban areas is increasing. In 2015, urban emissions were estimated to be 25 GtCO 2 -eq (about 62% of the global share) and in 2020, 29 GtCO 2 -eq (67–72% of the global share). [[#footnote-061|15]] The drivers of urban GHG emission are complex and include population size, income, state of urbanisation and urban form. ( ''high confidence'' ) {8.1, 8.3}

'''B.2.4''' Global energy intensity (total primary energy per unit GDP) decreased by 2% yr –1 between 2010 and 2019. Carbon intensity (CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO 2 -FFI) per unit primary energy) decreased by 0.3% yr –1 , with large regional variations, over the same period mainly due to fuel switching from coal to gas, reduced expansion of coal capacity, and increased use of renewables. This reversed the trend observed for 2000–2009. For comparison, the carbon intensity of primary energy is projected to decrease globally by about 3.5% yr –1 between 2020 and 2050 in modelled scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%), and by about 7.7% yr –1 globally in scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot. [[#footnote-060|16]] ( ''high confidence'' ) {Figure 2.16, 2.2, 2.4, Table 3.4, 3.4, 6.3}

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'''B.3 '''Regional contributions''' [[#footnote-059|17]] '''to global GHG emissions continue to differ widely. Variations in regional, and national per capita emissions partly reflect different development stages, but they also vary widely at similar income levels. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute a disproportionately large share of global household GHG emissions. At least 18 countries have sustained GHG emission reductions for longer than 10 years. (''' high confidence ) Expand [[#figure-spm-2|Figure SPM.2]] Links to chapters Figure 1.1, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.25, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, Figure TS.4, Figure TS.5'''
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'''B.3.1''' GHG emissions trends over 1990–2019 vary widely across regions and over time, and across different stages of development, as shown in Figure SPM.2. Average global per capita net anthropogenic GHG emissions increased from 7.7 to 7.8 tCO 2 -eq, ranging from 2.6 tCO 2 -eq to 19 tCO 2 -eq across regions. Least developed countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO 2 -eq and 4.6 tCO 2 -eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO 2 -eq), excluding CO 2 -LULUCF. [[#footnote-058|18]] ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure1.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, 2.2, Figure TS.4}

'''B.3.2''' Historical contributions to cumulative net anthropogenic CO 2 emissions between 1850 and 2019 vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO 2 -FFI (1650 ± 73 GtCO 2 -eq) and net CO 2 -LULUCF (760 ± 220 GtCO 2 -eq) emissions. 10 Globally, the major share of cumulative CO 2 -FFI emissions is concentrated in a few regions, while cumulative CO 2 -LULUCF 9 emissions are concentrated in other regions. LDCs contributed less than 0.4% of historical cumulative CO 2 -FFI emissions between 1850 and 2019, while SIDS contributed 0.5%. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 2.10, 2.2, TS.3, Figure 2.7}

'''B.3.3''' In 2019, around 48% of the global population lives in countries emitting on average more than 6 tCO 2 -eq per capita, excluding CO 2 -LULUCF. 35% live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO 2 -eq per capita. Another 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO 2 -eq per capita. A substantial share of the population in these low-emitting countries lack access to modern energy services. [[#footnote-057|19]] Eradicating extreme poverty, energy poverty, and providing decent living standards [[#footnote-056|20]] to all in these regions in the context of achieving sustainable development objectives, in the near-term, can be achieved without significant global emissions growth. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 1.2, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 3.7, 4.2, 6.7, Figure TS.4, Figure TS.5}

'''B.3.4''' Globally, the 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, [[#footnote-055|21]] while the middle 40% contribute 40–53%, and the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. ( ''high confidence'' ) {2.6, Figure 2.25}

'''B.3.5''' At least 18 countries have sustained production-based GHG and consumption-based CO 2 emission reductions for longer than 10 years. Reductions were linked to energy supply decarbonisation, energy efficiency gains, and energy demand reduction, which resulted from both policies and changes in economic structure. Some countries have reduced production-based GHG emissions by a third or more since peaking, and some have achieved several years of consecutive reduction rates of around 4% yr –1 , comparable to global reductions in scenarios limiting warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) or lower. These reductions have only partly offset global emissions growth. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure TS.4, 2.2, 1.3.2}

