Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-11 (section)

==== 11.4.2.2 In-depth Discussion and ‘Reality’ Check of Pathways From Specific Sector Scenarios ====

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Since AR5 a number of studies providing a high technological level of detail for the industry sector have been released which describe how the industry sector can significantly reduce its GHG emissions until the middle of the century. Many of these studies try to specifically reflect the particular industry sector characteristics and barriers that hinder industry to follow an optimal transformation pathway. They vary in respect to different characteristics. In respect to their geographical scope, some studies analyse the prospects for industry sector decarbonisation on a global level ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA 2017]] a; [[#Energy%20Transitions%20Commission--2018|Energy Transitions Commission 2018]] ; [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. 2018]] ; [[#IEA--2020a|IEA 2020a]] , 2019b, 2020c; [[#Tchung-Ming--2018|Tchung-Ming et al. 2018]] ); regional level, for example, [[#European%20Commission--2018|European Commission (2018)]] and [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] ; or country level – studies for China, from where most industry-related emissions come (e.g., [[#Zhou--2019|Zhou et al. 2019]] ). [[#footnote-004|23]] In regard to sectoral scope, some studies include the entire industry sector, while others focus on selected GHG emission intensive sectors, such as steel, chemicals and/or concrete. Most of the scenarios focus solely on CO 2 emissions, that is non-CO 2 emissions of the industrial sector are neglected. [[#footnote-003|24]]

Industry sector mitigation studies also differ in regard to whether they develop coherent scenarios or whether they focus on discussing and analysing selected key mitigation strategies, without deriving full energy and emission scenarios. Coherent scenarios are developed in [[#IEA--2017|IEA (2017)]] ; [[#Energy%20Transitions%20Commission--2018|Energy Transitions Commission (2018)]] ; [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Tchung-Ming--2018|Tchung-Ming et al. (2018)]] ; IEA (2019b, 2020a,c); [[#IEA--2021a|IEA (2021a)]] ; and [[#IRENA--2021|IRENA (2021)]] on the global level, and in [[#Climact--2018|Climact (2018)]] ; [[#European%20Commission--2018|European Commission (2018)]] ; and [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] on the European level. Recent literature analysing selected key mitigation strategies, for example [[#IEA--2019b|IEA (2019b)]] and [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] has focused either exclusively or to a large extent on analysing the potential of materials efficiency and circular economy measures to reduce the need for primary raw materials relative to a business-as-usual development. The IEA (2021a, 2020a) also provides deep insights in to single mitigation strategies for the industry sector, particularly the role of CCS. The following discussion mainly concentrates on scenarios from the IEA. It has to be acknowledged that they only represent a small segment of the huge scenario family (see the scenario database in Chapter 3), but this approach enables to show the chronological evolution of scenarios coming from the same institution, using the same modelling approach (which allows a technology-rich analytical backcasting approach), but reflect additional requests that emerge over time (Table 11.5). In the 2DS scenario from the ‘Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP)’ study ( [[#IEA--2017|IEA 2017]] ), which intends to describe in great technological detail how the global energy system could transform by 2060 so as to be in line with limiting global warming to below 2°C, total CO 2 emissions are 74% lower in 2060 than in 2014, while only 39% lower in the industry sector. The Beyond 2°C Scenario (B2DS) of the same study intends to show how far known clean energy technologies (including those that lead to negative emissions) could go if pushed to their practical limits, allowing the future temperature increase to be limited to ‘well below’ 2°C and lowering total CO 2 emissions by 100% by 2060 and by 75% relative to 2014 in the industry sector.

