Editing IPCC:AR6/SR15/Chapter-5 (section)

==== 5.5.3.2 Development trajectories, sharing of efforts and cooperation ====

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The potential for pursuing sustainable and climate-resilient development pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world differs between and within nations, due to differential development achievements and trajectories, and opportunities and challenges ( ''very high confidence'' ) (Figure 5.1). There are clear differences between high-income countries where social achievements are high, albeit often with negative effects on the environment, and most developing nations where vulnerabilities to climate change are high and social support and life satisfaction are low, especially in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (Sachs et al., 2017; O’Neill et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r332|332]]</sup> . Differential starting points for CRDPs between and within countries, including path dependencies (Figure 5.5), call for sensitivity to context (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r333|333]]</sup> . For the developing world, limiting warming to 1.5°C also means potentially severely curtailed development prospects (Okereke and Coventry, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r334|334]]</sup> and risks to human rights from both climate action and inaction to achieve this goal (Robinson and Shine, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r335|335]]</sup> (Section 5.2). Within-country development differences remain, despite efforts to ensure inclusive societies (Gupta and Arts, 2017; Gupta and Pouw, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r336|336]]</sup> . Cole et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r337|337]]</sup> , for instance, show how differences between provinces in South Africa constitute barriers to sustainable development trajectories and for operationalising nation-level SDGs, across various dimensions of social deprivation and environmental stress, reflecting historic disadvantages.

Moreover, various equity and effort- or burden-sharing approaches to climate stabilization in the literature describe how to sketch national potentials for a 1.5°C warmer world (e.g., Anand, 2004; CSO Equity Review, 2015; Meinshausen et al., 2015; Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Bexell and Jönsson, 2017; Otto et al., 2017; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r338|338]]</sup> . Many approaches build on the AR5 ‘responsibility –capacity– need’ assessment (Clarke et al., 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r339|339]]</sup> , complement other proposed national-level metrics for capabilities, equity and fairness (Heyward and Roser, 2016; Klinsky et al., 2017a) <sup>[[#fn:r340|340]]</sup> , or fall under the wider umbrella of fair share debates on responsibility, capability and the right to development in climate policy (Fuglestvedt and Kallbekken, 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r341|341]]</sup> . Importantly, different principles and methodologies generate different calculated contributions, responsibilities and capacities (Skeie et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r342|342]]</sup> .

The notion of nation-level fair shares is now also discussed in the context of limiting global warming to 1.5°C and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) (see Chapter 4, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4) (CSO Equity Review, 2015; Mace, 2016; Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; Holz et al., 2018; Kartha et al., 2018; Winkler et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r343|343]]</sup> . A study by Pan et al. (2017) <sup>[[#fn:r344|344]]</sup> concluded that all countries would need to contribute to ambitious emissions reductions and that current pledges for 2030 by seven out of eight high-emitting countries would be insufficient to meet 1.5°C. Emerging literature on justice-centred pathways to 1.5°C points towards ambitious emissions reductions domestically and committed cooperation internationally whereby wealthier countries support poorer ones, technologically, financially and otherwise to enhance capacities (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Holz et al., 2018; Robinson and Shine, 2018; Shue, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r345|345]]</sup> . These findings suggest that equitable and 1.5°C-compatible pathways would require fast action across all countries at all levels of development rather than late accession of developing countries (as assumed under SSP3, see Chapter 2), with external support for prompt mitigation and resilience-building efforts in the latter ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ).

Scientific advances since the AR5 now also make it possible to determine contributions to climate change for non-state actors (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1) and their potential to contribute to CRDPs ( ''medium evidence, medium agreement'' ). These non-state actors includes cities (Bulkeley et al., 2013, 2014; Byrne et al., 2016) <sup>[[#fn:r346|346]]</sup> , businesses (Heede, 2014; Frumhoff et al., 2015; Shue, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r347|347]]</sup> , transnational initiatives (Castro, 2016; Andonova et al., 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r348|348]]</sup> and industries. Recent work demonstrates the contributions of 90 industrial carbon producers to global temperature and sea level rise, and their responsibilities to contribute to investments in and support for mitigation and adaptation (Heede, 2014; Ekwurzel et al., 2017; Shue, 2017) <sup>[[#fn:r349|349]]</sup> (Sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2).

At the level of groups and individuals, equity in pursuing climate resilience for a 1.5°C warmer world means addressing disadvantage, inequities and empowerment that shape transformative processes and pathways (Fazey et al., 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r350|350]]</sup> , and deliberate efforts to strengthen the capabilities, capacities and well-being of poor, marginalized and vulnerable people (Byrnes, 2014; Tokar, 2014; Harris et al., 2017; Klinsky et al., 2017a; Klinsky and Winkler, 2018) <sup>[[#fn:r351|351]]</sup> . Community-driven CRDPs can flag potential negative impacts of national trajectories on disadvantaged groups, such as low-income families and communities of colour (Rao, 2014) <sup>[[#fn:r352|352]]</sup> . They emphasize social equity, participatory governance, social inclusion and human rights, as well as innovation, experimentation and social learning (see Glossary) ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) (Sections 5.5.3.3 and 5.6).

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