Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-15 (section)

==== 15.3.4.9 Key Risks in Small Islands ====

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===== 15.3.4.9.1 Key risk approach =====

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This section builds on cross-chapter work led by [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16|Chapter 16]] aimed at identifying and assessing KRs across sectors and regions ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-16#16.5|Section 16.5]] and SM16). KRs are the risks of most pressing concern that are caused or exacerbated by climate change in a given region. A KR is defined as a ‘potentially’ severe risk, which can either be already severe or projected to become severe in the future, as a result of (a) changes in associated climate-related hazards and/or the exposure and/or vulnerability of natural and human systems to these hazards, and/or of (b) the adverse consequences of adaptation or mitigation responses to the risk. In line with the guidelines used in the WGII AR6, the identification of KRs in small islands is based on the chapter authors’ expert judgement, using scientific literature and five types of criteria: (1) importance of the affected system or dimension of the system, which is a value judgement left to readers to make; (2) magnitude of adverse consequences, based on their pervasiveness, degree and irreversibility, and on the potential for impact thresholds and cascading effects across the system; (3) likelihood of adverse consequences, although this probability is rarely quantifiable for small islands due to limited downscaled data at a small island level; (4) temporal characteristics of the risk, including its period of emergence, persistence over time and trend; and (5) ability to respond to the risk, with the severity of the risk being inversely proportional to this ability.

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===== 15.3.4.9.2 Key risks in small islands =====

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Slow-onset climate and ocean changes, and changes in extreme events, are expected to cause and/or to amplify nine KRs in small islands, through both direct (e.g., decrease in rainfall will increase water insecurity) and indirect, that is, cascading effects: For example, loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services will increase water insecurity, which will in turn cause the degradation of human health and well-being (Figure 15.5, Table 15.6 and SM16).

'''Table 15.6 |''' Adaptation options per key risk in small islands. This table summarises risk-oriented adaptation options, their level of implementation, enablers and effectiveness in reducing exposure and vulnerability, co-benefits and disbenefits in small islands. For KR2 (submergence of reef islands), not included, adaptation options are the same as for KR5.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Key risks

! colspan="2"| Risk-oriented adaptation options

! Evidence and agreement

! Implementation

! Key enablers

! Reduction of exposure and vulnerability

! Co-benefits

! Disbenefits

|-
| rowspan="5"| KR1. Loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services

| rowspan="2"| EbA measures (15.4.4)

| MPAs; paired terrestrial and MPAs

| ''Medium evidence, low agreement'' with regard to climate change adaptation and benefits

| Widespread across small islands, with climate resilience being a target of some MPAs

| Strong governance and sufficient financial resources

| Reduces the ecosystem exposure to human disturbances, increasing their resistance and resilience to climate events

| For biodiversity, food supply, economics, human health and well-being

|
|-
| Active restoration of coastal and marine ecosystems

| ''Limited evidence, low agreement'' with regard to long-term success

| Mostly small-scale: replanting of mangroves, seagrasses and beach vegetation; transplantation of corals; beach nourishment

| Funding: adaptation taxes and levies imposed on tourism; blue bonds; public–private partnerships

| Reduces the vulnerability of natural ecosystems by increasing their resilience

| Improved water quality; reduction in coastal erosion and flood risks; economic benefits

|
|-
| Hard protection (15.5.1)

| Hard structures designed to enhance marine biodiversity

| ''Medium evidence, medium agreement''

| Artificial reefs

| Funding: adaptation and environmental taxes and levies, with ''limited evidence'' of direct reinvestment in conservation and management

| Uncertainty on reduction of exposure and vulnerability of marine ecosystems; reduces the exposure of population and infrastructure to coastal risks

| For food supply, economies (tourism), human health and well-being

|
|-
| Diversifying livelihoods (15.5.6)

| Diversifying fisheries livelihoods (e.g., to aquaculture and tourism), changing fishing grounds and/or target species

| ''Limited'' to ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement''

| Examples in the Caribbean region and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans

| Improved governance and cooperation (e.g., through regional strategies); weather insurance to enhance resilience

