Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-15 (section)

== 15.5 Assessment of Adaptation Options and Their Implementation ==

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Since AR5, small islands have experimented with new adaptation options, which has increased the lessons learnt from on-the-ground practices in these settings. Figure 15.7 shows some of the adaptation options that are being experimented with in small islands. This section covers most common adaptation actions and approaches across small islands and assesses the many constraints, enablers and limits to adaptation. Adaptation also plays a key role in climate resilient development and the insights emerging from small islands on this topic are discussed after the adaptation section.

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[[File:29e42466b92c088b3da62148ee9e2881 IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_15_007.png]]

'''Figure 15.7 |''' '''Adaptation measures implemented to reduce coastal risks in small islands.''' ''Panel 1'' provides examples of implementation of different types of measures aimed at reducing coastal erosion and flooding. The measures include no response (no intervention, widespread in small islands), hard protection through the construction of engineering-based structures, accommodation through dwelling and infrastructure raising, planned retreat, advance (i.e., especially island raising) and ecosystem-based measures, in three small island regions, the Indian and Pacific oceans and Caribbean. It highlights the prevalence of no response, hard protection and the increasing use of ecosystem-based measures. Based on the example of two beach sites in Mauritius (Mon Choisy in the north and Saint-Félix in the south), ''panel 2'' shows that the measures used at a given coastal site evolve over time (e.g., from no response to hard protection, and then planned retreat and ecosystem-based measures) and that recent DRR (Saint-Félix) and adaptation (Mon Choisy) projects often combine several types of measures, including retreat and ecosystem-based measures ( [[#Duvat--2020a|Duvat et al., 2020a]] ). Together, panels 1 and 2 emphasise the diversity and increasing complexity of the measures implemented in small islands.

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=== 15.5.1 Hard Protection ===

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Seawalls have been a popular coastal protection measure on islands (Figure 15.7). An analysis of National Communications shows that 28% of coastal protection actions are seawalls, followed by breakwater structures and coastal protection units ( [[#Robinson--2017a|Robinson, 2017a]] ). Coastal protection infrastructure has been heavily invested, for example, in the Caribbean region ( [[#Mycoo--2014b|Mycoo, 2014b]] ) and Cuba ( [[#Mycoo--2014a|Mycoo, 2014a]] ). A similar situation applies in many Indian Ocean islands, where coastal protection strategies are manifested by hard shoreline structures, many of which are proving challenging to maintain ( [[#Naylor--2015|Naylor, 2015]] ; [[#Betzold--2017|Betzold and Mohamed, 2017]] ; Magnan and [[#Duvat--2018|Duvat, 2018]] ). In the Pacific the situation is different given that many islands have been occupied for millennia by indigenous communities with extant knowledge for coping with adversity ( [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson, 2017]] ). The latter generally favours ‘soft’ shoreline structures for coastal protection although the building of seawalls has been rapid, especially in urban islands ( [[#Umeyama--2012|Umeyama, 2012]] ; [[#Duvat--2013|Duvat, 2013]] ; [[#Magnan--2018|Magnan et al., 2018]] ; [[#Morris--2018|Morris et al., 2018]] ), and also in some rural islands (e.g., Tubuai, French Polynesia ( [[#Salmon--2019|Salmon et al., 2019]] )).

Many rural communities have uncritically emulated structures in urban contexts built and maintained with external finances. As a result, in many Pacific SIDS, seawalls have collapsed without additional funding available for repairs ( [[#Nunn--2018|Nunn and Kumar, 2018]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2020|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020]] ; [[#Nunn--2021|Nunn et al., 2021]] ). Similar cases have been recorded along the coast of Puerto Rico ( [[#Jackson--2012|Jackson et al., 2012]] ) while on Indian Ocean islands (e.g., Seychelles), the shorelines are littered with broken seawalls and groynes ( [[#Duvat--2009|Duvat, 2009]] ). In Samoa, seawalls close to Apia need constant investments to remain viable.

