Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1 (section)

== 1.5 Facilitating Long-Term Transformation ==

<div id="h1-6-siblings" class="h1-siblings"></div>

This report highlights that transformative system change is required to meet the SDGs (Chapter 18). '''Transformation''' is defined as ‘a change in the fundamental attributes of a system including altered goals or values’ (SR 1.5). The related concept of '''transition''' is defined as ‘the process of changing from one state or condition to another in a given period of time’ (IPCC SR 1.5/SRCCL; also see Section 1.5.2).

Many time scales have been assessed that shape the context for any such transformations: including the present, 2030 and mid-century (Cross-Chapter Box CLIMATE in Chapter 1). In the present, significant changes in the climate system have already occurred in many places (WGI), while commensurate adaptation actions have in general been lacking (Chapter 16). By 2030, the SDGs call for significant societal changes, many of which would be more difficult to achieve without significant reductions in climate risk and impacts. By mid-century, global emissions pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement 1.5°C target drop to zero net GHG emissions with no overshoot and roughly a decade later with overshoot (Cross-Chapter Box CLIMATE in Chapter 1). Pathways consistent with the Paris 2°C target drop to zero net emissions in the latter half of the 21st century. Even in low emission scenarios, temperatures, storm intensities, sea levels and other climate parameters are expected to continue to change for decades ( [[#IPCC--2021a|IPCC, 2021a]] ).

The concepts of transition and transformation help organise assessments of near- and longer-term adaptation actions that may prove feasible and effective in achieving societal goals related to climate and sustainable development.

<div id="1.5.1" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="understanding-transformation"></span>
=== 1.5.1 Understanding Transformation ===

<div id="h2-15-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Over the last 200 years, human society has undergone a rapid and profound transformation, with population and income per capita expanding by an order of magnitude or more after many millennia of relative stasis in living standards ( [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ). The transformations associated with sustainable development and managing climate risk may be of similar scale as these historic transformations. In the past, changes in technologies and economies of this scale are not separate from, but are necessarily embedded alongside changes in political, religious and social relationships ( [[#Polanyi--1957|Polanyi, 1957]] ). Future transformation may similarly involve such interlinked social, cultural, economic, environmental, technical and political factors (Chapter 18; Section 1.5.2). Technology-led, market-led or state-led transitions aimed at meeting Paris Agreement and SDGs may fail without integrating dimensions of social justice and addressing the social and political exclusion that prevent the disadvantaged from accessing such improvements and increasing their incomes ( [[#Burkett--2014|Burkett et al., 2014]] ; Scoones et al., 2015) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

As used in the global environmental change literature, transformation is a pluralistic concept embracing many interpretations (Box 18.3), but all focus on the general idea of fundamental change in society as opposed to change that is minor, marginal or incremental. Uses of the term can differ with respect to: (a) how the system undergoing change is conceptualised, (b) the extent to which change is continuous or discontinuous and the time scales involved, (c) the extent to which transformation is guided towards desired goals or emerges without intent and (d) whether the usage focuses on descriptions of societal processes or includes normative judgements as to which outcomes should or should not occur ( [[#Feola--2015|Feola, 2015]] ) . The literature generally uses transformation as an analytic-descriptive concept, which aims to describe significant change in couple human–natural systems, or as a solutions-oriented concept, which aims to inform or contribute to societal change.

The IPCC Fifth Assessment cycle, starting with its Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), first highlighted the concept of transformation, drawing primarily on the solutions-oriented approaches of [[#O’Brien--2011|O’Brien (2011)]] and [[#Pelling--2011|Pelling (2011)]] . This Sixth Assessment report also generally employs transformation as a solutions-oriented concept, with mention in almost all chapters and significant emphasis in the synthesis chapters.

The IPCC Sixth Assessment cycle also highlights the concept of transition, drawn from the sustainability transitions literature ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ). The 1.5 SR organises its assessments of feasibility and potential policy actions around transitions in four socio-technical system: energy, land, urban and infrastructure, and industrial systems ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] , Chapter 4). This report adds a fifth system transition—a societal transition focused on attributes that drive innovation, the evolution of patterns of consumption and development and power relationships among societal actors (Section 18.1.4). The AR6 WGIII report is organised around six systems transitions: energy; agricultural, forestry, other land use; urban; buildings; transportation; and industry, which includes supply chains and the circular economy.

