Editing IPCC:AR6/WGIII/Chapter-13 (section)

== 13.2 National and Sub-national Institutions and Governance ==

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Institutions and governance arrangements can help address ‘policy gaps’ and ‘implementation gaps’ (Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4) that hinder climate mitigation. While the need for institutions and governance is universal, individual country approaches vary, based on national approaches and circumstances, as discussed in this section.

Since AR5, the understanding of climate governance has become more encompassing and complex, involving multiple actors, decision-making arenas, levels of decision-making and a variety of political goals. Climate governance sometime directly targets GHG emissions; at other times mitigation results from measures that primarily aim to solve other issues, for instance relating to food production, forest management, energy markets, air pollution, transport systems or technology development, but with mitigation or adaptation effects ( [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson et al. 2020]] ).

Consistent with usage in this assessment, institutions are rules, norms and conventions that guide, constrain or enable behaviours and practices, including the organisations through which they operate, while governance is the structure, processes and actions that public and private actors use to address societal goals (See Glossary for complete definitions). Multiple terms are used in the literature to discuss climate governance, often varying across countries. Climate laws, or legislation, is passed by legislatures, and often sets the overarching governance context, but the term is also used to refer to legislation that is salient to climate outcomes even if not centrally focused on climate change. National strategies, often referred to as plans, most often operate through executive action by government, set guidance for action and often are not legally binding, although strategies may also be enshrined in law. Both laws and strategies may elaborate targets, or goals, for emissions outcomes, although these are not necessary components of laws and strategies. While laws typically operate at the national level (states may also make laws in federal nations), strategies, plans and targets may also operate at the sub-national level.

This section begins with a discussion of national laws for climate action ( [[#13.2.1|Section 13.2.1]] ), followed by a discussion of national strategies ( [[#13.2.2|Section 13.2.2]] ). The third section examines institutions (Section13.2.3), including organisations that are established to govern climate actions, and the final section explores sub-national institutions and their challenges in influencing climate mitigation ( [[#13.2.4|Section 13.2.4]] ).

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=== 13.2.1 Climate Laws ===

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National laws that govern climate action often set the legal basis for climate action ( [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al. 2021]] ). This legal basis can serve several functions: establish a platform for transparent target setting and implementation ( [[#Bennett--2018|Bennett 2018]] ); provide a signal to actors by indicating intent to harness state authority behind climate action ( [[#Scotford--2019|Scotford and Minas 2019]] ); promise enhanced regulatory certainty ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al. 2017]] ); create law-backed agencies for coordination, compliance and accountability ( [[#Scotford--2019|Scotford and Minas 2019]] ); provide a basis for mainstreaming mitigation into sector action, and create focal points for social mobilisation ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Dubash--2013|Dubash et al. 2013]] ). For lower/middle income countries, in particular, the existence of a law may also attract international finance by serving as a signal of credibility ( [[#Fisher--2017|Fisher et al. 2017]] ). The realisation of these potential governance gains depends on local context, legal design, successful implementation, and complementary action at different scales.

There are both narrow and broad definitions of what counts as ‘climate laws’. The literature distinguishes direct climate laws that explicitly considers climate change causes or impacts – for example through mention of greenhouse gas reductions in its objectives or title ( [[#Dubash--2013|Dubash et al. 2013]] ) – from indirect laws that have ‘the capacity to affect mitigation or adaptation’ through the subjects they regulate, for example, through promotion of co-benefits, or creation of reporting protocols ( [[#Scotford--2019|Scotford and Minas 2019]] ). Closely related is a ‘sectoral approach’ based on the layering of climate considerations into existing laws in the absence of an overarching framework law ( [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble 2019]] ). Many countries also adopt executive climate strategies (discussed in [[#13.2|Section 13.2]] ), which may either coexist with or substitute for climate laws, and that may also be related to a country’s NDC process under the Paris Agreement.

The prevalence of both direct and indirect climate laws has increased considerably since 2007, although definitional differences across studies complicate a clear assessment of their relative importance ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Iacobuta--2018|Iacobuta et al. 2018]] ; [[#Nachmany--2018|Nachmany and Setzer 2018]] ). Direct climate laws – with greenhouse gas limitation as a direct objective – had been passed in 56 countries (of 194 studied) covering 53% of emissions in 2020, with most of that rise happening between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 13.1). Both direct and indirect laws – those that have an effect on mitigation even if this is not the primary outcome – is most closely captured by the ‘Climate Change Laws of the World’ database, which illustrates the same trend of growing prevalence, documenting 694 mitigation-related laws by 2020 versus 558 in 2015 and 342 in 2010 ( [[#Nachmany--2018|Nachmany and Setzer 2018]] ; [[#LSE%20Grantham%20Research%20Institute%20on%20Climate%20Change%20and%20the%20Environment--2021|LSE Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 2021]] ). [[#footnote-004|1]] Among these, the majority are accounted for by sectoral indirect laws. For example, a study of Commonwealth countries finds that a majority of these countries have not taken the route of a single overarching law, but rather have an array of laws across different areas, for example, Indian laws on energy efficiency and Ghana’s laws on renewable energy promotion ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al. 2017]] ).

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'''Figure 13.1 | Prevalence of legislation by emissions and number of countries across regions.''' '''Top:''' Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate change legislations – in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. '''Bottom:''' Number of countries with national climate legislation – in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Climate legislation is defined as an act passed by a parliament that includes in its title or objectives reductions in GHGs. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR = Africa; LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from [[#Iacobuta--2018|Iacobuta et al. (2018)]] to reflect AR6 regional aggregation and recent data.

Some direct climate laws may serve as ‘framework’ laws ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble 2019]] ) that set an overarching legal context within which other legislation and policies operate. Framework laws are intended to provide a coherent legal basis for action, to integrate past legislation in related areas, set clear directions for future policy, and create necessary processes and institutions ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ) ( [[#Townshend--2013|Townshend et al. 2013]] ; [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova et al. 2017]] ; [[#Fankhauser--2018|Fankhauser et al. 2018]] ; [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble 2019]] ; [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al. 2021]] ). There are a variety of approaches to framework laws. Reviews of climate legislation, many of which draw particularly from the long-standing UK Climate Change Act, suggest the need for statutory targets with a long-term direction, shorter term instruments such as carbon budgets to induce action toward targets, a clear assignment of duties and responsibilities including identification of policies and responsibility for their implementation, annual reporting to Parliament; an independent body to support evidence-based decision-making and rules to govern information collection and provision ( [[#Barton--2018|Barton and Campion 2018]] ; [[#Fankhauser--2018|Fankhauser et al. 2018]] ; [[#Abraham-Dukuma--2020|Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020]] ; [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al. 2021]] ).

