Editing IPCC:AR6/SR15/Chapter-5 (section)

=== 5.5.3 Climate-Resilient Development Pathways ===

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This section assesses the literature on pathways as solution-oriented trajectories and decision-making processes for attaining transformative visions for a 1.5°C warmer world. It builds on climate-resilient development pathways (CRDPs) introduced in the AR5 (Section 5.1.2) (Olsson et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r303|303]]</sup> as well as growing literature (e.g., Eriksen et al., 2017; Johnson, 2017; Orindi et al., 2017; Kirby and O’Mahony, 2018; Solecki et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r304|304]]</sup> that uses CRDPs as a conceptual and aspirational idea for steering societies towards low-carbon, prosperous and ecologically safe futures. Such a notion of pathways foregrounds decision-making processes at local to national levels to situate transformation, resilience, equity and well-being in the complex reality of specific places, nations and communities (Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017; Fazey et al., 2018; Gajjar et al., 2018; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r305|305]]</sup> .

Pathways compatible with 1.5°C warming are not merely scenarios to envision possible futures but processes of deliberation and implementation that address societal values, local priorities and inevitable trade-offs. This includes attention to politics and power that perpetuate business-as-usual trajectories (O’Brien, 2016; Harris et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r306|306]]</sup> , the politics that shape sustainability and capabilities of everyday life (Agyeman et al., 2016; Schlosberg et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r307|307]]</sup> , and ingredients for community resilience and transformative change (Fazey et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r308|308]]</sup> . Chartering CRDPs encourages locally situated and problem-solving processes to negotiate and operationalize resilience ‘on the ground’ (Beilin and Wilkinson, 2015; Harris et al., 2017; Ziervogel et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r309|309]]</sup> . This entails contestation, inclusive governance and iterative engagement of diverse populations with varied needs, aspirations, agency and rights claims, including those most affected, to deliberate trade-offs in a multiplicity of possible pathways ( ''high confidence'' ) (see Figure 5.5) (Stirling, 2014; Vale, 2014; Walsh-Dilley and Wolford, 2015; Biermann et al., 2016; J.R.A. Butler et al., 2016; O’Brien, 2016, 2018; Harris et al., 2017; Jones and Tanner, 2017; Mapfumo et al., 2017; Rosenbloom, 2017; Gajjar et al., 2018; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Lyon, 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r310|310]]</sup> .

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==== 5.5.3.1 Transformations, equity and well-being ====

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Most literature related to CRDPs invokes the concept of transformation, underscoring the need for urgent and far-reaching changes in practices, institutions and social relations in society. Transformations towards a 1.5°C warmer world would need to address considerations for equity and well-being, including in trade-off decisions (see Figure 5.1).

To attain the anticipated ''transformations'' , all countries as well as non-state actors would need to strengthen their contributions, through bolder and more committed cooperation and equitable effort-sharing ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Rao, 2014; Frumhoff et al., 2015; Ekwurzel et al., 2017; Millar et al., 2017; Shue, 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r312|312]]</sup> . Sustaining decarbonization rates at a 1.5°C-compatible level would be unprecedented and not possible without rapid transformations to a net-zero-emissions global economy by mid-century or the later half of the century (see Chapters 2 and 4). Such efforts would entail overcoming technical, infrastructural, institutional and behavioural barriers across all sectors and levels of society (Pfeiffer et al., 2016; Seto et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r313|313]]</sup> and defeating path dependencies, including poverty traps (Boonstra et al., 2016; Enqvist et al., 2016; Lade et al., 2017; Haider et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r314|314]]</sup> . Transformation also entails ensuring that 1.5°C-compatible pathways are inclusive and desirable, build solidarity and alliances, and protect vulnerable groups, including against disruptions of transformation (Patterson et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r315|315]]</sup> .

There is growing emphasis on the role of ''equity, fairness'' and ''justice'' (see Glossary) regarding context-specific transformations and pathways to a 1.5°C warmer world ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Shue, 2014; Thorp, 2014; Dennig et al., 2015; Moellendorf, 2015; Klinsky et al., 2017b; Roser and Seidel, 2017; Sealey-Huggins, 2017; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r316|316]]</sup> . Consideration for what is equitable and fair suggests the need for stringent decarbonization and up-scaled adaptation that do not exacerbate social injustices, locally and at national levels (Okereke and Coventry, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r317|317]]</sup> , uphold human rights (Robinson and Shine, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r318|318]]</sup> , are socially desirable and acceptable (von Stechow et al., 2016; Rosenbloom, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r319|319]]</sup> , address values and beliefs (O’Brien, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r320|320]]</sup> , and overcome vested interests (Normann, 2015; Patterson et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r321|321]]</sup> . Attention is often drawn to huge disparities in the cost, benefits, opportunities and challenges involved in transformation within and between countries, and the fact that the suffering of already poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged populations may be worsened, if care to protect them is not taken (Holden et al., 2017; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r322|322]]</sup> .

