Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-8 (section)

=== 8.3.4 Observed Disproportionate Impacts According to Economic and Non-economic Losses and Damages Due to Climate Change ===

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Since AR5 a new discourse on L&amp;D has emerged with new typology and elaboration of a definition. L&amp;D has a long and contentious history and is enshrined in the Paris Agreement (see Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17). Despite ambiguity about what constitutes L&amp;D ( [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ), it focuses on how to avert, minimise, and address the negative impacts of climate change, including those that cannot be avoided through adaptation. It can also be thought of as the observed residual risk (and potentially irreversible losses) from climate change when adaptation limits are encountered and mitigation has failed ( [[#Boda--2020|Boda et al., 2020]] ). L&amp;D is considered a policy mechanism (see Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17). There is also a burgeoning science for L&amp;D ( [[#Mechler--2019b|Mechler et al., 2019b]] ) which advances the breakdown on compounding vulnerabilities and highlights the disproportionate effects of climate change on the vulnerable and marginal (see Box 8.5 for illustration of distributional effect of both the drought and responses in the Cape region in South Africa). New evidence provides additional insight into L&amp;D from slow-onset events related to climate change (sea level rise, drought) (see [[#Anjum--2021|Anjum and Fraser, 2021]] ; [[#Lund--2021|Lund, 2021]] ) For example, ( [[#Singh--2021|Singh et al., 2021]] ) found growing evidence of urban droughts leading to economic losses (e.g., groundwater overextraction, financial impacts) and non-economic losses (e.g., conflict, increased drudgery).

The literature is assessed according to this new L&amp;D typology, which includes both extreme and slow-onset events and has a strong emphasis on climate justice and disproportionate impacts of climate hazards (see Figure 8.3), with a new focus non-economic L&amp;D.

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==== 8.3.4.1 Economic (e.g., Income, Assets) Impacts of Climate Change and Vulnerability ====

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While extreme events are not new, the intensity and frequency of extreme events are stacking, leading to additional increase in poverty or vulnerability in some regions, exacerbated by COVID-19, and up against existing development pathways leading to significant impact on economic losses globally ( ''high confidence'' ). There is ''robust evidence'' that many African countries experience climate-related losses in terms of loss of crop yields, destroyed homes, food insecurity through increased food prices, and displacement (Box 8.5; [[#Olsson--2014|Olsson et al., 2014]] ). Attention has been focused on low-income groups, women and children, poor rural communities, and Indigenous Peoples such as the example of the Dupong, an Indigenous Peoples in Ghana using Indigenous strategies to limit adverse impacts of climate change-induced water shortages ( [[#Opare--2018|Opare, 2018]] ). In Kenya, economic L&amp;D during droughts between 2009 and 2011 incurred costs that included trucking emergency water and food supplies, and loss of livestock and livelihoods. Cross-sectoral economic effects were estimated to reduce gross domestic product (GDP) by 2.8% yr −1 ( [[#King-Okumu--2021|King-Okumu et al., 2021]] ). Past studies have similarly shown that in the context of extreme events, such as floods or droughts, the most commonly sold assets are livestock and land. The sale of property particularly reduces the asset base, creates long-term vulnerabilities to future events and can trigger chronic poverty ''(high confidence'' ). People may face food shortages in the future from lack of crop production ( [[#Opondo--2013|Opondo, 2013]] ).The sale of cattle affects the household asset base, as well as important access to animal traction power for farming.

