Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-15 (section)

== 15.6 Enablers, Limits and Barriers to Adaptation ==

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Since AR5, more literature has emerged on barriers, limits and enablers to climate change adaptation across small islands. Here, we cover barriers, limits and enablers as they relate to key themes across small islands and adaptation.

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=== 15.6.1 Governance ===

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Specific governance-related barriers for effective adaptation include: lack of coordination between government departments and sectors and limited policy integration ( [[#Scobie--2016|Scobie, 2016]] ; [[#Robinson--2018b|Robinson, 2018b]] ), lack of ownership of adaptation implementation in cases where communities or national governments have not been part of the adaptation decision process ( [[#Conway--2014|Conway and Mustelin, 2014]] ; [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ; [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ; [[#Nunn--2018|Nunn and Kumar, 2018]] ; [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons and Nalau, 2019]] ), and difficulties in integrating IKLK in adaptation initiatives. Specific barriers to effective sustained adaptation in the Pacific include variable climate change awareness among decision makers, and the preference for short-term responses rather than longer-term transformative ones ( [[#Nunn--2014|Nunn et al., 2014]] ). These barriers also stem from donors’ preferencing their own priorities that do not necessarily fit the country priorities or context ( [[#Conway--2014|Conway and Mustelin, 2014]] ; [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ; [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ), which has led to increasing calls for effective community/cultural engagement in adaptation, especially through CBA and EbA ( [[#Nalau--2018b|Nalau et al., 2018b]] ). In cases where recovery efforts are framed as purely a matter of infrastructure other important aspects, such as livelihoods and gender, are more easily overlooked in adaptation ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ).

In the Caribbean small islands such as Jamaica and St. Lucia, and also in the Pacific, barriers to mainstreaming adaptation include competing development priorities, the absence of planning frameworks or ‘undetected’ overlaps in existing frameworks, serious governance flaws linked to the prevalence of corruption and corrupt people in political and public life, and insufficient manpower and human resources, linked to countries’ financial capacity ( [[#Robinson--2018b|Robinson, 2018b]] ). In addition, the lack of strong governance mechanisms for urban planning has contributed to urban sprawl and expansion that has increased the number of informal settlements, which together with population growth are driving Caribbean small islands to their limits ( [[#Enríquez-de-Salamanca--2018|Enríquez-de-Salamanca, 2018]] ; [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ; 2018b). In the Pacific, only a few countries have embedded climate change adaptation in existing legislation despite the overall regional agreement to ''A New Song for Coastal Fisheries—Pathways to Change: The Noumea Strategy'' to improve coastal fisheries management in a changing climate ( [[#Gourlie--2018|Gourlie et al., 2018]] ). Many climate change-specific initiatives across small islands have a unidirectional focus on climate risks and shift limited resources away from other important development objectives ( [[#Baldacchino--2018|Baldacchino, 2018]] ). Local-level plans are often overlooked: For example, in Mauritius, local-level climate adaptation plans are currently nearly non-existent while district councils have rarely been successful in even accessing international adaptation finance ( [[#Williams--2020|Williams et al., 2020]] ). In Samoa, several national-level programs on adaptation have had difficulties in engaging with the local level even if the decision-making powers on actual land management sit within the communities ( [[#McGinn--2020|McGinn and Solofa, 2020]] ).

Adaptation governance is also complicated further by the multitude of stakeholders involved, with differing agendas and priorities. In the Bahamas, private properties have significant say in how and what adaptation measures they decide to pursue and are not well regulated, with the tourism sector in particular dominated mainly by external investors ( [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] ). Social organisations, such as the churches, which have significant influence in many Oceanic countries, are engaging in climate change discussions and governance. Many churches report, however, being constrained to act on climate adaptation due to lack of financial resources, low levels of professional knowledge on adaptation, and their members not perceiving climate change as an urgent risk ( [[#Rubow--2016|Rubow and Bird, 2016]] ). Actors such as military services in the Indian and Pacific oceans also control a high number of assets in vulnerable locations and will need to integrate climate information into adaptive planning in the future ( [[#Finucane--2015|Finucane and Keener, 2015]] ).

Low technical capacity and poor data availability and quality are reported as limiting adaptation in Caribbean small islands such as Dominica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines ( [[#Smith--2016|Smith and Rhiney, 2016]] ; [[#Robinson--2018a|Robinson, 2018a]] ) and Trinidad and Tobago ( [[#Mycoo--2020|Mycoo, 2020]] ). These factors are, however, secondary to the lack of finances, which is seen as a fundamental limit ( [[#Charan--2017|Charan et al., 2017]] ; [[#Robinson--2018a|Robinson, 2018a]] ; [[#Williams--2020|Williams et al., 2020]] ). This was also reported in the Seychelles, despite its success with innovative financing streams and being a leader in the Indian Ocean in this regard ( [[#Robinson--2018a|Robinson, 2018a]] ).