However, country examples also suggest other, different approaches to framework laws. Korea’s Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth seeks to shift business and society toward green growth through a process of strategy setting and action plans ( [[#Jang--2010|Jang et al. 2010]] ). Kenya’s framework Climate Change Act creates an institutional structure to mainstream climate considerations into sectoral decisions, one of several examples across Africa of efforts to create framework legislation to promote mainstreaming ( [[#Rumble--2019|Rumble 2019]] ). Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change includes sectoral emission targets, along with the creation of coordinating institutions across ministries and sub-national authorities ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova and Guzman Luna 2018]] ). Consequently, different countries have placed emphasis on different aspects of framework laws, although the most widely prevalent approach is that exemplified by the UK.

Climate laws spread through multiple mechanisms, including the impetus provided by international negotiation events, diffusion by example across countries, and domestic factors such as business cycles ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Major landmark events under the UNFCCC have been associated with increases in national legislation ( [[#Iacobuta--2018|Iacobuta et al. 2018]] ), with a stronger effect in countries where international commitments are binding ( [[#Fankhauser--2016|Fankhauser et al. 2016]] ). Diffusion through example of legislation from other countries has been documented ( [[#Fankhauser--2016|Fankhauser et al. 2016]] ; [[#Fleig--2017|Fleig et al. 2017]] ; [[#Torney--2017|Torney 2017]] ; [[#Inderberg--2019|Inderberg 2019]] ; [[#Torney--2019|Torney 2019]] ). For example, the UK Climate Change Act was an important influence in pursuing similar acts in Finland and Ireland ( [[#Torney--2019|Torney 2019]] ) and was also considered in the formulation of Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova and Guzman Luna 2018]] ). The presence of a framework law is positively associated with creation of additional supportive legislation ( [[#Fankhauser--2015|Fankhauser et al. 2015]] ). Domestic contextual factors can also affect the likelihood of legislation such as a weak business cycle that can impact the political willingness to pass legislation ( [[#Fankhauser--2015|Fankhauser et al. 2015]] ). In some cases, civil society groups play a role as advocates for legislation, as occurred in the UK ( [[#Lockwood--2013|Lockwood 2013]] ; [[#Lorenzoni--2014|Lorenzoni and Benson 2014]] ; [[#Carter--2018|Carter and Childs 2018]] ; [[#Devaney--2020|Devaney et al. 2020]] ) and in Germany in the build up to passage of their respective Climate Change Act ( [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ).

The performance of framework laws suggests a mixed picture. While the structure of the UK Act successfully sets a direction of travel and has resulted in a credible independent body, it performs less well in fostering integration across sectoral areas and providing an enforcement mechanism ( [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al. 2021]] ). a review of seven European climate change acts concludes that overall targets may not be entirely aligned with planning, reporting and evaluation mechanisms, and that sanction mechanisms are lacking across the board ( [[#Nash--2019|Nash and Steurer 2019]] ), which limit the scope for legislation to perform its integrative task. These observations suggest the need for careful attention to the design of framework laws.

There is extremely limited evidence on the aggregate effects of climate laws on climate outcomes, although there is a broader literature assessing climate policies ( [[#13.6|Section 13.6]] in this chapter and Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14). a single assessment of direct and indirect climate laws as well as relevant executive action across a global database finds a measurable and positive effect: global annual emissions have reduced by about 5.9 CO 2 compared to an estimation of what they otherwise would have been ( [[#Eskander--2020|Eskander and Fankhauser 2020]] ). Climate laws require further research, including on the quantification of impact, framework versus sectoral approaches, and the various mechanisms through which laws act – target setting, creating institutional structures, mainstreaming and ensuring compliance.

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=== 13.2.2 National Strategies and Nationally Determined Contributions ===

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National climate strategies, which are often formulated through executive action, contribute to climate governance in several ways. Strategies enable discussion of low-emissions pathways while accounting for uncertainty, national circumstances and socio-economic objectives ( [[#Falduto--2020|Falduto and Rocha 2020]] ).

They frequently set out long term emission goals and possible trajectories over time, with analysis of technological and economic factors ( [[#Levin--2018|Levin et al. 2018]] ; [[#WRI--2020|WRI 2020]] ). This can include quantitative modelling of low-emissions transitions and their economic effects to inform policymakers and stakeholders of potential outcomes ( [[#Waisman--2019|Waisman et al. 2019]] ; [[#Weitzel--2019|Weitzel et al. 2019]] ). Scenario analysis can be used to explore how to make strategies more robust in the face of uncertainty ( [[#Sato--2019|Sato and Altamirano 2019]] ). Strategies and their regular revision can support long-term structural change by stimulating deliberation and learning ( [[#Voß--2009|Voß et al. 2009]] ), and to make the link between mitigation and adaptation objectives and actions ( [[#Watkiss--2019|Watkiss and Klein 2019]] ; [[#Hans--2020|Hans et al. 2020]] ). As part of the Paris Agreement process, several countries have prepared and submitted long-term low-emissions development strategies ( [[#Levin--2018|Levin et al. 2018]] ), while others have different forms of national climate change strategies independently of the UNFCCC process. Strategies set over time by the European Union are discussed in Box 13.1.

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) prepared under the Paris Agreement may be informed by national strategies ( [[#Rocha--2019|Rocha and Falduto 2019]] ). But the process of preparing NDCs can itself raise political awareness, encourage institutional innovation and coordination, and engage stakeholders ( [[#Röser--2020|Röser et al. 2020]] ). Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) illustrate a diversity of approaches: direct mitigation targets, strategies, plans and actions for low-GHG emission development, or the pursuit of mitigation co-benefits resulting from economic diversification plans and/or adaptation actions ( [[#UNFCCC%20Secretariat--2021|UNFCCC Secretariat 2021]] ). [[#_idTextAnchor048|Figure 13.2]] shows that the prevalence of emission targets increased across all regions between 2010 and 2020, the period during which the Paris Agreement was reached.