| Reduces exposure and vulnerability of livelihoods through the diversification of income and spreading of risks; targeting less offshore pelagic species reduces exposure of coastal habitats to overfishing

| Sustainably managed fisheries, improved food and income security, greater economic and social resilience

|
|-
| Reef-to-ridge ecosystem management (Figure 15.4)

| Improved land use as a driver of marine ecosystem health, including better management of forests, nutrients and wastewater upland catchments

| ''Limited evidence, medium agreement''

| Mostly in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| Improved governance

| Reduces the exposure of coral reefs to human degradation, increasing their resilience

| Improved ecosystem protection services (e.g., against flooding, landslides and mudflows), biodiversity, human health and livelihoods

|
|-
| rowspan="5"| KR3. Loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services

| Decreased deforestation (15.5.4)

|
| ''Limited'' to ''medium evidence, high agreement''

| Mostly in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| National determined contributions (NDCs), external and long-term funding, engagement of local landowners and resolution of land ownership issues, gender-sensitive participation

| For example, increase in forest extent, reduction in human exposure to natural disasters (hurricanes, landslides), improvement in vulnerability assessment scores

| Increased connectivity between forest fragments, reduced erosion, improved water supply and quality, improved human health and sanitation, improved livelihoods and soil health; decreased poverty; supports global mitigation

|
|-
| Increased reforestation (native species) (15.5.4)

| Towards habitat connectivity, heterogeneity and diversity

| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Relatively widespread, with examples in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| NDC, funding, technical assistance, supply materials, provision of land, awareness raising, enforcement of policies, sense of shared responsibility, inclusion of IKLK, social capital

| Generally ''limited evidence'' , lack of long-term monitoring

| Increased DRR; fewer floods and landslides; reduced erosion; increased human health and well-being; increased quality of ecosystem services; increased adaptive capacity; supports global mitigation

|
|-
| EbA (15.5.4)

| Agroforestry and other silvicultural/agroecological practices (e.g., climate-smart agriculture)

| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Widespread in the Caribbean region and Pacific Ocean

| NDC, shared access and benefit, local knowledge and training, farmers, private sector for developing technology, financing, data availability; political, institutional and socioeconomic conditions

| Limited examples, some increases in adaptive capacity

| Improved climate change awareness, increased well-being, improved gender equity, improved productivity and livelihoods

|
|-
| Watershed management/conservation (15.5.4)

| Reforestation, slope revegetation

| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Widespread (e.g., in the Caribbean region and Pacific Ocean)

| Less socially and politically acceptable than engineering solutions; communication and trust between stakeholders; sustainable financing mechanisms; island remoteness barrier to logistical implementation

| Yes, through improved water security, reduced adaptation costs, reduced vulnerability to drought

| DRD, improved climate change awareness, increased water security and quality, reduced run-off and sedimentation, increased well-being and financial stability

|
|-
| Ridge-to-reef ecosystem management (Figure 15.4)

| Improved land use as a driver of terrestrial ecosystem health

| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| See above

| See above

| ''Limited but slowly increasing evidence'' to date

|
|-
| rowspan="2"| KR3. Loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services

| Increasing the connectivity of protected areas (PAs) across elevation/climatic gradients to facilitate climate-driven redistribution of species (Figure 15.4)

| Establishment of new PAs, forested migration corridors across elevation/climatic gradients, improving landscape connectivity by permanent protection of stepping stones

| ''Very limited evidence, high agreement''

| Low degree of new implementations due to terrain limitations combined with competition from human land use needs; large variation in PA coverage among islands

| Conservation of larger areas of forest habitat surrounding PAs, reforestation of degraded areas, increasing and enforcement of forest cover within PAs, policies towards the coordination of conservation actions/partnerships, incorporation of ‘Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures’ (OECMs)

| Yes, especially if landscape connectivity is improved (migration corridors)

| Improved water security, improved coastal ecosystem health, greater resiliency and recovery from wildfires, reduced pollution, DRR

| May facilitate movement of IAS

|-
| Eradication of IAS (15.3.3.3)