Technologies penetration assumed in the CTS scenario by 2060 allows for an industrial emission cut of 45% from 2017 levels and a 50% cut against projected 2060 emissions in the Reference Technology Scenario (RTS) from the same study ( [[#IEA--2019b|IEA 2019b]] ), similar to IEA’s 2DS scenario. Energy efficiency improvements and deployment of BATs contribute 46% to cumulative emission reduction in 2018–2060, while fuel switching (15%), material efficiency (19%) and deployment of innovative processes (20%) provide the rest. IEA (2020a,c) which continues the Energy Technology Perspectives series include the new Sustainable Development Scenario (SDS) to describe a trajectory for emissions consistent with reaching global ‘net zero’ CO 2 emissions by around 2070. [[#footnote-002|25]] In 2070 the net zero balance is reached through a compensation of the remaining CO 2 emissions (fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes still lead to around 3 GtCO 2 ) by a combination of BECCS and to a lesser degree direct air capture and storage. In [[#IEA--2020c|IEA (2020c)]] the Faster Innovation Case (FIC) shows a possibility to reach a net zero emissions level globally already in 2050, assuming that technology development and market penetration can be significantly accelerated. Innovation plays a major role in this scenario as almost half of all the additional emissions reductions in 2050 relative to the reference case would be from technologies that are in an early stage of development and have not yet reached the market today ( [[#IEA--2020c|IEA 2020c]] ). The most ambitious IEA scenario NZE2050 ( [[#IEA--2021a|IEA 2021a]] ) describes a pathway reaching net zero emissions at system level by 2050. With 0.52 GtCO 2 industry-related CO 2 emissions (including process emissions) it ends up 94% below 2018 levels in 2050. Remaining emissions in the industry sector have to be compensated by negative emissions (e.g., via DAC).

Two studies complement the discussion of the IEA scenarios and are related to the IEA database. [[#footnote-001|26]] The ETC Supply Side scenario builds on the ETP 2017 study, investigating additional emission reduction potentials in the emissions-intensive sectors such as heavy industry and heavy-duty transport so as to be able to reach net zero emissions by the middle of the century. The LED scenario ( [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. 2018]] ) also builds on the ETP 2017 study, but focuses on the possible potential of very far-reaching efforts to reduce future material demand.

A comparison of the different mitigation scenarios shows that they depend on how individual mitigation strategies in the industry sector (Figure 11.13) are assessed. The use of CCS, for example, is in many scenarios assessed as very important, while other scenarios indicate that ambitious mitigation levels can be achieved without CCS in the industry sector. CCS plays a major role in the B2DS scenario (3.2 GtCO 2 in 2050), the ETC Supply Side scenario (5.4 GtCO 2 in 2050) and the IEA (2020a, 2021a) scenarios (e.g., 2.8 Gt CO 2 in NZE2050 in 2050, roughly one half of the captured CO 2 is related to cement production), while it is explicitly excluded in the LED scenario. In the latter scenario, on the other hand, considerable emission reductions are assumed to be achieved by far-reaching reductions in material demand relative to a baseline development. In other words, the analysed scenarios also suggest that to reach very strong emission reductions from the industry sector either CCS needs to be deployed to a great extent or considerable material demand reductions will need to be realised. Such demand reductions only play a minor role in the 2DS scenario and no role in the ETC Supply Side scenario. The SDS described in [[#IEA--2020a|IEA (2020a)]] provides a pathway where both CCS and material efficiency contribute significantly. In SDS material efficiency is a relevant factor in several parts of industry, explicitly steel, cement, and chemicals. Combining the different material efficiency options including a substantial part lifetime extension (particularly of buildings) leads to 29% less steel production by 2070, 26% less cement production, and 25% less chemicals production respectively in comparison to the reference line used in the study (Stated Policy Scenario: STEPS). Sector- or subsector-specific analysis supports the growing role of material efficiency. For the global chemical and petrochemical sector, [[#Saygin--2021|Saygin and Gielen (2021)]] point out that circular economy (including recycling) has to cover 16% of the necessary reduction that is needed for the implementation of a 1.5°C scenario.