The literature offers multiple views on the relationships between transition and transformation (Box 18.3). The 1.5 SR suggests that transformation is needed to generate the four system transitions. In many literatures, transformation is considered a more expansive process than transition, with the former less exclusively focused on socio-technical systems and more engaged with questions of power, politics, capabilities, culture, identity and sense-making ( [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hoelscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ; [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ). This report generally takes this more expansive view of transformation to engage with issues of equity, climate justice and large-scale institutional and societal change (Box 18.3).

This WGII report has a particular focus on '''transformational adaptation''' (Section 1.4.4.1), which it views as laying on a continuum from incremental and transformational with no sharp division between them (Sections 1.5.2; 17.2.2.3).

The IPCC first highlighted the concept of transformational adaptation in SREX. SREX generally used the phrase transformation to refer to fundamental societal changes that advance climate adaptation, disaster risk management and sustainable development. Transformation was seen as one part of the solution space alongside options such as reducing vulnerability and exposure, and increasing resilience for managing risk. WGII of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report used the phrase ‘transformational adaptation’ to contrast with ‘incremental adaptation’. That report used the former term to refer to: (a) adaptation at large scope or scale, (b) the type of adaptation that occurs once soft limits have been breached, or (c) change that addresses root causes of vulnerability as well as redressing long-standing inequities. The Fifth Assessment Report’s WGIII employed the concepts of transformation and transformation pathways to assess the large-scale societal changes needed to meet GHG emission reduction goals.

This WGII report focuses on transformational adaptation as one component of climate resilient development in which adaptation, mitigation and development solutions are pursued together to exploit synergies and reduce trade-offs among these actions (Section 1.5.3; Chapter 18). Chapter 16 assesses the extent to which transformational adaptation is currently being implemented, using criteria including the scope, depth and speed of the adaptation actions, as well as the extent to which limits to adaptation have been considered (Section 16.3.2.4). Chapter 17 ranks potential adaptation options by where they lie on the incremental to transformational continuum (Section 17.2.2.4).

Societal transformation can arise without explicit intent as, arguably, did the industrial revolution and some of the trends re-making today’s society (see Section 1.1). In order to help policymakers achieve societal goals, this report seeks to identify the conditions for '''deliberate transformations''' , that is, those envisioned and intended by at least some societal actors ( [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ).

Figure 1.9 connects several key concepts that this report employs to help distinguish pathways that lead to deliberative and forced transformations. As shown in the figure, adaptation goals might imply a desired level of adaptation: (a) accessible by actions within the solution space of the existing system or (b) beyond the solution space of the existing system. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels that avoid threatening private or social norms (also see Figure 17.6). In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation is necessary to reach the goals. Alternatively, if deliberate transformation does not successfully occur or hard limits are exceeded, the system may nonetheless undergo some type of forced transformation which results in outcomes inconsistent with societal goals. While the figure shows single decision points, multiple actors are involved at each stage. Thus, some people may find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks which are not otherwise avoided. Often such coping situations display significant inequities, with tolerable risks for powerful groups and intolerable ones for marginalised groups.

<div id="_idContainer057" class="Figure"></div>

[[File:4ba5481e99914f2b89eb61533e2454ee IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_009.png]]

'''Figure 1.9 |''' '''Alternative pathways to transformation.''' Adaptation goals may be accessible by actions within or beyond the existing solution space. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels. In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation becomes necessary to achieve goals. If a successful deliberate transformation does not occur, the system may nonetheless undergo a forced transformation. Multiple actors are involved at each stage so that some people may nonetheless find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks.

Multiple narratives describe pathways for pursuing deliberate transformations ( [[#Cavanagh--2017|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017]] ). While building on the new ‘green economy’ framing that emerged with the Rio+20 conference in 2012 ( [[#UNEP--2011|UNEP, 2011]] ; [[#De-Mello--2012|De Mello and Dutz, 2012]] ; [[#OECD--2012|OECD, 2012]] ), these narratives reflect differing trade-offs among values and differing assumptions about the factors driving system change (see WGIII). The narratives range from ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios focused on modernisation of sectors such as energy, agriculture and use of natural resources to more transformational propositions such as various green new deal proposals ( [[#European%20Commission--2019|European Commission, 2019]] ), the new climate economy ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ), and ‘doughnut economics’ ( [[#Raworth--2017|Raworth, 2017]] ). Some literature suggests significant benefits from such new climate economy proposals, claiming tens of trillions in economic benefits, tens of millions of new jobs and close to a million fewer premature deaths from pollution over the coming decade ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ).

Two contrasting schools of thought, called ecomodernism and degrowth (D'Alisa et al., 2014), offer important bounding narratives for ‘green economy’ approaches that aim achieve the SDGs and Paris Agreement goals.