''Well-being for all'' (Dearing et al., 2014; Raworth, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r323|323]]</sup> is at the core of an ecologically safe and socially just space for humanity, including health and housing, peace and justice, social equity, gender equality and political voices (Raworth, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r324|324]]</sup> . It is in alignment with transformative social development (UNRISD, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r325|325]]</sup> and the 2030 Agenda of ‘leaving no one behind’. The social conditions to enable well-being for all are to reduce entrenched inequalities within and between countries (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r326|326]]</sup> ; rethink prevailing values, ethics and behaviours (Holden et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r327|327]]</sup> ; allow people to live a life in dignity while avoiding actions that undermine capabilities (Klinsky and Golub, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r328|328]]</sup> ; transform economies (Popescu and Ciurlau, 2016; Tàbara et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r329|329]]</sup> ; overcome uneven consumption and production patterns (Dearing et al., 2014; Häyhä et al., 2016; Raworth, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r330|330]]</sup> and conceptualize development as well-being rather than mere economic growth ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Gupta and Pouw, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r331|331]]</sup> .

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==== 5.5.3.2 Development trajectories, sharing of efforts and cooperation ====

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The potential for pursuing sustainable and climate-resilient development pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world differs between and within nations, due to differential development achievements and trajectories, and opportunities and challenges ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Figure 5.1). There are clear differences between high-income countries where social achievements are high, albeit often with negative effects on the environment, and most developing nations where vulnerabilities to climate change are high and social support and life satisfaction are low, especially in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Sachs et al., 2017; O’Neill et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r332|332]]</sup> . Differential starting points for CRDPs between and within countries, including path dependencies (Figure 5.5), call for sensitivity to context (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r333|333]]</sup> . For the developing world, limiting warming to 1.5°C also means potentially severely curtailed development prospects (Okereke and Coventry, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r334|334]]</sup> and risks to human rights from both climate action and inaction to achieve this goal (Robinson and Shine, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r335|335]]</sup> (Section 5.2). Within-country development differences remain, despite efforts to ensure inclusive societies (Gupta and Arts, 2017; Gupta and Pouw, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r336|336]]</sup> . Cole et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r337|337]]</sup> , for instance, show how differences between provinces in South Africa constitute barriers to sustainable development trajectories and for operationalising nation-level SDGs, across various dimensions of social deprivation and environmental stress, reflecting historic disadvantages.

Moreover, various equity and effort- or burden-sharing approaches to climate stabilization in the literature describe how to sketch national potentials for a 1.5°C warmer world (e.g., Anand, 2004; CSO Equity Review, 2015; Meinshausen et al., 2015; Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Bexell and Jönsson, 2017; Otto et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r338|338]]</sup> . Many approaches build on the AR5 ‘responsibility –capacity– need’ assessment (Clarke et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r339|339]]</sup> , complement other proposed national-level metrics for capabilities, equity and fairness (Heyward and Roser, 2016; Klinsky et al., 2017a) <sup>[[#fn:r340|340]]</sup> , or fall under the wider umbrella of fair share debates on responsibility, capability and the right to development in climate policy (Fuglestvedt and Kallbekken, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r341|341]]</sup> . Importantly, different principles and methodologies generate different calculated contributions, responsibilities and capacities (Skeie et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r342|342]]</sup> .

The notion of nation-level fair shares is now also discussed in the context of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (see Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4) (CSO Equity Review, 2015; Mace, 2016; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r343|343]]</sup> . A study by Pan et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r344|344]]</sup> concluded that all countries would need to contribute to ambitious emissions reductions and that current pledges for 2030 by seven out of eight high-emitting countries would be insufficient to meet 1.5°C. Emerging literature on justice-centred pathways to 1.5°C points towards ambitious emissions reductions domestically and committed cooperation internationally whereby wealthier countries support poorer ones, technologically, financially and otherwise to enhance capacities (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Holz et al., 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018; Shue, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r345|345]]</sup> . These findings suggest that equitable and 1.5°C-compatible pathways would require fast action across all countries at all levels of development rather than late accession of developing countries (as assumed under SSP3, see Chapter 2), with external support for prompt mitigation and resilience-building efforts in the latter ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ).

Scientific advances since the AR5 now also make it possible to determine contributions to climate change for non-state actors (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1) and their potential to contribute to CRDPs ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ). These non-state actors includes cities (Bulkeley et al., 2013, 2014; Byrne et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r346|346]]</sup> , businesses (Heede, 2014; Frumhoff et al., 2015; Shue, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r347|347]]</sup> , transnational initiatives (Castro, 2016; Andonova et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r348|348]]</sup> and industries. Recent work demonstrates the contributions of 90 industrial carbon producers to global temperature and sea level rise, and their responsibilities to contribute to investments in and support for mitigation and adaptation (Heede, 2014; Ekwurzel et al., 2017; Shue, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r349|349]]</sup> (Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2).