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'''Figure 11.13 | Potentials and costs for zero-carbon mitigation options for industry and basic materials:''' CIEL – carbon intensity of electricity for indirect emissions; EE – energy efficiency; ME – material efficiency; Circularity – material flows (clinker substituted by coal fly ash, blast furnace slag or other by-products and waste, steel scrap, plastic recycling, etc '''''.''''' '''''); FeedCI – feedstock carbon intensity (hydrogen, biomass, novel cement, natural clinker substitutes); FSW+El – fuel switch and processes electrification with low-carbon electricity.''''' Ranges for mitigation options are shown based on bottom-up studies for grouped technologies packages, not for single technologies. In circles, contribution to mitigation from technologies based on their readiness are shown for 2050 (2040) and 2070. Direct emissions include fuel combustion and process emissions. Indirect emissions include emissions attributed to consumed electricity and purchased heat. For basic chemicals only methanol, ammonia and high-value chemicals are considered. The total for industry doesn’t include emissions from waste. Base values for 2020 for direct and indirect emissions were calculated using 2019 GHG emission data ( [[#Crippa--2021|Crippa et al. 2021]] ) and data for materials production from [[#World%20Steel%20Association--2020a|World Steel Association (2020a)]] and [[#IEA--2021d|IEA (2021d)]] . Negative mitigation costs for some options like Circularity are not reflected. Data from sources: [[#Pauliuk--2013a|Pauliuk et al. (2013a)]] ; [[#Fawkes--2016|Fawkes et al. (2016)]] ; [[#WBCSD--2016|WBCSD (2016)]] ; [[#Bazzanella--2017|Bazzanella and Ausfelder (2017)]] ; IEA (2018a, 2019b,g,h, 2020a,c, 2021a); [[#Lehne--2018|Lehne and Preston (2018)]] ; [[#Scrivener--2018|Scrivener et al. (2018)]] ; [[#EUROFER--2019|EUROFER (2019)]] ; Friedmann et al. (2019); [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] ; [[#Sandalow--2019|Sandalow et al. (2019)]] ; [[#CAT--2020|CAT (2020)]] ; [[#CEMBUREAU--2020|CEMBUREAU (2020)]] ; [[#Gielen--2020|Gielen et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Habert--2020|Habert et al. (2020)]] ; [[#World%20Steel%20Association--2020b|World Steel Association (2020b)]] ; [[#Bataille--2020a|Bataille (2020a)]] ; [[#GCCA--2021a|GCCA (2021a)]] ; and [[#Saygin--2021|Saygin and Gielen (2021)]] .

In all scenarios, the relevance of biomass and electricity in industrial final energy demand increases, especially in the more ambitious scenarios NZE2050, SDS, ETC Supply Side and LED. While in all scenarios, electrification becomes more and more important, hydrogen or hydrogen-derived fuels, on the other hand, do not contribute to industrial final energy demand by the middle of the century in 2DS and B2DS, while LED (1% final energy share in 2050) and particularly ETC Supply Side (25% final energy share in 2050) consider hydrogen or hydrogen-derived fuels as a significant option. In the updated IEA scenarios hydrogen and hydrogen-based fuels already play a more important role. In the SDS share in industry, final energy is around 10% ( [[#IEA--2020a|IEA 2020a]] ) and in the Faster Innovation Case around 12% ( [[#IEA--2020c|IEA 2020c]] ) in 2050. In the latter case this is based on the assumption that by 2050 on average each year 22 hydrogen-based steel plants come into operation ( [[#IEA--2020c|IEA 2020c]] ). In SDS around 60% of the hydrogen is produced on-site via water electrolysis while the remaining 40% is generated in fossil fuel plants (methane reforming) coupled with CCS facilities. In the NZE2050 scenario biomass/biomethane (13%/3%), hydrogen (3%), natural gas with CCUS (4%), and coal with CCUS (4%) are responsible for 27% of the final energy demand of the sector. This is much more than in 2018, starting here from roughly 6% (only biomass). Direct use of electricity still plays a bigger role in the analysis, as share of electricity increases in NZE2050 from 22% in 2018 to 28% in 2030 and 46% in 2050 (with 15% a part of the electricity is used to produce hydrogen). This is reflecting the effect that since the publication of older IEA reports more direct electric applications for the sector become available. In NZE2050 approximately 25% of total heat used in the sector is electrified directly with heat pumps or indirectly with synthetic fuels already by 2030.

