Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/TS (section)

== TS.2 The Changed Global Context, Signs of Progress and Continuing Challenges ==

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'''Since the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), important changes that have emerged include the specific objectives established in the Paris Agreement of 2015 (for temperature, adaptation and finance), rising climate impacts, and higher levels of societal awareness and support for climate action (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Meeting the long-term temperature goal in the Paris Agreement, however, implies a rapid inflection in GHG emission trends and accelerating decline towards ‘net zero’. This is implausible without urgent and ambitious action at all scales. {1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.6, Chapters 3 and 4}

'''Effective and equitable climate policies are largely compatible with the broader goal of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty as enshrined in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), notwithstanding trade-offs in some cases (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts is one of the 17 SDGs (SDG 13). However, climate change mitigation also has synergies and/or trade-offs with many other SDGs. There has been a strong relationship between development and GHG emissions, as historically both per-capita and absolute emissions have risen with industrialisation. However, recent evidence shows countries can grow their economies while reducing emissions. Countries have different priorities in achieving the SDGs and reducing emissions as informed by their respective national conditions and capabilities. Given the differences in GHG emissions contributions, degree of vulnerability and impacts, as well as capacities within and between nations, equity and justice are important considerations for effective climate policy and for securing national and international support for deep decarbonisation. Achieving sustainable development and eradicating poverty would involve effective and equitable climate policies at all levels from local to global scale. Failure to address questions of equity and justice over time can undermine social cohesion and stability. International cooperation can enhance efforts to achieve ambitious global climate mitigation in the context of sustainable development. Pathways that illustrate movement towards fulfilling the SDGs are shown in Figure TS.1. {1.4, 1.6, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 17}

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'''Figure TS.1 |''' '''Sustainable development pathways towards fulfilling the Sustainable Development Goals.''' The graph shows global average per-capita GHG emissions (vertical axis) and relative ‘Historic Index of Human Development’ (HIHD) levels (horizonal) have increased globally since the industrial revolution (grey line). The bubbles on the graph show regional per-capita GHG emissions and human development levels in the year 2015, illustrating large disparities. Pathways towards fulfilling the Paris Agreement (and SDG 13) involve global average per-capita GHG emissions below about 5 tCO ''2'' -eq by 2030. Likewise, to fulfil SDGs 3, 4 and 8, HIHD levels (see footnote 7 in Chapter 1) need to be at least 0.5 or greater. This suggests a ‘sustainable development zone’ for year 2030 (in pale brown); the in-figure text also suggests a ‘sustainable development corridor’, where countries limit per-capita GHG emissions while improving levels of human development over time. The emphasis of pathways into the sustainable development zone differ (dashed brown arrows), but in each case transformations are needed in how human development is attained while limiting GHG emissions.

'''The transition to a low-carbon economy depends on a wide range of closely intertwined drivers and constraints, including policies and technologies where notable advances over the past decade have opened up new and large-scale opportunities for deep decarbonisation, and for alternative development pathways which could deliver multiple social and developmental goals (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Drivers for, and constraints on, low-carbon societal transitions comprise economic and technological factors (the means by which services such as food, heating and shelter are provided and for whom, the emissions intensity of traded products, finance and investment), socio-political issues (political economy, equity and fairness, social innovation and behaviour change), and institutional factors (legal framework and institutions, and the quality of international cooperation). In addition to being deeply intertwined, all the factors matter to varying degrees, depending on the prevailing social, economic, cultural and political context. They often both drive and inhibit transitions at the same time, within and across different scales. The development and deployment of innovative technologies and systems at scale are important for achieving deep decarbonisation, and in recent years, the cost of several low-carbon technologies has declined sharply as deployment has risen rapidly. (Figure TS.7) {1.3, 1.4, Chapters 2, 4, 5, 13,14}

