Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-5 (section)

=== 5.4.2 Socio-cultural Drivers of Climate Mitigation ===

<div id="h2-18-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div>

Collective behaviours and social organisation are part of everyday life, and feeling part of active collective action renders mitigation measures efficient and pervasive ( [[#Climact--2018|Climact 2018]] ). Social and cultural processes play an important role in shaping what actions people take on climate mitigation, interacting with individual, structural, institutional and economic drivers ( [[#Barr--2014|Barr and Prillwitz 2014]] ). Just like infrastructure, social and cultural processes can ‘lock in’ societies to carbon-intensive patterns of service delivery. They also offer potential levers to change normative ideas and social practices in order to achieve extensive emissions cuts ( ''high confidence'' ) (Table 5.4).

In terms of cultural processes, we can distinguish two levels of analysis: specific meanings associated with particular technologies or practices, and general narratives about climate change mitigation. Specific '''meanings''' (e.g., comfort, status, identity and agency) are associated with many technologies and everyday social practices that deliver energy services, from driving a car to using a cookstove ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#5.5|Section 5.5]] ). Meanings are symbolic and influence the willingness of individuals to use existing technologies or shift to new ones ( [[#Wilhite--1995|Wilhite and Ling 1995]] ; [[#Wilhite--2009|Wilhite 2009]] ; [[#Sorrell--2015|Sorrell 2015]] ). Symbolic motives are more important predictors of technology adoption than instrumental motives ( [[#Steg--2005|Steg 2005]] ; [[#Noppers--2014|Noppers et al. 2014]] ; [[#Noppers--2015|Noppers et al. 2015]] ; [[#Noppers--2016|Noppers et al. 2016]] ) (see case study on app cabs in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8)). If an individual’s pro-environmental behaviour is associated with personal meaning than it also increases subjective well-being ( [[#Zawadzki--2020|Zawadzki et al. 2020]] ). Status consciousness is highly relevant in GHG emission-intensive consumption choices (cars, houses). However, inversely framing energy-saving behaviour as high status is a promising strategy for emission reduction ( [[#Ramakrishnan--2021|Ramakrishnan and Creutzig 2021]] ).

At a broader level, '''narratives''' about climate mitigation circulate within and across societies, as recognised in SR1.5, and are broader than the meanings associated with specific technologies ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ). Narratives enable people to imagine and make sense of the future through processes of interpretation, understanding, communication and social interaction ( [[#Smith--2017|Smith et al. 2017]] ). Stories about climate change are relevant for mitigation in numerous ways. They can be utopian or dystopian (e.g., ''The great derangement'' by Amitav Ghosh) ( [[#Ghosh--2016|Ghosh 2016]] ), for example presenting apocalyptic stories and imagery to capture people’s attention and evoke emotional and behavioural response ( [[#O’Neill--2014|O’Neill and Smith 2014]] ). Reading climate stories has been shown to cause short-term influences on attitudes towards climate change, increasing the belief that climate change is human caused and increasing its issue priority ( [[#Schneider-Mayerson--2020|Schneider-Mayerson et al. 2020]] ). Climate narratives can also be used to justify scepticism of science, drawing together coalitions of diverse actors into social movements that aim to prevent climate action ( [[#Lejano--2020|Lejano and Nero 2020]] ). Narratives are also used in integrated assessment and energy system models that construct climate stabilisation scenarios, for example in the choice of parameters, their interpretation and model structure ( [[#Ellenbeck--2019|Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019]] ). One important narrative choice of many models involves framing climate change as market failure (which leads to the result that carbon pricing is required). While such a choice can be justified, other model framings can be equally justified ( [[#Ellenbeck--2019|Ellenbeck and Lilliestam 2019]] ).

Power and agency shape which climate narratives are told and how prevalent they are ( [[#O’Neill--2014|O’Neill and Smith 2014]] ; [[#Schneider-Mayerson--2020|Schneider-Mayerson et al. 2020]] ). For example, narratives have been used by indigenous communities to imagine climate futures divergent from top-down, government-led narratives ( [[#Streeby--2018|Streeby 2018]] ). The uptake of new climate narratives is influenced by political beliefs and trust. Policymakers can enable emissions reduction by employing narratives that have broad societal appeal, encourage behavioural change and complement regulatory and fiscal measures ( [[#Terzi--2020|Terzi 2020]] ). Justice narratives may not have universal appeal: in a UK study, justice narratives polarised individuals along ideological lines, with lower support amongst individuals with right-wing beliefs; by contrast, narratives centred on saving energy, avoiding waste and patriotic values were more widely supported across society ( [[#Whitmarsh--2017|Whitmarsh and Corner 2017]] ). More research is needed to assess if these findings are prevalent in diverse socio-cultural contexts, as well as the role played by social media platforms to influence emerging narratives of climate change ( [[#Pearce--2019|Pearce et al. 2019]] ).

