Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-7 (section)

=== 7.4.2 Policies for food security and social protection ===

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There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that a combination of structural and non-structural policies are required in averting and minimising as well as responding to land and climate change risk, including food and livelihood security. If disruptions to elements of food security are long-lasting, policies are needed to change practices.

If disruptions to food and livelihood systems are temporary, then policies aimed at stemming worsening human well-being and stabilising short-term income fluctuations in communities (such as increasing rural credit or providing social safety-net programmes) may be appropriate (Ward 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r480|480]]</sup> ).

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==== 7.4.2.1 Policies to ensure availability, access, utilisation and stability of food ====

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Food security is affected by interactions between climatic factors (rising temperatures, changes in weather variability and extremes), changes in land use and land degradation, and Socio-economic Pathways and policy choices related to food systems (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). As outlined in Chapter 5, key aspects of food security are food availability, access to food, utilisation of food, and stability of food systems.

While comprehensive reviews of policy are rare and additional data is needed (Adu et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r367|367]]</sup> ), evidence indicates that the results of food security interventions vary widely due to differing values underlying the design of instruments. A large portfolio of measures is available to shape outcomes in these areas from the use of tariffs or subsidies, to payments for production practices (OECD 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r368|368]]</sup> ). In the past, efforts to increase food production through significant investment in agricultural research, including crop improvement, have benefited farmers by increasing yields and reducing losses, and have helped consumers by lowering food prices (Pingali 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r1677|1677]]</sup> , 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1678|1678]]</sup> ; Alston and Pardey 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r369|369]]</sup> ; Popp et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r370|370]]</sup> ). Public spending on agriculture research and development (R&amp;D) has been more effective at raising sustainable agriculture productivity than irrigation or fertiliser subsidies (OECD 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r371|371]]</sup> ). Yet, on average, between 2015 and 2017, governments spent only around 14% of total agricultural support on services, including physical and knowledge infrastructure, transport and information and communications technology.

In terms of increasing food availability and supply, producer support, including policies mandating subsidies or payments, have been used to boost production of certain commodities or protect ES. Incentives can distort markets and farm business decisions in both negative and positive ways. For example, the European Union promotes meat and dairy production through voluntary coupled direct payments. These do not yet internalise external damage to climate, health, and groundwater (Velthof et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r372|372]]</sup> ; Bryngelsson et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r373|373]]</sup> ). In most countries, producer support has been declining since the mid-1990s (OECD 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r374|374]]</sup> ). Yet new evidence indicates that a government policy supporting producer subsidy could encourage farmers to adopt new technologies and reduce GHG emissions in agriculture ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). However, this will require large capital (Henderson 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r375|375]]</sup> ). Since a 1995 reform in its forest law, Costa Rica has effectively used a combination of fuel tax, water tax, loans and agreements with companies, to pay landowners for agroforestry, reforestation and sustainable forest management (Porras and Asquith 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r376|376]]</sup> ).

Inland capture fisheries and aquaculture are an integral part of nutrition security and livelihoods for large numbers of people globally (Welcomme et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r377|377]]</sup> ; Hall et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r378|378]]</sup> ; Tidwell and Allan 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r379|379]]</sup> ; Youn et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r380|380]]</sup> ) and are increasingly vulnerable to climate change and competing land and water use (Allison et al. 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r381|381]]</sup> ; Youn et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r382|382]]</sup> ). Future production may increase in some high-latitude regions ( ''low'' ''confidence'' ) but production is likely to decline in low-latitude regions under future warming ( ''high confidence'' ) (Brander and Keith 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r383|383]]</sup> ; Brander 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r384|384]]</sup> ). However over-exploitation and degradation of rivers has resulted in a decreasing trend in the contribution of capture fisheries to protein security in comparison to managed aquaculture (Welcomme et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r385|385]]</sup> ). Aquaculture, however, competes for land and water resources with many negative ecological and environmental impacts (Verdegem and Bosma 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r386|386]]</sup> ; Tidwell and Allan 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r387|387]]</sup> ). Inland capture fisheries are undervalued in national and regional food security, ES and economy, are data deficient and are neglected in terms of supportive policies at national levels, and absent in SDGs (Cooke et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r388|388]]</sup> ; Hall et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r389|389]]</sup> ; Lynch et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r390|390]]</sup> ). Revival of sustainable capture fisheries and converting aquaculture to environmentally less-damaging management regimes, is likely to succeed with the following measures: investment in recognition of their importance, improved valuation and assessment, secure tenure and adoption of social, ecological and technological guidelines, upstream-downstream river basin cooperation, and maintenance of ecological flow regimes in rivers (Youn et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r391|391]]</sup> ; Mostert et al. 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r392|392]]</sup> ; Ziv et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r393|393]]</sup> ; Hurlbert and Gupta 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r394|394]]</sup> ; Poff et al. 2003 <sup>[[#fn:r395|395]]</sup> ; Thomas 1996 <sup>[[#fn:r396|396]]</sup> ; FAO 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r397|397]]</sup> ).