In South Asia, there is ''robust evidence'' of economic impacts of climate change ( [[#Cao--2021|Cao et al., 2021]] ), for example in the Sundarbans (a transboundary ecosystem with components in both India and Bangladesh, with the problem of unproductive livelihoods being common across residents of both countries) observations show local livelihoods are rapidly becoming unproductive (loss of fish, and increasing salination making agriculture increasingly difficult) ( [[#Ghosh--2018|Ghosh, 2018]] ); conditions that are exacerbated by climate change impacts ( ''high confidence'' ). Cyclone and storm surges induced by climate change force saline water into agricultural lands along the coast, which damages crops not only in the year the cyclone hits, but for several years afterwards ( [[#Rabbani--2013|Rabbani et al., 2013]] ). They showed in Shyamnagar Upazilla in Satkhira district the proportion of salinity-free farmland has gone down over the past 20 years, from more than 60% to nil ( [[#Rabbani--2013|Rabbani et al., 2013]] ). Vietnam has also experienced effects of flooding and salinisation in the Mekong delta, coupled with rapid social development. Intensified floods and droughts have dramatically resulted in loss of livelihoods in agriculture and fisheries in some areas of the basin ( [[#Evers--2018|Evers and Pathirana, 2018]] ). In Vietnam, the expected salinisation increases livelihood shifts into areas that are riskier, such as shrimp farming. Furthermore, the Vietnamese Mekong Delta is characterised by strong migration processes towards cities, particularly Ho Chi Min, meaning that abrupt livelihood shifts are already happening. There are emerging examples of Indigenous Peoples affected by climate change in indigenous farming mountain communities of the Nepal Himalaya. ( [[#Sujakhu--2019|Sujakhu et al., 2019]] ). The Philippines has experienced extreme events, such as Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, which left more than 7353 people reported dead or missing, damaged or swept away more than 1.1 million houses and injured more than 27,000 people ( [[#McPherson--2015|McPherson et al., 2015]] ). More than 4 million were displaced. The cost of damages has been estimated at USD 864 million with USD 435 million for infrastructure and USD 440 million for agriculture in affected regions ( [[#McPherson--2015|McPherson et al., 2015]] ).

Sea level rise, coastal flooding and surge inundation are increasingly pressing problems across the urban Pacific, including the urban and coastal population of Vanuatu ( [[#McDonnell--2021|McDonnell, 2021]] ). Pacific region islands, such as Vanuatu ( [[#Handmer--2019|Handmer and Nalau, 2019]] ), are particularly vulnerable to climate change. Kiribati and Tuvalu are impacted by exceptionally high tides that affect the urban atolls of South Tarawa and Funafuti, and cyclonic activity causing extensive economic damage in Tuvalu ( [[#Curtain--2019|Curtain and Dornan, 2019]] ). Limited migration opportunities for low-income households can result in forced immobility, and high tides, sea level rise and cyclonic damages could result in relocation of significant groups of the population.

A pertinent example of economic losses is the example of the Torres Strait in Australia. This example shows evidence of communities living on remote islands. Boigu is a low-lying mud island inundated by the sea during high tides and storm surges. Those most exposed and vulnerable to climate change have limited livelihood assets and face challenges to secure external support with government and others. Place-based values evoke a reluctance to relocate or retreat with economic losses such as community infrastructure, housing and cultural sites ( [[#McNamara--2017|McNamara et al., 2017]] ). In the Great Barrier Reef, Australia sea level rise and sea level global temperature warming affects fisheries’ productivity and tourism ( [[#Evans--2016|Evans et al., 2016]] ). Unprecedented burn area of wild forest fires in Australia between September 2019 and January 2020 ( [[#Boer--2020|Boer et al., 2020]] ) extended over almost 19 million hectares, destroyed over 3000 houses and killed 33 people ( [[#Filkov--2020|Filkov et al., 2020]] ).

The 2018 European heatwave in Northern and Eastern Europe caused multiple and simultaneous crop failures—among the highest observed in recent decades ( ''high agreement'' ). These yield losses were associated with extremely low rainfall in combination with high temperatures between March and August 2018 ( [[#Beillouin--2020|Beillouin et al., 2020]] ). Across Europe, in 2018, people experienced one of the worst harvests in a generation. Northern and Eastern Europe experienced multiple and simultaneous crop failures—among the highest observed in recent decades. These yield losses were associated with extremely low rainfalls in combination with high temperatures between March and August 2018. This compounding of extreme conditions in 2018 led to one of the highest negative relative yield anomalies at the scale of Eastern and Northern Europe, across a large array of crop species ( [[#Beillouin--2020|Beillouin et al., 2020]] ).