Trust in organisations is a key predictor of the take-up of novel energy services ( [[#Lutzenhiser--1993|Lutzenhiser 1993]] ), particularly when financial incentives are high ( [[#Stern--1985|Stern et al. 1985]] ; [[#Joskow--1995|Joskow 1995]] ). Research has shown that if there is low public trust in utility companies, service delivery by community-based non-profit organisations in the US ( [[#Stern--1985|Stern et al. 1985]] ) or public/private partnerships in Mexico ( [[#Friedmann--1998|Friedmann and Sheinbaum 1998]] ), offer more effective solutions, yet only if public trust is higher in these types of organisations. UK research shows that acceptance of shifts to less resource-intensive service provision (e.g., more resource-efficient products, extending product lifetimes, community schemes for sharing products) varies depending on factors including trust in suppliers and manufacturers, affordability, quality and hygiene of shared products, and fair allocation of responsibilities ( [[#Cherry--2018|Cherry et al. 2018]] ). Trust in other people plays an important role in the sharing economy ( [[#Li--2020|Li and Wang 2020]] ), for example predicting shifts in transport mode, specifically car sharing involving rides with strangers ( [[#Acheampong--2019|Acheampong and Siiba 2019]] ) ( [[#5.3.4.2|Section 5.3.4.2]] ).

Action on climate mitigation is influenced by our perception of what other people commonly do, think or expect, known as social norms ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Cialdini--2006|Cialdini 2006]] ) (Table 5.3), even though people often do not acknowledge this ( [[#Nolan--2008|Nolan et al. 2008]] ; [[#Noppers--2014|Noppers et al. 2014]] ). Changing social norms can encourage societal transformation and social tipping points to address climate mitigation ( [[#Nyborg--2016|Nyborg et al. 2016]] ; [[#Otto--2020|Otto et al. 2020]] ). Providing feedback to people about how their own actions compare to others’ can encourage mitigation ( [[#Delmas--2013|Delmas et al. 2013]] ), although the overall effect size is not strong ( [[#Abrahamse--2013|Abrahamse and Steg 2013]] ). Trending norms are behaviours that are becoming more popular, even if currently practised by a minority. Communicating messages that the number of people engaging in a mitigation behaviour (e.g., giving a financial donation to an environmental conservation organisation) is increasing – a simple low-cost policy intervention – can encourage shifts to the targeted behaviour, even if the effect size is relatively small ( [[#Mortensen--2019|Mortensen et al. 2019]] ).

Socially comparative feedback seems to be more effective when people strongly identify with the reference group ( [[#De%20Dominicis--2019|De Dominicis et al. 2019]] ). Descriptive norms (perceptions of behaviours common in others) are more strongly related to mitigation actions when injunctive norms (perceptions of whether certain behaviours are commonly approved or disapproved) are also strong, when people are not strongly personally involved with mitigation topics ( [[#Göckeritz--2010|Göckeritz et al. 2010]] ), when people are currently acting inconsistently with their preferences, when norm-based interventions are supported by other interventions and when the context supports norm-congruent actions ( [[#Miller--2016|Miller and Prentice 2016]] ). A descriptive norm prime (‘most other people try to reduce energy consumption’) together with injunctive norm feedback (‘you are very good at saving energy’) is a very effective combination to motivate further energy savings ( [[#Bonan--2020|Bonan et al. 2020]] ). Second-order beliefs (perceptions of what others in the community believe) are particularly important for leveraging descriptive norms ( [[#Jachimowicz--2018|Jachimowicz et al. 2018]] ).

Behavioural contagion, which describes how ideas and behaviours often spread like infectious diseases, is a major contributor to the climate crisis ( [[#Sunstein--2019|Sunstein 2019]] ). But harnessing contagion can also mitigate warming. Carbon-heavy consumption patterns have become the norm only in part because we’re not charged for environmental damage we cause ( [[#Pigou--1920|Pigou 1920]] ). The deeper source of these patterns has been peer influence ( [[#Frank--1999|Frank 1999]] ), because what we do influences others. A rooftop solar installation early in the adoption cycle, for example, spawns a copycat installation in the same neighbourhood within four months, on average. With such installations thus doubling every four months, a single new order results in 32 additional installations in just two years. And contagion doesn’t stop there, since each family also influences friends and relatives in distant locations.