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'''Figure SPM.2: Regional GHG emissions, and the regional proportion of total cumulative''' '''production-based''' '''CO''' 2 '''emissions from 1850 to 2019.''' '''Panel a''' shows global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (in GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 (GWP100-AR6)) for the time period 1990–2019. 6 Percentage values refer to the contribution of each region to total GHG emissions in each respective time period. The single-year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO 2 -LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Regions are as grouped in Annex II. '''Panel b''' shows the share of historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO 2 emissions per region from 1850 to 2019 in GtCO 2 . This includes CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO 2 -FFI) and net CO 2 emissions from land use, land-use change, forestry (CO 2 -LULUCF). Other GHG emissions are not included. 6 CO 2 -LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of ±70% (90% confidence interval). '''Panel c''' shows the distribution of regional GHG emissions in tonnes CO 2 -eq per capita by region in 2019. GHG emissions are categorised into: CO 2 -FFI; net CO 2 -LULUCF; and other GHG emissions (methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated gases, expressed in CO 2 -eq using GWP100-AR6). The height of each rectangle shows per capita emissions, the width shows the population of the region, so that the area of the rectangles refers to the total emissions for each region. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. In the case of two regions, the area for CO 2 -LULUCF is below the axis, indicating net CO 2 removals rather than emissions. CO 2 -LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of ±70% (90% confidence interval). '''Panel d''' shows population, GDP per person, emission indicators by region in 2019 for percentage GHG contributions, total GHG per person, and total GHG emissions intensity, together with production-based and consumption-based CO 2 -FFI data, which is assessed in this report up to 2018. Consumption-based emissions are emissions released to the atmosphere in order to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e.g., region). Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. {1.3, Figure 1.2, 2.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Annex II}

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'''B.4 The unit costs of several low-emission technologies have fallen continuously since 2010. Innovation policy packages have enabled these cost reductions and supported global adoption. Both tailored policies and comprehensive policies addressing innovation systems have helped overcome the distributional, environmental and social impacts potentially associated with global diffusion of low-emission technologies. Innovation has lagged in developing countries due to weaker enabling conditions. Digitalisation can enable emission reductions, but can have adverse side effects unless appropriately governed. ( high confidence ) Expand [[#figure-spm-3|Figure SPM.3]] Links to chapters 2.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.2, 12.2, 16.2, 16.4, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 16'''
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'''Figure SPM.3 | Unit cost reductions and use in some rapidly changing mitigation technologies.''' The '''top panel''' shows global costs per unit of energy (USD per MWh) for some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. Solid blue lines indicate average unit cost in each year. Light blue shaded areas show the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles in each year. Grey shading indicates the range of unit costs for new fossil fuel (coal and gas) power in 2020 (corresponding to USD55–148 per MWh). In 2020, the levelised costs of energy (LCOE) of the four renewable energy technologies could compete with fossil fuels in many places. For batteries, costs shown are for 1 kWh of battery storage capacity; for the others, costs are LCOE, which includes installation, capital, operations, and maintenance costs per MWh of electricity produced. The literature uses LCOE because it allows consistent comparisons of cost trends across a diverse set of energy technologies to be made. However, it does not include the costs of grid integration or climate impacts. Further, LCOE does not take into account other environmental and social externalities that may modify the overall (monetary and non-monetary) costs of technologies and alter their deployment. The '''bottom panel''' shows cumulative global adoption for each technology, in GW of installed capacity for renewable energy and in millions of vehicles for battery-electric vehicles. A vertical dashed line is placed in 2010 to indicate the change since AR5. Shares of electricity produced and share of passenger vehicle fleet are indicated in text for 2020 based on provisional data, i.e., percentage of total electricity production (for PV, onshore wind, offshore wind, CSP) and of total stock of passenger vehicles (for EVs). The electricity production share reflects different capacity factors; for example, for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV. {2.5, 6.4} Renewable energy and battery technologies were selected as illustrative examples because they have recently shown rapid changes in costs and adoption, and because consistent data are available. Other mitigation options assessed in the report are not included as they do not meet these criteria.

