Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-1 (section)

=== 1.7.4 Approaches From Psychology and Politics of Changing Course ===

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The continued increase in global emissions to 2019, despite three decades of scientific warnings of ever-greater clarity and urgency, motivates growing attention in the literature to the psychological ‘faults of our rationality’ ( [[#Bryck--2016|Bryck and Ellis 2016]] ), and the political nature of climate mitigation.

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==== 1.7.4.1 Psychological and Behavioural Dimensions ====

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The AR5 emphasised that decision processes often include both deliberate (‘calculate the costs and beneﬁts’) and intuitive thinking, the latter utilising emotion- and rule-based responses that are conditioned by personal past experience, social context, and cultural factors (e.g., [[#Kahneman--2003|Kahneman 2003]] ), and that laypersons tend to judge risks differently than experts – for example, ‘intuitive’ reactions are often characterised by biases to the status quo and aversion to perceived risks and ambiguity ( [[#Kahneman--1979|Kahneman and Tversky 1979]] ). Many of these features of human reasoning create ‘psychological distance’ from climate change ( [[#Spence--2012|Spence et al. 2012]] ; [[#Marshall--2014|Marshall 2014]] ). These can impede adequate personal responses, in addition to the collective nature of the problem, where such problems can take the form of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’, neglected and so becoming ‘unknown knowns’ ( [[#Sarewitz--2020|Sarewitz 2020]] ). These decision processes, and the perceptions that shape them, have been studied through different lenses from psychology ( [[#Weber--2016|Weber 2016]] ) to sociology ( [[#Guilbeault--2018|Guilbeault et al. 2018]] ), and media studies ( [[#Boykoff--2011|Boykoff 2011]] ). [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and Gilek (2020)]] identify science denialism and ‘decision thresholds’ as key mechanisms of delay.

Experimental economics ( [[#Allcott--2011|Allcott 2011]] ) also helps explain why cost-effective energy efficiency measures or other mitigation technologies are not taken up as fast or as widely as the benefits might suggest, including procrastination and inattention, as ‘we often resist actions with clear long-term benefits if they are unpleasant in the short run’ ( [[#Allcott--2010|Allcott and Mullainathan 2010]] ). Incorporating behavioural and social dynamics in models is required particularly to better represent the demand side ( [[#Nikas--2020|Nikas et al. 2020]] ), for example, [[#Safarzyńska--2018|Safarzyńska (2018)]] demonstrates how behavioural factors change responses to carbon pricing relative to other instruments. A key perspective is to eschew ‘either/or’ between economic and behavioural frameworks, as the greatest effects often involve combining behavioural dimensions (e.g., norms, social influence networks, convenience and quality assurance) with financial incentives and information ( [[#Stern--2010|Stern et al. 2010]] ). Randomised, controlled field trials can help predict the effects of behavioural interventions ( [[#Levitt--2009|Levitt and List 2009]] ; [[#McRae--2016|McRae and Meeks 2016]] ; [[#Gillan--2017|Gillan 2017]] ). [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-5|Chapter 5]] explores both positive and negative dimensions of behaivour in more depth, including the development of norms and interactions with the wider social context, with emphasis upon the services associated with human well-being, rather than the economic activities per se.

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==== 1.7.4.2 Socio-political and Institutional Approaches ====

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Political and institutional dynamics shape climate change responses in important ways, not least because incumbent actors have frequently blocked climate policy ( [[#1.4.5|Section 1.4.5]] ). Institutional perspectives probe networks of opposition ( [[#Brulle--2019|Brulle 2019]] ) and emphasise that their ability to block – as well as the ability of others to foster low-carbon transitions – are structured by specific institutional forms across countries ( [[#Lamb--2020|Lamb and Minx 2020]] ). National institutions have widely been developed to promote traditionally fossil fuel-based sectors like electricity and transport as key to economic development, contributing to carbon lock-in ( [[#Seto--2016|Seto et al. 2016]] ) and inertia ( [[#Rosenschöld--2014|Rosenschöld et al. 2014]] ).

The influence of interest groups on policymaking varies across countries. Comparative political economy approaches tend to find that countries where interests are closely coordinated by governments (‘coordinated market economies’) have been able to generate transformative change more than those with a more arms-length, even combative relationship between interest groups and governments (‘liberal market economies’) ( [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Ćetković--2016|Ćetković and Buzogány 2016]] ; [[#Zou--2016|Zou et al. 2016]] ; [[#Meckling--2018|Meckling 2018]] ). ‘Developmental states’ often have the capacity for strong intervention but any low-carbon interventions may be overwhelmed by other pressures and very rapid economic growth ( [[#Wood--2020a|Wood et al. 2020a]] ).

Institutional features affecting climate policy include levels and types of democracy ( [[#Povitkina--2018|Povitkina 2018]] ), electoral systems, or levels of institutional centralisation (federal vs unitary states, presidential vs parliamentary systems) ( [[#Lachapelle--2013|Lachapelle and Paterson 2013]] ; [[#Steurer--2018|Steurer and Clar 2018]] ; [[#Clulow--2019|Clulow 2019]] ). Countries that have constructed an overarching architecture of climate governance institutions (e.g., cross-department and multi-level coordination, and semi-autonomous climate agencies), are more able to develop the strategic approaches to climate governance needed to foster transformative change ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ).