Extension services, and policies supporting agricultural extension systems, are also critical. Smallholder farmer-dominated agriculture is currently the backbone of global food security in the developing world. Without education and incentives to manage land and forest resources in a manner that allows regeneration of both the soils and wood stocks, smallholder farmers tend to generate income through inappropriate land management practices, engage in agricultural production on unsuitable land and use fertile soils, timber and firewood for brick production and construction. Also, they engage in charcoal production (deforestation) as a coping mechanism (increasing income) against food deficiency (Munthali and Murayama 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r398|398]]</sup> ). Through extension services, governments can play a proactive role in providing information on climate and market risks, animal and plant health. Farmers with greater access to extension training retain more crop residues for mulch on their fields (Jaleta et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r1679|1679]]</sup> , 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r1680|1680]]</sup> ; Baudron et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r399|399]]</sup> ).

Food security cannot be achieved by increasing food availability alone. Policy instruments, which increase access to food at the household level, include safety-net programming and universal basic income. The graduation approach, developed and tested over the past decade using randomised control trials in six countries, has lasting positive impacts on income, as well as food and nutrition security (Banerjee et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r400|400]]</sup> ; Raza and Poel 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r401|401]]</sup> ) ( ''robust evidence, high agreement'' ). The graduation approach layers and integrates a series of interventions designed to help the poorest: consumption support in the form of cash or food assistance, transfer of an income- generating asset (such as a livestock) and training on how to maintain the asset, assistance with savings and coaching or mentoring over a period of time to reinforce learning and provide support. Due to its success, the graduation approach is now being scaled up, and is now used in more than 38 countries and included by an increasing number of governments in social safety-net programmes (Hashemi and de Montesquiou 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r402|402]]</sup> ).

At the national and global levels, food prices and trade policies impact on access to food. Fiscal policies, such as taxation, subsidies, or tariffs, can be used to regulate production and consumption of certain foods and can affect environmental outcomes. In Denmark, a tax on saturated fat content of food adopted to encourage healthy eating habits accounted for 0.14% of total tax revenues between 2011 and 2012 (Sassi et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r403|403]]</sup> ). A global tax on GHG emissions, for example, has large mitigation potential and will generate tax revenues, but may also result in large reductions in agricultural production (Henderson 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r404|404]]</sup> ). Consumer-level taxes on GHG- intensive food may be applied to address competitiveness issues between different countries, if some countries use taxes while others do not. However, increases in prices might impose disproportionate financial burdens on low-income households, and may not be publicly acceptable. A study examining the relationship between food prices and social unrest found that, between 1990 and 2011, whereas food price stability has not been associated with increases in social unrest (Bellemare 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r405|405]]</sup> ).

Interventions that allow people to maximise their productive potential while protecting the ES may not ensure food security in all contexts. Some household land holdings are so small that self-sufficiency is not possible (Venton 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r406|406]]</sup> ). Value chain development has, in the past, increased farm income but delivered fewer benefits to vulnerable consumers (Bodnár et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r407|407]]</sup> ). Ultimately, a mix of production activities and consumption support is needed. Consumption support can be used to help achieve the second important element of food security – access to food.

Agricultural technology transfer can help optimise food and nutrition security (Section 7.4.4.3). Policies that affect agricultural innovation span sectors and include ‘macro-economic policy-settings; institutional governance; environmental standards; investment, land, labor and education policies; and incentives for investment, such as a predictable regulatory environment and robust intellectual property rights’.