'''B.4.1''' From 2010 to 2019, there have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (85%), wind energy (55%), and lithium-ion batteries (85%), and large increases in their deployment, e.g., &gt;10× for solar and &gt;100× for electric vehicles (EVs), varying widely across regions (Figure SPM.3). The mix of policy instruments which reduced costs and stimulated adoption includes public R&amp;D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and demand pull instruments such as deployment subsidies to attain scale. In comparison to modular small-unit size technologies, the empirical record shows that multiple large-scale mitigation technologies, with fewer opportunities for learning, have seen minimal cost reductions and their adoption has grown slowly. ( ''high confidence'' ) {1.3, 1.5, Figure 2.5, 2.5, 6.3, 6.4, 7.2, 11.3, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 13.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6}

'''B.4.2''' Policy packages tailored to national contexts and technological characteristics have been effective in supporting low-emission innovation and technology diffusion. Appropriately designed policies and governance have helped address distributional impacts and rebound effects. Innovation has provided opportunities to lower emissions and reduce emission growth and created social and environmental co-benefits ( ''high confidence'' ). Adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most developing countries, particularly least developed ones, due in part to weaker enabling conditions, including limited finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity. In many countries, especially those with limited institutional capacities, several adverse side effects have been observed as a result of diffusion of low-emission technology, for example, low-value employment, and dependency on foreign knowledge and suppliers. Low-emission innovation along with strengthened enabling conditions can reinforce development benefits, which can, in turn, create feedbacks towards greater public support for policy. ( ''medium confidence'' ) {9.9, 13.6, 13.7, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16, TS.3}

'''B.4.3''' Digital technologies can contribute to mitigation of climate change and the achievement of several SDGs ( ''high confidence'' ). For example, sensors, internet of things, robotics, and artificial intelligence can improve energy management in all sectors, increase energy efficiency, and promote the adoption of many low-emission technologies, including decentralised renewable energy, while creating economic opportunities ( ''high confidence'' ). However, some of these climate change mitigation gains can be reduced or counterbalanced by growth in demand for goods and services due to the use of digital devices ( ''high confidence'' ). Digitalisation can involve trade-offs across several SDGs, for example, increasing electronic waste, negative impacts on labour markets, and exacerbating the existing digital divide. Digital technology supports decarbonisation only if appropriately governed ( ''high confidence'' ). {5.3, 10, 12.6, 16.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 16, TS.5, Box TS.14}

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'''B.5 There has been a consistent expansion of policies and laws addressing mitigation since AR5. This has led to the avoidance of emissions that would otherwise have occurred and increased investment in low-GHG technologies and infrastructure. Policy coverage of emissions is uneven across sectors. Progress on the alignment of financial flows towards the goals of the Paris Agreement remains slow and tracked climate finance flows are distributed unevenly across regions and sectors. ( high confidence ) Expand Links to chapters 5.6, 13.2, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.9, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14, 15.3, 15.5'''
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'''B.5.1''' The Kyoto Protocol led to reduced emissions in some countries and was instrumental in building national and international capacity for GHG reporting, accounting and emissions markets ( ''high confidence'' ). At least 18 countries that had Kyoto targets for the first commitment period have had sustained absolute emission reductions for at least a decade from 2005, of which two were countries with economies in transition ( ''very high confidence'' ) ''.'' The Paris Agreement, with near universal participation, has led to policy development and target-setting at national and sub-national levels, in particular in relation to mitigation, as well as enhanced transparency of climate action and support ( ''medium confidence'' ). {14.3, 14.6}

'''B.5.2''' The application of diverse policy instruments for mitigation at the national and sub-national levels has grown consistently across a range of sectors ( ''high confidence'' ). By 2020, over 20% of global GHG emissions were covered by carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, although coverage and prices have been insufficient to achieve deep reductions ( ''medium confidence'' ). By 2020, there were ‘direct’ climate laws focused primarily on GHG reductions in 56 countries covering 53% of global emissions ( ''medium confidence'' ). Policy coverage remains limited for emissions from agriculture and the production of industrial materials and feedstocks ( ''high confidence'' ). {5.6, 7.6, 11.5, 11.6, 13.2, 13.6}