Access of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to policy processes enables new ideas to be adopted, but too close an NGO-government relation may stifle innovation and transformative action ( [[#Dryzek--2003|Dryzek et al. 2003]] ). NGO campaigns on fracking ( [[#Neville--2019|Neville et al. 2019]] ) or divestment ( [[#Mangat--2018|Mangat et al. 2018]] ) have raised attention to ideas such as ‘stranded assets’ in policy arenas ( [[#Green--2018|Green 2018]] ; [[#Piggot--2018|Piggot 2018]] ; Newell et al. 2020; [[#Paterson--2021|Paterson 2021]] ). Attempts to depoliticise climate change may narrow the space for democratic participation and contestation, thus impacting policy responses ( [[#Swyngedouw--2010|Swyngedouw 2010]] , 2011; [[#Kenis--2014|Kenis and Lievens 2014]] ). Some institutional innovations have more directly targeted enhanced public deliberation and participation, notably in citizens’ climate assemblies ( [[#Howarth--2020|Howarth et al. 2020]] ) and in the use of legal institutions to litigate against those opposing climate action (Peel and Osofksy 2020). This literature shows that transformative pathways are possible within a variety of institutional settings, although institutional innovation will be necessary everywhere to pursue zero carbon transitions ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.4|Section 4.4]] , [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-13 Chapter 13] and Cross-Chapter Box 12).

Balancing the forces outlined in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4#4.6|Section 4.6]] in [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-4|Chapter 4]] typically involves building coalitions of actors who benefit economically from climate policy ( [[#Levin--2012|Levin et al. 2012]] ). Policy stability is critical to enabling long-term investments in decarbonisation ( [[#Rietig--2017|Rietig and Laing 2017]] ; [[#Rosenbloom--2018|Rosenbloom et al. 2018]] ). Policy design can encourage coalitions to form that sustain momentum by supporting further policy development to accelerate decarbonisation ( [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ), for example, by generating concentrated benefits to coalition members ( [[#Bernstein--2018|Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018]] ; [[#Meckling--2019|Meckling 2019]] ; [[#Millar--2020|Millar et al. 2020]] ), as with renewable feed-in tariffs (FiTs) in Germany ( [[#Michaelowa--2018|Michaelowa et al. 2018]] ). Coalitions may also be sustained by overarching framings, especially to involve actors (e.g., NGOs) for whom the benefits of climate policy are not narrowly economic. However, policy design can also provoke coalitions to oppose climate policy, as in the FiT programme in Ontario ( [[#Stokes--2013|Stokes 2013]] ; [[#Raymond--2020|Raymond 2020]] ) or the yellow vest protests against carbon taxation in France ( [[#Berry--2019|Berry and Laurent 2019]] ). The Just Transitions frame can thus also be understood in terms of coalition-building, as well as ethics, as the pursuit of low-carbon transitions which spread the economic benefits broadly, through ‘green jobs’, and the redistributive policies embedded in them both nationally and globally ( [[#Healy--2017|Healy and Barry 2017]] ; [[#Winkler--2020|Winkler 2020]] ). Appropriate policy design will be different at different stages of the transition process ( [[#Meckling--2017|Meckling et al. 2017]] ; [[#Breetz--2018|Breetz et al. 2018]] ).

'''Integration.''' Politics is ultimately the way in which societies make decisions – which in turn, reflect diverse forces and assumed frameworks. Effective policy requires understandings which combine economic efficiency, ethics and equity, the dynamics and processes of large-scale transitions, and the role of psychology and politics. No one framework is adequate to such a broad-ranging goal, nor are single tools. [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-13 Chapter 13] (Figure 13.6) presents a ‘framing’ table for policy instruments depending on the extent to which they focus on mitigation per se or wider socio-economic development, and whether they aim to shift marginal incentives or drive larger transitions. Holistic analysis needs to bridge modelling, qualitative transition theories illuminated by case studies, and practice-based action research ( [[#Geels--2016|Geels et al. 2016]] ).

These analytic frameworks also point to arenas of potential synergies and trade-offs (when broadly known), and opportunities and risks (when uncertainties are greater), associated with mitigation. This offers theoretical foundations for mitigation strategies which can also generate co-benefits. Climate policy may help to motivate policies with beneficial synergies (such as the consumer cost savings from energy efficiency, better forest management, transitions to cleaner vehicles) and opportunities (such as stimulating innovation), by focusing on options for which the positives outweigh the negatives, or can be made to be, through smart policy (e.g., [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson et al. 2020]] ). More broadly, climate concerns may help to attract international investment, and help overcoming bureaucratic or political obstacles to better policy, and support synergies between mitigation, adaptation, and other SDGs, a foundation for shifting development pathways towards sustainability ( [https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/chapter/chapter-17 Chapter 17] and [[#1.6.1|Section 1.6.1]] ).

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