Extreme climate events are disproportionately impacting economies of the most vulnerable everywhere ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). In the Caribbean, Central America and USA, Hurricanes Katrina, Harvey, Irma, Maria and Michael are examples of extreme climate events that have displaced households, destroyed homes, and led to loss of income among the poor and marginalised ( [[#Klinenberg--2020|Klinenberg et al., 2020]] ). Puerto Rico was devastated by Hurricane Maria but received less support from the Federal Emergency Management Agency ( [[#García--2021|García, 2021]] ). Evidence is emerging on unequal governance responses in the USA versus Puerto Rico ( [[#Joseph--2020|Joseph et al., 2020]] ). Floods, storms and heatwaves have impacted poorer communities and wildfires in California have impacted many wealthy groups, and also infrastructure used by all, for example, with lengthy electrical power blackouts. However, they have particularly impacted those vulnerable to disasters, such as undocumented Latino/a and Indigenous immigrants in the case of the Thomas Fire in California’s Ventura and Santa Barbara counties ( [[#Méndez--2020|Méndez et al., 2020]] ). In 2017, Hurricane Irma hit Ragged Island in the Bahamas as a category 5 storm, leaving the island in ruins and deemed ‘unliveable’ by its authorities, with most infrastructure left as rubble, no essential utilities remained, schools and health clinics were in ruins and the stench of dead animals was overwhelming. This storm resulted in significant economic L&amp;D by the community through loss of their homes, churches, schools, agricultural land and infrastructure ( [[#Thomas--2020|Thomas and Benjamin, 2020]] ).

Across South America, groups of farmers, children, elderly, Indigenous Peoples and traditional communities are increasingly exposed to floods, droughts, wild forest fires and losses in crop yields, resulting in significant economic costs ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (see Box 8.6). Urban communities, in particular those living in informal settlements, are exposed to heatwaves. In Peru, analysis of water risks posed by climate change in the Vilcanota-Urubamba basin, Southern Peru, revealed seasonal water scarcity and glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), pose a serious threat for highly exposed and vulnerable people. It showed that very high-risk potentials of 134 current and another 6 out of 20 future glacier lakes as potentially highly susceptible to outburst floods. A total of eight existing and one possible future lakes indicate future river discharge could be reduced by some 2–11% (7–14%) until 2050 (2100). Farmers, in particular smallholders, in some regions face losses to irrigated agriculture and hydropower capacity with effects on water scarcity and food security ( [[#Drenkhan--2019|Drenkhan et al., 2019]] ). However, other assessments also point towards positive effects of water reservoirs and hydropower in terms of water storage, flood management and irrigation ( [[#Ahmad--2014|Ahmad et al., 2014]] ; [[#Liu--2015|Liu et al., 2015]] ; [[#Kuraku--2019|Kuraku et al., 2019]] )

There are additional dimensions of economic losses that are of a more diffuse nature. In particular, climate change is also expected to negatively affect labour supply, particularly in temperature exposed industries (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction), due to increases in the number of extreme hot days ( [[#Graff%20Zivin--2014|Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014]] ; [[#Garg--2020|Garg et al., 2020]] ). Low-income countries have on average a large share of workers in such industries and will thus be especially hard hit. Aside from labour supply, a number of studies also document negative impacts to manufacturing productivity ( [[#Acharya--2018|Acharya et al., 2018]] ; [[#Pogacar--2018|Pogacar et al., 2018]] ; [[#Somanathan--2021|Somanathan et al., 2021]] ). These findings provide a channel to explain macroeconomic consequences of climate change ( [[#Burke--2015|Burke et al., 2015]] ). However, there are also non-economic costs in that extreme heat will cause increased discomfort to workers, such as psychological stress, disease and in extreme cases, death among the workforce in developing economies, as well as tropical and sub-tropical countries ( [[#Ansah--2021|Ansah et al., 2021]] ).

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==== 8.3.4.2 Non-economic loss and damage (e.g., Mobility, Well-being) ====

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Climate change L&amp;D presents an existential threat to some ( [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ). For example, Pacific Island countries have contributed least to total GHG emissions, but the nations of the South Pacific are highly vulnerable to rising sea levels, tropical cyclones and other climate-related risks ( [[#Nand--2020|Nand and Bardsley, 2020]] ). For example, across Oceania there is significant risk that sea level rise will lead to forced relocation. Pacific leaders underscore the importance of losses, including deep connections between their world views and their land, and that leaving their islands can only be considered an option of ‘last resort’ ( [[#McDonnell--2021|McDonnell, 2021]] ).