'''B.5.3''' In many countries, policies have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and accelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some cases reduced or removed emissions ( ''high confidence'' ). Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to avoided global emissions of several GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 ( ''medium confidence'' ) ''.'' At least 1.8 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 can be accounted for by aggregating separate estimates for the effects of economic and regulatory instruments. Growing numbers of laws and executive orders have impacted global emissions and were estimated to result in 5.9 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 less emissions in 2016 than they otherwise would have been. ( ''medium confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.3) {2.2, 2.8, 6.7, 7.6, 9.9, 10.8, 13.6, Cross-chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14}

'''B.5.4''' Annual tracked total financial flows for climate mitigation and adaptation increased by up to 60% between 2013/14 and 2019/20 (in USD2015), but average growth has slowed since 2018 [[#footnote-054|22]] ( ''medium confidence'' ). These financial flows remained heavily focused on mitigation, are uneven, and have developed heterogeneously across regions and sectors ( ''high confidence'' ) ''.'' In 2018, public and publicly mobilised private climate finance flows from developed to developing countries were below the collective goal under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to mobilise USD100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation ( ''medium confidence'' ). Public and private finance flows for fossil fuels are still greater than those for climate adaptation and mitigation ( ''high confidence'' ). Markets for green bonds, ESG (environmental, social and governance) and sustainable finance products have expanded significantly since AR5. Challenges remain, in particular around integrity and additionality, as well as the limited applicability of these markets to many developing countries. ( ''high confidence'' ) {Box 15.4, 15.3, 15.5, 15.6, Box 15.7}

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'''B.6 Global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) announced prior to COP26 [[#footnote-053|23]] would make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century. [[#footnote-052|24]] Likely limiting warming to below 2°C would then rely on a rapid acceleration of mitigation efforts after 2030. Policies implemented by the end of 2020 [[#footnote-051|25]] are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs. ( high confidence ) Expand [[#figure-spm-4|Figure SPM.4]] Links to chapters 3.3, 3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4'''
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'''B.6.1''' Policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs, indicating an implementation gap. A gap remains between global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 and those associated with modelled mitigation pathways assuming immediate action (for quantification see Table SPM.1). [[#footnote-050|26]] The magnitude of the emissions gap depends on the global warming level considered and whether only unconditional or also conditional elements of NDCs [[#footnote-049|27]] are considered. [[#footnote-048|28]] ( ''high confidence'' ) {3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

'''Table SPM.1 |''' '''Projected global emissions in 2030 associated with policies implemented by the end of 2020 and NDCs announced prior to COP26, and associated emissions gaps.''' *Emissions projections for 2030 and absolute differences in emissions are based on emissions of 52–56 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 in 2019 as assumed in underlying model studies. ( ''medium confidence'' ) {4.2, Table 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! rowspan="2"|
! rowspan="2"| Implied by policies implemented by the end of 2020

(GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 )

! colspan="2"| Implied by NDCs announced prior to COP26

|-
! Unconditional elements

(GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 )

! Including conditional elements

(GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 )

|-
| Median projected global emissions (min–max)*

| 57 [52–60]

| 53 [50–57]

| 50 [47–55]

|-
| Implementation gap between implemented policies and NDCs (median)

|
| 4

| 7

|-
| Emissions gap between NDCs and pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) with immediate action

|
| 10–16

| 6–14

|-
| Emissions gap between NDCs and pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot with immediate action

|
| 19–26

| 16–23

|}

'''B.6.2''' Global emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 are lower than the emissions implied by the original NDCs [[#footnote-047|29]] ( ''high confidence'' ). The original emissions gap has fallen by about 20% to one-third relative to pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) with immediate action (category C3a in Table SPM.2), and by about 15–20% relative to pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot (category C1 in Table SPM.2) ( ''medium confidence'' ). (Figure SPM.4) {3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

'''B.6.3''' Modelled global emission pathways consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) (category C3b in Table SPM.2) imply annual average global GHG emissions reduction rates of 0–0.7 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 during the decade 2020–2030, with an unprecedented acceleration to 1.4–2.0 GtCO 2 -eq yr –1 during 2030–2050 ( ''medium confidence'' ). Continued investments in unabated high-emitting infrastructure and limited development and deployment of low-emitting alternatives prior to 2030 would act as barriers to this acceleration and increase feasibility risks ( ''high confidence'' ). {3.3, 3.5, 3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4}

