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=== 4.7.3 Impacts of climate-related land degradation on migration and conflict === <div id="section-4-7-3-impacts-of-climate-related-land-degradation-on-migration-and-conflict-block-1"></div> Land degradation may trigger competition for scarce natural resources, potentially leading to migration and/or conflict, though, even with ''medium evidence,'' there is ''low agreement'' in the literature. Linkages between land degradation and migration occur within a larger context of multi-scale interaction of environmental and non-environmental drivers and processes, including resettlement projects, searches for education and/or income, land shortages, political turmoil, and family-related reasons (McLeman 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r886|886]]</sup> ; Hermans and Ide 2019 <sup>[[#fn:r887|887]]</sup> ). The complex contribution of climate to migration and conflict hampers retrieving any level of confidence on climate-migration and climate-conflict linkages, therefore constituting a major knowledge gap (Cramer et al. 2014 <sup>[[#fn:r888|888]]</sup> ; Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r889|889]]</sup> ). There is ''low evidence'' on the causal linkages between climate change, land degradation processes (other than desertification) and migration. Existing studies on land degradation and migration – particularly in drylands – largely focus on the effect of rainfall variability and drought, and show how migration serves as adaptation strategy (Piguet et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r890|890]]</sup> ; McLeman 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r891|891]]</sup> ; Chapter 3). For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, severe topsoil erosion and forest degradation is a major environmental stressor which is amplified by recurring droughts, with migration being an important household adaptation strategy (Morrissey 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r892|892]]</sup> ). In the humid tropics, land degradation, mainly as a consequence of deforestation, has been a reported reason for people leaving their homes during the Amazonian colonisation (Hecht 1983 <sup>[[#fn:r894|894]]</sup> ) but was also observed more recently, for example in Guatemala, where soil degradation was one of the most frequently cited migration pushes (López-Carr 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r895|895]]</sup> ) and Kenya, where households respond to low soil quality by sending temporary migrants for additional income generation (Gray 2011 <sup>[[#fn:r896|896]]</sup> ). In contrast, in the Andean highlands and the Pacific coastal plain, migration increased with land quality, probably because revenues from additional agricultural production was invested in costly forms of migration (Gray and Bilsborrow 2013 <sup>[[#fn:r897|897]]</sup> ). These mixed results illustrate the complex, non-linear relationship of land degradation–migration linkages and suggest that explaining land degradationand migration linkages requires considering a broad range of socio-ecological conditions (McLeman 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r898|898]]</sup> ). In addition to people moving away from an area due to ‘lost’ livelihood activities, climate-related land degradation can also reduce the availability of livelihood safety nets – environmental assets that people use during times of shocks or stress. For example, Barbier (2000) <sup>[[#fn:r899|899]]</sup> notes that wetlands in north-east Nigeria around Hadejia–Jama’are floodplain provide dry season pastures for seminomadic herders, agricultural surpluses for Kano and Borno states, groundwater recharge of the Chad formation aquifer and ‘insurance’ resources in times of drought. The floodplain also supports many migratory bird species. As climate change and land degradation combine, delivery of these multiple services can be undermined, particularly as droughts become more widespread, reducing the utility of this wetland environment as a safety net for people and wildlife alike. Early studies conducted in Africa hint at a significant causal link between land degradation and violent conflict (Homer-Dixon et al. 1993 <sup>[[#fn:r900|900]]</sup> ). For example, Percival and Homer-Dixon (1995) <sup>[[#fn:r901|901]]</sup> identified land degradation as one of the drivers of the crisis in Rwanda in the early 1990s, which allowed radical forces to stoke ethnic rivalries. With respect to the Darfur conflict, some scholars and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concluded that land degradation, together with other environmental stressors, constitute a major security threat for the Sudanese people (Byers and Dragojlovic 2004 <sup>[[#fn:r902|902]]</sup> ; Sachs 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r903|903]]</sup> ; UNEP 2007 <sup>[[#fn:r904|904]]</sup> ). Recent studies show low agreement, suggesting that climate change can increase the likelihood of civil violence if certain economic, political and social factors, including low development and weak governance mechanisms, are present (Scheffran et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r905|905]]</sup> ; Benjaminsen et al. 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r906|906]]</sup> ). In contrast, Raleigh and Urdal (2007) <sup>[[#fn:r907|907]]</sup> found in a global study that land degradation is a weak predictor for armed conflict. As such, studies addressing possible linkages between climate change – a key driver of land degradation – and the risks of conflict have yielded contradictory results, and it remains largely unclear whether land degradation resulting from climate change leads to conflict or cooperation (Salehyan 2008 <sup>[[#fn:r908|908]]</sup> ; Solomon et al. 2018 <sup>[[#fn:r909|909]]</sup> ). Land degradation–conflict linkages can be bi-directional. Research suggests that households experiencing natural resource degradation often engage in migration for securing livelihoods (Kreamer 2012 <sup>[[#fn:r910|910]]</sup> ), which potentially triggers land degradation at the destination, leading to conflict there (Kassa et al. 2017 <sup>[[#fn:r911|911]]</sup> ). While this indeed holds true for some cases, it may not for others, given the complexity of processes, contexts and drivers. Where conflict and violence do ensue, it is often as a result of a lack of appreciation for the cultural practices of others. <span id="addressing-land-degradation-in-the-context-of-climate-change"></span>
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