Jump to content
Main menu
Main menu
move to sidebar
hide
Navigation
Main page
Recent changes
Random page
Help about MediaWiki
Special pages
ClimateKG
Search
Search
English
Appearance
Create account
Log in
Personal tools
Create account
Log in
Pages for logged out editors
learn more
Contributions
Talk
Editing
IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1
(section)
IPCC
Discussion
English
Read
Edit source
View history
Tools
Tools
move to sidebar
hide
Actions
Read
Edit source
View history
General
What links here
Related changes
Page information
In other projects
Appearance
move to sidebar
hide
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
=== 1.5.1 Understanding Transformation === <div id="h2-15-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Over the last 200 years, human society has undergone a rapid and profound transformation, with population and income per capita expanding by an order of magnitude or more after many millennia of relative stasis in living standards ( [[#Dasgupta--2018|Dasgupta et al., 2018]] ). The transformations associated with sustainable development and managing climate risk may be of similar scale as these historic transformations. In the past, changes in technologies and economies of this scale are not separate from, but are necessarily embedded alongside changes in political, religious and social relationships ( [[#Polanyi--1957|Polanyi, 1957]] ). Future transformation may similarly involve such interlinked social, cultural, economic, environmental, technical and political factors (Chapter 18; Section 1.5.2). Technology-led, market-led or state-led transitions aimed at meeting Paris Agreement and SDGs may fail without integrating dimensions of social justice and addressing the social and political exclusion that prevent the disadvantaged from accessing such improvements and increasing their incomes ( [[#Burkett--2014|Burkett et al., 2014]] ; Scoones et al., 2015) ( ''medium confidence'' ). As used in the global environmental change literature, transformation is a pluralistic concept embracing many interpretations (Box 18.3), but all focus on the general idea of fundamental change in society as opposed to change that is minor, marginal or incremental. Uses of the term can differ with respect to: (a) how the system undergoing change is conceptualised, (b) the extent to which change is continuous or discontinuous and the time scales involved, (c) the extent to which transformation is guided towards desired goals or emerges without intent and (d) whether the usage focuses on descriptions of societal processes or includes normative judgements as to which outcomes should or should not occur ( [[#Feola--2015|Feola, 2015]] ) . The literature generally uses transformation as an analytic-descriptive concept, which aims to describe significant change in couple human–natural systems, or as a solutions-oriented concept, which aims to inform or contribute to societal change. The IPCC Fifth Assessment cycle, starting with its Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), first highlighted the concept of transformation, drawing primarily on the solutions-oriented approaches of [[#O’Brien--2011|O’Brien (2011)]] and [[#Pelling--2011|Pelling (2011)]] . This Sixth Assessment report also generally employs transformation as a solutions-oriented concept, with mention in almost all chapters and significant emphasis in the synthesis chapters. The IPCC Sixth Assessment cycle also highlights the concept of transition, drawn from the sustainability transitions literature ( [[#Köhler--2019|Köhler et al., 2019]] ). The 1.5 SR organises its assessments of feasibility and potential policy actions around transitions in four socio-technical system: energy, land, urban and infrastructure, and industrial systems ( [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] , Chapter 4). This report adds a fifth system transition—a societal transition focused on attributes that drive innovation, the evolution of patterns of consumption and development and power relationships among societal actors (Section 18.1.4). The AR6 WGIII report is organised around six systems transitions: energy; agricultural, forestry, other land use; urban; buildings; transportation; and industry, which includes supply chains and the circular economy. The literature offers multiple views on the relationships between transition and transformation (Box 18.3). The 1.5 SR suggests that transformation is needed to generate the four system transitions. In many literatures, transformation is considered a more expansive process than transition, with the former less exclusively focused on socio-technical systems and more engaged with questions of power, politics, capabilities, culture, identity and sense-making ( [[#Gillard--2016|Gillard et al., 2016]] ; [[#Hoelscher--2018|Hölscher et