'''B.6.4''' Modelled global emission pathways consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 will ''likely'' exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century. Those pathways that then return warming to 1.5°C by 2100 with a likelihood of 50% or greater imply a temperature overshoot of 0.15°C–0.3°C (42 pathways in category C2 in Table SPM.2). In such pathways, global cumulative net-negative CO 2 emissions are –380 [–860 to –200] GtCO 2 [[#footnote-046|30]] in the second half of the century, and there is a rapid acceleration of other mitigation efforts across all sectors after 2030. Such overshoot pathways imply increased climate-related risk, and are subject to increased feasibility concerns, [[#footnote-045|31]] and greater social and environmental risks, compared to pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Figure SPM.4, Table SPM.2) {3.3, 3.5, 3.8, 12.3; AR6 WGII SPM B.6}

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'''Figure SPM.4: Global GHG emissions of modelled pathways (funnels in Panel a, and associated bars in Panels b, c, d) and projected emission outcomes from''' '''near-term''' '''policy assessments for 2030 (Panel b).''' '''Panel a''' shows global GHG emissions over 2015–2050 for four types of assessed modelled global pathways:

– Trend from implemented policies: Pathways with projected near-term GHG emissions in line with policies implemented until the end of 2020 and extended with comparable ambition levels beyond 2030 (29 scenarios across categories C5–C7, Table SPM.2).

– Limit to 2°C (&gt;67%) or return warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) after a high overshoot, NDCs until 2030: Pathways with GHG emissions until 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26, followed by accelerated emissions reductions ''likely'' to limit warming to 2°C (C3b, Table SPM.2) or to return warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% or greater after high overshoot (subset of 42 scenarios from C2, Table SPM.2).

– Limit to 2°C (&gt;67%) with immediate action: Pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) with immediate action after 2020 26 (C3a, Table SPM.2).

– Limit to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot: Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (C1, Table SPM.2 C1). All these pathways assume immediate action after 2020.

Past GHG emissions for 2010–2015 used to project global warming outcomes of the modelled pathways are shown by a black line [[#footnote-044|32]] and past global GHG emissions in 2015 and 2019 as assessed in [https://www.ipcc.ch/chapters/chapter-2 Chapter 2] are shown by whiskers. '''Panels b, c and d''' show snapshots of the GHG emission ranges of the modelled pathways in 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively. Panel b also shows projected emissions outcomes from near-term policy assessments in 2030 from Chapter 4.2 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3; median and full range). GHG emissions are in CO 2 -equivalent using GWP100 from AR6 WGI. {3.5, 4.2, Table 4.2, Table 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

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'''B.7 Projected cumulative future CO 2 emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure without additional abatement exceed the total cumulative net CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot. They are approximately equal to total cumulative net CO 2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%). ( high confidence ) Expand Links to chapters 2.7, 3.3'''
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'''B.7.1''' If historical operating patterns are maintained, [[#footnote-043|33]] and without additional abatement, [[#footnote-042|34]] estimated cumulative future CO 2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure, the majority of which is in the power sector, would, from 2018 until the end of its lifetime, amount to 660 [460–890] GtCO 2 . They would amount to 850 [600–1100] GtCO 2 when unabated emissions from currently planned infrastructure in the power sector is included. These estimates compare with cumulative global net CO 2 emissions from all sectors of 510 [330–710] GtCO 2 until the time of reaching net zero CO 2 emissions [[#footnote-041|35]] in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 890 [640–1160] GtCO 2 in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%). ( ''high confidence'' ) (Table SPM.2) {2.7, Figure 2.26, Figure TS.8}

'''B.7.2''' In modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) or lower, most remaining fossil fuel CO 2 emissions until the time of global net zero CO 2 emissions are projected to occur outside the power sector, mainly in industry and transport. Decommissioning and reduced utilisation of existing fossil fuel-based power sector infrastructure, retrofitting existing installations with CCS, [[#footnote-040|36]] switches to low-carbon fuels, and cancellation of new coal installations without CCS are major options that can contribute to aligning future CO 2 emissions from the power sector with emissions in the assessed global modelled least-cost pathways. The most appropriate strategies will depend on national and regional circumstances, including enabling conditions and technology availability. ( ''high confidence'' ) (Box SPM.1) {Table 2.7, 2.7, 3.4, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7}

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