Ecomodernism aims to decouple GHG emissions and other environmental impacts from GDP growth (WGIII Section 1.4.1; Desrochers and Szurmak., 2020) through three primary strategies: (a) ‘green’ technological innovation, (b) resource efficiency or productivity improvements and (c) the sustainable intensification of land use in both rural and urban areas ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] ; [[#Isenhour--2016|Isenhour, 2016]] ). Such efforts to mobilise large-scale investment in climate change adaptation and to decouple GDP growth from environmental impacts could generate substantial employment opportunities and open up profitable investment frontiers ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] ; [[#Adelman--2018|Adelman, 2018]] ), which could help achieve SDG 8, which calls for accelerated annual growth rates of at least 7% in least developed countries and achieve SDG 10, which calls for ‘income growth of the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average’.

Degrowth proponents question the feasibility of decoupling at a scale and rate sufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals ( [[#Kallis--2017|Kallis, 2017]] ; [[#Parrique--2019|Parrique et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gómez-Baggethun--2020|Gómez-Baggethun, 2020]] ; [[#Hickel--2020|Hickel and Kallis, 2020]] ). Using precautionary principle-rooted arguments ( [[#Latouche--2001|Latouche, 2001]] ), degrowth aims for intentional decreases in both GDP and coupled GHG emissions ( [[#Kallis--2011|Kallis, 2011]] ) using policy mechanisms such a ‘cap and share’ framework for distributing emissions permits on an annually declining basis with legislation to prohibit the overshoot of established carbon budgets ( [[#Douthwaite--2012|Douthwaite, 2012]] ; [[#Kallis--2012|Kallis et al., 2012]] ). Degrowth thus seeks to minimise reliance on negative emissions technologies, such as the large-scale deployment of BECCS (e.g., illustrative emissions reduction pathway labelled P4 in IPCC SR1.5, [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; also WGIII Chapter 3) and aims to generate progress toward achieving the SDGs by prioritising redistribution rather than GDP growth. SDGs potentially addressed by degrowth include universal basic income (SDGs 1 and 10), work-sharing to guarantee full employment (SDGs 8 and 10) and shifting taxation burdens from income to resource and energy extraction (SDGs 8 and 12).

The contrasting premises of ecomodernism and degrowth have prompted a series of mutual counterarguments. Degrowth scholars emphasise that global absolute decoupling is currently not proceeding fast enough to meet Paris Agreement targets ( [[#Ward--2016|Ward et al., 2016]] ; Moreau et al., 2019; [[#Haberl--2020|Haberl et al., 2020]] ). Ecomodernists point to important progress towards achieving absolute decoupling at the national or regional scale—as shown by [[#Le%20Quéré--2019|Le Quéré et al. (2019)]] in 18 developed countries—and the future potential of emerging technologies and policy reforms ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] )

<div id="1.5.2" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="enabling-transformation"></span>
=== 1.5.2 Enabling Transformation ===

<div id="h2-16-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

As one important theme, this Sixth Assessment report assesses who needs to take what actions and when in order that transformations unfold at sufficient speed and scale to meet the Paris Agreement, the SDGs and other policy goals. A number of literatures inform these assessments.

Various literatures describe multiple, co-evolving societal elements which organise themselves into stable regimes that, under some circumstances, can undergo significant change. The sustainability transitions literature provides one central focus for understanding such processes and potential intervention points for actors seeking change ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ). This literature identifies three, interacting scales: the micro, meso and macro.( [[#Geels--2004|Geels, 2004]] ; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ) The micro level reflects changing individual choices, attitudes and motivations. The meso reflects socio-technical systems, ‘a cluster of elements, including technology, regulations, user practices and markets, cultural meanings, infrastructure, maintenance networks and supply networks’ ( [[#Geels--2004|Geels, 2004]] , p. 436). The macro reflects the cultures, institutions, norms, governance and other broad organising features of society. The sustainability transitions literature generally focuses on change that originates and occurs within the meso scale, while the transformation literature focuses on change within and among all scales. This Working Group II report often considers three interacting scales labelled personal, practical and political ( [[#O’Brien--2013|O’Brien and Sygna, 2013]] ). Working Group III often employs the multi-level perspectives framework ( [[#Geels--2004|Geels, 2004]] ) and the more actor-oriented three domains of decision making framework (WGIII Section 1.6.4; [[#Grubb--2014|Grubb et al., 2014]] ;) to describe related societal scales.