Limited regional cooperation across sub-national island jurisdictions (jurisdictions with semi-autonomous status) along with limited regional-scale climate information are also stymying action ( [[#Petzold--2019|Petzold and Magnan, 2019]] ). This is a concern given the need for pooled governance in response to capacity constraints across small jurisdictions ( [[#Dornan--2014|Dornan, 2014]] ; [[#Kelman--2018|Kelman, 2018]] ). There is also an insufficient understanding of the role of regional and international actors such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre and the Global Environment Facility, respectively ( [[#Middelbeek--2014|Middelbeek et al., 2014]] ). Sometimes external pressure and, for example, transregional trade agreements are ‘useful for reducing unsustainable local sociopolitical arrangements’ as seen in the Solomon Islands regarding fisheries management within the concept of blue economy ( [[#Keen--2018|Keen et al., 2018]] , p. 338). Similarly, in Samoa, the World Bank’s Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and the Adaptation Fund’s Enhancing Resilience of Samoa’s Coastal Communities to Climate Change illustrate successful examples of multilevel governance due to their programmatic and pragmatic approaches versus project-based approaches ( [[#McGinn--2020|McGinn and Solofa, 2020]] ). Enabling factors in these programmes relate to strategic placements of funds and responsibilities in the relevant ministries, alignment with national priorities and pre-existing plans, pooling funding to fill existing finance gaps, and increased awareness across scales and departments of synergies and gaps between different initiatives ( [[#McGinn--2020|McGinn and Solofa, 2020]] ). Initiatives such as the Pacific Adaptive Capacity Framework ( [[#Warrick--2017|Warrick et al., 2017]] ) and regional strategies such as the Framework for the Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) enable the localising of climate adaptation into cultural contexts in an integrated manner ( [[#SPC--2016|SPC, 2016]] ).

Countries including the Seychelles and Maldives have developed national climate change plans that recognise linkages to food security, health and DRR, although these face significant resourcing issues when it comes to implementation ( [[#Techera--2018|Techera, 2018]] ). National-level plans, such as National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), increasingly could include local government engagement and have a stronger focus on urban centres and adaptation ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ). Building codes act as supportive enablers for adaptation governance: Requiring more hurricane-resistant housing in the Caribbean, including incentives for informal settlements to build in a more resilient manner, can achieve multiple development and adaptation outcomes ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ). In Dominica, a Climate Resilience Executing Agency of Dominica (CREAD) established in 2019, aims to enable stronger climate resilience by bringing all sectors and services together for more effective coordination ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ). Improvements in cross-sectoral and cross-agency coordination are creating opportunities for improved disaster preparedness and resilience measures in Vanuatu ( [[#Webb--2015|Webb et al., 2015]] ). A range of mechanisms also exist in the tourism industry: Adaptation taxes and improved building regulations could reduce risk drastically, for example, in the Caribbean region ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ).

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=== 15.6.2 Health-Related Adaptation Strategies ===

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The term ‘health systems’ refers to the organisation of people, institutions and resources that work to protect and promote population health. The two components of health systems are public health and healthcare; adaptation is needed in both to develop climate-resilient health systems ( [[#WHO--2015|WHO, 2015]] ). Adaptation measures focus on each of the building blocks of health systems, including leadership and governance; a knowledgeable health workforce; health information systems; essential medical products and technologies; health service delivery; and financing. Many small island states have policies to manage climate-sensitive health risks, although ministries of health are largely unprepared to adapt to a changing climate because few programmes take climate change into account ( [[#McIver--2016|McIver et al., 2016]] ). Particularly vulnerable groups, such as Indigenous Peoples, are often inadequately represented in adaptation planning processes and implementation, resulting in less effective interventions ( [[#Jones--2019|Jones, 2019]] ).

A range of climate-sensitive diseases pose threats to island communities. A vulnerability and adaptation assessment conducted in Dominica identified vector-, water- and food-borne diseases and food security as priority threats from climate change ( [[#Schnitter--2019|Schnitter et al., 2019]] ). Short-term adaptation options include strengthening solid waste management and enforcing current legislation; increasing public awareness; training health sector staff; improving the reliability and safety of water-storage practices; improving climate change and health data collection methods and enhancing environmental monitoring; enhancing the integration of climate services into health decision-making; strengthening the organisational structure of emergency response; and ensuring sufficient resources and surge capacity. Longer-term adaptation options include developing early warning and response systems for climate-sensitive health risks; enhancing data collection and information flow; increasing the capacity of laboratory facilities; and developing emergency plans. For example, rainfall is the best environmental predictor of malaria in North Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, leading to the development of an early warning tool that could increase resilience to climate change ( [[#Smith--2017|Smith et al., 2017]] ; [[#Jeanne--2018|Jeanne et al., 2018]] ).

In small island states, water, sanitation and hygiene infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to climate change, with impacts on the burden of diarrhoeal diseases. The resilience of types of sanitation infrastructure in urban and rural households in the Solomon Islands differs under scenarios of increased rainfall and flooding versus decreased rainfall and drought, reinforcing the centrality of taking the local context into account during adaptation decision-making ( [[#Fleming--2019|Fleming et al., 2019]] ). Healthcare facilities, including hospitals, clinics and community care centres, are vulnerable to extreme weather and climate events, such as flooding and TCs, and to climate-related outbreaks of infectious diseases that overwhelm their capacity to provide critical services ( [[#WHO--2020|WHO, 2020]] ). These facilities may lack functioning infrastructure and trained health workforce, and be predisposed to inadequate energy supplies and water, sanitation and waste management services. Adaptation is needed to build resilience and contribute to environmental sustainability.