On small islands, another widespread issue with seawalls and other hard shoreline structures is that they invariably shift problems of shoreline erosion and lowland inundation elsewhere ( [[#Donner--2014|Donner and Webber, 2014]] ). Even surrounding entire islands with such structures, as has happened on Male’ (Maldives), is not a long-term solution because of incidences of localised seawall collapse that can spread quickly if not addressed immediately ( [[#Naylor--2015|Naylor, 2015]] ). Hard structures for coastal protection will become increasingly ineffective in the future, demonstrating the need for adaptation along most island coasts to become more transformative than has been the case over the past few decades. In the Bahamas, it has been suggested that coastal protection structures and strategies are implemented through ‘a rather piecemeal approach of single projects and small patches, partially resulting in maladaptation by further increasing processes of erosion’ ( [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] , p. 95). In the village of Lalomalava, Samoa, national adaptation funding was spent on erecting a seawall to protect the village, but the wall was not long enough to protect the whole village, leading some families and properties to face increasing impacts from large waves ( [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban, 2018]] ).

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=== 15.5.2 Accommodation and Advance as Strategies ===

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In most small island contexts, the costs of adaptation through accommodation are prohibitive so that it has in most cases not been contemplated as a widespread option. However, accommodation measures such as the raising of dwellings and key infrastructure like coastal roads above ground level have been implemented to reduce the impacts of flooding in some islands (Figure 15.7). In the most populous islands of the Tuamotu atolls, French Polynesia, where between 48% and 98% of dwellings have already experienced flooding since the 1980s, elevated houses with floors built 1.5 m above ground level are subsidised by the government as part of risk prevention plans ( [[#Magnan--2018|Magnan et al., 2018]] ). Despite this incentive, the opposition of the local authorities and population to these plans (which also include constraining setback guidelines) considerably limited implementation, hence elevated houses only represent 7% of the total housing stock. In the Philippines (Tubigon) and Indonesia (Jakarta area), residents have elevated their houses by building stilted houses or raising the floor using coral stones to face increased flooding ( [[#Jamero--2017|Jamero et al., 2017]] ; [[#Esteban--2020|Esteban et al., 2020]] ). Also, in Puerto Rico houses have been raised to address flooding ( [[#Lopez-Marrero--2010|Lopez-Marrero, 2010]] ).

In some small island settings, land reclamation (i.e., land gain through infilling) has been implemented for decades to allow for infrastructure construction and to address land shortages arising from high population growth. For example, land reclamation in Port of Spain, the capital city of Trinidad, has long been used as a solution space to meet land for housing, industrial development and infrastructure provision ( [[#Mycoo--2018b|Mycoo, 2018b]] ). Likewise, one third of the land area of Male’, the capital island of the Maldives, results from land reclamation ( [[#Naylor--2015|Naylor, 2015]] ). Land reclamation is also common in Pacific atoll countries and territories, where it occurs both in urban islands facing high population pressure, such as South Tarawa, Kiribati ( [[#Biribo--2013|Biribo and Woodroffe, 2013]] ), Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu ( [[#Onaka--2017|Onaka et al., 2017]] ), and Rangiroa Atoll, French Polynesia ( [[#Duvat--2019b|Duvat et al., 2019b]] ), and in rural islands, for example, Takapoto and Mataiva atolls, French Polynesia ( [[#Duvat--2017b|Duvat et al., 2017b]] ). In some cases, land reclamation has paved the way for land raising, which is increasingly considered to adapt to SLR in small island contexts (Figure 15.7). For example, since the 1990s, the capital area of the Maldives has been expanded through the construction of a large new island, Hulhumalé, which is still under construction and is built 60 cm higher than Male’ to take into account SLR ( [[#Hinkel--2018|Hinkel et al., 2018]] ; [[#Brown--2020|Brown et al., 2020]] ). More generally, in the Maldives, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami has boosted island raising as part of the ‘safe island development programme’ ( [[#Shaig--2008|Shaig, 2008]] ). Recent studies suggest that land and island raising have some potential in small islands, especially in urban high-value areas where this can generate substantial revenues through the sale or lease of new land, and therefore leverage public adaptation finance ( [[#Bisaro--2019|Bisaro et al., 2019]] ).