al., 2018]] ; [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ). This report generally takes this more expansive view of transformation to engage with issues of equity, climate justice and large-scale institutional and societal change (Box 18.3). This WGII report has a particular focus on '''transformational adaptation''' (Section 1.4.4.1), which it views as laying on a continuum from incremental and transformational with no sharp division between them (Sections 1.5.2; 17.2.2.3). The IPCC first highlighted the concept of transformational adaptation in SREX. SREX generally used the phrase transformation to refer to fundamental societal changes that advance climate adaptation, disaster risk management and sustainable development. Transformation was seen as one part of the solution space alongside options such as reducing vulnerability and exposure, and increasing resilience for managing risk. WGII of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report used the phrase ‘transformational adaptation’ to contrast with ‘incremental adaptation’. That report used the former term to refer to: (a) adaptation at large scope or scale, (b) the type of adaptation that occurs once soft limits have been breached, or (c) change that addresses root causes of vulnerability as well as redressing long-standing inequities. The Fifth Assessment Report’s WGIII employed the concepts of transformation and transformation pathways to assess the large-scale societal changes needed to meet GHG emission reduction goals. This WGII report focuses on transformational adaptation as one component of climate resilient development in which adaptation, mitigation and development solutions are pursued together to exploit synergies and reduce trade-offs among these actions (Section 1.5.3; Chapter 18). Chapter 16 assesses the extent to which transformational adaptation is currently being implemented, using criteria including the scope, depth and speed of the adaptation actions, as well as the extent to which limits to adaptation have been considered (Section 16.3.2.4). Chapter 17 ranks potential adaptation options by where they lie on the incremental to transformational continuum (Section 17.2.2.4). Societal transformation can arise without explicit intent as, arguably, did the industrial revolution and some of the trends re-making today’s society (see Section 1.1). In order to help policymakers achieve societal goals, this report seeks to identify the conditions for '''deliberate transformations''' , that is, those envisioned and intended by at least some societal actors ( [[#Linnér--2019|Linnér and Wibeck, 2019]] ). Figure 1.9 connects several key concepts that this report employs to help distinguish pathways that lead to deliberative and forced transformations. As shown in the figure, adaptation goals might imply a desired level of adaptation: (a) accessible by actions within the solution space of the existing system or (b) beyond the solution space of the existing system. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels that avoid threatening private or social norms (also see Figure 17.6). In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation is necessary to reach the goals. Alternatively, if deliberate transformation does not successfully occur or hard limits are exceeded, the system may nonetheless undergo some type of forced transformation which results in outcomes inconsistent with societal goals. While the figure shows single decision points, multiple actors are involved at each stage. Thus, some people may find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks which are not otherwise avoided. Often such coping situations display significant inequities, with tolerable risks for powerful groups and intolerable ones for marginalised groups. <div id="_idContainer057" class="Figure"></div> [[File:4ba5481e99914f2b89eb61533e2454ee IPCC_AR6_WGII_Figure_1_009.png]] '''Figure 1.9 |''' '''Alternative pathways to transformation.''' Adaptation goals may be accessible by actions within or beyond the existing solution space. In the former case, incremental adaptation may stay within soft limits and hold risks to tolerable levels. In the latter case, deliberate transformational adaptation becomes necessary to achieve goals. If a successful deliberate transformation does not occur, the system may nonetheless undergo a forced transformation. Multiple actors are involved at each stage so that some people may nonetheless find themselves coping with what they regard as intolerable risks. Multiple narratives describe pathways for pursuing deliberate transformations ( [[#Cavanagh--2017|Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017]] ). While building on the new ‘green economy’ framing that emerged with the Rio+20 conference in 2012 ( [[#UNEP--2011|UNEP, 2011]] ; [[#De-Mello--2012|De