Harnessing contagion can also underwrite the investment necessary for climate stability. If taxed more heavily, top earners would spend less, shifting the frames of reference that shape spending of those just below, and so on – each step simultaneously reducing emissions and liberating resources for additional green investment ( [[#Frank--2020|Frank 2020]] ). Many resist, believing that higher taxes would make it harder to buy life’s special extras. But that belief is a cognitive illusion ( [[#Frank--2020|Frank 2020]] ). Acquiring special things, which are inherently in short supply, requires outbidding others who also want them. When top tax rates rise in tandem, relative bidding power is completely unchanged, so the same penthouse apartments would end up in the same hands as before. More generally, behavioural contagion is important to leverage all relevant social tipping points for stabilising Earth’s climate ( [[#Otto--2020|Otto et al. 2020]] ).

For new climate policies and mitigation technologies to be rapidly and extensively implemented, they must be socially acceptable to those who are directly impacted by those policies and technologies ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ). Policies that run counter to social norms or cultural meanings are less likely to be effective in reducing emissions ( [[#Demski--2015|Demski et al. 2015]] ; [[#Perlaviciute--2018|Perlaviciute et al. 2018]] ; [[#Roy--2018b|Roy et al. 2018b]] ). More just and acceptable implementation of renewable energy technologies requires taking account of the cultural meanings, emotional attachments and identities linked to particular landscapes and places where those technologies are proposed ( [[#Devine-Wright--2009|Devine-Wright 2009]] ) and enabling fairness in how decisions are taken and costs and benefits distributed ( [[#Wolsink--2007|Wolsink 2007]] ). This is important for achieving the goal of SDG 7 (increased use of renewable energy resources) in developing countries while achieving energy justice ( [[#Calzadilla--2017|Calzadilla and Mauger 2017]] ). ‘Top-down’ imposition of climate policies by governments can translate into local opposition when perceived to be unjust and lacking transparency ( ''high evidence, high agreement'' ). Policymakers can build trust and increase the legitimacy of new policies by implementing early and extensive public and stakeholder participation, avoiding ‘Nimby’ (Not In My Back Yard) assumptions about objectors and adopting ‘Just Transition’ principles ( [[#Owens--2000|Owens 2000]] ; [[#Wolsink--2007|Wolsink 2007]] ; [[#Wüstenhagen--2007|Wüstenhagen et al. 2007]] ; [[#Dietz--2008|Dietz and Stern 2008]] ; [[#Devine-Wright--2011|Devine-Wright 2011]] ; [[#Heffron--2018|Heffron and McCauley 2018]] ). Participatory mechanisms that enable deliberation by a representative sample of the public ( [[#Climate%20Assembly%20UK--2020|Climate Assembly UK 2020]] ) can inform policymaking and increase the legitimacy of new and difficult policy actions ( [[#Dryzek--2019|Dryzek et al. 2019]] ).

Collective action by civil society groups and social movements can work to enable or constrain climate mitigation. Civil society groups can advocate policy change, provide policy research and open up opportunities for new political reforms ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) as recognised in previous IPCC reports ( [[#IPCC--2007|IPCC 2007]] ). Grassroots environmental initiatives, including community energy groups, are collective responses to, and critiques of, normative ways that everyday material needs (e.g., food, energy, making) are produced, supplied and circulated ( [[#Schlosberg--2016|Schlosberg and Coles 2016]] ). Such initiatives can reconcile lower carbon footprints with higher life satisfaction and higher incomes ( [[#Vita--2020|Vita et al. 2020]] ). Local initiatives such as Transition Towns and community energy projects can lead to improvements in energy efficiency, ensure a decent standard of living and increase renewable energy uptake, while building on existing social trust, and, in turn, building social trust and initiating engagement, capacity building, and social capital formation ( [[#Hicks--2018|Hicks and Ison 2018]] ). Another example are grassroot initiatives that aim to reduce food loss and waste, even as overall evidence on their effectiveness remains limited ( [[#Mariam--2020|Mariam et al. 2020]] ). However, community energy initiatives are not always inclusive and require policy support for widespread implementation across all socio-economic groups ( [[#Aiken--2017|Aiken et al. 2017]] ). In addition, more evidence is required of the impacts of community energy initiatives ( [[#Creamer--2018|Creamer et al. 2018]] ; [[#Bardsley--2019|Bardsley et al. 2019]] ).