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=== 15.5.3 Migration ===

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Migration, including planned resettlement, is increasingly occurring in small islands to intentionally respond to or prepare for climate change impacts (Figure 15.7; [[#Magnan--2019|Magnan et al., 2019]] ). There is currently ''limited evidence'' and ''low agreement'' in the literature as to whether migration of various types is an effective strategy to adapt to localised impacts of climate change, as outcomes are highly context specific ( [[#Donner--2015|Donner, 2015]] ; [[#McNamara--2016|McNamara et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hermann--2017|Hermann and Kempf, 2017]] ; [[#McMichael--2019|McMichael et al., 2019]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019a|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Tabe--2019|Tabe, 2019]] ; [[#Bertana--2020|Bertana, 2020]] ; [[#Weir--2020|Weir, 2020]] ).

In situ adaptation options are frequently the preference of communities over resettlement ( [[#Jamero--2017|Jamero et al., 2017]] ) and in many documented cases, relocation—both planned and autonomous—is an adaptation option of last resort due to high economic and sociocultural cost (McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; [[#Jamero--2017|Jamero et al., 2017]] ; [[#Crichton--2020|Crichton et al., 2020]] ). In small islands, there is ''medium evidence'' and ''high agreement'' that the degree of migrant agency and choice in decisions about whether to move, where, when and how is an important determinant of success and therefore ‘adaptiveness’ (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; [[#Hino--2017|Hino et al., 2017]] ; [[#McMichael--2019|McMichael et al., 2019]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019a|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a]] ; [[#Bertana--2020|Bertana, 2020]] ). Two case studies of community relocation in Fiji (Denimanu and Vunidogoloa villages) recommend that participatory inclusion of all social groups in the relocation planning process, including in planning for livelihood sustainability in new locations, should be ensured in future planned community relocation to foster positive adaptive outcomes ( [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019a|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a]] ).

There are few examples of highly ‘successful’ and therefore adaptive international resettlement or relocation in response to environmental pressures in history. For example, the experiences of Gilbertese resettled in the Solomon Islands highlight that tensions with host communities over land and resource rights and limited knowledge of new environments (such as when communities previously reliant on marine resources are resettled in high island locations) can create new vulnerabilities ( [[#Donner--2015|Donner, 2015]] ; [[#Weber--2016a|Weber, 2016a]] ; [[#Tabe--2019|Tabe, 2019]] ). Even where gradual international relocation is supported and planned through policy as in the case of Kiribati’s ‘migration with dignity’ strategy, strong cultural connection to land and uncertainty about life in receiving communities in Australia and New Zealand means that many remain opposed to indefinite or permanent migration ( [[#Allgood--2017|Allgood and McNamara, 2017]] ; [[#Hermann--2017|Hermann and Kempf, 2017]] ). The same challenges could apply where domestic migration occurs between significantly different cultural, social and physical environments. However, planned migration for employment or education can reduce exposure in sending locations and spread risk through expanding economic opportunities and providing remittances, thus having inadvertent adaptation outcomes ( [[#Campbell--2014a|Campbell, 2014a]] ). Policies which support migration for employment by the most vulnerable—those that may wish to migrate but lack the resources to do so—may offer an adaptive strategy to environmental pressure, particularly where these incorporate adequate preparedness for life in host communities ( [[#Luetz--2017|Luetz, 2017]] ; [[#Curtain--2019|Curtain and Dornan, 2019]] ; [[#Drinkall--2019|Drinkall et al., 2019]] ). Research from the Maldives suggests that women and men do not possess equal capacities to use mobility as a strategy to adapt to climate change, with women less able to employ migration as an adaptation strategy due to gender roles, social expectations, economic structures, political laws and religious doctrines, and gender norms and cultural practices ( [[#Lama--2018|Lama, 2018]] ).

Forced relocation, involuntary displacement and low-agency migration (e.g., due to low migrant financial resources, or limited participation in migration planning) are commonly associated with unsuccessful outcomes and can therefore be considered an impact of climate change rather than an adaptation strategy ( [[#Weber--2016a|Weber, 2016a]] ; [[#Thomas--2017|Thomas and Benjamin, 2017]] ; [[#Tabe--2019|Tabe, 2019]] ). Resettlement of households, communities and larger island populations is increasingly discussed in the context of losses and damages when in situ adaptation limits are thought to be reached. Limited data and research relating to adaptation limits, transformational adaptation, tolerable and intolerable risk levels in small islands, and limited ability to directly attribute climate change to migration decisions (in the context of both slow-onset changes and extreme events) mean that policy applications are currently limited ( [[#Thomas--2018b|Thomas and Benjamin, 2018b]] ; [[#Handmer--2019|Handmer and Nalau, 2019]] ; [[#Nand--2020|Nand and Bardsley, 2020]] ).