These literatures describe similar processes through which these interacting elements generate significant system change. In the sustainability transitions literature, the process begins with a stable system of actors, technologies and institutions ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ). Radical innovations begin in niches or protected spaces, sometimes introduced by new entrants or outsiders. Successful innovations expand in scale, scope and geographically, and ultimately help generate new regimes. Incumbent actors can support or resist innovations through combinations of government policies, economic forces and institutional and behavioural pressures. Such processes can, but need not, follow a common S-curve pattern of initial adoption, take-off, acceleration and stabilisation ( [[#Rotmans--2001|Rotmans et al., 2001]] ). The multi-level perspectives literature in WGIII similarly describes innovations as moving from niches to socio-technical regimes, at first mediated by and then potentially altering exogenous socio-technical landscapes (WGIII Section 1.6.4; [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-1/Smith--2010 Smith et al., 2010] ).

The socio-ecological systems literature, a main source of the resilience concept, focuses on the system elements of society and ecosystems, their interdependence and on how they change in response to shocks (Section 1.2.1.4). Coupled human and natural systems maintain their vital functions through what are called adaptive cycles that begin with growth, reach a period of stasis, experience a disruption and then reorganise. This repeating cycle can leave the system unchanged or transition it to new states. Human agency can alter system characteristics so that after any disruption the system will reorganise into a different, more desired state, guide the reorganisation in desired directions after a system shock (such as a natural disaster) or provide the shock that catalyses a reorganisation.

These literatures view incremental and transformational change as linked processes. In the transformational adaptation literature, [[#Park--2012|Park et al. (2012)]] consider incremental and transformational adaptation as two concentric and linked action-learning cycles with similar steps that include monitoring and learning. Systems generally reside in the incremental cycle but can temporarily jump to the transformational cycle before returning to the incremental, albeit in a state with fundamentally changed attributes. Shifts from the incremental to transformational cycle are made possible by knowledge and skills, as well as adjustments to vision, agendas and coalitions achieved through monitoring and learning. The incremental cycle is characterised by reactive responses to external drivers and performance evaluation relative to past performance. Shifts to the transformational cycle are characterised by more pro-active responses and more expansive problem framings.

The socio-ecological and sustainability transitions literature describes transitions as often nonlinear, characterised by tipping point behaviour with periods of relative stability interspersed with periods of more rapid change as thresholds are crossed ( [[#van%20Ginkel--2020|van Ginkel et al., 2020]] ). Actors seeking transformation may take incremental steps that aim to induce such tipping point behaviour ( [[#Otto--2020b|Otto et al., 2020b]] ). For instance, full accounting of climate risk in insurance and financial lending decisions could similarly act as such social tipping point interventions for adaptation ( [[#Hill--2019|Hill and Martinez-Diaz, 2019]] ). Transformations need not, however, be equitable or smooth. Historical examples suggest the potential for rigidity traps, in which suppression of innovation and a high degree of connectivity in a system delay an eventual transformation, which, when it eventually occurs, unfolds as exceptionally harsh ( [[#Hegmon--2008|Hegmon et al., 2008]] ).

Many actors can contribute to launching or blocking significant system change. Pelling et al. (2015) highlights power relationships within and among activity spheres that influence the process of transformational adaptation and distribution of risks. In the sustainability transitions literature each set of actors—including those from academia, politics, industry, civil society and households—brings their own resources, capabilities, beliefs, strategies and interests, which affects their interest, objectives, ability to affect the process and their ability to affect others ( [[#Kern--2018|Kern and Rogge, 2018]] ).

There is no consensus in the literature on the best means for actors to pursue deliberate transformation (Section 1.5.1) and the extent to which actors can guide the process. The transitions and some transformation literature derive from a complex systems perspective ( Section 1.3.1.2; [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ; [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ) in which behaviours can be understood but not predicted (Chapter 17; [[#Mitchell--2009|Mitchell, 2009]] ). These literatures suggest that interventions in such systems will rarely result in them evolving along some pre-determined pathway. Rather, successful interventions more often resemble iterative processes of action, observation and response, which are described in the literature with terms such as iterative risk management (Section 17.2.1), clumsy solutions ( [[#Thompson--1998|Thompson and Rayner, 1998]] ; [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ), probe and response (Chapter 17; [[#French--2013|French, 2013]] ) and what [[#Young--2017|Young (2017)]] calls adaptive governance.