'''Accelerating mitigation to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system will require the integration of broadened assessment frameworks and tools that combine multiple perspectives, applied in a context of multi-level governance (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Analysing a challenge on the scale of fully decarbonising our economies entails integration of multiple analytic frameworks. Approaches to risk assessment and resilience, established across IPCC Working Groups, are complemented by frameworks for probing the challenges in implementing mitigation. ''Aggregate frameworks'' include cost-effectiveness analysis towards given objectives, and cost-benefit analysis, both of which have been developing to take fuller account of advances in understanding risks and innovation, the dynamics of sectors and systems and of climate impacts, and welfare economic theory including growing consensus on long-term discounting. ''Ethical frameworks'' consider the fairness of processes and outcomes which can help ameliorate distributional impacts across income groups, countries and generations. ''Transition and transformation frameworks'' explain and evaluate the dynamics of transitions to low-carbon systems arising from interactions amongst levels. ''Psychological, behavioural and political frameworks'' outline the constraints (and opportunities) arising from human psychology and the power of incumbent interests. A comprehensive understanding of climate mitigation must combine these multiple frameworks. Together with established risk frameworks, these collectively help to explain potential synergies and trade-offs in mitigation, implying a need for a wide portfolio of policies attuned to different actors and levels of decision-making, and underpin ‘just transition’ strategies in diverse contexts. {1.2.2, 1.7, 1.8, Figure 1.7}

'''The speed, direction, and depth of any transition will be determined by choices in the environmental, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional realms (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Transitions in specific systems can be gradual or can be rapid and disruptive. The pace of a transition can be impeded by ‘lock-in’ generated by existing physical capital, institutions, and social norms. The interaction between politics, economics and power relationships is central to explaining why broad commitments do not always translate to urgent action. At the same time, attention to, and support for, climate policies and low-carbon societal transitions has generally increased, as the impacts have become more salient. Both public and private financing and financial structures strongly affect the scale and balance of high- and low-carbon investments. Societal and behavioural norms, regulations and institutions are essential conditions to accelerate low-carbon transitions in multiple sectors, whilst addressing distributional concerns endemic to any major transition. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had far-reaching impacts on the global economic and social system, and recovery will present both challenges and opportunities for climate mitigation. (Box TS.1) {1.3, Box 1.1, 1.4, 1.8, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 17}

'''Achieving the global transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient and sustainable world requires purposeful and increasingly coordinated planning and decisions at many scales of governance including local, sub-national, national and global levels (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Accelerating mitigation globally would imply strengthening policies adopted to date, expanding the effort across options, sectors, and countries, and broadening responses to include more diverse actors and societal processes at multiple – including international – levels. The effective governance of climate change entails strong action across multiple jurisdictions and decision-making levels, including regular evaluation and learning. Choices that cause climate change as well as the processes for making and implementing relevant decisions involve a range of non-nation state actors such as cities, businesses, and civil society organisations. At global, national and sub-national levels, climate change actions are interwoven with, and embedded in, the context of much broader social, economic and political goals. Therefore, the governance required to address climate change has to navigate power, political, economic, and social dynamics at all levels of decision-making. Effective climate-governing institutions, and openness to experimentation on a variety of institutional arrangements, policies and programmes can play a vital role in engaging stakeholders and building momentum for effective climate action. {1.4, 1.9, Chapters 8, 13, 15, 17}

'''Table TS.1''' '''|''' '''Signs of progress and continuing challenges.'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! '''Signs of progress'''

! '''Continuing challenges'''

|-
| colspan="2"| Emissions trends

|-
| '''The rate of global GHG emissions growth has slowed in recent years,''' from 2.1% yr –1 between 2000 and 2009, to 1.3% yr –1 in between 2010 and 2019. (TS.3) {2.2}

| '''GHG emissions have continued to grow at high absolute rates''' . Emissions increased by 8.9 GtCO 2 -eq from 2000 to 2009 and by 6.5 GtCO 2 -eq from 2010 to 2019, reaching 59 GtCO 2 -eq in 2019. (TS.3) {2.2}

|-
| '''A growing number of countries have reduced both territorial carbon dioxide (CO''' 2 ''') and GHG emissions and consumption-based CO''' 2 '''emissions''' '''in absolute terms for at least 10 years.''' These include mainly European countries, some of which have reduced production-based GHG emissions by a third or more since peaking. Some countries have achieved several years of rapid sustained CO 2 reduction rates of 4% yr –1 . (TS.3) {2.2}