The scientific community can partner across sectors and industries for better data sharing, integration, and improved modelling and analytical capacities (Janetos et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r408|408]]</sup> ; Lunt et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r409|409]]</sup> ). To better predict, respond to, and prepare for concurrent agricultural failures, and gain a more systematic assessment of exposure to agricultural climate risk, large data gaps need to be filled, as well as gaps in empirical foundation and analytical capabilities (Janetos et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r410|410]]</sup> ; Lunt et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r411|411]]</sup> ). Data required include global historical datasets, many of which are unreliable, inaccessible, or not available (Maynard 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r412|412]]</sup> ; Lunt et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r413|413]]</sup> ). Participation in co-design for scenario planning can build social and human capital while improving understanding of food system risks and creating innovative ways for collectively planning for a more equitable and resilient food system (Himanen et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r414|414]]</sup> ; Meijer et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r415|415]]</sup> ; Van Rijn et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r417|417]]</sup> ). Bangladesh has managed to sustain a rapid reduction in the rate of child undernutrition for at least two decades. Rapid wealth accumulation and large gains in parental education are the two largest drivers of change (Headey et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r418|418]]</sup> ). Educating consumers, and providing affordable alternatives, will be critical to changing unsustainable food-use habits relevant to climate change.

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==== 7.4.2.2 Policies to secure social protection ====

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There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' from all regions of the world that safety nets and social protection schemes can provide stability which prevents and reduces abject poverty (Barrientos 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r419|419]]</sup> ; Hossain 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r420|420]]</sup> ; Cook and Pincus 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r421|421]]</sup> ; Huang and Yang 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r422|422]]</sup> ; Slater 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r423|423]]</sup> ; Sparrow et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r424|424]]</sup> ; Rodriguez-Takeuchi and Imai 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r425|425]]</sup> ; Bamberg et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r426|426]]</sup> ) in the face of climatic stressors and land change (Davies et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r427|427]]</sup> ; Cutter et al. 2012b <sup>[[#fn:r428|428]]</sup> ; Pelling 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r429|429]]</sup> ; Ensor 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r430|430]]</sup> ).

The World Bank estimates that, globally, social safety net transfers have reduced the absolute poverty gap by 45% and the relative poverty gap by 16% (World Bank 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r431|431]]</sup> ). Adaptive social protection builds household capacity to deal with shocks as well as the capacity of social safety nets to respond to shocks. For low-income communities reliant on land and climate for their livelihoods and well-being, social protection provides a way for vulnerable groups to manage weather and climatic variability and deteriorating land conditions to household income and assets ( ''robust evidence, high agreement'' ) (Baulch et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r432|432]]</sup> ; Barrientos 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r433|433]]</sup> ; Harris 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r434|434]]</sup> ; Fiszbein et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r435|435]]</sup> ; Kiendrebeogo et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r436|436]]</sup> ; Kabeer et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r437|437]]</sup> ; FAO 2015b <sup>[[#fn:r438|438]]</sup> ; Warner et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r439|439]]</sup> ; World Bank 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r440|440]]</sup> ).

A lifecycle approach to social protection is one approach, which some countries (such as Bangladesh) are using when developing national social protection policies. These policies acknowledge that households face risks across the lifecycle that they need to be protected from. If shocks are persistent, or occur numerous times, then policies can address concerns of a more structural nature (Glauben et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r441|441]]</sup> ). Barrett (2005) <sup>[[#fn:r442|442]]</sup> , for example, distinguishes between the role of safety nets (which include programmes such as emergency feeding programmes, crop or unemployment insurance, disaster assistance, etc.) and cargo nets (which include land reforms, targeted microfinance, targeted school food programmes, etc.). While the former prevents non-poor and transient poor from becoming chronically poor, the latter is meant to lift people out of poverty by changing societal or institutional structures. The graduation approach has adopted such systematic thinking with successful results (Banerjee et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r443|443]]</sup> ).

Social protection systems can provide buffers against shocks through vertical or horizontal expansion, ‘piggybacking’ on pre-established programmes, aligning social protection and humanitarian systems or refocusing existing resources (Wilkinson et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r444|444]]</sup> ; O’Brien et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r445|445]]</sup> ; Jones and Presler-Marshall 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r446|446]]</sup> ). There is increasing evidence that forecast-based financing, linked to a social protection, can be used to enable anticipatory actions based on forecast triggers, and guarantee funding ahead of a shock (Jjemba et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r447|447]]</sup> ). Accordingly, scaling up social protection based on an early warning could enhance timeliness, predictability and adequacy of social protection benefits (Kuriakose et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r448|448]]</sup> ; Costella et al. 2017a <sup>[[#fn:r449|449]]</sup> ; Wilkinson et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r450|450]]</sup> ; O’Brien et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r451|451]]</sup> ).

