Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-1 (section)

=== 1.7.2 Ethical Approaches ===

<div id="h2-21-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Gardiner’s (2011) book on climate change as ‘The Perfect Moral Storm’ identified three ‘tempests’. Its ''global'' dimension, in a world of sovereign states which have only fragmentary responsibility and control, makes it ‘difficult to generate the moral consideration and necessary political will’. Its impacts are ''intergenerational'' but future generations have no voice in contemporary affairs, the usual mechanism for addressing distributional injustices, amplified by the intrinsic inequity of wealthy big emitters impacting particularly poorer victims. He argues that these are exacerbated by a third, ''theoretical'' failure to acknowledge a central need for ‘moral sensitivity, compassion, transnational and transgenerational care, and other forms of ethical concern to rise to the surface’ to help guide effective climate action. As noted in [[#1.4.6|Section 1.4.6]] , however, equity and ethics are both a driver of and constraint on mitigation.

<div id="1.7.2.1" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="ethics-and-values"></span>
==== 1.7.2.1 Ethics and Values ====

<div id="h3-4-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

A large body of literature examines the critical role of values, ethics, attitudes, and behaviours as foundational frames for understanding and assessing climate action, sustainable development and societal transformation ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC 2014a]] Chapter 3). Most of this work is offered as a counterpoint or critique to mainstream literature’s focus on the safeguarding of economic growth of nations, corporations and individuals ( [[#Castree--2017|Castree 2017]] ; [[#Gunster--2017|Gunster 2017]] ). These perspectives highlight the dominance of economic utilitarianism in western philosophical thought as a key driver for unsustainable consumption and global environmental change ( [[#Hoeing--2015|Hoeing et al. 2015]] ; Popescu 2016).

Entrenching alternative values that promote deep decarbonisation, environmental conservation and protection across all levels of society is then viewed as foundational component of climate-resilient and sustainable development and for achieving human rights, and a safe climate world ( [[#Evensen--2015|Evensen 2015]] ; [[#Jolly--2015|Jolly et al. 2015]] ; Popescu 2016; Tàbara et al. 2019). The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner has highlighted the potentially crucial role of human rights in relation to climate change (UNHCR 2018). While acknowledging the role of policy, technology, and finance, the ‘managerialist’ approaches, that emphasise ‘technical governance’ and fail to challenge the deeper values that underpin society, may not secure the deep change required to avert dangerous climate change and other environmental challenges ( [[#Hartzell-Nichols--2014|Hartzell-Nichols 2014]] ; [[#Steinberger--2020|Steinberger et al. 2020]] ).

Social justice perspectives emphasise the distribution of responsibilities, rights, and mutual obligations between nations in navigating societal transformations (Gawel and Kuhlicke 2017; [[#Leach--2018|Leach et al. 2018]] ; [[#Patterson--2018|Patterson et al. 2018]] ). Current approaches to climate action may fail to match what is required by science because they tend to circumvent constraints on human behaviour, especially constraints on economic interest and activity. Related literature explores governance models that are centred on environmental limits, planetary boundaries and the moral imperative to prioritise the poor in earth systems governance ( [[#Carley--2020|Carley and Konisky 2020]] ; [[#Kashwan--2020|Kashwan et al. 2020]] ), with emphasis on trust and solidarity as foundations for global cooperation on climate change ( [[#Jolly--2015|Jolly et al. 2015]] ). A key obstacle is that the economic interests of states tend to be stronger than the drivers for urgent climate action ( [[#Bain--2017|Bain 2017]] ).

Short-term interests of stakeholders are acknowledged to impede the reflection and deliberation needed for climate mitigation and adaptation planning ( [[#Hackmann--2016|Hackmann 2016]] ; [[#Sussman--2016|Sussman et al. 2016]] ; [[#Schlosberg--2017|Schlosberg et al. 2017]] ; [[#Herrick--2018|Herrick 2018]] ). Situationally appropriate mitigation and adaptation policies at both national and international level may require more ethical self-reflection ( [[#Herrick--2018|Herrick 2018]] ), including self-transcendent values such as universalism and benevolence, and moderation which are positively related to pro-environmental behaviours ( [[#Jonsson--2014|Jonsson and Nilsson 2014]] ; [[#Katz-Gerro--2015|Katz-Gerro et al. 2015]] ; [[#Braito--2017|Braito et al. 2017]] ; [[#Howell--2017|Howell and Allen 2017]] ).

