Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-16 (section)

=== 16.4.2 The Drivers and Politics of National Policies for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation ===

<div id="h2-14-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Governments around the world implement innovation policies in the energy and climate space with the aim of simultaneously advancing environmental, industrial policy (or competitiveness), and security goals ( [[#Anadón--2012|Anadón 2012]] ; [[#Surana--2015|Surana and Anadon 2015]] ; [[#Meckling--2017|Meckling et al. 2017]] ; [[#Matsuo--2019|Matsuo and Schmidt 2019]] ; [[#Peñasco--2021|Peñasco et al. 2021]] ) ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Co-benefits of policies shaping technological innovation in climate-related technologies, including competitiveness, health, and improved distributional impacts can be drivers of climate mitigation policy in the innovation sphere ( [[#Stokes--2017|Stokes and Warshaw 2017]] ; [[#Deng--2018|Deng et al. 2018]] ; [[#Probst--2020|Probst et al. 2020]] ). For instance, this was the case for climate and air pollution policies with local content requirements for different types of renewable energy projects in places including China ( [[#Qiu--2012|Qiu and Anadon 2012]] ; [[#Lewis--2014|Lewis 2014]] ), India ( [[#Behuria--2020|Behuria 2020]] ), South Africa ( [[#Kuntze--2012|Kuntze and Moerenhout 2012]] ), and Canada ( [[#Genest--2014|Genest 2014]] ) ( ''robust evidence'' , ''medi'' ''um agreement'' ).

The emergence of industries and support groups can lead to more sustained support for innovation policies ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ; [[#Schmidt--2017|Schmidt and Sewerin 2017]] [[#Stokes--2018|Stokes and Breetz 2018]] ; [[#Meckling--2019|Meckling 2019]] ; [[#Meckling--2019|Meckling and Nahm 2019]] ; [[#Schmid--2020|Schmid et al. 2020]] ). Conversely, policies shaping technology innovation contribute to the creation and evolution of different stakeholder groups ( ''robust evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Most of the literature on the role of the politics and interest groups has focused on renewable energy technologies, although there is some work on heating in buildings ( [[#Wesche--2019|Wesche et al. 2019]] ).

As novel technologies become cost-competitive, opposition of incumbents usually grows, as well as the dangers of lock-in that can be posed by the new winner. Addressing this involves adapting policy ( ''robust evidence'' , ''hi'' ''gh agreement'' ).

Three phases of politics in the development of policies to meet climate and industrial objectives can be identified, at the top, the middle and the bottom of the experience curve ( [[#Breetz--2018|Breetz et al. 2018]] ) (see also Figure 16.1, and [[#Geels--2002|Geels 2002]] ). In the first phase of ‘niche market diffusion’, the politics of more sustained support for a technology or set of technologies become possible after a group of economic winners and ‘clean energy constituencies’ are created ( [[#Meckling--2015|Meckling et al. 2015]] ). When technologies grow out of the niche (second phase), they pose a more serious competition to incumbents who may become more vocal opponents of additional support for innovation in the competing technologies ( [[#Geels--2014|Geels 2014]] ; [[#Stokes--2016|Stokes 2016]] ). In a third phase, path-dependence in policymaking and lock-in in institutions need to change to accommodate new infrastructure, the integration of technologies, the emergence of complementary technologies and of new regulatory regimes ( [[#Levin--2012|Levin et al. 2012]] ; [[#Aklin--2013|Aklin and Urpelainen 2013]] ).

<div id="16.4.3" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="indicators-to-assess-the-innovation-competitiveness-and-distributional-outcomes-of-policy-instruments"></span>