Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-1 (section)

== 1.4 Enabling the response ==

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Climate change and sustainable development are challenges to society that require action at local, national, transboundary and global scales. Different time-perspectives are also important in decision-making, ranging from immediate actions to long-term planning and investment. Acknowledging the systemic link between food production and consumption, and land-resources more broadly is expected to enhance the success of actions (Bazilian et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r845|845]]</sup> ; Hussey and Pittock 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r846|846]]</sup> ). Because of the complexity of challenges and the diversity of actors involved in addressing these challenges, decision-making would benefit from a portfolio of policy instruments. Decision-making would also be facilitated by overcoming barriers such as inadequate education and funding mechanisms, as well as integrating international decisions into all relevant (sub)national sectoral policies (Section 7.4).

‘Nexus thinking’ emerged as an alternative to the sector-specific governance of natural resource use to achieve global securities of water (D’Odorico et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r847|847]]</sup> ), food and energy (Hoff 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r848|848]]</sup> ; Allan et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r849|849]]</sup> ), and also to address biodiversity concerns (Fischer et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r850|850]]</sup> ). Yet, there is no agreed definition of “nexus” nor a uniform framework to approach the concept, which may be land-focused (Howells et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r851|851]]</sup> ), water-focused (Hoff 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r852|852]]</sup> ) or food-centred (Ringler and Lawford 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r853|853]]</sup> ; Biggs et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r854|854]]</sup> ). Significant barriers remain to establish nexus approaches as part of a wider repertoire of responses to global environmental change, including challenges to cross-disciplinary collaboration, complexity, political economy and the incompatibility of current institutional structures (Hayley et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r855|855]]</sup> ; Wichelns 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r856|856]]</sup> ) (Sections 7.5.6 and 7.6.2).

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=== 1.4.1 Governance to enable the response ===

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Governance includes the processes, structures, rules and traditions applied by formal and informal actors including governments, markets, organisations, and their interactions with people. Land governance actors include those affecting policies and markets, and those directly changing land use (Hersperger et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r858|858]]</sup> ). The former includes governments and administrative entities, large companies investing in land, non-governmental institutions and international institutions. It also includes UN agencies that are working at the interface between climate change and land management, such as the FAO and the World Food Programme that have inter alia worked on advancing knowledge to support food security through the improvement of techniques and strategies for more resilient farm systems. Farmers and foresters directly act on land (actors in proximate causes) (Hersperger et al. 2010) (Chapter 7).

Policy design and formulation has often been strongly sectoral. For example, agricultural policy might be concerned with food security, but have little concern for environmental protection or human health. As food, energy and water security and the conservation of biodiversity rank highly on the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, the promotion of synergies between and across sectoral policies is important (IPBES 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r859|859]]</sup> ). This can also reduce the risks of anthropogenic climate forcing through mitigation, and bring greater collaboration between scientists, policymakers, the private sector and land managers in adapting to climate change (FAO 2015a <sup>[[#fn:r860|860]]</sup> ). Polycentric governance (Section 7.6) has emerged as an appropriate way of handling resource management problems, in which the decision-making centres take account of one another in competitive and cooperative relationships and have recourse to conflict resolution mechanisms (Carlisle and Gruby 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r861|861]]</sup> ). Polycentric governance is also multi-scale and allows the interaction between actors at different levels (local, regional, national and global) in managing common pool resources such as forests or aquifers.

Implementation of systemic, nexus approaches has been achieved through socio-ecological systems (SES) frameworks that emerged from studies of how institutions affect human incentives, actions and outcomes (Ostrom and Cox 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r862|862]]</sup> ). Recognition of the importance of SES laid the basis for alternative formulations to tackle the sustainable management of land resources focusing specifically on institutional and governance outcomes (Lebel et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r863|863]]</sup> ; Bodin 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r864|864]]</sup> ). The SES approach also addresses the multiple scales in which the social and ecological dimensions interact (Veldkamp et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r865|865]]</sup> ; Myers et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r866|866]]</sup> ; Azizi et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r867|867]]</sup> ) (Section 6.1).