|
| ''Robust evidence, high agreement''

| Widespread (&gt;700 islands)

| Integration of changing climate conditions within ongoing prevention, control and eradication strategies, prevention via ongoing vigilance and biosecurity via quarantine, control and monitoring of incoming cargo and goods into islands

| Yes, positive demographic and distributional responses of native species following eradication of IAS

| Food security, protection of ecosystem health and services, increased livelihood security

| A few native species harmed by eradication process

|-
| rowspan="4"| KR4. Water insecurity

| Rainwater harvesting (15.3.4.3)

|
| ''Robust evidence, high agreement''

| Widespread across small islands (e.g., Jamaica, Barbuda, Solomon Islands)

| Sociocultural and financial

| Yes

| Biodiversity (watershed protection); health; economic (reduced dependence on public supply); food security

| Dependent on mode of implementation. Nothing mentioned in the chapter.

|-
| Desalination (15.6.1)

|
| ''Limited evidence, high agreement''

| Relatively limited (e.g., Maldives)

| Financial

| Yes

| Health; economic (reduced dependence on public supply)

| Energy intensive (carbon footprint)

|-
| Reforestation (15.5.4)

|
| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Examples reported in the Caribbean and Pacific (e.g., Fiji, Papua New Guinea)

| Governance–whole-of-island approaches foster integrated management practices in small islands

| Yes, through supporting wetland-oriented tourism

| Economic (agroforestry); biodiversity (watershed restoration); food security; DRR

| rowspan="2"| Dependent on mode of implementation. Nothing mentioned in the chapter.

|-
| PA management (terrestrial) (15.5.4)

|
| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Widespread across small islands (e.g., Samoa, Jamaica, Haiti, Grenada)

| Financial/governance

| Yes, through soil stabilisation and sequestration of pollutants

| Biodiversity (forest conservation); DRR

|-
| rowspan="5"| KR5. Destruction of settlements and infrastructure

| Hard protection (15.5.1)

|
| ''Medium agreement, limited evidence'' with regard to climate change adaptation and success

| Widespread in both urban and rural areas of the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans

| External funding; sociocultural (meets the preference of the population); political–institutional (e.g., supported by business-as-usual approach of coastal risks); technical (requires materials and skills)

| Reduces exposure in some places but not in others; increases vulnerability

| ''Limited evidence'' of co-benefits

| Beach loss; erosion acceleration; ecosystem degradation through material extraction; increased SLR impacts

|-
| Accommodation (15.5.2)

|
| ''Limited evidence'' with regard to climate change adaptation and success

| Relatively limited

| Technological, financial, institutional, sociocultural

| ''Limited evidence'' to date

| Maintains the functionalities of coastal systems and allows their maintenance through landward migration, under SLR

|
|-
| Advance with land raising and/or through the creation of artificial islands (15.5.2)

|
| ''Limited evidence'' with regard to climate change adaptation (driven by population growth in the Maldives)

| Limited (e.g., Hulhumalé, Maldives)

| Technological, financial, institutional, sociocultural, high potential in urban (compared to rural) areas

| Reduces population exposure where high standard as in Hulhumalé, Maldives

| Offers new land for economic development, generates revenues through sale or lease of land in urban areas

| Widespread ecosystem destruction, increased negative impacts of SLR

|-
| Migration including planned resettlement (15.5.3)

|
| ''Limited evidence, low agreement'' with regard to climate change adaptation

| Village-scale planned resettlement supported by government policy/legislation in the Pacific

| Participatory inclusion of all social groups; financial (for small and remote communities); social–cultural connections; strong governance frameworks; enabling legislation; land availability or ownership; conditions in receiving locations; technical support

| Reduced exposure locally; has created new vulnerabilities at some locations by bearing significant economic cost, impacting social capital and reducing access to services

| New livelihood opportunities

| Loss of cultural heritage, impacts on receiving communities

|-
| EbA measures (15.4.4)

|
| ''Medium agreement, medium evidence''

| Increasingly experienced; includes artificial reefs, beach nourishment and vegetation (including mangrove) restoration