Another strong theme in the literature concerns recognition of interdependence including the intimate relationship between humans and the non-human world ( [[#Hannis--2016|Hannis 2016]] ; [[#Gupta--2018|Gupta and Racherla 2018]] ; [[#Howell--2017|Howell and Allen 2017]] ), with such ecological interdependence offered as an organising principle for enduring transformation to sustainability. A key policy implication of this is moving away from valuing nature only in market and monetary terms to strongly incorporating existential and non-material value of nature in natural-resource accounting ( [[#Neuteleers--2015|Neuteleers and Engelen 2015]] ; [[#Shackleton--2017|Shackleton et al. 2017]] ; [[#Himes-Cornell--2018|Himes-Cornell et al. 2018]] ). There has been increasing attention on ways to design climate policy frameworks to help reconcile ecological virtue (with its emphasis on the collective) with individual freedoms and personal autonomy ( [[#Kasperbauer--2016|Kasperbauer 2016]] ; [[#Nash--2017|Nash et al. 2017]] ; [[#Xiang--2019|Xiang et al. 2019]] ). In such a framework, moderation, fairness, and stewardship are all understood and promoted as directly contributing to the ‘good life’. Such approaches are deemed vital to counteract tendencies to ‘free ride’, and to achieve behavioural changes often associated with tackling climate change ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5#5.2.1|Section 5.2.1]] ).

Some literature suggests that attention to emotions, especially with regards to climate communication, could help societies and individuals act in ways that focus less on monetary gain and more on climate and environmental sustainability ( [[#Bryck--2016|Bryck and Ellis 2016]] ; [[#Chapman--2017|Chapman et al. 2017]] ; [[#Nabi--2018|Nabi et al. 2018]] ; [[#Zummo--2020|Zummo et al. 2020]] ).

<div id="1.7.2.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="equity-and-representation-international-public-choice-across-time-and-space"></span>
==== 1.7.2.2 Equity and Representation: International Public Choice Across Time and Space ====

<div id="h3-5-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Equity perspectives highlight three asymmetries relevant for climate change ( [[#Okereke--2016|Okereke and Coventry 2016]] ; [[#Okereke--2017|Okereke 2017]] ) ( [[#1.4.6|Section 1.4.6]] ). ''Asymmetry in contribution'' highlights different contributions to climate change both in historical and current terms, and applies both within and between states as well as between generations ( [[#Caney--2016|Caney 2016]] ; [[#Heyward--2016|Heyward and Roser 2016]] ). ''Asymmetry in impacts'' highlights the fact that the damages will be borne disproportionately across countries, regions, communities, individuals and gender; moreover, it is often those that have contributed the least that stand to bear the greatest impact of climate change ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC 2014a]] ; [[#Shi--2016|Shi et al. 2016]] ). ''Asymmetry in capacity'' highlights differences of power between groups and nations to participate in climate decision and governance, including the capacity to implement mitigation and adaptation measures.

If attention is not paid to equity, efforts designed to tackle climate change may end up exacerbating inequities among communities and between countries ( [[#Heffron--2018|Heffron and McCauley 2018]] ). The implication is that to be sustainable in the long run, mitigation involves a central place for consideration of justice, both within and between countries (Chapters 4 and 14). Arguments that the injustices following from climate change are symptomatic of a more fundamental structural injustice in social relations, are taken to imply a need to address the deeper inequities within societies ( [[#Routledge--2018|Routledge et al. 2018]] ).

Climate change and climate policies affect countries and people differently, with the poor likely to be more affected ( [[#1.6.1|Section 1.6.1]] ). Ideas of Just Transitions (outlined in [[#1.8.2|Section 1.8.2]] .) often have a national focus in the literature, but also imply that mitigation should not increase the asymmetries between rich and poor countries, implying a desire for transitions which seek to reduce (or at least avoid adverse) distributional affects. Thus, it comes into play in the timing of zero emissions (Chapters 3 and 14). International climate finance in which rich countries finance mitigation and adaptation in poor countries is also essential for reducing the asymmetries between rich and poor countries ( [[#1.6.3|Section 1.6.3]] and Chapter 15).

Equity across generations – the distribution between the present and future generations – also matters. One aspect is discounting ( [[#1.7.1|Section 1.7.1]] ). Another approach has been to study the burdens on each generation following from the transition to low-carbon economies ( [[#IPCC--2014a|IPCC 2014a]] Chapter 3) (Cross-Working Group Box 3 in Chapter 12). Suggestions include shifting more investments into ‘natural capital’, so that future generations will inherit less physical capital but a better environment, or financing mitigation efforts today using governmental debt redeemed by future generations ( [[#Heijdra--2006|Heijdra et al. 2006]] ; [[#Broome--2012|Broome 2012]] ; [[#Karp--2014|Karp and Rezai 2014]] ; [[#Hoel--2019|Hoel et al. 2019]] ).

<div id="1.7.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="transition-and-transformation-processes"></span>