Editing IPCC:AR6/SRCCL/Chapter-3 (section)

==== 3.4.2.9 Impacts on migration ====

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Environmentally induced migration is complex and accounts for multiple drivers of mobility as well as other adaptation measures undertaken by populations exposed to environmental risk ( ''high confidence'' ). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''low agreement'' that climate change impacts migration. The World Bank (2018) <sup>[[#fn:r784|784]]</sup> predicted that 143 million people would be forced to move internally by 2050 if no climate action is taken. Focusing on asylum seekers alone, rather than the total number of migrants, Missirian and Schlenker (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r785|785]]</sup> predict that asylum applications to the European Union will increase from 28% (98,000 additional asylum applications per year) up to 188% (660,000 additional applications per year) depending on the climate scenario by 2100. While the modelling efforts have greatly improved over the years (Hunter et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r786|786]]</sup> ; McLeman 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r787|787]]</sup> ; Sherbinin and Bai 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r788|788]]</sup> ) and in particular, these recent estimates provide an important insight into potential future developments, the quantitative projections are still based on the number of people exposed to risk rather than the number of people who would actually engage in migration as a response to this risk (Gemenne 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r789|789]]</sup> ; McLeman 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r790|790]]</sup> ) and they do not take into account individual agency in migration decision nor adaptive capacities of individuals (Hartmann 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r791|791]]</sup> ; Kniveton et al. 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r792|792]]</sup> ; Piguet 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r793|793]]</sup> ) (see Section 3.6.2 discussing migration as a response to desertification). Accordingly, the available micro-level evidence suggests that climate-related shocks are one of the many drivers of migration (Adger et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r794|794]]</sup> ; London Government Office for Science and Foresight 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r795|795]]</sup> ; Melde et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r796|796]]</sup> ), but the individual responses to climate risk are more complex than commonly assumed (Gray and Mueller 2012a <sup>[[#fn:r797|797]]</sup> ). For example, despite strong focus on natural disasters, neither flooding (Gray and Mueller 2012b <sup>[[#fn:r798|798]]</sup> ; Mueller et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r799|799]]</sup> ) nor earthquakes (Halliday 2006 <sup>[[#fn:r800|800]]</sup> ) were found to induce long-term migration; but instead, slow-onset changes, especially those provoking crop failures and heat stress, could affect household or individual migration decisions (Gray and Mueller 2012a <sup>[[#fn:r801|801]]</sup> ; Missirian and Schlenker 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r802|802]]</sup> ; Mueller et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r803|803]]</sup> ). Out-migration from drought-prone areas has received particular attention (de Sherbinin et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r804|804]]</sup> ; Ezra and Kiros 2001 <sup>[[#fn:r805|805]]</sup> ). A substantial body of literature suggests that households engage in local or internal migration as a response to drought (Findlay 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r806|806]]</sup> ; Gray and Mueller 2012a <sup>[[#fn:r807|807]]</sup> ), while international migration decreases with drought in some contexts (Henry et al. 2004 <sup>[[#fn:r808|808]]</sup> ), but might increase in contexts where migration networks are well established (Feng et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r809|809]]</sup> ; Nawrotzki and DeWaard 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r810|810]]</sup> ; Nawrotzki et al. 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r811|811]]</sup> , 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r812|812]]</sup> ). Similarly, the evidence is not conclusive with respect to the effect of environmental drivers, in particular desertification, on mobility. While it has not consistently entailed out-migration in the case of Ecuadorian Andes (Gray 2009, 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r813|813]]</sup> ), environmental and land degradation increased mobility in Kenya and Nepal (Gray 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r814|814]]</sup> ; Massey et al. 2010 <sup>[[#fn:r815|815]]</sup> ), but marginally decreased mobility in Uganda (Gray 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r816|816]]</sup> ). These results suggest that in some contexts, environmental shocks actually undermine households’ financial capacity to undertake migration (Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r817|817]]</sup> ), especially in the case of the poorest households (Barbier and Hochard 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r818|818]]</sup> ; Koubi et al. 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r819|819]]</sup> ; Kubik and Maurel 2016 <sup>[[#fn:r820|820]]</sup> ; McKenzie and Yang 2015 <sup>[[#fn:r821|821]]</sup> ). Adding to the complexity, migration, especially to frontier areas, by increasing pressure on land and natural resources, might itself contribute to environmental degradation at the destination (Hugo 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r822|822]]</sup> ; IPBES 2018a <sup>[[#fn:r823|823]]</sup> ; McLeman 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r824|824]]</sup> ). The consequences of migration can also be salient in the case of migration to urban or peri-urban areas; indeed, environmentally induced migration can add to urbanisation (Section 3.6.2.2), often exacerbating problems related to poor infrastructure and unemployment.

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