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=== 8.4.2 The Influence of Future Climate Change Impacts on Future Response Capacities === <div id="h2-10-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> The influence of climate change also impacts the future response capacities of people and nations to deal with future climate change and climate hazards. Recent studies (e.g., [[#Mysiak--2016|Mysiak et al., 2016]] ) conclude that climate change can increase the severity and intensity of crises or even trigger disasters, particularly floods, storms, forest and wildfires, and droughts. These have undermined decade-long poverty reduction efforts, particularly in low-income and at-risk countries ( [[#Djalante--2019|Djalante, 2019]] ). Climate-influenced (disaster) risks are getting more complex and systemic ( [[#UNDRR--2019|UNDRR, 2019]] ). The magnitude of global annual average economic losses from natural and climate-induced hazards to the built environment alone are estimated in the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Global Assessment Report (2015) as being comparable with the GDP of the 36th largest economy in the world at that time—the Philippines (in 2015) ( [[#UNISDR--2015|UNISDR, 2015]] ; [[#Mysiak--2016|Mysiak et al., 2016]] ). In addition, a World Bank study concludes that losses of human well-being are higher than the overserved economic losses from natural hazards ( [[#Hallegatte--2017|Hallegatte et al., 2017]] ). In this regard, it is ''likely'' that future impacts of climate change, particularly under increasing levels of global warming (above 1.5°C) will also increase non-economic losses (see [[#8.3.2.3|Section 8.3.2.3]] ) and losses of human well-being that are particularly relevant to most vulnerable groups and the poor. Furthermore, the expected future increase in the number of people exposed to climate hazards, such as sea level rise and coastal flooding, is not only determined by changing hazard patterns, but also by regional processes of migration and urbanisation for example in Asia and Africa, including an increasing number of urban poor living in low-elevation coastal zones ( [[#United%20Nations--2018|United Nations, 2018]] ). This can increase again the probability that more people require assistance and support for buffering these effects of climate-related hazards, for example, in coastal zones. Historical urbanisation processes, in coastal cities in Asia (e.g., in China, Vietnam, etc.) and Africa (e.g., in Nigeria) have increased the exposure of people to climate hazards, such as sea level rise, which by 2100 under Relative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 will globally threaten 630 million people, largely in coastal cities ( [[#Kulp--2019|Kulp and Strauss, 2019]] ). In addition, [[#Smirnov--2016|Smirnov et al. (2016)]] conclude that worldwide the number of people exposed to extreme droughts will increase under both the RCP4.5 and the RCP8.5 particularly at the end of the century. The authors assess that under RCP4.5 the average monthly global population exposed to drought will increase between the periods 2008–2017 and 2081–2100 from a mean of 80 million to 212 million, and under RCP8.5 from about 90 million to approximately 472 million people. The research findings underscore that there is a high probability that exposure to extreme droughts will increase, particularly in regions and countries already classified as highly vulnerable (e.g., Nigeria, Sudan, etc.) ( [[#Smirnov--2016|Smirnov et al., 2016]] ). Extreme droughts are expected to further erode coping and adaptive capacities of those already characterised by high levels of vulnerability (see [[#8.3.1|Section 8.3.1]] ). Building adaptive capacities for the most vulnerable groups in the future in these areas will be a challenge, since high levels of livelihood insecurity are coupled with high levels of structural vulnerability at national and regional scale (poverty, state fragility, etc.) making planned adaptation support very complex and difficult. Therefore, increasing adaptation gaps at different scales are anticipated in the future. Increasing population exposure (e.g., due to urbanisation of coastal zones, etc.), coupled with higher frequencies and intensities of specific climate hazards are ''likely'' in connection with the existing adaptation gap (e.g., high levels of vulnerability) to compromise development and human security. Recent studies, such as that by Harrington (2018), conclude that the actual exposure and the physical individual recognition of some climate hazards, will be higher in low-income countries. The study of Harrington (2018) underscores that changes in extreme heat, for example, will be felt by the average citizen of a low-income country after 1.5°C of global warming and will not be felt by about 40% of people living in high-income nations until well after double the amount of global warming is reached (3°C increase). In this context, even if a city or place is exposed to heat stress, people experience it quite differently due to different levels of vulnerability and adaptive capacities, such as the ability to afford air conditioning ( [[#Barreca--2016|Barreca et al., 2016]] ). That means well-off populations are better insulated from effects of global warming than poorer or more vulnerable groups, even if they are geographically living in the same exposure zone. These findings underscore that issues of climate justice need to be considered within the problem definition when designing adaptation strategies, and not solely at the end. Impacts of future climate hazards (heat stress, flooding, etc.) differ not only due to changes in frequency and intensity of the hazard itself, but also significantly in terms of the opportunities people have to respond and prepare for these hazards and climatic changes at present and in the future. However, extreme heat stress has also caused significant fatalities in countries classified as having low vulnerability, such as seen within the heat wave in Europe in 2003. <div id="8.4.3" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="the-influence-of-climate-change-responses-on-projected-development-pathways"></span>
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