Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-16 (section)

==== 16.2.3.10 Displacement and Migration ====

<div id="h3-17-siblings" class="h3-siblings"></div>

Given the complexity of human migration processes and decisions (e.g., [[#Boas--2019|Boas et al., 2019]] , [[#Cattaneo--2019|Cattaneo et al., 2019]] ) and the paucity of long-term, reliable and internally consistent observational data on displacement ( [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ; [[#IDMC--2020|IDMC, 2020]] ) and migration ( [[#Laczko--2016|Laczko, 2016]] ), the contribution of long-term changes in climate-related systems to observed human displacement or migration patterns has not been quantified so far, except for individual examples of displacement induced by inland flooding where the heavy precipitation has been attributed to anthropogenic climate forcing and coastal flooding (see ‘Other societal impacts—Displacement and migration’, Table SM16.22; Section CCP2).

However, new evidence has emerged since the AR5 that further documents widespread effects of weather fluctuations and extreme events on migration (see ‘Other societal impacts—Displacement and migration’, Table SM16.23). Numerous studies find significant links between temperature or precipitation anomalies, or ''extreme weather events'' such as storms or floods, and internal as well as international migration ( [[#Coniglio--2015|Coniglio and Pesce, 2015]] ; [[#Cattaneo--2016|Cattaneo and Peri, 2016]] ; [[#Nawrotzki--2016|Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2016]] ; [[#Beine--2017|Beine and Parsons, 2017]] , for international migration; and [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] , for internal displacement). Internal displacement of millions of people every year is triggered by natural hazards, mainly floods and storms ( [[#IDMC--2019|IDMC, 2019]] ). The effects of weather fluctuations and extremes on migration are considered more important for temporary mobility and displacement than permanent migration, and more influential on short-distance movement, including urbanisation, than international migration ( [[#McLeman--2014|McLeman, 2014]] ; [[#Hauer--2020|Hauer et al., 2020]] ; [[#Hoffmann--2020|Hoffmann et al., 2020]] , [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-7#7.2.6|Section 7.2.6]] ). Importantly, these links are conditional on the socioeconomic situation in the origin; for example, poor populations may be ‘trapped’ and not able to migrate in the face of adverse climate or weather conditions ( [[#Black--2013|Black et al., 2013]] ; [[#Adams--2016|Adams, 2016]] ). Many studies have also explored the channels through which climate or weather influence migration, and have identified incomes in the agricultural sector as one of the main channels ( [[#Nawrotzki--2015|Nawrotzki et al., 2015]] ; [[#Viswanathan--2015|Viswanathan and Kavi Kumar, 2015]] ; [[#Cai--2016a|Cai et al., 2016a]] ). In particular, declines in agricultural incomes and employment due to changed weather variability may foster increased rural–urban movement, and the resulting pressures on urban wages in turn foster international migration ( [[#Marchiori--2012|Marchiori et al., 2012]] ; [[#Maurel--2016|Maurel and Tuccio, 2016]] ). Another possible but controversial channel is violent conflict, which may be fostered (though not exclusively caused) by adverse climate conditions such as drought, and in turn lead to people seeking refugee status, although evidence of such an indirect effect is weak ( [[#Brzoska--2016|Brzoska and]] [[#Fröhlich--2016|Fröhlich, 2016]] ; [[#Abel--2019|Abel et al., 2019]] ; [[#Schutte--2021|Schutte et al., 2021]] ).

<div id="16.3" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="synthesis-of-observed-adaptation-related-responses"></span>