At the level of groups and individuals, equity in pursuing climate resilience for a 1.5°C warmer world means addressing disadvantage, inequities and empowerment that shape transformative processes and pathways (Fazey et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r350|350]]</sup> , and deliberate efforts to strengthen the capabilities, capacities and well-being of poor, marginalized and vulnerable people (Byrnes, 2014; Tokar, 2014; Harris et al., 2017; Klinsky et al., 2017a; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r351|351]]</sup> . Community-driven CRDPs can flag potential negative impacts of national trajectories on disadvantaged groups, such as low-income families and communities of colour (Rao, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r352|352]]</sup> . They emphasize social equity, participatory governance, social inclusion and human rights, as well as innovation, experimentation and social learning (see Glossary) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Sections 5.5.3.3 and 5.6).

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==== 5.5.3.3 Country and community strategies and experiences ====

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There are many possible pathways towards climate-resilient futures (O’Brien, 2018; Tàbara et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r353|353]]</sup> . Literature depicting different sustainable development trajectories in line with CRDPs is growing, with some of it being specific to 1.5°C global warming. Most experiences to date are at local and sub-national levels (Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter), while state-level efforts align largely with green economy trajectories or planning for climate resilience (Box 5.3). Due to the fact that these strategies are context-specific, the literature is scarce on comparisons, efforts to scale up and systematic monitoring.

States can play an enabling or hindering role in a transition to a 1.5°C warmer world (Patterson et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r354|354]]</sup> . The literature on strategies to reconcile low-carbon trajectories with sustainable development and ecological sustainability through green growth, inclusive growth, de-growth, post-growth and development as well-being shows ''low agreement'' (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Efforts that align best with CRDPs are described as ‘transformational’ and ‘strong’ (Ferguson, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r355|355]]</sup> . Some view ‘thick green’ perspectives as enabling equity, democracy and agency building (Lorek and Spangenberg, 2014; Stirling, 2014; Ehresman and Okereke, 2015; Buch-Hansen, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r356|356]]</sup> , others show how green economy and sustainable development pathways can align (Brown et al., 2014; Georgeson et al., 2017b) <sup>[[#fn:r357|357]]</sup> , and how a green economy can help link the SDGs with NDCs, for instance in Mongolia, Kenya and Sweden (Shine, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r358|358]]</sup> . Others still critique the continuous reliance on market mechanisms (Wanner, 2014; Brockington and Ponte, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r359|359]]</sup> and disregard for equity and distributional and procedural justice (Stirling, 2014; Bell, 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r360|360]]</sup> .

Country-level pathways and achievements vary significantly ( ''robust evidence, medium agreement'' ). For instance, the Scandinavian countries rank at the top of the Global Green Economy Index (Dual Citizen LLC, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r361|361]]</sup> , although they also tend to show high spill-over effects (Holz et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r362|362]]</sup> and transgress their biophysical boundaries (O’Neill et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r363|363]]</sup> . State-driven efforts in non-member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development include Ethiopia’s ‘Climate-resilient Green Economy Strategy’, Mozambique’s ‘Green Economy Action Plan’ and Costa Rica’s ecosystem- and conservation-driven green transition paths. China and India have adopted technology and renewables pathways (Brown et al., 2014; Death, 2014, 2015, 2016; Khanna et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Kim and Thurbon, 2015; Wang et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2015) <sup>[[#fn:r364|364]]</sup> . Brazil promotes low per capita GHG emissions, clean energy sources, green jobs, renewables and sustainable transportation, while slowing rates of deforestation (see Chapter 4, Box 4.7) (Brown et al., 2014; La Rovere, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r365|365]]</sup> . Yet concerns remain regarding persistent inequalities, ecosystem monetization, lack of participation in green-style projects (Brown et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r366|366]]</sup> and labour conditions and risk of displacement in the sugarcane ethanol sector (McKay et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r367|367]]</sup> . Experiences with low-carbon development pathways in LDCs highlight the crucial role of identifying synergies across scale, removing institutional barriers and ensuring equity and fairness in distributing benefits as part of the right to development (Rai and Fisher, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r368|368]]</sup> .

In small islands states, for many of which climate change hazards and impacts at 1.5°C pose significant risks to sustainable development (see Chapter 3 Box 3.5, Chapter 4 Box 4.3, Box 5.3), examples of CRDPs have emerged since the AR5. This includes the SAMOA Pathway: SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (see Chapter 4, Box 4.3) (UNGA, 2014; Government of Kiribati, 2016; Steering Committee on Partnerships for SIDS and UN DESA, 2016; Lefale et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r369|369]]</sup> and the Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific, a leading example of integrated regional climate change adaptation planning for mitigation and sustainable development, disaster risk management and low-carbon economies (SPC, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r370|370]]</sup> . Small islands of the Pacific vary significantly in their capacity and resources to support effective integrated planning (McCubbin et al., 2015; Barnett and Walters, 2016; Cvitanovic et al., 2016; Hemstock et al., 2017; Robinson and Dornan, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r371|371]]</sup> . Vanuatu (Box 5.3) has developed a significant coordinated national adaptation plan to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, respond to the Paris Agreement and reduce the risk of disasters in line with the Sendai targets (UNDP, 2016; Republic of Vanuatu, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r372|372]]</sup> .

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