Mello and Dutz, 2012]] ; [[#OECD--2012|OECD, 2012]] ), these narratives reflect differing trade-offs among values and differing assumptions about the factors driving system change (see WGIII). The narratives range from ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios focused on modernisation of sectors such as energy, agriculture and use of natural resources to more transformational propositions such as various green new deal proposals ( [[#European%20Commission--2019|European Commission, 2019]] ), the new climate economy ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ), and ‘doughnut economics’ ( [[#Raworth--2017|Raworth, 2017]] ). Some literature suggests significant benefits from such new climate economy proposals, claiming tens of trillions in economic benefits, tens of millions of new jobs and close to a million fewer premature deaths from pollution over the coming decade ( [[#Global%20Commission%20on%20the%20Economy%20and%20Climate--2018|Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2018]] ). Two contrasting schools of thought, called ecomodernism and degrowth (D'Alisa et al., 2014), offer important bounding narratives for ‘green economy’ approaches that aim achieve the SDGs and Paris Agreement goals. Ecomodernism aims to decouple GHG emissions and other environmental impacts from GDP growth (WGIII Section 1.4.1; Desrochers and Szurmak., 2020) through three primary strategies: (a) ‘green’ technological innovation, (b) resource efficiency or productivity improvements and (c) the sustainable intensification of land use in both rural and urban areas ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] ; [[#Isenhour--2016|Isenhour, 2016]] ). Such efforts to mobilise large-scale investment in climate change adaptation and to decouple GDP growth from environmental impacts could generate substantial employment opportunities and open up profitable investment frontiers ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] ; [[#Adelman--2018|Adelman, 2018]] ), which could help achieve SDG 8, which calls for accelerated annual growth rates of at least 7% in least developed countries and achieve SDG 10, which calls for ‘income growth of the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average’. Degrowth proponents question the feasibility of decoupling at a scale and rate sufficient to meet Paris Agreement goals ( [[#Kallis--2017|Kallis, 2017]] ; [[#Parrique--2019|Parrique et al., 2019]] ; [[#Gómez-Baggethun--2020|Gómez-Baggethun, 2020]] ; [[#Hickel--2020|Hickel and Kallis, 2020]] ). Using precautionary principle-rooted arguments ( [[#Latouche--2001|Latouche, 2001]] ), degrowth aims for intentional decreases in both GDP and coupled GHG emissions ( [[#Kallis--2011|Kallis, 2011]] ) using policy mechanisms such a ‘cap and share’ framework for distributing emissions permits on an annually declining basis with legislation to prohibit the overshoot of established carbon budgets ( [[#Douthwaite--2012|Douthwaite, 2012]] ; [[#Kallis--2012|Kallis et al., 2012]] ). Degrowth thus seeks to minimise reliance on negative emissions technologies, such as the large-scale deployment of BECCS (e.g., illustrative emissions reduction pathway labelled P4 in IPCC SR1.5, [[#IPCC--2018b|IPCC, 2018b]] ; also WGIII Chapter 3) and aims to generate progress toward achieving the SDGs by prioritising redistribution rather than GDP growth. SDGs potentially addressed by degrowth include universal basic income (SDGs 1 and 10), work-sharing to guarantee full employment (SDGs 8 and 10) and shifting taxation burdens from income to resource and energy extraction (SDGs 8 and 12). The contrasting premises of ecomodernism and degrowth have prompted a series of mutual counterarguments. Degrowth scholars emphasise that global absolute decoupling is currently not proceeding fast enough to meet Paris Agreement targets ( [[#Ward--2016|Ward et al., 2016]] ; Moreau et al., 2019; [[#Haberl--2020|Haberl et al., 2020]] ). Ecomodernists point to important progress towards achieving absolute decoupling at the national or regional scale—as shown by [[#Le%20Quéré--2019|Le Quéré et al. (2019)]] in 18 developed countries—and the future potential of emerging technologies and policy reforms ( [[#Asafu-Adjaye--2015|Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015]] ) <div id="1.5.2" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="enabling-transformation"></span>
Summary:
Please note that all contributions to ClimateKG may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here.
You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see
ClimateKG:Copyrights
for details).
Do not submit copyrighted work without permission!
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)
Search
Search
Editing
IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-1
(section)
Add languages
Add topic