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=== 6.4.6 Demand-side Mitigation Options from an Energy Systems Perspective === <div id="h2-11-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Demand-side measures are fundamental to an integrated approach to low-carbon energy systems ( ''high confidence'' ). Mitigation options, such as wind parks, CCS, and nuclear power plants, may not be implemented when actors oppose these options. Further, end users, including consumers, governments, businesses and industry, would need to adopt the relevant options, and then use these as intended; user adoption can be a key driver to scale up markets for low-carbon technologies. This section discusses which factors shape the likelihood that end users engage in relevant mitigation actions, focusing on consumers; strategies to promote mitigation actions are discussed in [[#6.7.6.1|Section 6.7.6.1]] . A wide range of actions of end users would reduce carbon emissions in energy systems ( [[#Abrahamse--2007|Abrahamse et al. 2007]] ; [[#Dietz--2013|Dietz 2013]] ; [[#Hackmann--2014|Hackmann et al. 2014]] ; [[#Creutzig--2018|Creutzig et al. 2018]] ; [[#Grubler--2018|Grubler et al. 2018]] ), including: • use of low-carbon energy sources and carriers. Actors can produce and use their own renewable energy (e.g., install solar PV, solar water heaters, heat pumps), buy shares in a renewable energy project (e.g., wind shares), or select a renewable energy provider. '''•''' adoption of technologies that support flexibility in energy use and sector coupling, thereby providing flexibility services by balancing demand and renewable energy supply. This would reduce the need to use fossil fuels to meet demand when renewable energy production is low and put less pressure on deployment of low-emission energy supply systems. Examples are technologies to store energy (e.g., batteries and EVs) or that automatically shift appliances on or off (e.g., fridges, washing machines). '''•''' adoption of energy-efficient appliances and systems and increase of resource efficiency of end uses so that less energy is required to provide the same service. Examples are insulating buildings, and passive or energy-positive buildings. '''•''' change behaviour to reduce overall energy demand or to match energy demand to available energy supplies. Examples include adjusting indoor temperature settings, reducing showering time, reducing car use or flying, and operating appliances when renewable energy production is high. • purchase and use products and services that are associated with low GHG emissions during their production (e.g., reduce dairy and meat consumption) or for transporting products (e.g., local products). Also, end users can engage in behaviour supporting a circular economy, by reducing waste (e.g., of food), sharing products (e.g., cars, equipment), and refurbishing products (e.g., repair rather than buying new products) so that fewer new products are used. Various factors shape whether such mitigation actions are feasible and considered by end users, including contextual factors, individual abilities, and motivational factors. Mitigation actions can be facilitated and encouraged by targeting relevant barriers and enablers ( [[#6.7.6.1|Section 6.7.6.1]] ). Contextual factors, such as physical and climate conditions, infrastructure, available technology, regulations, institutions, culture, and financial conditions define the costs and benefits of mitigation options that enable or inhibit their adoption ( ''high confidence'' ). Geographic location and climate factors may make some technologies, such as solar PV or solar water heaters, impractical ( [[#Chang--2009|Chang et al. 2009]] ). Culture can inhibit efficient use of home heating or PV ( [[#Sovacool--2020|Sovacool and Griffiths 2020]] ), low-carbon diets ( [[#Dubois--2019|Dubois et al. 2019]] ), and advanced fuel choices ( [[#Van%20Der%20Kroon--2013|Van Der Kroon et al. 2013]] ). Also, favourable financial conditions promote the uptake of PV ( [[#Wolske--2018|Wolske and Stern 2018]] ), good facilities increase recycling ( [[#Geiger--2019|Geiger et al. 2019]] ), and vegetarian meal sales increase when more vegetarian options are offered. Mitigation actions are more likely when individuals feel capable to adopt them ( [[#Pisano--2017|Pisano and Lubell 2017]] ; [[#Geiger--2019|Geiger et al. 2019]] ), which may depend on income and knowledge. Low-income groups may lack resources to invest in refurbishments and energy-efficient technology with high upfront costs ( [[#Chang--2009|Chang et al. 2009]] ; [[#Andrews-Speed--2016|Andrews-Speed and Ma 2016]] ; [[#Wolske--2018|Wolske and Stern 2018]] ). Yet, higher-income groups can afford more carbon-intensive lifestyles ( [[#Golley--2012|Golley and Meng 2012]] ; [[#Frederiks--2015|Frederiks et al. 2015]] ; [[#Wiedenhofer--2017|Wiedenhofer et al. 2017]] ; [[#Namazkhan--2019|Namazkhan et al. 2019]] ; Santillán Vera and de la Vega Navarro 2019; [[#Mi--2020|Mi et al. 2020]] ). Knowledge of the causes and consequences of climate change and of ways to reduce GHG emissions is not always accurate, but lack of knowledge is not a main barrier to mitigation actions ( [[#Boudet--2019|Boudet 2019]] ). Motivation to engage in mitigation action, reflecting