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'''Figure 13.2 | Prevalence of targets by emissions and number of countries across region.''' '''Top:''' Shares of global GHG emissions under national climate emission targets – in 2010, 2015 and 2020. Emissions data used are for 2019, since emissions shares across regions deviated from past patterns in 2020 due to COVID. '''Bottom:''' Number of countries with national climate emission targets – in 2010, 2015, and 2020. Emissions reductions targets were taken into account as a legislative target when they were defined in a law or as part of a country’s submission under the Kyoto Protocol, or as an executive target when they were included in a national policy or official submissions under the UNFCCC. Targets were included if they were economy wide or included at least the energy sector. The proportion of national emissions covered are scaled to reflect coverage and whether targets are in GHG or CO 2 terms. AR6 regions: DEV = Developed countries; APC = Asia and Pacific; EEA = Eastern Europe and West-Central Asia; AFR = Africa; LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean; MDE = Middle East. Source: updated and adapted with permission from [[#Iacobuta--2018|Iacobuta et al. (2018)]] to reflect AR6 regional aggregation and recent data.

The NDCs vary in their scope, content and time frame, reflecting different national circumstances, and are widely heterogeneous in both stringency and coverage of mitigation efforts ( [[#UNFCCC%20Secretariat--2016|UNFCCC Secretariat 2016]] , 2021; [[#Pauw--2018|Pauw et al. 2018]] ; [[#Campagnolo--2019|Campagnolo and Davide 2019]] ; [[#Pauw--2019|Pauw et al. 2019]] ). The mitigation targets in the new or updated NDCs range from economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets to strategies, plans and actions for low-emission development, with specific time frames or implementation periods specified. Less than 10% of parties’ NDCs specify when their emissions are expected to peak and some of these parties express their target as a carbon budget ( [[#UNFCCC%20Secretariat--2021|UNFCCC Secretariat 2021]] ). Many long-term strategies submitted by Parties to the UNFCCC refer to net zero emissions or climate neutrality, carbon neutrality, or GHG neutrality with reference to 2050, 2060 or mid-century targets ( [[#UNFCCC%20Secretariat--2021|UNFCCC Secretariat 2021]] ). The growing prevalence and coverage of emission targets is documented in [[#_idTextAnchor048|Figure 13.2]] .

Almost all Parties outlined domestic mitigation measures as key instruments for achieving mitigation targets in specific priority areas such as energy supply (89%), transport (80%), buildings (72%), industry (39%), agriculture (67%), LULUCF (75%) and waste (68%). Renewable energy generation was the most frequently indicated mitigation option (84%), followed by improving energy efficiency of buildings (63%) and multi-sector energy efficiency improvement (48%); afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (48%); and improving energy efficiency of transport (45%) ( [[#UNFCCC%20Secretariat--2021|UNFCCC Secretariat 2021]] ). Parties often communicated mitigation options related to the circular economy, including reducing waste (29%) and recycling waste (30%) and promoting circular economy (25%). Many Parties highlighted policy coherence and synergies between their mitigation measures and development priorities, which included long-term low-emission development strategy(LT-LEDS), the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and, for some, green recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Some countries approach NDCs as an opportunity to integrate mitigation objectives and broader economic shifts or sectoral transformations ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). For example, Brazil’s 2016 NDC focussed on emissions from land-use change, including agricultural intensification, to align mitigation with a national development strategy of halting deforestation in the Amazon, and increasing livestock production ( [[#De%20Oliveira%20Silva--2018|De Oliveira Silva et al. 2018]] ). While the forest sector accounts for the bulk of Madagascar’s mitigation potential, its NDC promotes GHG mitigation in both AFOLU and energy sectors to maximise co-benefits, and achieve a higher number of sustainable development goals (SDGs) ( [[#Nogueira--2020|Nogueira et al. 2020]] ).

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=== Box 13.1 | EU Climate Policy Portfolio and the European Green Deal ===

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The European Union (EU) [[#footnote-000|1]] has developed an encompassing climate governance framework ( [[#Kulovesi--2020|Kulovesi and Oberthür 2020]] ), having ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. In 2003 the EU adopted an Emissions Trading System for sectors with large GHG emitters, which started in 2005. From 2007 to 2009, the EU revised its climate policies, including for vehicle emissions, renewable energy and energy efficiency, and adopted targets for 2020 for GHG emissions reductions, renewable energy shares and energy efficiency improvements. It also adopted in 2009 an Effort Sharing Decision for Member States’ emissions reductions for the period 2013–2020 in sectors not covered by the ETS ( [[#Boasson--2013|Boasson and Wettestad 2013]] ; [[#Bertoldi--2018|Bertoldi 2018]] ). The ETS has been improved multiple times, including through a 2015 Market Stability Reserve to reduce the surplus of emission allowances ( [[#Chaton--2018|Chaton et al. 2018]] ; [[#Wettestad--2019|Wettestad and Jevnaker 2019]] ). In 2010, the European Commission created a directorate-general (equal to a ministry at the domestic level) for Climate Action. Between 2014 and 2018, the EU agreed on emission reduction targets for 2030 of 30% GHG emission reductions compared to 1990, and again revised its climate policy portfolio including new targets for renewable energies and energy efficiency and a new Effort Sharing Regulation ( [[#Fitch-Roy--2019a|Fitch-Roy et al. 2019a]] ; [[#Oberthür--2019|Oberthür 2019]] ).

From 2018, climate planning and reporting has been regulated by the EU Governance Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2018/1999), requiring member states to develop detailed and strategic National Energy and Climate Plans ( [[#Knodt--2020|Knodt et al. 2020]] ). In 2019, the European Commission, backed by the European Council (heads of states and government in the EU) and the European Parliament, launched a new broad climate and environment initiative; the ‘European Green Deal’, implying the revision of many EU polices and introducing the Climate Pact (European Commission 2019a). This roadmap develops a ‘new growth strategy for the EU’ aimed at reaching climate neutrality by 2050 and spans multiple sectors. In 2020, the European Commission introduced a new climate law establishing the framework for achieving the climate neutrality by 2050 principle, and upgraded its 2030 GHG emission reduction target to at least net 55% reduction, which was adopted in June 2021 (European Commission 2020a). In June 2021, the new policy package ‘Fit for 55’ was adopted by the Commission; the packages included a proposal for the revision of the ETS, including its extension to shipping and a separate emission trading system for road transport and buildings, a revision of the effort sharing regulation, an amendment of the regulation setting CO 2 emission standards for cars and vans, a revision of the energy tax directive, a new carbon border adjustment mechanism, a revision of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets and directives, and a new social fund to make the transition to climate neutrality fair.

