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=== 14.4.2 Science, Technology and Innovation === <div id="h2-12-siblings" class="h2-siblings"></div> Science, technology and innovation are essential for the design of effective measures to address climate change and, more generally, for economic and social development ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015a|de Coninck and Sagar 2015a]] ). The OECD finds that single countries alone often cannot provide effective solutions to today’s global challenges, as these cross national borders and affect different actors ( [[#OECD--2012|OECD 2012]] ). [[#Madani--2020|Madani (2020)]] shows how conflict, including international sanctions, can reduce science and innovation capacity, which is not evenly distributed, particularly across the developed and the developing world. For this reason, many countries have introduced strategies and policies to enhance international cooperation in science and technology ( [[#Chen--2019|Chen et al. 2019]] ). Partnerships and international cooperation can play a role in establishing domestic innovation systems, which enable more effective science and technology innovation ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015b|de Coninck and Sagar 2015b]] ,a). International cooperation in science and technology occurs across different levels, with a growing number of international cooperation initiatives aimed at research and collaborative action in technology development. [[#Weart--2012|Weart (2012)]] finds that such global efforts are effective in advancing climate change science due to the international nature of the challenge. Global research programmes and institutions have also provided the scientific basis for major international environmental treaties. For example, the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention and the Montreal Protocol were both informed by scientific assessments based on collaboration and cooperation of scientists across several geographies ( [[#Andresen--2000|Andresen et al. 2000]] ). Furthermore, the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) provided the scientific basis and evidence for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in particular SDG 7 to ensure access to affordable, reliable and sustainable modern energy for all ( [[#GEA--2012|GEA 2012]] ). The GEA drew on the expertise of scientists from over 60 countries and institutions. Several other platforms exist to provide scientists and policymakers an opportunity for joint research and knowledge sharing, such as The World in 2050, an initiative that brings together scientists from some 40 institutions from around the world to provide the science for SDG and Paris Agreement implementation ( [[#TWI2050--2018|TWI2050 2018]] ). Non-state actors are also increasingly collaborating internationally. Such collaborations, referred to as international cooperative initiatives (ICIs), bring together multi-stakeholder groups across industry, communities, and regions, and operate both within and outside the UNFCCC process. [[#Lui--2021|Lui et al. (2021)]] find that such initiatives could make a major contribution to global emissions reduction, [[#Bakhtiari--2018|Bakhtiari (2018)]] finds that the impact on greenhouse gas reduction of these initiatives is hindered due to a lack of coordination between ICIs, overlap with other activities conducted by the UNFCCC and governments, and a lack of monitoring systems to measure impact. Increasing the exchange of information between ICIs, enhancing monitoring systems, and increasing collaborative research in science and technology would help address these issues ( [[#Boekholt--2009|Boekholt et al. 2009]] ; [[#Bakhtiari--2018|Bakhtiari 2018]] ). At the level of research institutes, there has been a major shift to a more structured and global type of cooperation in research; [[#Wagner--2017|Wagner et al. (2017)]] found significant increases in both the proportion of papers written by author teams from multiple countries and in the number of countries participating in such collaboration, over the time period 1990–2013. Although only a portion of these scientific papers address the issue of climate change specifically, this growth of scientific collaboration across borders provides a comprehensive view of the conducive environment in which climate science collaboration has grown. However, there are areas in which international cooperation can be strengthened. Both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development call for more creative forms of international cooperation in science that help bridge the science and policy interface, and provide learning processes and places to deliberate on possible policy pathways across disciplines on a more sustainable and long-lasting basis. Scientific assessments, such as the IPCC and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) offer this possibility, but processes need to be enriched for this to happen more effectively ( [[#Kowarsch--2016|Kowarsch et al. 2016]] ). A particular locus for international cooperation on technology development and innovation is found within institutions and mechanisms of the UN climate regime. The UNFCCC, in Article 4.1(c), calls on ‘all Parties’ to ‘promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases’ and places responsibility on developed country Parties to ‘take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention’ ( [[#UNFCCC--1992|UNFCCC 1992]] , Art. 4.5). The issue of technology development and transfer has continued to receive much attention in the international climate policy domain since its initial inclusion in the UNFCCC in 1992 – albeit often overshadowed by dominant discourses around market-based mechanisms – and its role in reducing GHG emissions and adapting to the consequences of climate change ‘is seen as becoming ever more critical’ ( [[#de%20Coninck--2015a|de Coninck and Sagar 2015a]] ). Milestones in the development of international cooperation on climate technologies under the UNFCCC have included: (i) the development of a technology transfer framework and establishment of the Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) under the SBSTA in 2001; (ii) recommendations for enhancing the technology transfer framework put forward at the Bali COP in 2007 and creation of