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=== 15.5.4 Ecosystem-Based Measures ===

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Small islands have focused increasingly on EbA approaches and other nature-based solutions that bring benefits both for the ecosystems and communities (Figure 15.7; [[#Giffin--2020|Giffin et al., 2020]] ). There is ''robust evidence'' on implementation of EbA approaches across small islands, yet ''medium agreement'' on the exact benefits of these activities ( [[#Mercer--2012|Mercer et al., 2012]] ; [[#Doswald--2014|Doswald et al., 2014]] ; [[#Nalau--2018a|Nalau et al., 2018a]] ) given the difficulties in quantifying benefits and the absence of monitoring and evaluation frameworks ( [[#Doswald--2014|Doswald et al., 2014]] ). Traditionally, EbA activities, especially at national and regional scales, have predominantly focused on restoring or conserving coastal and marine ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, mangrove forests and seagrass meadows), with less emphasis on the services provided by natural inland forests ( [[#Mercer--2012|Mercer et al., 2012]] ). Incorporation of forests is, however, increasing, in most cases as components of ridge to reef (Figure 15.4) (or Disaster Risk Reduction) projects ( ''limited'' to ''medium evidence'' ), and is geared towards integrated watershed management to establish downstream water security, erosion control and ultimately to protect the health of coral reef ecosystems ( [[#Förster--2019|Förster et al., 2019]] ).

Additionally, some islands are constructing climate-smart development plans such as improved management of existing and newly established protected areas, restoration of riparian zones, urban forests/trees, sub-urban and peri-urban home gardens, and improved agroforestry practices towards increasing resilience to changing climate conditions, wildfires as well as decreasing food insecurity (e.g., [[#Pedersen--2016|Pedersen et al., 2016]] ; [[#McLeod--2019|McLeod et al., 2019]] ). Paired terrestrial and marine protected areas (MPAs) have shown that forest conservation and rehabilitation yield better outcomes for coral health as forests stabilise soils and prevent erosion and sequester groundwater pollutants ( ''limited'' to ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Carlson--2019|Carlson et al., 2019]] ). The success of protected areas is, however, undermined by weak governance due in part to limited financial resources which undermine management and the enforcement of regulations governing activity within them ( [[#Schleicher--2019|Schleicher et al., 2019]] ).

Since the 1990s, artificial reefs have been increasingly used in small islands to support reef restoration and reduce beach erosion, especially in the Caribbean region (e.g., Dominican Republic, Antigua, Grand Cayman, Grenada) and Indian Ocean (Maldives, Mauritius) ( [[#Fabian--2013|Fabian et al., 2013]] ; [[#Reguero--2018|Reguero et al., 2018]] ). They have been more or less successful in reducing the destructive impacts of extreme events, depending on their technical characteristics and the local context. For example, while it resisted the waves generated by hurricanes Georges and Mitch in 1998, the artificial reef (Reef Ball breakwater type) implemented at Gran Dominicus Resort, Dominican Republic, did not prevent significant beach erosion. By contrast, the coral reef restoration project implemented to ‘build a beach’ on the resort island of Ihuru, North Malé Atoll, Maldives, was successful as it enabled beach expansion and prevented the erosive impacts of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami on the beach ( [[#Fabian--2013|Fabian et al., 2013]] ).

Over the past decades, beach nourishment has been implemented in small islands either to reduce beach erosion (e.g., in tourist areas) or to protect critical human assets (e.g., roads) that are highly exposed to storm waves. It has been increasingly used to maintain beaches in the islands of the Maldives ( [[#Shaig--2011|Shaig, 2011]] ) and in Barbados ( [[#Mycoo--2014b|Mycoo, 2014b]] ). However, islands have limited sand stocks, and sediment extraction can aggravate risks and/or accelerate ecosystem degradation if implemented without the necessary precautions.