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[[#footnote-000-backlink|1]] The European Union is an international organisation that is discussed here because it plays a large role in shaping climate obligations and policies of its Member States.

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=== 13.2.3 Approaches to National Institutions and Governance ===

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==== 13.2.3.1 The Forms of Climate Institutions ====

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Universal ‘best-practice’ formulations of organisations may not be applicable across country contexts, but institutions that are suited to national context can be ratcheted up over time in their scope and effectiveness ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). National climate institutions take diverse forms because they emerge out of country-specific interactions between national climate politics and existing institutional structures. Certain institutional forms tend to be common across countries, such as expert climate change commissions; a review finds eleven such institutions in existence as of mid-2020. Although this institutional form may be common, these commissions vary in terms of expertise, independence and focus ( [[#Abraham-Dukuma--2020|Abraham-Dukuma et al. 2020]] ), reinforcing the important shaping role of national context.

A review of institutions in eight countries suggests three broad processes through which institutions emerge: ‘purpose-built’ dedicated institutions focused explicitly on mitigation; ‘layering’ of mitigation objectives on existing institutions; and ‘latent’ institutions created for other purposes that nonetheless have implications for mitigation outcomes ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). In relatively few countries do new, purpose-built, legally-mandated bodies created specifically for climate mitigation exist although this number is growing; examples include the UK ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova et al. 2018]] ), China ( [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ), Australia ( [[#Keenan--2012|Keenan et al. 2012]] ) and New Zealand ( [[#Timperley--2020|Timperley 2020]] ). These cases indicate that dedicated and lasting institutions with a strategic long-term focus on mitigation emerge only under conditions of broad national political agreement around climate mitigation as a national priority ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). However, the specific forms of those institutions differ, as illustrated by the case of the UK’s Climate Change Committee established as an independent agency (Box 13.2) and China, which is built around a top-down planning structure (Box 13.3).

Where economy-wide institutions do not exist, new institutions may still address sub-sets of the challenge. In Australia, while political conditions resulted in the repeal of an overarching Clean Energy Act in 2014, although a Climate Change Authority continued, other institutions primarily focused on the energy sector such as the Clean Energy Regulator, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, and the Australia Renewable Agency continued to shape energy outcomes ( [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ).

Where new dedicated organisations have not emerged, countries may layer climate responsibilities on existing institutions; the addition of mitigation to the responsibilities of the US Environmental Protection Agency is an example ( [[#Mildenberger--2021|Mildenberger 2021]] ). Layering is also a common approach when climate change is embedded within consideration of multiple objectives of policy. In these cases, climate institutions tend to be layered on sectoral institutions for the pursuit of co-benefits or broader development concerns. Examples include India, where energy security was an important objective of renewable energy promotion policy (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), Brazil’s mitigation approach focused on sectoral forest policy ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ) and South Africa’s emphasis on job creation as a necessary factor in mitigation policy ( [[#Chandrashekeran--2017|Chandrashekeran et al. 2017]] ; [[#Rennkamp--2019|Rennkamp 2019]] ). Prior to this process of layering, sectoral institutions, such as in forest and energy sectors, may play an important latent role in shaping climate outcomes, before climate considerations are part of their formal mandate.

New rules and organisations are not only created, they are also dismantled or allowed to wither away. Cases of institutional dismantling or neglect include the Australian Clean Energy Act ( [[#Crowley--2017|Crowley 2017]] ; [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ), the Indian Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change, which, while formally functional, effectively does not meet (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ), and the weakening of climate units inside sectoral ministries in Brazil ( [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ). While there is limited literature on the robustness of climate institutions, case studies suggest institutions are more likely to emerge, persist and be effective when institutions map to a framing of climate change that has broad political support ( ''medium evidence'' , ''medium agreement'' ). Thus while mitigation focused framings and institutions may win political support in some countries, in other cases sectorally focused or multiple objectives oriented institutions may be most useful and resilient ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ).

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==== 13.2.3.2 Addressing Climate Governance Challenges ====

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Climate governance challenges include ensuring coordination, building consensus by mediating conflict, and setting strategy ( ''medium evidence'' , ''high agreement'' ). Coordination is important because climate change is an all-of-economy and society problem that requires cross-sectoral and cross-scale action; building consensus is needed because large-scale transformations can unsettle established interests; and strategy setting is required due to the transformative and time-bound nature of climate mitigation ( [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash et al. 2021]] ). Yet, climate institutions have a mixed record in addressing these challenges.

Institutions that provide coordination, integration across policy areas and mainstreaming are particularly important given the scope and scale of climate change ( [[#Candel--2016|Candel and Biesbroek 2016]] ; [[#Tosun--2017|Tosun and Lang 2017]] ) ( [[#13.7|Section 13.7]] ). Ministries of environment are often appointed as ''de facto'' agents of coordination, but have been hampered by their limited regulative authority and ability to engage in intra-governmental bargaining with ministries with larger budgets and political heft ( [[#Aamodt--2018|Aamodt 2018]] ).

Creation of a high-level coordinating body to coordinate across departments and mainstream climate into sectoral actions is another common approach ( [[#Oulu--2015|Oulu 2015]] ). For example, Kenya has created a National Climate Change Council, which operates through a climate change directorate in the environment ministry to mainstream climate change at the county level ( [[#Guey--2019|Guey and Bilich 2019]] ). [[#Zhou--2011|Zhou and Mori (2011)]] suggest that well-functioning inter-agency coordination mechanisms require support from heads of government, involvement by industry and environment agencies; and engagement by multiple sectoral agencies. However, coordination mechanisms without a clear authority and basis for setting directions run the risk of ‘negative coordination’, a process through which ministries comment on each other’s proposals, removing any ideas that run counter to the interests of their own ministry, leading to even weaker decisions ( [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ). Countries with dedicated, new climate institutions tend to have a more explicit and authorised body for climate coordination, such as China’s National Leading Group (Box 13.3).