Adaptation or resilience pathways within the SES frameworks require several attributes, including indigenous and local knowledge (ILK) and trust building for deliberative decision-making and effective collective action, polycentric and multi-layered institutions and responsible authorities that pursue just distributions of benefits to enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups and communities (Lebel et al. 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r868|868]]</sup> ). The nature, source and mode of knowledge generation are critical to ensure that sustainable solutions are community-owned and fully integrated within the local context (Mistry and Berardi 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r869|869]]</sup> ; Schneider and Buser 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r870|870]]</sup> ). Integrating ILK with scientific information is a prerequisite for such community-owned solutions (Cross-Chapter Box 13 in Chapter 7). ILK is context-specific, transmitted orally or through imitation and demonstration, adaptive to changing environments, and collectivised through a shared social memory (Mistry and Berardi 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r871|871]]</sup> ). ILK is also holistic since indigenous people do not seek solutions aimed at adapting to climate change alone, but instead look for solutions to increase their resilience to a wide range of shocks and stresses (Mistry and Berardi 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r872|872]]</sup> ). ILK can be deployed in the practice of climate governance, especially at the local level where actions are informed by the principles of decentralisation and autonomy (Chanza and de Wit 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r873|873]]</sup> ). ILK need not be viewed as needing confirmation or disapproval by formal science, but rather it can complement scientific knowledge (Klein et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r874|874]]</sup> ).

The capacity to apply individual policy instruments and policy mixes is influenced by governance modes. These modes include hierarchical governance that is centralised and imposes policy through top-down measures, decentralised governance in which public policy is devolved to regional or local government, public-private partnerships that aim for mutual benefits for the public and private sectors and self or private governance that involves decisions beyond the realms of the public sector (IPBES 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r875|875]]</sup> ). These governance modes provide both constraints and opportunities for key actors that impact the effectiveness, efficiency and equity of policy implementation.

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=== 1.4.2 Gender agency as a critical factor in climate and land sustainability outcomes ===

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Environmental resource management is not gender neutral. Gender is an essential variable in shaping ecological processes and change, building better prospects for livelihoods and sustainable development (Resurrección 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r876|876]]</sup> ) (Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 7). Entrenched legal and social structures and power relations constitute additional stressors that render women’s experience of natural resources disproportionately negative when compared to men. Socio-economic drivers and entrenched gender inequalities affect land-based management (Agarwal 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r877|877]]</sup> ). The intersections between climate change, gender and climate adaptation takes place at multiple scales: household, national and international, and adaptive capacities are shaped through power and knowledge.

Germaine to the gender inequities is the unequal access to land-based resources. Women play a significant role in agriculture (Boserup 1989 <sup>[[#fn:r878|878]]</sup> ; Darity 1980 <sup>[[#fn:r879|879]]</sup> ) and rural economies globally (FAO 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r880|880]]</sup> ), but are well below their share of labour in agriculture globally (FAO 2011). In 59% of 161 surveyed countries, customary, traditional and religious practices hinder women’s land rights (OECD 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r881|881]]</sup> ). Moreover, women typically shoulder disproportionate responsibility for unpaid domestic work including care-giving activities (Beuchelt and Badstue 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r882|882]]</sup> ) and the provision of water and firewood (UNEP 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r883|883]]</sup> ). Exposure to violence restricts, in large regions, their mobility for capacity-building activities and productive work outside the home (Day et al. 2005 <sup>[[#fn:r884|884]]</sup> ; UNEP 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r885|885]]</sup> ). Large-scale development projects can erode rights, and lead to over-exploitation of natural resources. Hence, there are cases where reforms related to land-based management, instead of enhancing food security, have tended to increase the vulnerability of both women and men and reduce their ability to adapt to climate change (Pham et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r886|886]]</sup> ). Access to, and control over, land and land-based resources is essential in taking concrete action on land-based mitigation, and inadequate access can affect women’s rights and participation in land governance and management of productive assets.