In designing and implementing EbA, IKLK have high relevance especially amongst Pacific small islands as many communities are remote and still rely on ecosystems for their livelihoods ( [[#Nalau--2018b|Nalau et al., 2018b]] ; [[#Narayan--2020|Narayan et al., 2020]] ). In Fiji, IKLK have informed EbA projects by identifying native species suitable for strengthening the coastal environment to reduce coastal erosion and flooding in the villages ( [[#Nalau--2018b|Nalau et al., 2018b]] ). Whole-of-island approaches, like Lomani Gau in the Gau Island in Fiji, try to foster integrated management practices in small islands that are based on shared governance of resources and on understanding the interlinkages between sectors and ecosystems ( [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ). In the Caribbean, EbA approaches are somewhat absent in national and regional programmes and plans, yet at the local scale EbA strategies are used increasingly with implementation mostly led by NGOs ( [[#Mercer--2012|Mercer et al., 2012]] ).

EbA approaches have many benefits but also face several challenges and limits. Biophysical limits can make some EbA and nature-based solutions ineffective: coral reefs are ''unlikely'' to withstand increased temperatures, reducing the effectiveness of coral reef-based EbA options under higher temperature scenarios ( [[#Barkdull--2018|Barkdull and Harris, 2018]] ; [[#Cornwall--2021|Cornwall et al., 2021]] ). Likewise, many other coastal and marine ecosystems, such as mangroves, face severe limitations with increasing sea levels and other climate impacts ( [[#Morris--2018|Morris et al., 2018]] ; [[#Thomas--2021|Thomas et al., 2021]] ).

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=== 15.5.5 Community-Based Adaptation ===

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Community-based adaptation (CBA) is best described as a ‘community-led process based on meaningful engagement and proactive involvement of local individuals and organisations’ ( [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ; p. 380). Enabling CBA projects to succeed relies on gaining a good understanding of the sociopolitical context within which the communities operate, including such key issues as land tenure arrangements and ownerships, gender and decision-making processes that operate on the ground ( [[#Nunn--2013|Nunn, 2013]] ; [[#Buggy--2016|Buggy and McNamara, 2016]] ; [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban, 2018]] ; [[#Delevaux--2018|Delevaux et al., 2018]] ; [[#Nalau--2018b|Nalau et al., 2018b]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ; [[#McNamara--2020|McNamara et al., 2020]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2020|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020]] ).This also includes the broader and often more urgent development issues that impact on communities’ well-being ( [[#Piggott-McKellar--2020|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020]] ). Community-based projects demonstrate in the Pacific that communities’ vulnerabilities, priorities and needs might be a better and more effective entry point for climate adaptation than framing projects solely around climate change ( [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ; [[#Weir--2020|Weir, 2020]] ).This is supported by a recent review of 32 CBA initiatives in the Pacific where initiatives that were locally funded and implemented were more successful than those with external international funding ( [[#McNamara--2020|McNamara et al., 2020]] ). Initiatives that integrated EbA and climate awareness raising also performed better ( [[#McNamara--2020|McNamara et al., 2020]] ).

While CBA approaches to adaptation projects can increase community ownership and commitment to project implementation, these can also face challenges. In Pele Island, Vanuatu, implementation of CBA projects has experienced significant failures due to elite capture of project management, internal power dynamics within communities, and different priorities of communities living across the island that were supposed to be all responsible for implementing whole-of-island projects ( [[#Buggy--2016|Buggy and McNamara, 2016]] ). Similarly, in Samoa, consultations with community leaders led to the misplacement of a revetment wall that increased flooding in the area against engineering advice (McGinn, 2020). Also, community scale might not always be the best fit if the best scale to leverage adaptation is across catchment or whole-of-island scale ( [[#Buggy--2016|Buggy and McNamara, 2016]] ; [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ).