Without explicit coordination with finance ministries, there is a risk of parallel and non-complementary approaches. For example, the South African Treasury pursued a carbon tax without clear indication of how it interfaced with a quantitative sectoral budget approach espoused by the environment ministry (Tyler and [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ). [[#Skovgaard--2012|Skovgaard (2012)]] suggests that there is an important distinction between finance ministries that bring a limiting ‘budget frame’ to climate action, versus a ‘market failure frame’ that encourages broader engagement by relevant ministries.

Coordination within federal systems poses additional complexities, such as overlapping authority across jurisdictions, multiple norms in place, and approaches to coordination across scales ( [[#Brown--2012|Brown 2012]] ). Multi-level governance systems such as the EU can influence the design and functioning of climate policies and institutions in member states, such as Germany ( [[#Skjærseth--2017|Skjærseth 2017]] ; [[#Jänicke--2019|Jänicke and Wurzel 2019]] ; [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ) and the UK ( [[#Lockwood--2021a|Lockwood 2021a]] ). In some cases, this can result in distinct European modes of governance as has been suggested occurred in the case of wind energy ( [[#Fitch-Roy--2016|Fitch-Roy 2016]] ).

Within countries, institutional platforms allow federal and sub-national governments to negotiate and agree on policy trajectories ( [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). In Germany, cooperation is channelled through periodic meetings of environment ministers and centre-state working groups ( [[#Weidner--2008|Weidner and Mez 2008]] ; [[#Brown--2012|Brown 2012]] ), and in Canada through bilateral negotiations and side-payments between scales of government ( [[#Rabe--2007|Rabe 2007]] ; [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ). Federal systems might allow for sub-national climate action despite constraints at the federal level, as has occurred in Australia ( [[#Gordon--2015|Gordon 2015]] ; [[#MacNeil--2021|MacNeil 2021]] ) and the United States ( [[#Rabe--2011|Rabe 2011]] ; [[#Jordaan--2019|Jordaan et al. 2019]] ; [[#Bromley-Trujillo--2020|Bromley-Trujillo and Holman 2020]] ; [[#Thompson--2020|Thompson et al. 2020]] ). Where agenda-setting rests with the central government, coordination may operate through targets, as with China ( [[#Qi--2013|Qi and Wu 2013]] ), or frameworks for policy action, as in India ( [[#Vihma--2011|Vihma 2011]] ; [[#Jogesh--2015|Jogesh and Dubash 2015]] ).

Because transition to a low-carbon future is likely to create winners and losers over different time scales; institutions are needed to mediate these interests and build consensus on future pathways ( [[#Kuzemko--2016|Kuzemko et al. 2016]] ; [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ; [[#Mildenberger--2020|Mildenberger 2020]] ). Institutions that provide credible knowledge can help support ambition. For example, analysis by the UK Climate Change committee has been harnessed, including by non-state actors, to prevent backsliding on decisions ( [[#Lockwood--2021a|Lockwood 2021a]] ). Institutions can also help create positive feedback by providing spaces in decision-making for low-carbon interests ( [[#Aklin--2013|Aklin and Urpelainen 2013]] ; [[#Roberts--2018|Roberts et al. 2018]] ; [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ; [[#Finnegan--2019|Finnegan 2019]] ). For example, a renewable energy policy community emerged in China through key agenda setting meetings ( [[#Shen--2017|Shen 2017]] ), and in India, a National Solar Mission provided a platform for the renewable energy industry (Pillai and [[#Dubash--2021|Dubash 2021]] ). Conversely, institutions can also exert a drag on change through ‘regulatory inertia’, as in the case of the UK energy regulator Ofgem, which has exercised veto powers in ways that may limit a low-carbon transition ( [[#Lockwood--2017|Lockwood et al. 2017]] ).

Institutions can also create spaces to accommodate concerns of other actors ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ). Deliberative bodies, such as Germany’s Enquete Commission ( [[#Weidner--2008|Weidner and Mez 2008]] ; [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ) or the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change (Tyler and [[#Hochstetler--2021|Hochstetler 2021]] ) provide a space for reconciling competing visions and approaches to climate change. Many countries are creating deliberative bodies to forge ‘Just Transition’ strategies ( [[#13.9|Section 13.9]] ). a recent innovation is the creation of Citizens’ Assemblies that bring together representative samples of citizens to deliberate on policy questions with the intent of informing them ( [[#Devaney--2020|Devaney et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sandover--2021|Sandover et al. 2021]] ). The ability of institutions to forge agreement also rests on attention to procedural justice (Box 13.4).

Since addressing climate change requires transformative intent and shifting development pathways (Sections 1.6, 3.6, 4.3, 4.4, 13.9, 17.3.2, and Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4), institutions that can devise strategies and set trajectories are useful enablers of transformation. Strategy setting often requires an overarching framework such as through framework laws that set targets ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova et al. 2017]] ), or identify key sectors and opportunities for low-carbon transition ( [[#Hochstetler--2015|Hochstetler and Kostka 2015]] ) and innovation ( [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP 2018]] ). Few countries have built deliberate and lasting institutions that provide strategic intent, and those that have, have pursued different approaches. The UK’s approach rests on five-yearly targets (Box 13.2); Germany requires sectoral budgets enforced through the Bundestag ( [[#Flachsland--2021|Flachsland and Levi 2021]] ); and China uses an apex decision-body to set targets ( [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ) (Box 13.3).

Addressing all of these governance concerns – coordination, mediating interests, and strategy setting – require attention to institutional capacity. These include the capacity to address ‘upstream’ policy issues of agenda setting, framing, analysis and policy design; pursue goals even while mediating interests ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ); identify and manage synergies and trade-offs across climate and development objectives ( [[#Ürge-Vorsatz--2014|Ürge-Vorsatz et al. 2014]] ; [[#von%20Stechow--2015|von Stechow et al. 2015]] ; [[#McCollum--2018|McCollum et al. 2018]] ); identify and choose amongst possible policy options ( [[#Howlett--2010|Howlett and Oliphant 2010]] ); identify areas for transformation and the means to induce innovation ( [[#Patt--2017|Patt 2017]] ; [[#UNEP--2018|UNEP 2018]] ); and developing the ability to monitor and evaluate outcomes ( [[#Upadhyaya--2021|Upadhyaya et al. 2021]] ) (Box 13.5). [[#Domorenok--2021|Domorenok et al. (2021)]] highlight different aspects of the capacity challenge particularly necessary for integrated policy making including: the capacity for horizontal and vertical coordination; implementation capacity including the independence of the state from interests; and administrative capacity required to address compound problems. At a basic level, questions of governmental capacity – the numbers and training of personnel – can shape the choices available for climate institutions and their ability to be strategic ( [[#Richerzhagen--2008|Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008]] ; [[#Harrison--2014|Harrison and Kostka 2014]] ; [[#Kim--2016|Kim 2016]] ). Box 13.5 describes South Africa’s approach to building monitoring and evaluation capacity.