Timely information, such as from early warning systems, is critical in managing risks, disasters, and land degradation, and in enabling land-based adaptation. Gender, household resources and social status, are all determinants that influence the adoption of land-based strategies (Theriault et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r887|887]]</sup> ). Climate change is not a lone driver in the marginalisation of women; their ability to respond swiftly to its impacts will depend on other socio-economic drivers that may help or hinder action towards adaptive governance. Empowering women and removing gender-based inequities constitutes a mechanism for greater participation in the adoption of sustainable practices of land management (Mello and Schmink 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r888|888]]</sup> ). Improving women’s access to land (Arora-Jonsson 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r889|889]]</sup> ) and other resources (water) and means of economic livelihoods (such as credit and finance) are the prerequisites to enable women to participate in governance and decision-making structures (Namubiru-Mwaura 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r890|890]]</sup> ). Still, women are not a homogenous group, and distinctions through elements of ethnicity, class, age and social status, require a more nuanced approach and not a uniform treatment through vulnerability lenses only. An intersectional approach that accounts for various social identifiers under different situations of power (Rao 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r891|891]]</sup> ) is considered suitable to integrate gender into climate change research and helps to recognise overlapping and interdependent systems of power (Djoudi et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r892|892]]</sup> ; Kaijser and Kronsell 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r893|893]]</sup> ; Moosa and Tuana 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r894|894]]</sup> ; Thompson-Hall et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r895|895]]</sup> ).

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=== 1.4.3 Policy instruments ===

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Policy instruments enable governance actors to respond to environmental and societal challenges through policy action. Examples of the range of policy instruments available to public policymakers are discussed below based on four categories of instruments: (i) legal and regulatory instruments, (ii) rights-based instruments and customary norms, (iii) economic and financial instruments, and (iv) social and cultural instruments.

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==== 1.4.3.1 Legal and regulatory instruments ====

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Legal and regulatory instruments deal with all aspects of intervention by public policy organisations to correct market failures, expand market reach, or intervene in socially relevant areas with inexistent markets. Such instruments can include legislation to limit the impacts of intensive land management, for example, protecting areas that are susceptible to nitrate pollution or soil erosion. Such instruments can also set standards or threshold values, for example, mandated water quality limits, organic production standards, or geographically defined regional food products. Legal and regulatory instruments may also define liability rules, for example, where environmental standards are not met, as well as establishing long-term agreements for land resource protection with land owners and land users.

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==== 1.4.3.2 Economic and financial instruments ====

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Economic (such as taxes, subsidies) and financial (weather-index insurance) instruments deal with the many ways in which public policy organisations can intervene in markets. A number of instruments are available to support climate mitigation actions including public provision, environmental regulations, creating property rights and markets (Sterner 2003 <sup>[[#fn:r896|896]]</sup> ). Market-based policies such as carbon taxes, fuel taxes, cap and trade systems or green payments have been promoted (mostly in industrial economies) to encourage markets and businesses to contribute to climate mitigation, but their effectiveness to date has not always matched expectations (Grolleau et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r897|897]]</sup> ) (Section 7.4.4). Market-based instruments in ecosystem services generate both positive (incentives for conservation), but also negative environmental impacts, and also push food prices up or increase price instability (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r898|898]]</sup> ; Farley and Voinov 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r899|899]]</sup> ). Footprint labels can be an effective means of shifting consumer behaviour. However, private labels focusing on a single metric (e.g., carbon) may give misleading signals if they target a portion of the life cycle (e.g., transport) (Appleton 2009 <sup>[[#fn:r900|900]]</sup> ) or ignore other ecological indicators (water, nutrients, biodiversity) (van Noordwijk and Brussaard 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r901|901]]</sup> ).

Effective and durable, market-led responses for climate mitigation depend on business models that internalise the cost of emissions into economic calculations. Such ‘business transformation’ would itself require integrated policies and strategies that aim to account for emissions in economic activities (Biagini and Miller 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r902|902]]</sup> ; Weitzman 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r903|903]]</sup> ; Eidelwein et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r904|904]]</sup> ). International initiatives such as REDD+ and agricultural commodity roundtables (beef, soybeans, palm oil, sugar) are expanding the scope of private sector participation in climate mitigation (Nepstad et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r905|905]]</sup> ), but their impacts have not always been effective (Denis et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r906|906]]</sup> ). Payments for environmental services (PES) defined as “voluntary transactions between service users and service providers that are conditional on agreed rules of natural resource management for generating offsite services” (Wunder 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r907|907]]</sup> ) have not been widely adopted and have not yet been demonstrated to deliver as effectively as originally hoped (Börner et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r908|908]]</sup> ) (Sections 7.4 and 7.5). PES in forestry were shown to be effective only when coupled with appropriate regulatory measures (Alix-Garcia and Wolff 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r909|909]]</sup> ). Better designed and expanded PES schemes would encourage integrated soil–water–nutrient management packages (Stavi et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r910|910]]</sup> ), services for pollinator protection (Nicole 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r911|911]]</sup> ), water use governance under scarcity, and engage both public and private actors (Loch et al. 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r912|912]]</sup> ). Effective PES also requires better economic metrics to account for human- directed losses in terrestrial ecosystems and to food potential, and to address market failures or externalities unaccounted for in market valuation of ecosystem services.