Non-economic loss and damage (NELD) is values based (subjective and intangible) and relates to norms, social values and highlights intersectional experiences and perspectives on climate risk. The discourse on L&amp;D includes a framing of NELD as loss of human and non-human life, and mental and physical health that is experienced widely across the world in vastly different ways associated with social values ( [[#Tschakert--2019|Tschakert et al., 2019]] ). There are respectable arguments for the case that all life has intrinsic value ( [[#Vetlesen--2019|Vetlesen, 2019]] ). The NELD framing of climate impacts highlights that not all risks are measurable. While difficult to measure, there are a growing number of cases of NELD globally ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Illustrative examples of NELD from climate change include the Pacific ( [[#McNamara--2021b|McNamara et al., 2021b]] ) and SIDS in the Caribbean. ( [[#Martyr-Koller--2021|Martyr-Koller et al., 2021]] ). For example, the hurricane season in 2017 was particularly extreme resulting in climate-induced displacement with direct implications for NELD, including threats to health and well-being and loss of culture and agency ( [[#Thomas--2020|Thomas and Benjamin, 2020]] ).

In the context of the Pacific Islands, NELDs are thought of as interconnected and span human mobility and territory, cultural heritage and Indigenous knowledge, life and health, biodiversity and ecosystem services, and sense of place and social cohesion ( [[#Carmona--2017|Carmona et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ojwang--2017|Ojwang et al., 2017]] ; [[#McNamara--2021b|McNamara et al., 2021b]] ). There are gaps in our understanding of NELD, much of the evidence is from the Global South and at smaller scales ( ''high agreement'' ), NELD is not explicitly linked to attribution science yet and evidence often lacks coverage on certain groups ( [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ; [[#Carmona--2017|Carmona et al., 2017]] ; [[#Ojwang--2017|Ojwang et al., 2017]] ). Non-economic losses are often associated with displacements and migration in terms of climate change and human vulnerability ( [[#8.2.1.4|Section 8.2.1.4]] ), studies show that the impacts of extreme flooding, droughts and/or hurricanes and cyclones that can lead to a sense of lost identity and place, and emotional distress, that are hardly assessed dimensions of impacts and risks ( [[#Adger--2014|Adger et al., 2014]] ; [[#Barnett--2016|Barnett et al., 2016]] ; [[#Tschakert--2017|Tschakert et al., 2017]] ; [[#Serdeczny--2018|Serdeczny et al., 2018]] ). Non-economic losses are particularly relevant for understanding adverse consequences of climate change on the poor and most vulnerable population groups ( ''high confidence'' ). These NELD categories are still overlooked in vulnerability assessments and adaptation planning. A novel way to consider NELD in assessments is to interconnect with a sustainable development perspective ( [[#Boyd--2017|Boyd et al., 2017]] ; [[#Boda--2020|Boda et al., 2020]] ).

In order to categorise the different types of NELD that exist, ( [[#Serdeczny--2016|Serdeczny et al., 2016]] ), reviewed the literature and came up with a set of systematic categories that capture what is usually thought about as having intrinsic value and according this framing of NELD this includes: human life, sense of place and mobility, cultural artefacts, biodiversity and ecosystems, communal and production sites and agency and identity ( [[#Serdeczny--2016|Serdeczny et al., 2016]] ; [[#Serdeczny--2019|Serdeczny, 2019]] ). For example, there is emerging evidence on linkages between slow-onset events and mobility decisions, trajectories and outcomes ( [[#Zickgraf--2021|Zickgraf, 2021]] ). In addition, categories include psychosocial and emotional distress ( [[#van%20Der%20Geest--2016|van Der Geest and Schindler, 2016]] ). For example, research shows potential increased risk of intimate partner violence following disasters, noting that societies that are vulnerable to climate change may need to prepare for the social disasters that can accompany disasters revealed by natural hazards (Malik and Stolove, 2017; [[#Rai--2021|Rai et al., 2021]] ).