For B2DS it is assumed that most of the available abatement options in the industry sector are pushed to their feasible limits. That leads to cumulative direct CO 2 emissions reductions compared to 2DS which come from: energy efficiency improvements and BAT deployment (42%), innovative processes and CCS (37%), switching to lower carbon fuels and feedstocks (13%), and material efficiency strategies in manufacturing processes (8%). Energy efficiency improvements are particularly important in the first time period.

The IEA World Energy Outlook indicates energy efficiency improvement in the 2020 to 2030 period as a major basis to switch from STEPS (stated policies) to the SDS (net zero emissions by 2070) pathway ( [[#IEA--2020i|IEA 2020i]] , 2021c). For many energy-intensive industries annual efficiency gains have to be almost doubled (e.g., from 0.6% yr –1 to 1.0% yr –1 for cement production) to contribute sufficiently to the overall goal. If net zero CO 2 emissions should be achieved already by 2050 as pursued in the NZE2050 scenario ( [[#IEA--2020i|IEA 2020i]] , 2021c) further accelerating energy efficiency improvements are necessary (e.g., for cement, annual efficiency gains of 1.75%), leading to the effect that in 2030 many processes are implemented closely to their technological limits. In total, sector final energy demand can be held nearly constant at 2018 levels until 2050 and decoupled from product demand growth.

The comparative analysis leads to the point that the relevance of individual mitigation strategies in different scenarios depends not only on a scenario’s level of ambition. Instead, implicit or explicit assumptions about: (i) the costs associated with each strategy, (ii) future technological progress and availability of individual technologies, and (iii) the future public or political acceptance of individual strategies are likely to be main reasons for the observed differences between the analysed scenarios. For many energy-intensive products, technologies capable of deep emission cuts are already available. Their application is subject to different economic and resources constraints (incremental investment needs, product prices escalation, requirements for escalation of new low-carbon power generation). To fully exploit potential availability of carbon-free energy sources (e.g., electricity or hydrogen and related derivates) is a fundamental prerequisite and marks the strong interdependencies between the industry and the energy sector.

Assessment of the scenario literature allows to conclude that under specific conditions strong CO 2 -emission reductions in the industry sector by 2050–2070 and even net-zero-emission pathways are possible. However, there is no consensus on the most plausible or most desirable mix of key mitigation strategies to be pursued. In addition it has to be stressed that suitable pathways are very country-specific and depend on the economic structure, resource potentials, technological competences, and political preferences and processes of the country or region in question ( [[#Bataille--2020a|Bataille 2020a]] ).

There is a consensus among the scenarios that a significant shift is needed from a transition process in the past mainly based on marginal (incremental) changes (with a strong focus on energy efficiency efforts) to one based on transformational change. To limit the barriers that are associated with transformational change, besides overcoming the valley of death for technologies or processes with breakthrough character, it is required to carefully identify structural change processes which are connected with substantial changes of the existing system (including the whole process chain). This has to be done at an early stage and has to be linked with considerations about preparatory measures which are able to flank the changes and to foster the establishment of new structures ( [[#11.6|Section 11.6]] ). The right sequencing of the various mitigation options and building appropriate bridges between the different strategies are important. [[#Rissman--2020|Rissman et al. (2020)]] proposes three phases of technologies deployment for the industry sector: (i) energy/material efficiency improvement (mainly incremental) and electrification in combination with demonstration projects for new technologies potentially important in subsequent phases (2020–2035), (ii) structural shifts based on technologies which reach maturity in phase (i) such as CCS and alternative materials (2035–2050), (iii) widespread deployment for technologies that are nascent today like molten oxide electrolysis-based steel-making. There are no strong boundaries between the different phases and all phases have to be accompanied by effective policies like R&amp;D programmes and market pull incentives.