| Environmental/physical conditions; social acceptability; technical capacities (enhanced by external support); funding; inclusion in national adaptation policies

| ''Limited evidence'' to date

| Biodiversity strengthening; increased food supply; increased human health and well-being

|
|-
| KR6. Health degradation

| Increasing public awareness of health risks associated with climate change; providing training to health sector staff; improving reliability and safety of water storage practices (15.6.2)

|
| ''Limited evidence''

| Few examples

| Financial and human resources to implement options; early warning and response systems; integrating climate services into health decision-making systems; public uptake and buy in; improving health data collection systems

| Primarily reduces vulnerability

| Increased water security

|
|-
| rowspan="5"| KR7. Economic decline and livelihood failure

| Circular migration (15.5.3)

|
| ''Limited evidence'' with regard to climate change adaptation (mostly driven by economic or social factors)

| Examples in Tuvalu from outer to capital atoll and locations overseas

| Labour and education opportunities in Funafuti, Tuvalu, and overseas

| Yes, on Nanumea Atoll, Tuvalu

| Job and education for migrants

|
|-
| Diversifying livelihoods (15.5.6)

|
| ''Limited'' to ''medium evidence, low agreement''

| Observed in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| Use of IKLK and changing fishing areas; investment in technology and education

| Yes, in documented places (e.g., Antigua, Vanuatu, Madagascar, Dominican Republic)

| Reduction of pressure on previous fishing areas

| Greater catch putting increasing pressure on fish stock

|-
| Improved technology and equipment/training (15.5.6)

|
| ''Limited evidence, medium agreement''

| Examples in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| Investments in technologies and education (e.g., irrigation technologies, growing salt-tolerant crops and relocating crop cultivation in Jamaica)

| Yes, in documented places

| New technologies and education strengthening

|
|-
| Livestock husbandry (15.5.6)

|
| ''Limited evidence''

| Limited (e.g., small-scale livestock husbandry in Jamaica)

| Farm inputs and investments in technologies and education

| No evidence to date. Limited examples of successful livestock husbandry only in Jamaica

| Investments in farm inputs

|
|-
| Adaptive finance/education (15.5.6)

|
| ''Limited evidence, medium agreement''

| Limited (e.g., in Puerto Rico, women engage in new commercial enterprises that do not rely on traditional coffee supply chains or government assistance)

| Tourism income; investment in education and capacity building; working with nature and EbA

| Yes, reduces risk and avoids negative knock-on effects

| Generates opportunities (e.g., for wetland tourism)

|
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| rowspan="2"| KR7. Economic decline and livelihood failure

| Product/market diversification (15.5.6)

| Diversity of crops, gardening in different areas, storage and preservation of foodstuffs, engagement of women in new commercial enterprises

| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Examples in the Caribbean region and Pacific

| Availability of crops and land, new markets

| Reduces vulnerability to tropical cyclones in Fiji and Vanuatu; new markets in Puerto Rico

| Increases food security and improves nutrition; increases income security

|
|-
| Adaptation in tourism policies (15.5.6)

|
| ''Limited evidence, high agreement''

| Limited (e.g., in the British Virgin Islands, policies like adaptation taxes and levies imposed on tourism can provide funding for adaptation measures)

| Tourism regulations and policies that mainstream climate change adaptations; taxes and levies imposed on tourism

| ''Limited evidence'' in reducing vulnerability

|
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| rowspan="2"| KR8. Loss of cultural resources and heritage

| Integrating IKLK with Western science to provide integrated approaches to climate change (15.6.5)

|
| ''Medium evidence, high agreement''

| Reported in the Pacific and Caribbean

| Use of IKLK for preparing for disasters and understanding environmental change; social networks in sharing information and helping others; eco-theology increasing people’s awareness of the environment

| Yes, can reduce vulnerability when IKLK supports robust adaptation; No, can increase vulnerability if IKLK no longer provides accurate information

| Can increase climate change information and its understanding in communities, and increase culturally appropriate climate adaptation