Geographical focus on non-economic losses in the literature is largely on the Global South with studies mainly smaller in scale ( ''high agreement'' ). Many events studied include severe storms, floods and landslides. Key groups affected include low-income groups, agro-pastoralists, women and girls, children and youth, Indigenous Peoples, ethnic and religious minorities. In Europe, the Samis face significant challenges to health as ecosystems deteriorate ( [[#Jaakkola--2018|Jaakkola et al., 2018]] ). In Zimbabwe, Storm Idai affected 270,000 people and subsequent flooding and landslides left 340 people dead and many others missing ( [[#Chanza--2020|Chanza et al., 2020]] ). There is evidence of loss of cultural heritage sites due to sea level rise and coastal erosion as well as other climate variability ( [[#Brooks--2020|Brooks et al., 2020]] ). Haile et al. (2013) show flood casualties in Ethiopia include children drowned while playing outside during the 2007 flood period although official data is hard to come by (p. 489). Moreover, loss of place was experienced in Itang, where many of the local houses are built from wood, grasses and mud walls, which are easy to reconstruct, but are not strong enough to withstand an extreme flood. Here, 38% of the surveyed houses were severely damaged by the 2007 flood. These houses were constructed as an adaptation strategy but could not withstand the floods. In Kenya, [[#Opondo--2013|Opondo (2013)]] shows loss of human life was the most severe impact of floods. For example, in the focus group discussion with men, ‘it was reported that a boat capsized on River Nzoia at Siginga and ten people died’ (p. 457). In Mozambique, Brida et al. (2013) show loss of sense of place occurred after flooding in the central districts of Caia and Mopeia, which had a devastating impact on homes and livestock ( [[#Brida--2013|Brida et al., 2013]] ). Health impacts of the forest fires in Amazon basin countries have disproportionately affected vulnerable people and social groups (see Box 8.6).

In the literature on NELD, there are many examples of loss of life ( ''high agreement'' ). In Nepal, one of the deadliest landslides in Nepal history resulted in the death of 156 people ( [[#van%20der%20Geest--2018|van der Geest, 2018]] ). Evidence from Landslide Jure and consecutive rainfall in Sindhupalchok in Nepal showed the experience led to mental stress, such as fear of new landslides, in about 68.4% of people interviewed ( [[#van%20Der%20Geest--2016|van Der Geest and Schindler, 2016]] ). One study in Nepal showed that almost a quarter (23%) of the households interviewed had sold property, including homes, livestock and heirlooms in response to flooding ( [[#Bauer--2013|Bauer, 2013]] ). Human deaths are increasingly associated with L&amp;Ds from tropical cyclones and typhoons, such as in the southern coastal districts of Bangladesh, in particular Khulna and Satkhira ( [[#Chiba--2017|Chiba et al., 2017]] ). A case study from Mindanao, Philippines, by [[#Chandra--2017|Chandra et al. (2017)]] also reported physical injuries and loss of life from the most powerful typhoon for over a century in 2012, affecting more than 6 million people and killing at least 1000 people ( [[#Eugenio--2016|Eugenio et al., 2016]] ). Beckman and Nguyen (2016) reported that in Vietnam floods in 2004 washed away 24 houses in the commune, with the loss of families when their houses were washed away.

An illustrative example is climate-induced loss of well-being and (im)mobility in Bhola Slum, an informal settlement in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Research revealed that IDPs from the southern coast experienced loss of belonging, identity, quality of life and social value produced in people a nostalgia and desire to return home ( [[#Ayeb-Karlsson--2020|Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2020]] ). Another example is of urban climate change justice experienced by migrants in the Indian cities of Bengaluru and Surat, where environmental marginalisation can be attributed to a lack of recognition of citizenship rights and informal livelihood strategies driven by broken social networks and a lack of political voice, as well as heightened exposure to emerging climate risks and economic precariousness. In this case, migrants experience extreme forms of climate injustice in their invisibility to formal government and are even actively erased from cities through force or discriminatory development policies ( [[#Chu--2019|Chu and Michael, 2019]] ).

NELD also includes the loss of social networks. This has lasting implications for psychological health as well as for coping with crises following disasters or challenges posed by adverse climate change impacts. For example, many households in villages affected by Cyclone Aila in Dacope and Koyra upazilas of Khulna district in Bangladesh migrated to other places permanently after the cyclone, as these affected villages were subject to long-term flooding (e.g., 2–3 years) following the cyclone. They migrated as they were unable to restore their livelihoods and, thus, were unable to secure necessary income for survival ( [[#Saha--2017|Saha, 2017]] ).

The examples show the multifaceted nature of intangible and non-economic losses that people experience in the context of climate change and the daily risks they are exposed to. Conventional vulnerability assessments cover some aspects that are linked to the likelihood of experiencing non-economic losses, such as aspects of health, governance, education and in some cases also forced migration and the role of social networks. Overall, the elements of this assessment here underscore that it is not just the climatic stressor, but rather the underlying context conditions that decide whether an extreme event translates into a disaster.

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