These literatures view transformation as a collective action challenge among actors with both common and differing values, interests and capabilities interacting over time with a mix of cooperation and competition ( [[#Young--2017|Young, 2017]] ; [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ). Concepts such as radical incremental transformation ( [[#Göpel--2016|Göpel, 2016]] ), direct incrementalism (Grunwald 2007) and progressive incrementalism ( [[#Levin--2012|Levin et al., 2012]] ) envision strategies in which actors pursue incremental actions in one or more niches that move the current system towards tipping points which, once crossed, will drive the system to a new state ( [[#Tàbara--2018|Tàbara et al., 2018]] ). The incremental actions aim to promote learning, remove barriers to change ( [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ; [[#Baresi--2020|Baresi et al., 2020]] ), create a series of wins that generate momentum and generate positive feedbacks (e.g., by creating constituencies) such that the speed and scale of the climate action grows over time ( [[#Levin--2012|Levin et al., 2012]] ). However, incremental strategies can fail to move fast enough, can succumb to path-dependency that locks in initially helpful but long-term adverse responses (such as the well-known levee effect) (Sadoff 2015; Haasnoot 2019) or can result in a transition that meets some goals (e.g., environmental) but not others (e.g., equity) ( ''high confidence'' ).

This report describes decision frameworks and tools that can help those involved in such a process—acting independently or collectively—identify, evaluate, seek compromise on and then implement sequences of solutions that lead to pathways with more desirable outcomes and avoid pathways with less desirable outcomes (Section 17.3.1). For instance, adaptive (also called adaptation) pathways (Cross-Chapter Boxes SLR in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-3|Chapter 3]] and DEEP in Chapter 17) explicitly chart alternative sequences of actions including near-term steps, indicators to monitor and contingency actions to take if pre-determined monitoring thresholds are breached. Employed in contexts with multiple actors and contested values, adaptive pathways frame deliberate transformation as both a near-term decision problem focused on physical, financial and natural resources, as well as a social change process of co-evolving knowledge, policies, institutions, values, rules and norms ( [[#Fazey--2016|Fazey et al., 2016]] ). Transition management ( [[#Loorbach--2010|Loorbach, 2010]] ), rooted in the sustainability transitions literature, supports arenas of actors that co-produce visions of future change, plan pathways and recruit additional actors into the change process.

As a central feature, such frameworks and tools embrace: (a) multiple objectives and measures (Section 1.4.1.2) to help identify and consider trade-offs among parties with a diversity of interests, values and objectives and (b) multiple scenarios that enable stress-testing of proposed actions to identify conditions in which they would fail to meet their goals and thus inform consideration of ways to make those actions more robust and resilient over multiple futures in the near and longer term (Chapter 17; Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17). A focus on single or overly aggregated measures (Section 1.4.1.2) and single scenarios can privilege some actors’ views over others, reduce transparency and make it more difficult to identify resilient and equitable solutions to complex, deeply uncertain, non-linear and contested problems ( [[#Schoen--1994|Schoen and and Rein, 1994]] ; [[#Renn--2008|Renn, 2008]] ; [[#Jones--2014|Jones et al., 2014]] ; [[#Lempert--2020|Lempert and Turner, 2020]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Nonetheless, most concepts of deliberate transformation also emphasise the importance of common goals and principles within a process of goal setting, acting on those goals, M&amp;E and readjustment. Such goals encourage pro-active action, help align the activities of multiple, loosely co-ordinated actors ( [[#Göpel--2016|Göpel, 2016]] ; [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ) and provide benchmarks against which to measure progress ( [[#Young--2017|Young, 2017]] ). The Paris Agreement and SDGs aim to provide such common goals for the world as a whole and implement what some have described as goal-based as opposed to rule-based governance for galvanising collective action ( [[#Sachs--2015|Sachs, 2015]] ; [[#Kanie--2017|Kanie and Biermann, 2017]] ). As intended, many public sector, private sector and civil society actors have developed their own goals that aim to align with the Paris Agreement and the SDGs (see Section 1.1). The existence of goals that help people envision a future significantly different than present can be one, often key, difference between decision processes that pursue transformational as opposed to incremental change ( [[#Park--2012|Park et al., 2012]] ; Chapter 17). Narratives that help explain where a community is, where it wants to go and how it intends to get there are an important enabler of transformation (Sections 1.5.1; 1.2.3; [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ; [[#Fazey--2020|Fazey et al., 2020]] ).