Taking the steel sector as an illustrative example, sector-specific scenarios examining the possibility to reach GHG reduction beyond 80% ( [[#CAT--2020|CAT 2020]] ; [[#Bataille--2021b|Bataille et al. 2021b]] ; [[#IEA--2021a|IEA 2021a]] ; [[#Vogl--2021b|Vogl et al. 2021b]] ) indicate that robust measures comprise direct reduction of iron (DRI) with hydrogen in combination with efforts to further close the loops and increase availability of scrap metal (reducing the demand for primary steel). As hydrogen-based DRI might not be a fully mature technology before 2030 (depending on further developments of the policy framework and technological progress), risk of path dependencies has to be taken into consideration when reinvestments in existing production capacities will be required in the coming years. For existing plants, implementation of energy efficiency measures (e.g., utilisation of waste heat, improvement of high-temperature pumps) could build a bridge for further mitigation measures but have only limited unexhausted potential. As many GHG mitigation measures are associated with high investment costs and missing operating experience, a step-by-step implementing process might be an appropriate strategy to avoid investment leakage (given the mostly long operation times, investment cycles have to be used so as not to miss opportunities) and to gain experience. In the case of steel, companies can start with the integration of a natural gas-based direct reduced iron furnace feeding the reduced iron to an existing blast furnace, blending and later replacing the natural gas by hydrogen in a second stage, and later transitioning to a full hydrogen DRI EAF or molten oxide electrolysis EAF, all without disturbing the local upstream and downstream supply chains.

It is worth mentioning the flexibility of implementing transformational changes not the least depends on the age profile and projected longevity of existing capital stock, especially the willingness to accept the intentional or market-based stranding of high GHG intensity investments. This is a relevant aspect in all producing countries, but particularly in those countries with a rather young industry structure (i.e., comparative low age of existing facilities on average). [[#Tong--2019|Tong et al. (2019)]] suggest that in China, using the survival rate as a proxy, less than 10% of existing cement or steel production facilities will reach their end of operation time by 2050. [[#Vogl--2021b|Vogl et al. (2021b)]] argue that the mean blast furnace campaign is considerably shorter than used in Tong et al.(2019), at only 17 years between furnace relining, which suggests there is more room for retrofitting with clean steel major process technologies than generally assumed. [[#Bataille--2021b|Bataille et al. (2021b)]] found if very low carbon intensity processes were mandatory starting in 2025, given the lifetimes of existing facilities, major steel process lifetimes of up to 27 years would still make a full retrofit cycle with low-carbon processes possible. [[#footnote-000|27]]

In general, early adoption of new technologies plays a major role. Considering the long operation time (lifetime) of industrial facilities (e.g., steel mills and cement kilns) early adoption of new technologies is needed to avoid lock-in. For the SDS 2020 scenario, the [[#IEA--2020h|IEA (2020h)]] calculated the potential cumulative reduction of CO 2 emissions from the steel, cement and chemicals sector to be around 57 GtCO 2 if production technology is changed at its first mandatory retrofit, typically 25 years, rather than at 40 years (typical retrofitted lifetime) (Figure 11.14). Net zero pathways require that the new facilities are based on zero- or near-zero emissions technologies from 2030 onwards ( [[#IEA--2021c|IEA 2021c]] ).

Another important finding is that material efficiency and demand management are still not well represented in the scenario literature. Besides [[#IEA--2020a|IEA (2020a)]] two of the few exceptions are [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] for the EU and [[#Zhou--2019|Zhou et al. (2019)]] for China. [[#Zhou--2019|Zhou et al. (2019)]] describe a consistent mitigation pathway (Reinventing Fire scenario) for China where in 2050 CO 2 emissions are at a level 42% below 2010 emissions. Around 13% of the reduction is related to less material demand, mainly based on extension of building and infrastructure lifetime, as well as reduction of material losses in the production process and application of higher quality materials particularly high-quality cement ( [[#Zhou--2019|Zhou et al. 2019]] ). For buildings and cars, [[#Pauliuk--2021|Pauliuk et al. (2021)]] analysed the potential role of material efficiency and demand management strategies on material demand to be covered by the industry sector.