The perceived need for attention to institutional capacity is highlighted by the fact that the NDCs of 113 developing countries out of 169 countries studied list capacity building as a condition of NDC implementation ( [[#Pauw--2020|Pauw et al. 2020]] ). While international support for capacity is widely articulated as essential for many countries ( [[#Khan--2020|Khan et al. 2020]] ), ensuring the form of capacity is appropriate, effective and led domestically remains a challenge ( [[#Nago--2020|Nago and Krott 2020]] ; [[#Sokona--2021|Sokona 2021]] ).

<div id="Box 13.2 | Climate Change Institu" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="box-13.2-climate-change-institu-tions-in-the-uk"></span>
=== Box 13.2 | Climate Change Institutions in the UK ===

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The central institutional arrangements of climate governance in the UK were established by the 2008 Climate Change Act (CCA): statutory five-year carbon budgets; an independent advisory body, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC); mandatory progress monitoring and reporting to Parliament; and continuous adaptive planning following a five-yearly cycle. The CCC is noteworthy as an innovative institution that has also been emulated by other countries.

The design of the CCC was influenced by the concept of independent central banking ( [[#Helm--2003|Helm et al. 2003]] ). It has established a reputation for independent high quality analysis and information dissemination, is frequently referred to in Parliament and widely used by other actors in policy debates, all of which suggest a high degree of legitimacy ( [[#Averchenkova--2018|Averchenkova et al. 2018]] ). However, since the CCC only recommends rather than sets budgets ( [[#McGregor--2012|McGregor et al. 2012]] ), accountability for meeting the carbon budgets works primarily through reputational and political effects rather than legal enforcement.

<div id="Box 13.3 | China’s Climate Chan" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="box-13.3-chinas-climate-chan-ge-institutions"></span>

=== Box 13.3 | China’s Climate Change Institutions ===

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Climate governance in China features a combination of top-down planning and vertical accountability ( [[#Sims%20Gallagher--2019|Sims Gallagher and Xuan 2019]] ; [[#Teng--2021|Teng and Wang 2021]] ). An overarching coordination role is performed by the Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality, appointed by and reporting to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the National Leading Group on Climate Change Response, Energy Conservation, and Emissions Reduction (NLGCCR), headed by the Premier and consisting of more than 30 ministers ( [[#Wang--2018a|Wang et al. 2018a]] ). The Department of Climate Change (DCC) under the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) is the primary agency in charge of climate issues, with a corresponding local Bureau of Ecology and Environment in each province or city. While MEE is the leading agency for climate policy, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the leading agency for setting overall and industry-specific targets in five-year plans, and thus has a key role in coordinating carbon emissions targets with energy and industrial development targets ( [[#Wang--2019|Wang et al. 2019]] ; [[#Yu--2021|Yu 2021]] ). Involvements of ministries related to foreign affairs, public finance, science and technology, as well as sector ministries such as transportation, construction, and manufacturing industries are also needed to push forward sector-specific climate initiatives. At subsidiary levels of government carbon intensity targets are enforced through a ‘targets and responsibilities’ system that is directly linked to the evaluation of governments’ performances ( [[#Lin--2012a|Lin 2012a]] ; [[#Li--2016|Li et al. 2016]] ).

<div id="Box 13.4 | Pro" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="box-13.4-pro-cedural-justice"></span>

=== Box 13.4 | Procedural Justice ===

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Decision-making consistent with energy and climate justice requires attention to procedural justice ( [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ), which includes how decisions are made, and who is involved and has influence on decisions ( [[#Sovacool--2015|Sovacool and Dworkin 2015]] ). Procedural justice emphasises the importance of equitable access to decision-making processes and non-discriminatory engagement with all stakeholders ( [[#Jenkins--2016|Jenkins et al. 2016]] ), attention to the capability, particularly of marginalised groups, to shape decisions ( [[#Holland--2017|Holland 2017]] ) and recognition of their specific vulnerabilities in collective political processes ( [[#Schlosberg--2012|Schlosberg 2012]] ). Consensus-building institutions should avoid reducing normative questions to technical ones, recognising that values, interests and behaviours are all shaped by ongoing climate governance ( [[#Ryder--2018|Ryder 2018]] ; [[#Schwanen--2021|Schwanen 2021]] ). Additionally, communities affected by low-carbon transition may face challenges in articulating their understandings and experiences, which needs to be addressed in the design of climate institutions ( [[#Ryder--2018|Ryder 2018]] ; [[#Schwanen--2021|Schwanen 2021]] ).

Spatially localised alternative discourses of justice are often more recognised socially than national and universal framings of climate justice ( [[#Bailey--2017|Bailey 2017]] ). Participatory forms of governance such as climate assemblies and citizen juries ( [[#Ney--2015|Ney and Verweij 2015]] ) can help enhance the legitimacy of institutional decisions, even while empirical assessments suggest that these approaches continue to face practical challenges ( [[#Devaney--2020|Devaney et al. 2020]] ; [[#Sandover--2021|Sandover et al. 2021]] ; [[#Creasy--2021|Creasy et al. 2021]] ).

<div id="Box 13.5 | South Africa’s Monitoring and Ev" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="box-13.5-south-africas-monitoring-and-ev-aluation-system"></span>

=== Box 13.5 | South Africa’s Monitoring and Evaluation System ===

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South Africa’s national monitoring and evaluation system provides high-level guidance on information requirements and assessment methodologies ( [[#DEA--2015|DEA 2015]] ). The country is developing a comprehensive, integrated National Climate Change Information System, to enable tracking, analysis and enhancement of South Africa’s progress towards the country’s transition to a low-carbon economy and climate-resilient society ( [[#DFFE%20Republic%20of%20South%20Africa--2021|DFFE Republic of South Africa 2021]] ). It includes information on GHG emission reductions achieved, observed and projected climate change, impacts and vulnerabilities, the impact of adaptation and mitigation actions, financial flows and technology transfer activities. South Africa’s approach is premised upon continuous learning and improvement through a phased implementation approach ( [[#DEA--2019|DEA 2019]] ).