Civil society social movements are a primary driver of social and institutional change ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) and can be differently positioned as, on the one hand, ‘insider’ social movements (e.g., World Wildlife Fund) that seek to influence existing state institutions through lobbying, advice and research and, on the other hand, ‘outsider’ social movements (e.g., Rising Tide, Extinction Rebellion) that advocate radical reform through protests and demonstrations ( [[#Newell--2005|Newell 2005]] ; [[#Caniglia--2015|Caniglia et al. 2015]] ). Civil society social movements frame grievances that resonate with society, mobilise resources to coordinate and sustain mass collective action, and operate within – and seek to influence – external conditions that enable or constrain political change ( [[#Caniglia--2015|Caniglia et al. 2015]] ). When successful, social movements open up windows of opportunity (so called ‘Overton Windows’) to unlock structural change ( ''high evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Szałek--2013|Szałek 2013]] ; [[#Piggot--2018|Piggot 2018]] ).

Climate social movements advocate new narratives or framings for climate mitigation (e.g., ‘climate emergency’) ( [[#della%20Porta--2014|della Porta and Parks 2014]] ); criticise positive meanings associated with high emission technologies or practices (see case studies on diet and solar PV, (Boxes 5.5 and 5.7)); show disapproval for high-emission behaviours (e.g., through ‘flight shaming’); model behaviour change (e.g., shifting to veganism or public transport – see case study on mobility in Kolkata, India (Box 5.8)); demonstrate against extraction and use of fossil fuels ( [[#Cheon--2018|Cheon and Urpelainen 2018]] ); and aim to increase a sense of agency amongst certain social groups (e.g., young people or indigenous communities) that structural change is possible. Climate strikes have become internationally prevalent, for example the September 2019 strikes involved participants in more than 180 countries ( [[#Rosane--2019|Rosane 2019]] ; [[#Fisher--2020|Fisher and Nasrin 2020]] ; [[#Martiskainen--2020|Martiskainen et al. 2020]] ). Enabled by digitalisation, these have given voice to youth on climate ( [[#Lee--2020|Lee et al. 2020]] ) and created a new cohort of active citizens engaged in climate demonstrations ( [[#Fisher--2019|Fisher 2019]] ). Research on bystanders shows that marches increase positive beliefs about marchers and collective efficacy ( [[#Swim--2019|Swim et al. 2019]] ).

Countermovement coalitions work to oppose climate mitigation ( ''high confidence'' ). Examples include efforts in the US to oppose mandatory limits on carbon emissions supported by organisations from the coal and electrical utility sectors ( [[#Brulle--2019|Brulle 2019]] ). There is evidence that US opposition to climate action by carbon-connected industries is broad-based, highly organised, and matched with extensive lobbying ( [[#Cory--2021|Cory et al., 2021]] ). Social movements can also work to prevent policy changes, for example in France the Gilet Jaunes objected to increases in fuel costs on the grounds that they unfairly distributed the costs and benefits of price rises across social groups, for example between urban, peri-urban and rural areas ( [[#Copland--2019|Copland 2019]] ).

Religion could play an important role in enabling collective action on climate mitigation by providing cultural interpretations of change and institutional responses that provide resources and infrastructure to sustain collective actions ( [[#Roy--2012|Roy et al. 2012]] ; [[#Haluza-DeLay--2014|Haluza-DeLay 2014]] ; [[#Caniglia--2015|Caniglia et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hulme--2015|Hulme 2015]] ). Religion can be an important cultural resource towards sustainability at individual, community and institutional levels ( [[#Ives--2019|Ives and Kidwell 2019]] ), providing leverage points for inner transformation towards sustainability ( [[#Woiwode--2021|Woiwode et al. 2021]] ). Normative interpretations of climate change for and from religious communities are found in nearly every geography, and often observe popular movements for climate action drawing on religious symbols or metaphors ( [[#Jenkins--2018|Jenkins et al. 2018]] ). This suggests the value for policymakers of involving religious constituencies as significant civil society organisations in devising and delivering climate responses.

<div id="box-5.7" class="h2-container box-container"></div>

<span id="box-5.7-solar-pv-and-the-agency-of-consumers"></span>