the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer under the GEF; and (iii) the establishment of the Technology Mechanism by the COP in 2010 as part of the Cancun Agreements ( [[#UNFCCC--2010b|UNFCCC 2010b]] ). The Technology Mechanism is presently the principal avenue within the UNFCCC for facilitating cooperation on the development and transfer of climate technologies to developing countries ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b|UNFCCC 2015b]] ). As discussed in [[#14.3.2.9|Section 14.3.2.9]] above, the Paris Agreement tasks the Technology Mechanism also to serve the Paris Agreement ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b|UNFCCC 2015b]] , Art. 10.3). The Technology Mechanism consists of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) (replacing the EGTT), as its policy arm, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), as its implementation arm ( [[#UNFCCC--2015b|UNFCCC 2015b]] ). The TEC focuses on identifying and recommending policies that can support countries in enhancing and accelerating the development and transfer of climate technologies ( [[#UNFCCC--2020b|UNFCCC 2020b]] ). The CTCN facilitates the transfer of technologies through three core services: (i) providing technical assistance at the request of developing countries; (ii) creating access to information and knowledge on climate technologies; and (iii) fostering collaboration and capacity building ( [[#CTCN--2020a|CTCN 2020a]] ). The CTCN ‘network’ consists of a diverse set of climate technology stakeholders from academic, finance, non-government, private sector, public sector, and research entities, together with more than 150 National Designated Entities, which serve as CTCN national focal points. Through its network, the CTCN seeks to mobilise policy and technical expertise to deliver technology solutions, capacity-building and implementation advice to developing countries ( [[#CTCN--2020b|CTCN 2020b]] ). At the Katowice UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in 2018, the TEC and CTCN were requested to incorporate the technology framework developed pursuant to Article 10 of the Paris Agreement into their respective workplans and programmes of work ( [[#UNFCCC--2019f|UNFCCC 2019f]] ). The Joint Annual Report of the TEC and CTCN for 2019 indicated that, as of July 2019, the CTCN had engaged with 93 developing country Parties regarding a total of 273 requests for technical assistance, including 11 multi-country requests. Nearly three-quarters (72.9%) of requests received by the CTCN had a mitigation component, with two-thirds of those mitigation requests related to either renewable energy or energy efficiency. Requests for decision-making or information tools are received most frequently (28% of requests), followed by requests for technology feasibility studies (20%) and technology identification and prioritisation (18%) ( [[#TEC%20and%20CTCN--2019|TEC and CTCN 2019]] ). The CTCN is presently funded from ‘various sources, ranging from the [UNFCCC] Financial Mechanism to philanthropic and private sector sources, as well as by financial and in-kind contributions from the co-hosts of the CTCN and from participants in the Network’ ( [[#TEC%20and%20CTCN--2019|TEC and CTCN 2019]] , para. 97). [[#Oh--2020b|Oh (2020b)]] describes the institution as ‘mainly financially dependent on bilateral donations from developed countries and multilateral support’. Nevertheless, inadequate funding of the CTCN poses a problem for its effectiveness and capacity to contribute to implementation of the Paris Agreement. A 2017 independent review of the CTCN identified ‘limited availability of funding’ as a key constraint on its ability to deliver services at the expected level and recommended that ‘[b]etter predictability and security over financial resources will ensure that the CTCN can continue to successfully respond to its COP mandate and the needs and expectations of developing countries’ (Ernst & Young 2017, para. 84). The 2019 Joint Report of the TEC and CTCN indicates that resource mobilisation for the Network remains a challenge ( [[#TEC%20and%20CTCN--2019|TEC and CTCN 2019]] , pp. 23–24). The importance of ‘financial support’ for strengthening cooperative action on technology development and transfer was recognised in Article 10.6 of the Paris Agreement. The technology framework established by the Paris Rulebook specifies actions and activities relating to the thematic area of ‘support’ as including: (i) enhancing the collaboration of the Technology Mechanism with the Financial Mechanism; (ii) identifying and promoting innovative finance and investment at different stages of the technology cycle; (iii) providing enhanced technical support to developing country Parties, in a country-driven manner, and facilitating their access to financing for innovation, enabling environments and capacity building, developing and implementing the results of TNAs, and engagement and collaboration with stakeholders, including organisational and institutional support; and (d) enhancing the mobilisation of various types of support, including pro bono and in-kind support, from various sources for the implementation of actions and activities under each key theme of the technology framework. Notwithstanding the technology framework’s directive for enhanced collaboration of the Technology and Financial Mechanisms of the UNFCCC, linkages between them, and particularly to the GCF, continue to engender political contestation between developing and developed countries ( [[#Oh--2020b|Oh 2020b]] ). Developing countries sought to address concerns over the unsustainable funding status of the CTCN by advocating linkage through a funding arrangement or financial linkage, whereas developed countries favour the design of an institutional linkage maintaining the different and separate mandates of the CTCN and the GCF ( [[#Oh--2020a|Oh 2020a]] ,b). With no resolution reached, the UNFCCC COP requested the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its fifty-third session, to take stock of progress in strengthening the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the Glasgow COP, scheduled for 2021 ( [[#UNFCCC--2019l|UNFCCC 2019l]] ). <div id="14.4.3" class="h2-container"></div> <span id="capacity-building-1"></span>
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