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=== Box 5.5 | Dietary Shifts in UK Society Towards Lower-emission Foods === <div id="h2-16-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Meat eating is declining in the UK, alongside a shift from carbon-intensive red meat towards poultry. This is due to the interaction of behavioural, socio-cultural and organisational drivers ( [[#Vinnari--2014|Vinnari and Vinnari 2014]] ). Reduced meat consumption is primarily driven by issues of personal health and animal welfare, instead of climate or environment concerns ( [[#Latvala--2012|Latvala et al. 2012]] ; [[#Dibb--2014|Dibb and Fitzpatrick 2014]] ; [[#Hartmann--2017|Hartmann and Siegrist 2017]] ; [[#Graça--2019|Graça et al. 2019]] ). Social movements have promoted shifts to a vegan diet ( [[#Morris--2014|Morris et al. 2014]] ; [[#Laestadius--2016|Laestadius et al. 2016]] ) yet their impact on actual behaviour is the subject of debate ( [[#Taufik--2019|Taufik et al. 2019]] ; [[#Harguess--2020|Harguess et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sahakian--2020|Sahakian et al. 2020]] ). Companies have expanded new markets in non-meat products ( [[#MINTEL--2019|MINTEL 2019]] ). Both corporate food actors and new entrants offering more innovative ‘meat alternatives’ view consumer preferences as an economic opportunity, and are responding by increasing the availability of meat replacement products. No significant policy change has taken place in the UK to enable dietary shift ( [[#Wellesley--2015|Wellesley and Froggatt 2015]] ); however the Climate Change Committee has recommended dietary shift in the Sixth Carbon Budget ( [[#Climate%20Change%20Committee--2020|Climate Change Committee 2020]] ), involving reduced consumption of high-carbon meat and dairy products by 20% by 2030, with further reductions in later years in order to reach net zero GHG emissions by 2050. Agricultural policies serve to support meat production with large subsidies that lower production cost and effectively increase the meat intensity of diets at a population level ( [[#Simon--2003|Simon 2003]] ; [[#Godfray--2018|Godfray et al. 2018]] ). Deeper, population-wide reductions in meat consumption are hampered by these lock-in mechanisms which continue to stabilise the existing meat production-consumption system. The extent to which policymakers are willing to actively stimulate reduced meat consumption thus remains an open question ( [[#Godfray--2018|Godfray et al. 2018]] ). See more in [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-5 Chapter 5] Supplementary Material I, Section 5.SM.6.4. People’s general perceptions of climate risks, first covered in AR5, motivate behaviour change; more proximate and personal feelings of being at risk triggered by extreme weather and climate-linked natural disasters will increase concern and willingness to act ( [[#Bergquist--2019|Bergquist et al. 2019]] ), though the window of increased support is short ( [[#Sisco--2017|Sisco et al. 2017]] ). 67% of individuals in 26 countries see climate change as a major threat to their country, an increase from 53% in 2013, though 29% also consider it a minor or no threat ( [[#Fagan--2019|Fagan and Huang 2019]] ). Concern that the COVID-19 crisis may derail this momentum due to a finite pool of worry ( [[#Weber--2006|Weber 2006]] ) appears to be unwarranted: Americans’ positions on climate change in 2020 matched high levels of concern measured in 2019 ( [[#Leiserowitz--2020|Leiserowitz et al. 2020]] ). Younger, female, and more educated individuals perceive climate risks to be larger ( [[#Weber--2016|Weber 2016]] ; [[#Fagan--2019|Fagan and Huang 2019]] ). Moral values and political ideology influence climate risk perception and beliefs about the outcomes and effectiveness of climate action ( [[#Maibach--2011|Maibach et al. 2011]] ). Motivation for demand-side solutions can be increased by focusing on personal health or financial risks and benefits that clearly matter to people ( [[#Petrovic--2014|Petrovic et al. 2014]] ). Consistent with climate change as a normally distant, non-threatening, statistical issue ( [[#Gifford--2011|Gifford 2011]] ; [[#Fox-Glassman--2016|Fox-Glassman and]] [[#Weber--2016|Weber 2016]] ), personal experience with climate-linked flooding or other extreme weather events increases perceptions of risk and willingness to act ( [[#Weber--2013|Weber 2013]] ; [[#Atreya--2015|Atreya and Ferreira 2015]] ; [[#Sisco--2017|Sisco et al. 2017]] ) when plausible mediators and moderators are considered [[#Brügger--2021|Brügger et al. (2021)]] , confirmed in all 24 countries studied by [[#Broomell--2015|Broomell et al. (2015)]] . Discounting the future matters ( [[#Hershfield--2014|Hershfield et al. 2014]] ): across multiple countries, individuals more focused on future outcomes are more likely to engage in environmental actions ( [[#Milfont--2012|Milfont et al. 2012]] ). There is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that demographics, values, goals, personal and social norms differentially determine ASI behaviours, in the Netherlands and Spain ( [[#Abrahamse--2009|Abrahamse and Steg 2009]] ; [[#Niamir--2019|Niamir 2019]] ; [[#Niamir--2020b|Niamir et al. 2020b]] ), the OECD ( [[#Ameli--2015|Ameli and Brandt 2015]] ), and 11 European countries ( [[#Mills--2012|Mills and Schleich 2012]] ; [[#Roy--2012|Roy et al. 2012]] ). Education and income increase ‘Shift’ and ‘Improve’ behaviour, whereas personal norms help to increase the more difficult ‘Avoid’ behaviours ( [[#Mills--2012|Mills and Schleich 2012]] ). Socio-demographic variables (household size and income) predict energy use, but psychological variables (perceived behavioural control, perceived responsibility) predict ''changes'' in energy use; younger households are more likely to adopt ‘Improve’ decisions, whereas education increases ‘Avoid’ decisions ( [[#Ahmad--2015|Ahmad et al. 2015]] ). In India and developing countries, ‘Avoid’ decisions are made by individuals championing a cause, while ‘Improve’ and ‘Shift’ behaviour are increased by awareness programmes and promotional materials highlighting environmental and financial benefits ( [[#Chakravarty--2016|Chakravarty and Roy 2016]] ; [[#Roy--2018a|Roy et al. 2018a]] ). Cleaner cookstove adoption Box 5.6), a widely studied ‘Improve’ solution in developing countries ( [[#Nepal--2010|Nepal et al. 2010]] ; [[#Pant--2014|Pant et al. 2014]] ), goes up with income, education, and urban location. Female education and investments in reproductive health are evident measures to reduce world population growth ( [[#Abel--2016|Abel et al. 2016]] ). <div id="box-5.6" class="h2-container box-container"></div> <span id="box-5.6-socio-behavioural-aspects-of-deploying-cookstoves"></span>
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