| Reports from Vanuatu indicate that IKLK are at times inaccurate (e.g., seasonal calendars, biophysical weather indicators) due to climate change

|-
| Hard protection (15.5.5.1)

|
| ''Medium agreement, limited evidence'' with regard to climate change adaptation and success

| Widespread in protecting cultural sites and villages in both urban and rural areas of the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans

| External funding; sociocultural (generally meets the preference of the population); political-institutional (e.g., supported by business-as-usual approach of coastal risks); technical (requires materials and skills)

| Reduces exposure in some places but not in others; increases vulnerability

| ''Limited evidence'' of co-benefits

| Beach loss; erosion acceleration; ecosystem degradation through material extraction; increased SLR impacts

|}

These KRs include loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services ( ''high confidence'' ) (KR1; for details on KR coverage, see [[#15.3.3.1|Section 15.3.3.1]] ); submergence of reef islands ( ''low confidence'' ) (KR2; [[#15.3.3.1.1|Section 15.3.3.1.1]] ); loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services ( ''high confidence'' ) (KR3; [[#15.3.3.3|Section 15.3.3.3]] ); water insecurity ( ''medium-high confidence'' ) (KR4; [[#15.3.4.3|Section 15.3.4.3]] ); destruction of settlements and infrastructure ( ''high confidence'' ) (KR5; [[#15.3.4.1|Section 15.3.4.1]] ); degradation of human health and well-being ( ''low confidence'' ) (KR6; [[#15.3.4.2|Section 15.3.4.2]] ); economic decline and livelihood failure ( ''high confidence'' ) (KR7; Sections 15.3.4.4 and 15.3.4.5); and loss of cultural resources and heritage ( ''low confidence'' ) (KR8; [[#15.3.4.7|Section 15.3.4.7]] ).

Risk accumulation and amplification through cascading effects from ecosystems and ecosystem services to human systems will likely cause reduced habitability of some small islands ( ''high confidence'' ) identified as the overarching KR (KR9). Habitability is understood as the ability of these islands to support human life by providing protection from hazards which challenge human survival; by assuring adequate space, food and freshwater; and by providing economic opportunities, which contribute to health and well-being—recognising that both supportive ecosystems and sociocultural conditions (i.e., beliefs and values, institutions and governance arrangements, sense of community and attachment to place) play a critical role in habitability ( [[#Duvat--2021a|Duvat et al., 2021a]] ). The reduction of island habitability is expected to cause increased migration, along the afore-mentioned involuntary displacement to planned resettlement spectrum ( [[#15.3.4.6|Section 15.3.4.6]] ), which may eventually lead to population movements from exposed areas and depopulation of some islands. This risk is the highest for atoll nations, where some islands might become uninhabitable over this century ( [[#15.3.4.6|Section 15.3.4.6]] ; [[#Storlazzi--2018|Storlazzi et al., 2018]] ; [[#Duvat--2021a|Duvat et al., 2021a]] ). Despite a lack of literature assessing the risk of reduced habitability in non-atoll islands, the latter are also expected to experience decreased habitability, especially in their coastal areas.

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'''Box 15.1 | Key Examples of Cumulative Impacts from Compound Events: Maldives Islands and Caribbean Region'''
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'''Cumulative Impacts of the Compound Events of the 1998–2016 Period in the Maldives Islands'''
Between 1998 and 2016, the Maldives Islands were affected by three major climate events, including the 1997–1998 ENSO event, the 2007 flood event and the 2016 ENSO event, and by one tectonic event, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ( [[#Morri--2015|Morri et al., 2015]] ). These events illustrate the cumulative and cascading risks that a series of events may cause in reef-dependent atoll contexts (Figure Box 15.1).

[[File:9e99beca64cbd208d342f2a881860f31 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_15_Box_15_1_1.png]]

'''Figure Box 15.1.1 |''' '''Cascading and cumulative impacts of the compound events of the 1998–2016 period in the Maldives Islands.'''