<div id="13.2.4" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="institution-building-at-the-sub-national-level"></span>

=== 13.2.4 Institution Building at the Sub-national Level ===

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Jurisdiction over significant mitigation-related arenas like planning, housing and community development reside at the sub-national level. To address linkages between mitigation and local concerns, sub-national actors engage in institution building within a broader socio-economic and political context, with actors and institutions at a multitude of scales shaping the effectiveness of sub-national-scale interventions ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ). Mitigation policies may demand coordination between sectoral and jurisdictional units that historically have not collaborated; they may require sub-national actors to confront politically sensitive issues such as carbon taxes or increases in utility rates; and they may demand a redistribution of resources to protect endangered ecosystems or vulnerable populations ( [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ).

Sub-national actors have built climate institutions by creating new visions and narratives, by setting new entities or committing existing offices, providing them with funds, staff and legal authority, or by experimenting with innovative solutions that could be transferred to other local governments or scaled nationally ( [[#Hoffmann--2011|Hoffmann 2011]] ; [[#Hoornweg--2011|Hoornweg et al. 2011]] ; [[#Aylett--2015|Aylett 2015]] ; [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). These actors have also created task forces, referendums, coordination of financial and human resources, technical assistance, awareness campaigns and funding ( [[#Castán%20Broto--2017|Castán Broto 2017]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). National governments can play a key role supporting planning for climate change at the regional and national level, for example, through the articulation of climate change action in national urban politics ( [[#Van%20Den%20Berg--2018|Van Den Berg et al. 2018]] ; [[#Cobbinah--2019|Cobbinah et al. 2019]] ).

<div id="13.2.4.1" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="significance-of-sub-national-networks"></span>
==== 13.2.4.1 Significance of Sub-national Networks ====

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Multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectoral sub-national networks in dozens of countries globally have helped build climate institutions. They have also facilitated social and institutional learning, and addressed gaps in national policy ( [[#Holden--2015|Holden and Larsen 2015]] ; [[#Jordan--2015|Jordan et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2015|Setzer 2015]] ; [[#Haarstad--2016|Haarstad 2016]] ; [[#Hermwille--2018|Hermwille 2018]] ; [[#Kammerer--2018|Kammerer and Namhata 2018]] ; [[#Rashidi--2018|Rashidi and Patt 2018]] ; [[#Westman--2018|Westman and Castan Broto 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2018|Lee and Jung 2018]] ; [[#Lee--2019|Lee 2019]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ).

Transnational networks have opened opportunities for sub-national actors to play a crucial mitigation role in political stalemates ( [[#Jones--2014|Jones 2014]] ; [[#Schwartz--2019|Schwartz 2019]] ). The C40, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, and ICLEI have disseminated information on best practices and promoted knowledge sharing between sub-national governments ( [[#Lee--2013|Lee 2013]] ; [[#Hakelberg--2014|Hakelberg 2014]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al. 2016]] ; [[#Kona--2016|Kona et al. 2016]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2020|Di Gregorio et al. 2020]] ) ( [[IPCC:Wg3:Chapter:Chapter-14#14.5.5|Section 14.5.5]] ). Organisations such as the US Carbon Cycle Working Group of the United States Global Change Research Program, the Australian Climate Action Network, and the Mexican Metropolitan Environmental Commission have helped facilitate coordination and learning across multiple jurisdictions and sectors, and connected ambiguous spaces between public, private and civil society actors ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Horne--2019|Horne and Moloney 2019]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ).

Transnational networks have limited influence on climate policies where national governments exert top-down control (e.g., in the city of Rizhao, China) ( [[#Westman--2019|Westman et al. 2019]] ); where sub-national actors face political fragmentation, lack regulations, and financial and human resources; or where vertically-integrated governance exists, as in State of São Paulo, Santiago de Chile, and Mexico City ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Setzer--2017|Setzer 2017]] ).

Public support for sub-national climate institutions increases when climate policies are linked to local issues such as travel congestion alleviation or air pollution control (Puppim de Oliveira 2013; [[#Romero-Lankao--2013|Romero-Lankao et al. 2013]] ; [[#Simon%20Rosenthal--2015|Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2015|Romero-Lankao et al. 2015]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ), or when embedded in development priorities that receive support from the national government or citizens (Jörgensen et al. 2015b; [[#Floater--2016|Floater et al. 2016]] ; [[#Dubash--2018|Dubash et al. 2018]] ). For example, Indian cities have engaged in international climate cooperation seeking innovative solutions to address energy, water and infrastructure problems (Beermann et al. 2016).

<div id="13.2.4.2" class="h3-container"></div>

<span id="factors-influencing-institution-building-at-the-sub-national-level"></span>
==== 13.2.4.2 Factors Influencing Institution Building at the Sub-national Level ====

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Availability of federal funding is a fundamental pillar of city actors’ capacity to develop mitigation policies. Administrative structures, such as the presence of a professional city manager and staff assigned specifically to climate efforts ( [[#Simon%20Rosenthal--2015|Simon Rosenthal et al. 2015]] ). Cooperation between administrative departments, and the creation of knowledge and data on energy use and emissions are also essential for mitigation planning ( [[#Hughes--2014|Hughes and Romero-Lankao 2014]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ). For example, the high technical competency of Tokyo’s bureaucracy combined with availability of historical and current data enabled the city’s unique cap-and-trade system on large building facilities ( [[#Roppongi--2017|Roppongi et al. 2017]] ).

Visions and narratives about the future benefits or risks of climate change are often effectively advanced at the sub-national level, drawing on local governmental abilities to bring together actors involved in place-based decarbonisation across sectors ( [[#Hodson--2009|Hodson and Marvin 2009]] ; [[#Bush--2016|Bush et al. 2016]] ; [[#Huang--2018|Huang et al. 2018]] ; [[#Prendeville--2018|Prendeville et al. 2018]] ; [[#Levenda--2019|Levenda et al. 2019]] ). For example, in the plans of 43 C40 Cities, climate action is framed as part of a vision for vibrant, economically prosperous, and socially just cities, that are habitable, secure, resource-efficient, socially and economically inclusive, and competitive internationally ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2019|Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019]] ).

