Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-4 (section)

==== 4.2.5.4 CCS May Be Needed to Mitigate Emissions From the Remaining Fossil Fuels That Cannot Be Decarbonised, but the Economic Feasibility of Deployment Is Not Yet Clear ====

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CCS is present in many accelerated mitigation scenarios in the literature. In Brazil, ( [[#Nogueira%20de%20Oliveira--2016|Nogueira de Oliveira et al. 2016]] ) consider BECCS and CCS in hydrogen generation more feasible than CCS in thermal power plants, with costs ranging from USD70–100 per tCO 2 . Overall, ( [[#van%20der%20Zwaan--2016|van der Zwaan et al. 2016]] ) estimate that 33–50% of total electricity generation in Latin America could be ultimately covered by CCS. In Japan, CCS and increased bioenergy adoption plus waste-to-energy and hydrogen-reforming from fossil fuel are all considered necessary in the power sector in existing studies, with potential up to 200 MtCO 2 yr –1 (Ashina et al. 2012; [[#Oshiro--2017a|Oshiro et al. 2017a]] ; [[#Kato--2019|Kato and Kurosawa 2019]] ; [[#Sugiyama--2021|Sugiyama et al. 2021]] ). In parts of the EU, after 2030, CCS could become profitable with rising CO 2 prices ( [[#Schiffer--2015|Schiffer 2015]] ). CDR is seen as necessary in some net GHG neutrality pathways ( [[#Capros--2019|Capros et al. 2019]] ) but evidence on cost-effectiveness is scarce and uncertain ( [[#European%20Commission--2013|European Commission 2013]] ). For France and Sweden, ( [[#Millot--2020|Millot et al. 2020]] ) include CCS and BECCS to meet net zero GHG emissions by 2050. For Italy, ( [[#Massetti--2012|Massetti 2012]] ) propose a zero-emission electricity scenario with a combination of renewable and coal, natural gas, and BECCS.

In China, an analysis concluded that CCS is necessary for remaining coal and natural gas generation out to 2050 ( [[#Jiang--2018|Jiang et al. 2018]] ; [[#Energy%20Transitions%20Commission%20and%20Rocky%20Mountain%20Institute--2019|Energy Transitions Commission and Rocky Mountain Institute 2019]] ). Seven to 10 CCS projects with installed capacity of 15 GW by 2020 and total CCS investment of 105 billion RMB (2010 RMB) are projected to be needed by 2050 under a 2°C compatible pathway according to ( [[#Jiang--2013|Jiang et al. 2013]] , 2016; [[#Lee--2018|Lee et al. 2018]] ). Under 1.5°C pathway, an analysis found China would need full CCS coverage of the remaining 12% of power generation from coal and gas power and 250 GW of BECCS ( [[#Jiang--2018|Jiang et al. 2018]] ). Combined with expanded renewable and nuclear development, total estimated investment in this study is 5% of China’s total GDP in 2020, 1.3% in 2030, and 0.6% in 2050 ( [[#Jiang--2016|Jiang et al. 2016]] ).

Views regarding feasibility of CCS can vary greatly for the same country. In the case of India’s electricity sector for instance, some studies indicate that CCS would be necessary ( [[#Vishwanathan--2018a|Vishwanathan et al. 2018a]] ), while others do not – citing concerns around its feasibility due to limited potential sites and issues related to socio-political acceptance – and rather point to very ambitious increase in renewable energy, which in turn could pose significant challenges in systematically integrating renewable energy into the current energy systems ( [[#Viebahn--2014|Viebahn et al. 2014]] ; [[#Mathur--2020|Mathur and Shekhar 2020]] ). Some limitations of CCS, including uncertain costs, lifecycle and net emissions, other biophysical resource needs, and social acceptance are acknowledged in existing studies ( [[#Viebahn--2014|Viebahn et al. 2014]] ; [[#Jacobson--2019|Jacobson 2019]] ; [[#Mathur--2020|Mathur and Shekhar 2020]] ; [[#Sekera--2020|Sekera and Lichtenberger 2020]] ).

While national mitigation portfolios aiming at net zero emissions or lower will need to include some level of CDR, the choice of methods and the scale and timing of their deployment will depend on the ambition for gross emission reductions, how sustainability and feasibility constraints are managed, and how political preferences and social acceptability evolve (Cross-Chapter Box 8). Furthermore, mitigation deterrence may create further uncertainty, as anticipated future CDR could dilute incentives to reduce emissions now ( [[#Grant--2021|Grant et al. 2021]] ), and the political economy of net negative emissions has implications for equity ( [[#Mohan--2021|Mohan et al. 2021]] ).

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