The 1997–1998 ENSO event was severe in the Maldives and as a result the living coral cover dropped to &lt;10% ( [[#Bianchi--2003|Bianchi et al., 2003]] ). Recovery was still in progress in 2004 when the tsunami caused further (although not quantitatively assessed ( [[#Gischler--2006|Gischler and Kikinger, 2006]] )) damage to the reef ecosystem. Post-1998 recovery ultimately took 15 years, (i.e., longer than following the 1987 ENSO event, after which recovery had only taken a few years) and also longer than in the neighbouring undisturbed Chagos atolls, thereby suggesting the alteration of the recovery capacity of the reef ecosystem by human-induced reef degradation and climate change ( [[#Morri--2015|Morri et al., 2015]] ; [[#Pisapia--2017|Pisapia et al., 2017]] ). Mid-2016, a new ENSO event occurred, which reduced living coral cover by 75% ( [[#Perry--2017|Perry and Morgan, 2017]] ). Future recovery of the reef ecosystem, which is critical to both current livelihoods and economic activities (especially diving-oriented tourism and fishing) and to long-term island persistence, will mainly depend first on the frequency and magnitude of future bleaching events, which are expected to increase due to ocean warming, and second on the highly variable effects of anthropogenic disturbances locally ( [[#Perry--2017|Perry and Morgan, 2017]] ; [[#Pisapia--2017|Pisapia et al., 2017]] ; [[#Duvat--2019b|Duvat and Magnan, 2019b]] ).

Additionally, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami ( [[#Magnan--2006|Magnan, 2006]] ) and the 2007 flood ( [[#Wadey--2017|Wadey et al., 2017]] ) caused damage totalling 62% of the country’s GDP ( [[#Luetz--2017|Luetz, 2017]] ). The tsunami also downgraded the Maldives (now a middle-income country) to the Least Developed Countries category and caused within-country migration, with 30,000 people (9.6% of the country’s population) displaced ( [[#Republic%20of%20Maldives--2009|Republic of Maldives, 2009]] ). These successive events, which had cumulative devastating effects on the reef ecosystem and cascading effects on health and well-being, livelihoods and the economy, highlighted the risk posed by limited recovery time to the whole social–ecological system as well as the detrimental effect of local human disturbances on reef recovery.

'''Cumulative Impacts of the 2017 Hurricanes in the Caribbean Region'''
Among the 29 Caribbean SIDS, 22 were affected by at least one Category 4 or 5 TC in 2017. These events highlighted how the pre-cyclone high exposure and vulnerability of these islands and their populations has caused a ‘cumulative community vulnerability’ ( [[#Lichtveld--2018|Lichtveld, 2018]] , p. 28) that has amplified the impacts of these TCs, which will in turn increase the long-term vulnerability of affected islands. The exposure of these islands over their entire surface, combined with the concentration of people, infrastructure, utilities and public services in flood-prone coastal areas, inadequate housing, limited access to healthy food and transportation, and unpreparedness explains widespread-to-total devastation ( [[#Shultz--2018|Shultz et al., 2018]] ; [[#Briones--2019|Briones et al., 2019]] ). The destruction of transport systems ( [[#Lopez-Candales--2018|Lopez-Candales et al., 2018]] ) and island supply chains ( [[#Kim--2019|Kim and Bui, 2019]] ), which heavily depend on ports, roads, power and communications, made rescue logistically complex, explaining the lack of freshwater, food supplies, medications and fuel on some islands for several weeks after the event. This cumulative vulnerability caused ‘cascading public health consequences’ ( [[#Shultz--2018|Shultz et al., 2018]] , p. 9), including delayed (i.e., over the next year) mortality, physical injury during the clean-up and recovery phase and increased risk of chronic, vector-borne, contaminated water-related diseases as well as of mental sequelae ( [[#Kishore--2018|Kishore et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ferre--2019|Ferre et al., 2019]] ).