For the four subsectors in industry with high emissions, [[#_idTextAnchor031|Table 11.5]] shows results from [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] for the EU. The combination of circularity, material and energy efficiency, fossil and waste fuels mix, electrification, hydrogen, CCS and biomass use varies from scenario to scenario with none of these options ignored, but trade-offs are required.

'''Table 11.5 | Contribution to emission reduction of different mitigation strategies for net zero emissions pathways (range represents three different pathways for the industry sector in Europe; each related scenario focuses on different key strategies).''' 27

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! rowspan="2"|
! Steel

! Plastics

! Ammonia

! Cement

|-
! colspan="4"| Contribution to emission reduction (%) (range represents the three different pathways of the study)

|-
| Circularity

| 5–27

| 15-28

| 13–22

| 10–44

|-
| Energy efficiency

| 5–23

| 2–9

| rowspan="5"| 25–84

| 1–5

|-
| Fossil fuels and waste fuels

| 9–41

| 0–27

| 0–51

|-
| Decarbonised electricity

| 36–59

| 16–22

| 29–71

|-
| Biomass for fuel or feedstock

| 5–9

| 18–22

| 0–9

|-
| End-of-life plastic

|
| 16–35

|
|-
| CCS

| 5–34

| 0–31

| 0–57

| 29–79

|-
|
| colspan="4"| '''Required electr''' '''ification level'''

|-
| Growth of electricity demand (times compared with 2015)

| 3–5

| 3–4

|
| 2–5

|-
|
| colspan="4"| '''Investments and production c''' '''osts escalation'''

|-
| Investment needs growth (% versus BAU)

| 25–65

| 122–199

| 6–26

| 22–49

|-
| Cost of production (% versus BAU)

| +2–20

| +20–43

| +15–111

| +70–115

|}

Source: [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics (2019)]] .

The analysis of net zero emission pathways requires significantly higher investments compared to business as usual (BAU): 25–65% for steel, 6–26% for ammonia, 22–49% for cement, and with 122–199% the highest number for plastics ( [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics 2019]] ).

While sector-specific cost analyses are rare in general, there are scenarios indicating that pathways to net zero CO 2 emissions in the emissions-intensive sectors can be realised with limited additional costs. According to the [[#Energy%20Transitions%20Commission--2018|Energy Transitions Commission (2018)]] , deep decarbonisation from four major industry subsectors (plastics, steel, aluminium and cement) is achievable on a global level with cumulative incremental capital investments (2015–2050) limited to about 0.1% of aggregate GDP over that period. [[#UKCCC--2019a|UKCCC (2019a)]] assesses that total incremental costs (compared to a theoretical scenario with no climate change policy action at all) for cutting industrial emissions by 90% by 2050 is 0.2% of expected 2050 UK GDP ( [[#UKCCC--2019a|UKCCC 2019a]] ). The additional investment is 0.2% of gross fixed capital formation ( [[#Material%20Economics--2019|Material Economics 2019]] ). The [[#IEA--2020a|IEA (2020a)]] indicates the required annual incremental global investment in heavy industry is approximately 40 billion 2019USD yr –1 moving from STEPS to the SDS scenario (2020–2040), rising to USD55 billion yr –1 (2040–2070), effectively 0.05–0.07% of global annual GDP today.

Finally, a new literature is emerging, based on the new sectoral electrification, hydrogen- and CCS- based technologies listed in previous sections, considering the possibility of rearranging standard supply and process chains using regional and international trade in intermediate materials like primary iron, clinker and chemical feedstocks, to reduce global emissions by moving production of these materials to regions with large and inexpensive renewable energy potential or CCS geology ( [[#Bataille--2020a|Bataille 2020a]] ; [[#Gielen--2020|Gielen et al. 2020]] ; [[#Bataille--2021a|Bataille et al. 2021a]] ; [[#Saygin--2021|Saygin and Gielen 2021]] ).