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=== 15.5.6 Livelihood Responses ===

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Communities across small islands are adapting to the impacts of climate change across a range of livelihood activities. Coastal fishers have adapted by employing several activities ranging from diversification of livelihoods to changing fishing grounds and considering weather insurance ( [[#Blair--2018|Blair and Momtaz, 2018]] ; [[#Lemahieu--2018|Lemahieu et al., 2018]] ; [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and McLean, 2020]] ; [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ). In Antigua and Vanuatu, fishers have undertaken adaptation in response to increases in air and ocean temperature, increases in wind and changes in rainfall. In Antigua, adaptation strategies amongst coastal fishers have included investments in improved technologies and equipment, changing fishing grounds, and seeking better training and education ( [[#Blair--2018|Blair and Momtaz, 2018]] ). In Efate (Vanuatu) the majority (87%) of the fishermen used livelihood diversification as an adaptation strategy whereas 53% also searched for new fishing areas as a result of the changing conditions ( [[#Blair--2018|Blair and Momtaz, 2018]] ). In southwest Madagascar, due to deteriorated reef conditions, coastal fishermen now go further offshore to catch fish or have adapted their fishing techniques, while others closer to the tourism markets have opted for livelihood diversification ( [[#Lemahieu--2018|Lemahieu et al., 2018]] ). Coastal fishers in the Dominican Republic have also diversified their livelihoods and use local knowledge in changing fishing practices and locations depending on environmental conditions ( [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and McLean, 2020]] ). In the future, increased inland rainfall could, for example, provide new areas for inland aquaculture in the Solomon Islands as an adaptation strategy and also reduce pressure from coastal fishing ( [[#Dey--2016|Dey et al., 2016]] ).

In the agricultural sector in Jamaica, adaptation strategies include varying expenditure on inputs (e.g., fertilisers, chemicals, labour), diversifying cropping patterns, expanding or prioritising other cash crops (e.g., fruits and vegetables), engaging in small-scale livestock husbandry ( [[#Guido--2018|Guido et al., 2018]] ), and investing in irrigation technologies due to increased drought and infrequent rainfall ( [[#Popke--2016|Popke et al., 2016]] ). In many higher-elevation islands within the Pacific, including Vanuatu and Fiji, communities continue to use to varying degrees traditional adaptive strategies designed to reduce their vulnerability to tropical cyclones. These include planting a diversity of different crops within household and communal gardens, locating gardens in different areas within their customary lands to ensure that not all crops are destroyed by an extreme event, and the storage and preservation of certain foodstuffs (so-called famine foods) ( [[#Campbell--2014b|Campbell, 2014b]] ; [[#McMillen--2014|McMillen et al., 2014]] ; [[#Le%20Dé--2018|Le Dé et al., 2018]] ; [[#Moncada--2019|Moncada and Bambrick, 2019]] ).

Given changes in climatic conditions, in Puerto Rico women in the coffee industry are now forming their own ‘micro-clusters’ of complementary activities, such as rebuilding of public spaces, running environmental education programmes for children, and opening new commercial enterprises (e.g., coffee shops, and food products) that do not rely on traditional coffee supply chains or government assistance ( [[#Borges-Méndez--2019|Borges-Méndez and Caron, 2019]] ). Such alternative livelihood strategies parallel those undertaken by Pacific women working on various local-level climate change adaptation and environmental projects throughout small island nations of the Pacific. Women report testing and using adaptive strategies informed by IKLK, but which are being modified to suit the changing environmental conditions they are encountering and those projected in the future. This includes harvesting rainwater during droughts, planting native plants along coastlines to prevent erosion and flooding, developing plant nurseries, experimenting with growing salt-tolerant (taro) crops, and relocating crop cultivation inland ( [[#McLeod--2018|McLeod et al., 2018]] ).

The tourism sector is increasingly a major source of cash-based livelihoods across small islands. Despite the high vulnerability and sensitivity of island tourism to climate change at a national scale ( [[#Scott--2019|Scott et al., 2019]] ), there is evidence from the South Pacific that local tourism operators’ adaptive capacity is high due to sociocultural factors. In Samoa, adaptive capacity consists of accommodation providers’ social networks, resources, past experiences and understanding of environmental conditions, and remittances as a form of informal insurance ( [[#Parsons--2017|Parsons et al., 2017]] ). The adaptive capacity of Tongan tour operators is strengthened by high awareness of climate change, strong social networks and remittances as well as perceived high resilience against climate change ( [[#van%20der%20Veeken--2016|van der Veeken et al., 2016]] ).