<div id="1.5.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="climate-resilient-development"></span>
=== 1.5.3 Climate Resilient Development ===

<div id="h2-17-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Adaptation and mitigation can reduce climate-related risks. Implementing these two types of climate action together increases their effectiveness by exploiting synergies and reducing trade-offs among them. In addition, implementing adaptation and mitigation as an integral part of development can similarly make all three more effective (Section 18.2.3). The link between climate change and sustainable development has long been recognised and has been assessed in every Working Group II report since AR3. AR5 introduced the concept of climate resilient development to help assess development trajectories that include co-ordinated adaptation and mitigation actions aimed at reducing climate risk.

Building on AR5, this AR6 report expands the focus with increased attention to equity and the processes needed to follow such trajectories. AR6 thus defines '''climate resilient development''' as ‘a process of implementing GHG mitigation and adaptation solutions to support sustainable development for all’ (Section 18.1.1). In AR6 WGII, some chapters have a section dedicated to climate resilient development, emphasising the need for integrative and transformative solutions within a sector or region that address the uneven distribution of climate risks among different groups and geographies, as well as extend the goals of these solutions to more than reducing risk, such as in improving social, economic and ecological outcomes (Sections 2.6.7; 4.1; 5.14.4; 6.4.8; 7.4.3.5; 7.4.5; 10.6; 11.8; 15.7; 17.6; Boxes 4.7; 13.3; 8.10). Multiple chapters also employ the concept of climate resilient development to identify and balance trade-offs and make progress on achieving the SDGs (Sections 6.1.3; 7.4.5; 10.6; 13.11; 15.7; 16.6.4.3; Box 4.7; Chapter 18).

Climate resilient development requires large and equitable changes in human and natural systems. As noted in Section 1.5.1, the SR1.5 finds that four transitions in socioeconomic systems—energy, land and ecosystems, urban and infrastructure, and industrial—must occur at large scale and rapid rate in order to achieve climate resilient development. This report notes that transitions of such scale, even when beneficial for many people, can also impose significant adverse impacts on others, in particular on marginal and vulnerable populations (Section 18.1.2). This report identifies a fifth socioeconomic transition, that in societal systems that ‘drive innovation, preferences for alternative patterns of consumption and development, and the power relationships among different actors that engage in climate resilient development (Section 18.1.4). Such societal transitions are necessary to ensure the other four transitions unfold at sufficient speed and scale to meet the goals of Paris and the SDGs, as well as to ensure equity in these transitions.

Introduced in the WGII AR5 (Olsson et al., 2014), and further addressed in SR1.5, climate resilient development pathways are trajectories that strengthen sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities, while promoting fair and equitable reductions of GHG emissions, and serve to steer societies towards low-carbon, prosperous and ecologically safe futures. This report defines a '''climate resilient development pathway''' as a trajectory in time reflecting a particular sequence of actions and consequences against a background of autonomous developments leading to a specific future situation (Section 18.1.2). Such a pathway emerges from the spatially and temporally distributed choices of many different actors in government, business, civic organisations and households at the individual, community, national and international levels. As such, there is no single or preferred pathway for climate resilient development and no single best combination of adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development strategies. All pathways involve complex trade-offs and synergies among different actions (Sections 18.1.4; 18.2.2). All pathways are subject to hard-to-predict shocks, both adverse, such as climate disasters, and beneficial, such as new technologies or shifts in public values. The pathway that emerges will represent the results of negotiation, cooperation and competition among actors at many scales, whose differing values and objectives would favour differing trajectories (Section 18.1.4). Individual actors at various scales will determine the mix of adaptation, mitigation and development appropriate for their development context and goals, while also influenced by the desire for their collective actions to become consistent with the global policy goals, such as those in the Paris Agreement and the SDGs (Section 18.1.2). The norms, institutions and power relationships that mediate such choices determine the extent to which the process unfolds consistent with principles of equity and social justice ( ''high confidence'' ).

Enabling conditions that can accelerate climate resilient development include governance, finance, economy, and science, technology and information (Sections 18.4.2; 18.9.2). The pursuit of equity and justice are both an enabler and an outcome of climate resilient development (Section 18.1.4). Climate resilient development involves a process of action, learning and response (Section 1.5.2), so the capability for such monitoring and iterative risk management also represents an important enabling condition (Section 18.1.4.2). Governments have an important role to play in expanding the solution space, often focusing on technology, policy and finance. Expanding the solution space also requires a broader set of actors. Chapter 18 and other chapters in this report use the climate resilient development concept to highlight the role of citizens, civil society, knowledge institutions, media, investors and businesses, and the importance of expanding the arenas of engagement in which they interact.

<div id="1.6" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="structure-of-the-report"></span>