In a sequence of sectoral- and industry-wide figures above (Figure 11.13), it is shown – starting in the present on the left and moving through 2050 to 2070 on the right, how much separate mitigation strategies can contribute and how they are integrated in the literature to reach near-zero emissions. For cement, steel and primary chemicals GHG intensities are presented, and for all industry absolute GHG emissions are displayed. Effects of the following mitigation strategies are reflected: energy efficiency, material efficiency, circularity/recycling, feedstock carbon intensity, fuel switching, CCU and CCS. Contributions of technologies split by their readiness for 2050 and 2070 are provided along with ranges of mitigation costs for achieving near-zero emissions for each strategy, accompanied by ranges of associated basic materials cost escalations and driven by these final products’ prices increments.

'''Table 11.4 | Perspectives on industrial sector mitigation potential (comparison of different''' '''IEA scenarios).'''

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! rowspan="2"| Reduction of direct CO 2 emissions

! rowspan="2"| Scenario assumptions a

! colspan="2"| IEA (2017, 2020c,i, 2021a)

! [[#IEA--2019b|IEA (2019b)]]

! colspan="2"| IEA (2020a,c)

|-
! 2030

! 2050

! 2060

! 2050

! 2070

|-
| colspan="7"| '''Baseline direct emissions from industrial sector'''

|-
| Reference Technology Scenario (RTS)

| Industry sector improvements in energy consumption and CO 2 emissions are incremental, in line with currently implemented and announced policies and targets.

| 9.8 GtCO 2

| 10.4 GtCO 2

| 9.7 GtCO 2

|
|-
| colspan="7"| '''Emissions reduction potential'''

|-
| 2°C Scenario (2DS)

| Assumes the decoupling of production in industry from CO 2 -emissions growth across the sector that would be compatible with limiting the rise in global mean temperature to 2°C by 2100.

| –7% vs 2014 a

–20% vs RTS b

| –39% vs 2014 b

–50% vs RTS b

|
|-
| Beyond 2°C Scenario (B2DS)

| Pushes the available CO 2 abatement options in industry to their feasible limits in order to aim for the ‘well below 2°C’ target.

| –28% vs 2014

–38% vs RTS

| –75% vs 2014

–80% vs RTS

|
|-
| Clean Technology Scenario (CTS)

| Strong focus on clean technologies. Energy efficiency and deployment of BATs contribute 46% to cumulative emission reduction in 2018–2060; fuel switch –15%; material efficiency – 19%; deployment of innovative processes – 20%.

|
| 5 Gt CO 2 or –45% vs 2017 level and –50% from 2060 RTS level

|
|-
| Sustainable Development Scenario 2020

(SDS 2020)

| Leads to net zero emissions globally by 2070. Remaining emissions in some sectors (including industry) in 2070 will be compensated by negative emissions in other areas (e.g., through BECCS and DAC).

|
| ~ 4.0 GtCO 2

| ~ 0.6 GtCO 2

|-
| Net zero emissions (NZE, 2021)

| Net zero emissions across all sectors are reached already by 2050.

| –23% (i.e., 2.1 GtCO 2 ) vs 2018.

| –94% (i.e., 8.4 GtCO 2 ) vs 2018

|
|-
| Faster Innovation Case (FIC)

| Achieves net-zero emissions status already by 2050 based on accelerated development and market penetration of technologies which have currently not yet reached the market.

|
| 0.8 Gt CO 2

(mainly steel and chemical industry)

|
|}

a Based on bottom-up technology modelling of five energy-intensive industry subsectors (cement, iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, aluminium, and pulp and paper).

b Industrial direct CO 2 emissions reached 8.3 GtCO 2 in 2014, 24% of global CO 2 emissions.

Source: IEA (2017, 2019b, 2020a, 2020c,i, 2021a).

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