Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-2 (section)

==== 2.5.2.1 Energy Transitions Can Occur Faster Than in the Past ====

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Recent studies have identified examples supporting fast energy transitions ( [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool 2016]] ; [[#Bond--2019|Bond et al. 2019]] ; [[#Reed--2019|Reed et al. 2019]] ). One describes five rapid national-scale transitions in end-use technologies, including lighting in Sweden, cook-stoves in China, liquefied petroleum gas stoves in Indonesia, ethanol vehicles in Brazil, and air conditioning in the USA ( [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool 2016]] ). Adoption of electric vehicles in Norway and in cities in China have also been rapid ( [[#Rietmann--2019|Rietmann and Lieven 2019]] ; [[#Li--2020|Li et al. 2020]] ; [[#Fridstrøm--2021|Fridstrøm 2021]] ). Examples in energy supply, include electrification in Kuwait, natural gas in the Netherlands, nuclear electricity in France and Sweden, combined heat and power in Denmark, renewable energy in Uruguay, and coal retirements in Ontario, Canada ( [[#Qvist--2015|Qvist and Brook 2015]] ). Reasons that these exemplars could be applied more broadly in the future include: growing urgency on climate change, shifting motivation from price response to proactive resource scarcity, and an increase in the likelihood of technological breakthroughs ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Sovacool--2016|Sovacool 2016]] ; [[#Bazilian--2020|Bazilian et al. 2020]] ). The emergence of smaller unit scale, granular technologies (described below) also creates the potential for faster system change ( [[#Trancik--2006|Trancik 2006]] ; [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. 2018]] ; [[#Wilson--2020a|Wilson et al. 2020a]] ). Energy service prices and government actions that affect demand are critical to the speed and extent of energy transitions ( [[#Kramer--2009|Kramer and Haigh 2009]] ). Reasons scholars consider for expecting a fast transition include: intentional policy and alignment with goals; globalisation which diversifies sources and integrates supply chains; collective action via the Paris Agreement; as well as bottom-up grassroots movements and private sector initiatives ( [[#Kern--2016|Kern and Rogge 2016]] ). Political support for change can also speed transitions ( [[#Burke--2017|Burke and Stephens 2017]] ; [[#Stokes--2018|Stokes and Breetz 2018]] ), as can the credibility of transition-related targets ( [[#Li--2018|Li and Pye 2018]] ; [[#Rogge--2018|Rogge and Dütschke 2018]] ).

The important role of leader countries is often missed when looking only at global aggregates ( [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Hughes 2018]] ); leaders accumulate important knowledge, provide scaled market, and set positive examples for followers ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Schwerhoff--2016|Schwerhoff 2016]] ; [[#Buchholz--2019|Buchholz et al. 2019]] ). In recent years, the conception of where leadership, climate-relevant innovation, and technology transfer originate has shifted to considering more meaningfully direct South-South and South-North forms of technology transfer, flows of capital, drivers for market access, origins of innovation, and other forms of cooperation ( [[#Urban--2018|Urban 2018]] ; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ). Recent evidence shows that South-South trade is enabling clean technology transfer ( [[#Gosens--2020|Gosens 2020]] ). Leaders can initiate a process of ‘catalytic cooperation’ in which they overcome collective action problems and stimulate rapid change (Hale 2018). Similarly, ‘sensitive intervention points’ – targeted support of social movements, technologies, or policies themselves – can lead to rapid and self-sustaining change ( [[#Farmer--2019|Farmer et al. 2019]] ), such as support for photovoltaics in Germany in the 2000s and student climate activism in Europe in 2019. The focus on leadership, catalysts, and intervention points reflects a systemic view of transitions that emphasises interactions and interdependence ( [[#Geels--2018|Geels 2018]] ; [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling and Hughes 2018]] ). Technological change has been at the core of transitions, but is best understood as part of a system in which social aspects are crucial ( ''medium confidence'' ) ( [[#Cherp--2018|Cherp et al. 2018]] ; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al. 2019]] ; [[#Overland--2020|Overland and Sovacool 2020]] ).

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