Evidence from Vanuatu shows that climate risk to tourism destinations is influenced by multiple, interconnected economic, sociocultural, political and environmental factors suggesting that holistic approaches are needed to reduce risk and avoid negative knock-on effects ( [[#Loehr--2019|Loehr, 2019]] ). Tourism can strengthen mechanisms that reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity of the wider destination, such as providing adaptation finance, investing in education and capacity building, and working with nature ( [[#Loehr--2019|Loehr, 2019]] ). Examples include numerous EBA initiatives in the Caribbean including marine-protected areas in St. Lucia and Jamaica ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ). In Vanuatu, tourism businesses are engaged in establishing marine-protected areas to address multiple risks from climate change, population growth and development ( [[#Loehr--2020|Loehr et al., 2020]] ). In the Seychelles, coral restoration programmes and mangrove reforestation are promoted through public–private partnerships, generating new opportunities for wetland-tourism livelihoods ( [[#Khan--2015|Khan and Amelie, 2015]] ).

The willingness of tourism businesses to finance adaptation measures varies. Islands have developed building codes which consider impacts from SLR but these are often not enforced ( [[#Hess--2017|Hess and Kelman, 2017]] ). In cases where tourist resorts have been part of climate adaptation projects, such as funding for hard coastal protection infrastructure, the resort owners find that these diminish the aesthetics of the beach destination ( [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban, 2018]] ). Adaptation taxes and levies imposed on tourism can provide funding ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ) as The Environmental Protection and Tourism Improvement Fund Act, 2017 of British Virgin Islands shows (Smith, 2017). A lack of interaction between tourism and climate change decision makers is a commonly identified issue ( [[#Becken--2019|Becken, 2019]] ; [[#Mahadew--2019|Mahadew and Appadoo, 2019]] ; [[#Scott--2019|Scott et al., 2019]] ). A number of adaptation measures are recommended in the literature such as increasing climate change research, education and institutional capacities; product and market diversification away from coastal tourism to include terrestrial-based experiences and heritage tourism; and mainstreaming adaptation in tourism policies and vice versa (e.g., to include appropriate planning guidelines for tourism development, coastal setbacks and environmental impact assessments ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ; [[#Becken--2020|Becken et al., 2020]] ) [[#Thomas--2020|Thomas et al., 2020]] ; [[#van%20der%20Veeken--2016|van der Veeken et al., 2016]] ).

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=== 15.5.7 Disaster Risk Management, Early Warning Systems and Climate Services ===

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Disaster risk management investments in small islands are commonly framed as reducing climate change-driven risk and contributing to sustainable development ( [[#Johnston--2014|Johnston, 2014]] ; [[#Mercer--2014a|Mercer et al., 2014a]] ; [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ). Examples include strengthening the capacity of National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NMHS ) to deliver effective (WMO et al., 2018); nurturing community-based disaster risk management to build social capital ( [[#Blackburn--2014|Blackburn, 2014]] ; [[#McNaught--2014|McNaught et al., 2014]] ; [[#Gero--2015|Gero et al., 2015]] ; [[#Handmer--2017|Handmer and Iveson, 2017]] ; [[#Chacowry--2018|Chacowry et al., 2018]] ; [[#De%20Souza--2018|De Souza and Clarke, 2018]] ; [[#Currenti--2019|Currenti et al., 2019]] ; [[#Cvitanovic--2019|Cvitanovic et al., 2019]] ; [[#Hagedoorn--2019|Hagedoorn et al., 2019]] ), as well as processes that integrate IKLK with science ( [[#Hiwasaki--2014|Hiwasaki et al., 2014]] ; [[#Carby--2015|Carby, 2015]] ; [[#Bryant-Tokalau--2018a|Bryant-Tokalau, 2018a]] ; CANARI, 2019).