individuals’ reasons for actions, depends on general goals that people strive for in their life (i.e., values). People who strongly value protecting the environment and other people are more likely to consider climate impacts and to engage in a wide range of mitigation actions than those who strongly value individual consequences of actions, such as pleasure and money ( [[#Taylor--2014|Taylor et al. 2014]] ; [[#Steg--2016|Steg 2016]] ). Values affect which types of costs and benefits people consider and prioritise when making choices, including individual, affective, social, and environmental costs and benefits ( [[#Gowdy--2008|Gowdy 2008]] ; [[#Steg--2016|Steg 2016]] ). First, people are more likely to engage in mitigation behaviour (i.e., energy savings, energy efficiency, resource efficiency in buildings, low-carbon energy generation) when they believe such behaviour has more individual benefits than costs ( [[#Harland--1999|Harland et al. 1999]] ; [[#Steg--2009|Steg and Vlek 2009]] ; [[#Kastner--2015|Kastner and Stern 2015]] ; [[#Korcaj--2015|Korcaj et al. 2015]] ; [[#Kardooni--2016|Kardooni et al. 2016]] ; [[#Kastner--2016|Kastner and Matthies 2016]] ; [[#Wolske--2017|Wolske et al. 2017]] ), including financial benefits, convenience, comfort, autonomy, and independence in energy supply ( [[#Wolske--2018|Wolske and Stern 2018]] ). Yet, financial consequences seem less important for decisions to invest in energy-efficiency and renewable energy production than people indicate (Zhao et al. 2012). Second, people are less likely to engage in mitigation behaviours that are unpleasurable or inconvenient ( [[#Steg--2016|Steg 2016]] ), and more likely to do so when they expect to derive positive feelings from such actions ( [[#Smith--1994|Smith et al. 1994]] ; [[#Pelletier--1998|Pelletier et al. 1998]] ; [[#Steg--2005|Steg 2005]] ; [[#Carrus--2008|Carrus et al. 2008]] ; [[#Brosch--2014|Brosch et al. 2014]] ; [[#Taufik--2016|Taufik et al. 2016]] ). Positive feelings may be elicited when behaviour is pleasurable, but also when it is perceived as meaningful ( [[#Bolderdijk--2013|Bolderdijk et al. 2013]] ; [[#Taufik--2015|Taufik et al. 2015]] ). Third, social costs and benefits can affect climate action ( [[#Farrow--2017|Farrow et al. 2017]] ), although people do not always recognise this ( [[#Nolan--2008|Nolan et al. 2008]] ; [[#Noppers--2014|Noppers et al. 2014]] ). People engage more in mitigation actions when they think others expect them to do so and when others act as well ( [[#Harland--1999|Harland et al. 1999]] ; [[#Nolan--2008|Nolan et al. 2008]] ; [[#Rai--2016|Rai et al. 2016]] ). Being part of a group that advocates mitigation encourages such actions ( [[#Biddau--2016|Biddau et al. 2016]] ; [[#Fielding--2016|Fielding and Hornsey 2016]] ; [[#Jans--2018|Jans et al. 2018]] ). Talking with peers can reduce uncertainties and confirm benefits about adoption of renewable energy technology ( [[#Palm--2017|Palm 2017]] ), and peers can provide social support ( [[#Wolske--2017|Wolske et al. 2017]] ). People may engage in mitigation actions when they think this would signal something positive about them ( [[#Milinski--2006|Milinski et al. 2006]] ; [[#Griskevicius--2010|Griskevicius et al. 2010]] ; [[#Noppers--2014|Noppers et al. 2014]] ; [[#Kastner--2015|Kastner and Stern 2015]] ). Social influence can also originate from political and business leaders ( [[#Bouman--2019|Bouman and Steg 2019]] ); GHG emissions are lower when legislators have strong environmental records ( [[#Jensen--2011|Jensen and Spoon 2011]] ; [[#Dietz--2015|Dietz et al. 2015]] ). Fourth, mitigation actions, including saving energy and hot water, limiting meat consumption, and investing in energy efficiency, resource efficiency in buildings, and renewable energy generation are more likely when people care more strongly about others and the environment ( [[#Steg--2015|Steg et al. 2015]] ; Van Der Werff and Steg 2015; [[#Wolske--2017|Wolske et al. 2017]] ). People across the world generally strongly value the environment ( [[#Steg--2016|Steg 2016]] ; [[#Bouman--2019|Bouman and Steg 2019]] ), suggesting that they are motivated to mitigate climate change. The more individuals are aware of the climate impact of their behaviour, the more they think their actions can help reduce such impacts, which strengthens their moral norms to act accordingly, and promotes mitigation actions ( [[#Steg--2010|Steg and de Groot 2010]] ; [[#Jakovcevic--2013|Jakovcevic and Steg 2013]] ; [[#Chen--2015|Chen 2015]] ; [[#Wolske--2017|Wolske et al. 2017]] ). Initial mitigation actions can encourage engagement in other mitigation actions when people experience that such actions are easy and effective ( [[#Lauren--2016|Lauren et al. 2016]] ), and when initial actions make them realise they are a pro-environmental person, motivating them to engage in more mitigation actions so as to be consistent (van der Werff et al. 2014; [[#Lacasse--2015|Lacasse 2015]] , 2016; Peters et al. 2018). This implies it would be important to create conditions that make it likely that initial mitigation actions motivate further actions. <div id="6.4.7" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="summary-of-mitigation-options"></span>
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