Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-16 (section)

==== 16.2.3.9 Social Conflict ====

<div id="h3-16-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

There are few studies directly attributing changes in conflict risk to climate change in the modern era ( [[#van%20Weezel--2020|van Weezel, 2020]] ), preventing a confident assessment of the effect of long-term changes in the climate-related systems on armed conflict (see ‘Other societal impacts—Social conflict’, Table SM16.22). However, a sizeable literature links the prevalence of armed conflict within countries to within- and between-year variations in rainfall, temperature or drought exposure, often via reduced-form econometric analysis or statistical models that control for important non-climatic factors, such as agricultural dependence, level of economic development, state capacity and ethnopolitical marginalisation (see ‘Other societal impacts—Social conflict’, Table SM16.23). Overall, there is more consistent evidence that climate variability has influenced low-intensity organised violence than major civil wars ( [[#Detges--2017|Detges, 2017]] ; [[#Nordkvelle--2017|Nordkvelle et al., 2017]] ; [[#Linke--2018|Linke et al., 2018]] ). Likewise, there is more consistent evidence that climate variability has affected dynamics of conflict, such as continuation, severity and frequency of violent conflict events, than the likelihood of initial conflict outbreak ( [[#Yeeles--2015|Yeeles, 2015]] ; [[#Eastin--2016|Eastin, 2016]] ; [[#Von%20Uexkull--2016|Von Uexkull et al., 2016]] , [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.2.7|Section 7.2.7]] ). Moreover, research suggests with ''medium confidence'' ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) that weather effects on armed conflict have been most prominent in contexts marked by a large population, low socioeconomic development, high political marginalisation and high agricultural dependence ( [[#Theisen--2017|Theisen, 2017]] ; [[#Koubi--2019|Koubi, 2019]] ; [[#Buhaug--2020|Buhaug et al., 2020]] ; [[#Ide--2020|Ide et al., 2020]] ).

Some studies also seek to evaluate potential indirect links between climate and weather anomalies and prevalence of armed conflict via food price shocks or forced migration. While there is ''robust evidence'' that the likelihood of social unrest in the developing world generally increases in response to rapid growth in food prices ( [[#Bellemare--2015|Bellemare, 2015]] ; [[#Rudolfsen--2018|Rudolfsen, 2018]] ), the magnitude of the climate effect on unrest via food prices is less well established ( [[#Martin-Shields--2019|Martin-Shields and Stojetz, 2019]] ). Similarly, research shows with ''high confidence'' that climate variability and extremes have affected human mobility (see ‘Other societal impacts—Displacement and migration’, Table SM16.23), but there is ''low agreement'' and ''limited evidence'' that weather-induced migration has increased the likelihood of armed conflict ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.2.7|Section 7.2.7]] , [[#Brzoska--2016|Brzoska and]] [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Kelley--2017|Kelley et al., 2017]] ; [[#Selby--2017|Selby et al., 2017]] ; [[#Abel--2019|Abel, 2019]] ). Research on weather-related effects on interstate security generally concludes that periods of transboundary water scarcity are more likely to facilitate increased international cooperation than conflict ( [[#Bernauer--2020|Bernauer and Böhmelt, 2020]] ).

In general, the historical influence of climate on conflict is judged to be small when compared with dominant conflict drivers ( [[#Mach--2019|Mach et al., 2019]] ). Much of this research is limited to (parts of) Sub-Saharan Africa, which raises some concerns about selection bias and generalisability of results ( [[#Adams--2018|Adams et al., 2018]] ).

<div id="16.2.3.10" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="displacement-and-migration"></span>