The loss of mangroves ( [[#Branoff--2018|Branoff, 2018]] ; [[#Walcker--2019|Walcker et al., 2019]] ; [[#Taillie--2020|Taillie et al., 2020]] ) and terrestrial forests ( [[#Eppinga--2018|Eppinga and Pucko, 2018]] ; [[#Feng--2018|Feng et al., 2018]] ; [[#Hu--2018|Hu and Smith, 2018]] ; [[#Van%20Beusekom--2018|Van Beusekom et al., 2018]] ) exacerbated the cyclone-induced economic crisis. In the most affected islands, the destruction of buildings and outmigration generated a significant loss of tangible (e.g., museums) and intangible (e.g., traditional artistry) cultural heritage ( [[#Boger--2019|Boger et al., 2019]] ). Prolonged displacement of entire island populations (e.g., Ragged Island, the Bahamas, Barbuda) caused ‘non-economic loss and damage’, including threats to health and well-being, and loss of culture, sense of place and agency ( [[#Thomas--2019|Thomas and Benjamin, 2019]] ), which may further exacerbate the long-term vulnerability of concerned communities.

In early 2020, while island communities were still recovering from the 2017 hurricanes, the COVID-19 pandemic caused the closure of global transportation, with devastating socioeconomic impacts on tourism-dependent Caribbean economies ( [[#Sheller--2020|Sheller, 2020]] ), illustrating how compounding crises increase island vulnerability to both climate- and non-climate-related events.

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'''Box 15.2 | Loss and Damage and Small Islands'''
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Loss and damage has a range of conceptualisations ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-1#1.4.4.2|Section 1.4.4.2]] ; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17) and is a critical issue for many small islands, closely related to issues of climate justice ( [[#15.7|Section 15.7]] ). Small islands are already experiencing an array of negative climate change impacts while climate risks are projected to increase as global average temperatures rise (Sections 15.3, 16.2; Cross-Chapter Paper 2). Barriers and limits to adaptation also contribute to greater levels of both economic and non-economic loss and damage for small islands (Sections 15.6, 16.4).

For SIDS in particular, loss and damage has negative implications for sustainable development ( [[#Benjamin--2018|Benjamin et al., 2018]] ). The costs of loss and damage, particularly from extreme events, can deplete national capital reserves ( [[#Noy--2019|Noy and Edmonds, 2019]] ). [[#Thomas--2017|Thomas and Benjamin (2017)]] show how loss and damage can lead to an ‘unvirtuous cycle of climate-induced erosion of development and resilience’. In this cycle, addressing loss and damage strains limited national resources, diverting public funding and other resources to address negative climate impacts. This in turn reduces resources and capacities which could be allocated to adaptation, building resilience and sustainable development, thereby increasing vulnerability to climate change and leading to further loss and damage where the cycle begins again. The cascading and cumulative impacts of extreme events experienced in Pacific and Caribbean SIDS exemplify that this cycle may already be in effect.

In addition to the strain on national resources that loss and damage currently presents, credit ratings of SIDS have recently begun to include vulnerability to climate change, which may have negative impacts on their abilities to borrow external funds, attract foreign investment or access concessional financing ( [[#Buhr--2018|Buhr et al., 2018]] ; [[#Volz--2020|Volz et al., 2020]] ). Costs of addressing loss and damage may also affect the ability of SIDS to repay external debt, thus endangering eligibility for future access to funding ( [[#Baarsch--2016|Baarsch and Kelman, 2016]] ; [[#Klomp--2017|Klomp, 2017]] ; [[#Shutter--2020|Shutter, 2020]] ). These factors may place SIDS in situations where they face mounting costs of climate change with eroding capacities and resources to address loss and damage.

In the international policy arena, small islands—as part of the AOSIS—have been strong advocates for including loss and damage in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); highlighting the increasing and irreversible risks that climate change poses for islands in particular ( [[#Roberts--2015|Roberts and Huq, 2015]] ; [[#Adelman--2016|Adelman, 2016]] ; [[#Mace--2016|Mace and Verheyen, 2016]] ). AOSIS, along with other developing countries and groups, have advocated that there is a pressing need for finance and resources to address loss and damage as well as greater integration of loss and damage in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, including in capacity building, technology and the global stocktake ( [[#Benjamin--2018|Benjamin et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nand--2020|Nand and Bardsley, 2020]] ).

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