However, institution building is often constrained by a lack of national support, funding, human resources, coalitions, coordination across old and new organisations, and the ability to create new institutional competences ( [[#Valenzuela--2014|Valenzuela 2014]] ; [[#Jörgensen--2015a|Jörgensen et al. 2015a]] ; [[#Ryan--2015|Ryan 2015]] ; [[#Dubash--2018|Dubash et al. 2018]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ; [[#Anderton--2018|Anderton and Setzer 2018]] ; [[#Cointe--2019|Cointe 2019]] ; [[#Di%20Gregorio--2019|Di Gregorio et al. 2019]] ; [[#Jaccard--2019|Jaccard et al. 2019]] ; [[#Hughes--2019b|Hughes 2019b]] ). Climate mitigation can also be limited by cultural norms and values of policy actors with varying levels of power, and shifting alliances ( [[#Lachapelle--2012|Lachapelle et al. 2012]] ; [[#Damsø--2016|Damsø et al. 2016]] ; [[#Giampieri--2019|Giampieri et al. 2019]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2018a|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018a]] ).

Institution building is constrained by inequities; resources, legal remit, knowledge, and political clout vary widely within and among sub-national governments globally ( [[#Jörgensen--2015b|Jörgensen et al. 2015b]] ; [[#Genus--2016|Genus and Theobald 2016]] ; [[#Joffe--2016|Joffe and Smith 2016]] ; [[#Klinsky--2018|Klinsky 2018]] ; [[#Reckien--2018|Reckien et al. 2018]] ; [[#Markkanen--2019|Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi 2019]] ). Dominant discourses tend to prioritise scientific and technical expertise and, thus, they focus on infrastructural and economic concerns over the concerns and needs of disadvantaged populations ( [[#Heikkinen--2019|Heikkinen et al. 2019]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2019|Romero-Lankao and Gnatz 2019]] ).

In addition, expert driven, technical solutions such as infrastructural interventions can undermine the knowledge of lower income countries, communities or indigenous knowledge holders, yet are often used by sub-national governments ( [[#Ford--2016|Ford et al. 2016]] ; [[#Brattland--2018|Brattland and Mustonen 2018]] ; [[#Nagorny-Koring--2019|Nagorny-Koring 2019]] ; [[#Whyte--2017|Whyte 2017]] , 2020). Technical solutions, such as electric vehicles or smart grids rarely address the needs and capabilities of disadvantaged communities that may not be able to afford these technologies ( [[#Mistry--2014|Mistry 2014]] ; [[#Romero-Lankao--2021|Romero-Lankao and Nobler 2021]] ). However, mitigation strategies in sectors such as transport and buildings have often focused on technical and market outcomes, the benefits of which are limited to some, while others experience negative externalities or face health risks ( [[#Markard--2018|Markard 2018]] ; [[#Williams--2019|Williams and Doyon 2019]] ; [[#Carley--2020|Carley and Konisky 2020]] ). Delivering climate justice requires community-driven approaches to understanding the problem addressing structural inequities and fostering justice, while reducing carbon emissions ( [[#Romero-Lankao--2018b|Romero-Lankao et al. 2018b]] ; [[#Carley--2020|Carley and Konisky 2020]] ; [[#Lewis--2020|Lewis et al. 2020]] ).

To address this situation requires procedural justice that involves all communities, particularly disadvantaged, in climate mitigation decisions and policies (Box 13.4). Also essential is recognition justice, that addresses past inequities through tools such as subsidies, tariffs, rebates, and other policies ( [[#Agyeman--2013|Agyeman 2013]] ; [[#Rydin--2013|Rydin 2013]] ; [[#UN%20Habitat--2016|UN Habitat 2016]] ). Both tenets are key to ensure the fair distribution of benefits or negative impacts from mitigation policies (distributional justice) ( [[#McCauley--2018|McCauley and Heffron 2018]] ; [[#Lewis--2020|Lewis et al. 2020]] ). However, the benefits of inclusive approaches are often overlooked in favour of growth oriented mitigation and planning ( [[#Rydin--2013|Rydin 2013]] ; [[#Altenburg--2011|Altenburg 2011]] ; [[#Smith--2019|Smith 2019]] ; [[#Lennon--2020|Lennon 2020]] ). Box 13.6 discusses how the city of Durban has internalised climate change with attention to considerations of justice.

Moreover, deep mitigation requires moving beyond existing technological responses ( [[#Mulugetta--2018|Mulugetta and Castán Broto 2018]] ) to policies that correspond to the realities of developing countries ( [[#Bouteligier--2013|Bouteligier 2013]] ).However, best practice approaches tend to be fragmented due to the requirements of different contexts, and often executed as pilot projects that rarely lead to structural change ( [[#Nagorny-Koring--2019|Nagorny-Koring 2019]] ). Instead, context-specific approaches that include consideration of values, cultures and governance better enable successful translation of best practices ( [[#Affolderbach--2016|Affolderbach and Schulz 2016]] ; [[#Urpelainen--2018|Urpelainen 2018]] ).

<div id="Box 13.6 | Institutionalising Climate Change Within Durban’s L" class="h2-container"></div>

<span id="box-13.6-institutionalising-climate-change-within-durbans-l-ocal-government"></span>
=== Box 13.6 | Institutionalising Climate Change Within Durban’s Local Government ===

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Durban has effectively linked climate change agendas with ongoing sustainability actions and goals. To do so, adaptation has been broadened to include a just transition to a low-carbon future to address development, energy security and GHG reduction ( [[#Roberts--2016|Roberts et al. 2016]] ).

Durban has mainstreamed climate and justice concerns within local government through strong local leadership by key individuals and departments; included climate concerns within various municipal short-term and long-term planning processes; mobilised civil society; enhanced local and international networking; explored funding opportunities; and restructured institutions ( [[#Roberts--2016|Roberts et al. 2016]] ).

Durban shows that embedding responses to climate change within local government activities requires that climate change is made relevant locally and framed within a broader environmental justice framework ( [[#Roberts--2010|Roberts 2010]] ). Civil society has been key in balancing the influence of the private sector on Durban’s dynamic political process ( [[#Aylett--2013|Aylett 2013]] ).

<div id="13.3" class="h1-container"></div>

<span id="structural-factors-that-shape-climate-governance"></span>