| '''The combined emissions reductions achieved by some countries have been outweighed by rapid emissions growth elsewhere''' , particularly among developing countries that have grown from a much lower base of per-capita emissions. Uncertainties in emissions levels and changes over time prevents a precise assessment of reductions in some cases. The per-capita emissions of developed countries remain high, particularly in Australia, Canada, and the United States of America. {2.2}

|-
| '''Lockdown policies in response to COVID-19 led to an estimated global drop of 5.8% in CO''' 2 '''emissions in 2020 relative to 2019.''' Energy demand reduction occurred across sectors, except in residential buildings due to teleworking and homeschooling. The transport sector was particularly impacted and international aviation emissions declined by 45%. (Box TS.1) {2.2}

| '''Atmospheric CO''' 2 '''concentrations continued to rise in 2020 and emissions have already rebounded as lockdown policies are eased.''' Economic recovery packages currently include support for fossil fuel industries. (Boxes TS.1 and TS.8)

|-
| colspan="2"| Sectors

|-
| '''Multiple low-carbon electricity generation and storage technologies have made rapid progress: costs have reduced, deployment has scaled up, and performance has improved.''' These include solar photovoltaics (PV), onshore and offshore wind, and batteries. In many contexts solar PV and onshore wind power are now competitive with fossil-based generation. (TS.3) {2.5, 6.3}

| '''Although deployment is increasing rapidly, low-carbon electricity generation deployment levels and rates are currently insufficient to meet stringent climate goals.''' The combined market share of solar PV and wind generation technologies are still below 10%. Global low-carbon electricity generation will have to reach 100% by 2050, which is challenged by the continuous global increase in electricity demand. The contribution of biomass has absolute limits. (TS.5) {2.5}

|-
| '''The rate of emissions growth from coal slowed since 2010''' as coal power plants were retired in the US and Europe, fewer new plants were added in China, and a large number of planned global plants were scrapped or converted to co-firing with biomass. (TS.3) {2.7, 6.3}

| '''Global coal emissions may not have peaked yet,''' and a few countries and international development banks continue to fund and develop new coal capacity, especially abroad. The lifetime emissions of current fossil-based energy infrastructures may already exceed the remaining carbon budget for keeping warming below 1.5°C. (TS.3) {2.2, 2.7, 6.7}

|-
| '''Deforestation has declined since 2010 and net forest cover increased.''' Government initiatives and international moratoria were successful in reducing deforestation in the Amazon between 2004 and 2015, while regrowth and regeneration occurred in Europe, Eurasia and North America. (TS.5.6.1) {7.3.1}

| '''The long-term maintenance of low deforestation rates is challenging.''' Deforestation in the Amazon has risen again over the past four years. Other parts of the world also face steady, or rapidly increasing, deforestation. {7.3.1}

|-
| '''Electrification of public transport services is demonstrated as a feasible, scalable and affordable mitigation option to decarbonise mass transportation.''' Electric vehicles (e-vehicles) are the fastest growing segment of the automobile industry, having achieved double-digit market share by 2020 in many countries. When charged with low-carbon electricity, these vehicles can significantly reduce emissions. {10.4}

| '''Transport emissions have remained roughly constant, growing at an average of 2% yr''' –1 '''between 2010 and 2019''' due to the persistence of high travel demand, heavier vehicles, low efficiencies, and car-centric development. The full decarbonisation of e-vehicles requires that they are charged with zero-carbon electricity, and that car production, shipping, aviation and supply chains are decarbonised. (TS.3) {2.4}

|-
| '''There has been a significant global transition from coal and biomass use in buildings towards modern energy carriers and''' '''efficient''' '''conversion''' '''technologies.''' This led to efficiency improvements and some emissions reductions in developed countries, as well as significant gains in health and well-being outcomes in developing regions. Nearly zero energy buildings (nZEB) or low-energy buildings are achievable in all regions and climate zones for both new and existing buildings. {9.3, 9.8}