Countries at high risk of natural disasters often have lower safety-net coverage percent (World Bank 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r452|452]]</sup> ), and there is ''medium evidence'' and ''medium agreement'' that those countries with few financial and other buffers have lower economic and social performance (Cutter et al. 2012b <sup>[[#fn:r453|453]]</sup> ; Outreville 2011a <sup>[[#fn:r454|454]]</sup> ). Social protection systems have also been seen as an unaffordable commitment of public budget in many developing and low-income countries (Harris 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r455|455]]</sup> ). National systems may be disjointed and piecemeal, and subject to cultural acceptance and competing political ideologies (Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r456|456]]</sup> ). For example, Liberia and Madagascar each have five different public works programmes, each with different donor organisations and different implementing agencies (Monchuk 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r457|457]]</sup> ). These implementation shortcomings mean that positive effects of social protection systems might not be robust enough to shield recipients completely against the impacts of severe shocks or from long-term losses and damages from climate change ( ''limited evidence, high agreement'' ) (Davies et al. 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r458|458]]</sup> ; Umukoro 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r459|459]]</sup> ; Béné et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r460|460]]</sup> ; Ellis et al. 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r461|461]]</sup> ).

There is increasing support for establishment of public-private safety nets to address climate-related shocks, which are augmented by proactive preventative (adaptation) measures and related risk transfer instruments that are affordable to the poor (Kousky et al. 2018b <sup>[[#fn:r462|462]]</sup> ). Studies suggest that the adaptive capacity of communities has improved with regard to climate variability, like drought, when ex-ante tools, including insurance, have been employed holistically; providing insurance in combination with early warning and institutional and policy approaches reduces livelihood and food insecurity as well as strengthens social structures (Shiferaw et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r463|463]]</sup> ; Lotze-Campen and Popp 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r464|464]]</sup> ). Bundling insurance with early warning and seasonal forecasting can reduce the cost of insurance premiums (Daron and Stainforth 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r465|465]]</sup> ). The regional risk insurance scheme, African Risk Capacity, has the potential to significantly reduce the cost of insurance premiums (Siebert 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r466|466]]</sup> ) while bolstering contingency planning against food insecurity.

Work-for-insurance programmes applied in the context of social protection have been shown to improve livelihood and food security in Ethiopia (Berhane 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r467|467]]</sup> ; Mohmmed et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r468|468]]</sup> ) and Pakistan. The R4 Rural Resilience Initiative in Ethiopia is a widely cited example of a programme that serves the most vulnerable and includes aspects of resource management, and access by the poor to financial services, including insurance and savings (Linnerooth-Bayer et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r469|469]]</sup> ). Weather index insurance (such as index-based crop insurance) is being presented to low-income farmers and pastoralists in developing countries (e.g., Ethiopia, India, Kazakhstan, South Asia) to complement informal risk sharing, reducing the risk of lost revenue associated with variations in crop yield, and provide an alternative to classic insurance (Bogale 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r470|470]]</sup> ; Conradt et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r471|471]]</sup> ; Dercon et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r472|472]]</sup> ; Greatrex et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r473|473]]</sup> ; McIntosh et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r474|474]]</sup> ). The ability of insurance to contribute to adaptive capacity depends on the overall risk management and livelihood context of households – studies find that agriculturalists and foresters working on rainfed farms/land with more years of education and credit but limited off-farm income are more willing to pay for insurance than households who have access to remittances (such as from family members who have migrated) (Bogale 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r475|475]]</sup> ; Gan et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r476|476]]</sup> ; Hewitt et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r477|477]]</sup> ; Nischalke 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r478|478]]</sup> ). In Europe, modelling suggests that insurance incentives, such as vouchers, would be less expensive than total incentivised damage reduction and may reduce residential flood risk in Germany by 12% in 2016 and 24% by 2040 (Hudson et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r479|479]]</sup> ).

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