Many small islands, especially those with the highest risks and the least resources, remain highly challenged in building and sustaining integrated, people-centred, end-to-end early warning systems (EWS) that are fully functional across the four interrelated components of EWS. Warning dissemination and communication, and disaster preparedness and response capacities are particular components of EWS requiring strengthening in SIDS ( [[#WMO--2020|WMO, 2020]] ). More recent assessments of early warning capabilities in the Caribbean highlight improvements in EWS for weather, water and climate over time (WMO et al., 2018; [[#Mahon--2019|Mahon et al., 2019]] ). However, progress has been uneven across hazards, governance levels and spatial and temporal scales, with more advanced development of some sub-systems and EWS pillars than others. Significant progress has been made in the area of detection, monitoring, analysis and forecasting of severe weather systems but there is a need to strengthen this area for other climate-related hazards such as wildfires, localised intense rainfall, floods, as well as heatwaves and droughts, which become more important in a changing climate. Assessments also point to specific deficiencies including significant gaps in the area of disaster risk knowledge—particularly the development of risk assessments, the variable capacity for interpreting scientific warning products across states, as well as effective communication of warning messages to populations at risk ( [[#Lumbroso--2016|Lumbroso et al., 2016]] ; WMO et al., 2018).

There is increasing recognition and commitment at global ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-3#3.6.3.2|Section 3.6.3.2.4]] ; [[#WMO--2014|WMO, 2014]] ; [[#UN--2015c|UN, 2015c]] ; [[#UN--2015b|UN, 2015b]] ; [[#UN--2015a|UN, 2015a]] ), regional ( [[#CCCCC--2012|CCCCC, 2012]] ; [[#CDEMA--2014|CDEMA, 2014]] ; [[#SPC--2016|SPC, 2016]] ; [[#SPREP--2017|SPREP, 2017]] ; [[#CIMH--2019|CIMH et al., 2019]] ) and national levels ( [[#SPREP--2016a|SPREP, 2016a]] ; WMO, 2016a) of the importance of climate services in supporting adaptation decision-making in small islands ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). A number of SIDS-focused climate service programmes have emerged, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific ( [[#Group--2015|Group, 2015]] ; [[#Martin--2015|Martin et al., 2015]] ; [[#SPREP--2016b|SPREP, 2016b]] ; WMO, 2016b; [[#WMO--2018|WMO, 2018]] a; [[#WMO--2018|WMO, 2018]] b) and at least one SIDS—Dominica—has been prioritised as a pilot implementation country under the Global Framework for Climate Services (WMO, 2016a). As is the case globally, climate services focused on decision-making at seasonal (3–6 month) timescales has thus far been the focus of investment in small islands. Less attention has been given to investments in and assessments of climate services for decision-making at longer timescales ( [[#Vaughan--2018|Vaughan et al., 2018]] ).

Studies from the Caribbean ( [[#Dookie--2019|Dookie et al., 2019]] ; [[#Mahon--2019|Mahon et al., 2019]] ) and Indian Ocean ( [[#Hermes--2019|Hermes et al., 2019]] ), have found that NMHSs and regional intergovernmental bodies face capacity challenges in translation, transfer and facilitation of the use of climate information to various end user groups. In many small island contexts a gap remains between investments in data quality and information services and uptake and use in risk reduction by policy and decision makers ( [[#Dookie--2019|Dookie et al., 2019]] ). Bringing policy makers and users together to guide investments in climate information services is recommended, as is provision of dedicated resources to develop applicable tools and products that turn data and information services into risk reduction measures ( [[#Dookie--2019|Dookie et al., 2019]] ; [[#Haines--2019|Haines, 2019]] ).

Many of the outlined KRs ( [[#15.3.4.9|Section 15.3.4.9]] ) can be addressed through the variety of adaptation options outlined in the previous sections in the context of small islands (Table 15.6, Supplementary Material 15.1). Whereas some of these adaptation options are widespread (e.g., hard protection, reforestation or the creation of MPAs), others (e.g., accommodation, health awareness raising and training) have been little experimented with to date in small island contexts. Although most of these adaptation options provide diversified co-benefits to small island communities, there is still ''limited evidence'' with regard to their effectiveness in reducing climate change impacts. While some of them respond directly to a KR or a number of KRs (Table 15.6), others can be understood as overarching options that, for example, build adaptive capacity of communities and organisations and enable these actors to respond to a variety of KRs in an effective manner (see SM15.1).

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