Resilient strategies for climate adaptation can rely on the construction of markets through social networks as in the case of livestock systems (Denis et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r913|913]]</sup> ) or when market signals encourage adaptation through land markets or supply chain incentives for sustainable land management practices (Anderson et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r914|914]]</sup> ). Adequate policy (through regulations, investments in research and development or support to social capabilities) can support private initiatives for effective solutions to restore degraded lands (Reed and Stringer 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r915|915]]</sup> ), or mitigate against risk and to avoid shifting risks to the public (Biagini and Miller 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r916|916]]</sup> ). Governments, private business, and community groups could also partner to develop sustainable production codes (Chartres and Noble 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r917|917]]</sup> ), and in co-managing land-based resources (Baker and Chapin 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r918|918]]</sup> ), while public-private partnerships can be effective mechanisms in deploying infrastructure to cope with climatic events (floods) and for climate-indexed insurance (Kunreuther 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r919|919]]</sup> ). Private initiatives that depend on trade for climate adaptation and mitigation require reliable trading systems that do not impede climate mitigation objectives (Elbehri et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r920|920]]</sup> ; Mathews 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r921|921]]</sup> ).

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==== 1.4.3.3 Rights-based instruments and customary norms ====

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Rights-based instruments and customary norms deal with the equitable and fair management of land resources for all people (IPBES 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r922|922]]</sup> ). These instruments emphasise the rights in particular of indigenous peoples and local communities, including for example, recognition of the rights embedded in the access to, and use of, common land. Common land includes situations without legal ownership (e.g., hunter-gathering communities in South America or Africa, and bushmeat), where the legal ownership is distinct from usage rights (Mediterranean transhumance grazing systems), or mixed ownership-common grazing systems (e.g., crofting in Scotland). A lack of formal (legal) ownership has often led to the loss of access rights to land, where these rights were also not formally enshrined in law, which especially effects indigenous communities, for example, deforestation in the Amazon basin. Overcoming the constraints associated with common-pool resources (forestry, fisheries, water) are often of economic and institutional nature (Hinkel et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r923|923]]</sup> ) and require tackling the absence or poor functioning of institutions and the structural constraints that they engender through access and control levers using policies and markets and other mechanisms (Schut et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r924|924]]</sup> ). Other examples of rights-based instruments include the protection of heritage sites, sacred sites and peace parks (IPBES 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r925|925]]</sup> ). Rights-based instruments and customary norms are consistent with the aims of international and national human rights, and the critical issue of liability in the climate change problem.

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==== 1.4.3.4 Social and cultural norms ====

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Social and cultural instruments are concerned with the communication of knowledge about conscious consumption patterns and resource-effective ways of life through awareness raising, education and communication of the quality and the provenance of land-based products. Examples of the latter include consumption choices aided by ecolabelling (Section 1.4.3.2) and certification. Cultural indicators (such as social capital, cooperation, gender equity, women’s knowledge, socio-ecological mobility) contribute to the resilience of social-ecological systems (Sterling et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r926|926]]</sup> ). Indigenous communities (such as the Inuit and Tsleil Waututh Nation in Canada) that continue to maintain traditional foods exhibit greater dietary quality and adequacy (Sheehy et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r927|927]]</sup> ). Social and cultural instruments also include approaches to self-regulation and voluntary agreements, especially with respect to environmental management and land resource use. This is becoming especially irrelevant for the increasingly important domain of corporate social responsibility (Halkos and Skouloudis 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r928|928]]</sup> ).

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