| '''There is a significant lock-in risk in all regions given the long lifespans''' '''of buildings and the low ambition of building policies.''' This is the case for both existing buildings in developed countries, and also for new buildings in developing countries that are also challenged by the lack of technical capacity and effective governance. Emissions reductions in developed countries have been outweighed by the increase in population growth, floor area per capita and the demand for electricity and heat. {9.3, 9.9}

|-
| '''The decarbonisation of most industrial processes has been demonstrated using technologies that include electricity and hydrogen for energy and feedstocks, carbon capture and utilisation technologies, and innovation in circular material flows.''' (TS.5.5) {11.2}

| '''Industry emissions continue to increase, driven by a strong global demand for basic materials.''' Without reductions in material demand growth and a very rapid scale-up of low-carbon innovations, the long lifetimes of industrial capital stock risks locking-in emissions for decades to come. (TS.5.5) {11.2}

|-
| colspan="2"| Policies and investment

|-
| '''The Paris Agreement established a new global policy architecture to meet stringent climate goals, while avoiding many areas of deadlock that had arisen in trying to extend the Kyoto Protocol.''' (TS.6.3)

| '''Current national pledges under the Paris Agreement''' '''[[#footnote-030|3]]''' '''are insufficient to''' '''limit warming to 1.5°C (&gt;50%) with no or limited overshoot, and would require''' '''an abrupt acceleration of mitigation efforts after 2030 to limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%).''' (TS.6.3)

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| '''Most wealthy countries, and a growing list of developing countries, have signalled an intention to achieve net zero GHG (or net zero CO''' 2 ''') emissions by mid-century.''' National economy-wide GHG emissions targets covered 90% of global emissions in 2020 compared to 49% in 2010. Direct and indirect climate legislation has also steadily increased and this is supported by a growing list of financial investors. (TS.6.2)

| '''Many net-zero targets are ambiguously defined, and the policies needed to achieve them are not yet in place.''' Opposition from status quo interests, as well as insufficient low-carbon financial flows, act as barriers to establishing and implementing stringent climate policies covering all sectors. (Box TS.6) {13.4}

|-
| '''The global coverage of mandatory policies – pricing and regulation – has increased, and sectoral coverage of mitigation policies has expanded.''' Emission trading and carbon taxes now cover over 20% of global CO 2 emissions. Allowance prices as of 1 April 2021 ranged from just over USD1 to USD50, covering between 9% and 80% of a jurisdiction’s emissions {13.6.3} . Many countries have introduced sectoral regulations that block new investment in fossil fuel technologies. (TS.6)

| '''There is incomplete global policy coverage of non-CO''' 2 '''gases, CO''' 2 '''from industrial processes, and emissions outside the energy sector.''' Few of the world’s carbon prices are at a level consistent with various estimates of the carbon price needed to limit warming to 2°C or 1.5°C. {13.6}

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| '''There has been a marked increase in civic and private engagement with climate governance.''' This includes business measures to limit emissions, invest in reforestation and develop carbon-neutral value chains such as using wood for construction. There is an upsurge in climate activism, and growing engagement of groups such as labour unions {1.3.3, 5.2.3} . The media coverage of climate change has also grown steadily across platforms and has generally become more accurate over time. (TS.6.2)

| '''There is no conclusive evidence that an increase in engagement results in overall pro-mitigation outcomes.''' A broad group of actors influence how climate governance develops over time, including a range of civic organisations, encompassing both pro-and anti-climate action groups. Accurate transference of the climate science has been undermined significantly by climate change counter-movements, in both legacy and new/social media environments through misinformation. (TS.6.2)

|}

'''GHG emissions continued to rise to 2019, although the growth of global GHG emissions has slowed over the past decade (''' '''''high confidence''''' ''').''' Delivering the updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to 2030 would turn this into decline, but the implied global emissions by 2030, still exceed pathways consistent with 1.5°C by a large margin and are near the upper end of the range of modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (&gt;67%) or below. In all chapters of this report there is evidence of progress towards deeper mitigation, but there remain many obstacles to be overcome. Table TS.1 summarises some of the key signs of progress in emission trends, sectors, policies and investment, as well as the challenges that persist.

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