Many major healthcare facilities in small island states are in exposed coastal areas and have limited ability to provide health services during disasters when services are most needed ( [[#WHO--2018|WHO, 2018]] ). For example, in Vanuatu, TC Pam in 2015 severely damaged two hospitals, 19 healthcare centres, and 50 healthcare dispensaries in 22 affected islands ( [[#Kim--2015|Kim et al., 2015]] ). A Smart Hospital Initiative in the Caribbean focuses on improving hospital resilience, strengthening structures and operations, and installing green technologies to reduce energy consumption and provide energy autonomy during extreme events and disasters ( https://www.paho.org/en/health-emergencies/smart-hospitals ).

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=== 15.6.3 Adaptation Finance and Risk Transfer Mechanisms ===

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In the majority of SIDS there is a high dependence on international financing to support adaptation to slow- and rapid-onset events ( [[#Robinson--2017|Robinson and Dornan, 2017]] ; [[#Petzold--2019|Petzold and Magnan, 2019]] ). However, funds tend to be geared towards supporting sectoral-level adaptation initiatives for vulnerable natural resource sectors such as water, biodiversity and coastal zones ( [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ). Considering low-income small islands such as Comoros, Haiti, and São Tomé and Príncipe, international modalities do little to address the root causes of vulnerability or to support system-wide transformations ( [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ). Although countries like Trinidad and Tobago have amassed oil wealth, the profits are not invested in a way that benefits environmental goals ( [[#Middelbeek--2014|Middelbeek et al., 2014]] ). In Mauritius, a lack of financial resources for climate change adaptation has been recognised as a specific impediment at the district council level ( [[#Williams--2020|Williams et al., 2020]] ).

Although small island jurisdictions have seen increased flows of adaptation finance through mostly top-town arrangements, they face large implementation difficulties ( ''medium evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Weir--2017|Weir and Pittock, 2017]] ; Magnan and [[#Duvat--2018|Duvat, 2018]] ). There are growing concerns among policy- and decision-makers in small islands about the current levels and forms of adaptation finance, and about countries’ experience with accessing it ( [[#Robinson--2017|Robinson and Dornan, 2017]] ). In the Caribbean, 38% of flows were concessional loans and 62% were grants ( [[#Atteridge--2017|Atteridge et al., 2017]] ); the situation in the Atlantic and Indian oceans is starkly different—nearly 75% of the flows were in the form of concessional loans and grants accounted for the remaining 25% ( [[#Canales--2017|Canales et al., 2017]] ). This raises questions about fairness and justice for small islands having to finance adaptation to climate impacts to which they have made a negligible contribution. In the Pacific, 86% of aid was delivered as project-based support ( [[#Atteridge--2017|Atteridge and Canales, 2017]] ), which can undermine the long-term sustainability of adaptation interventions ( [[#Conway--2014|Conway and Mustelin, 2014]] ; [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ; [[#Atteridge--2017|Atteridge and Canales, 2017]] ). Direct budget support was rare ( [[#Atteridge--2017|Atteridge and Canales, 2017]] ), signalling the importance of works such as [[#Rambarran--2018|Rambarran (2018)]] that support cross-regional lesson-learning by, for example, showcasing the experience of Seychelles with successfully devising innovative financing mechanisms for supporting adaptation and conservation goals, and reducing its public debt. Regional catastrophe risk insurance schemes, however, such as Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company under the World Bank’s Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) Program are trying to enable a regional effort in increasing accessibility to insurance ( [[#PCRAFI--2017|PCRAFI, 2017]] ) as does the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, although these funds are still rather small compared to the needs across the countries ( [[#Handmer--2019|Handmer and Nalau, 2019]] ).

Microfinance is increasingly viewed as a positive mechanism to improve access to climate adaptation funding ( [[#Di%20Falco--2018|Di Falco and Sharma, 2018]] ). In the Caribbean, a significant barrier in accessing climate finance relates to bureaucratic structures, which means that money intended for communities does not reach them ( [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo, 2018a]] ). Many adaptation projects even at the community level have upfront costs that need to be supported, especially in communities where there is little hard cash in use ( [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ). Despite such challenges, communities in the Pacific region have used ‘cashless adaptation’ for a long time, which involves trading of services and items as a form of indigenous microfinance ( [[#Nunn--2019b|Nunn and Kumar, 2019b]] ). Social networks also function as a source of informal microfinance where extended family members send back remittances from overseas to their families and communities especially after disasters. In Samoa, indigenous tourism operators receive remittances from overseas family members ( [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban, 2018]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ), with similar processes observed among atoll communities in the Solomon Islands ( [[#Birk--2014|Birk and Rasmussen, 2014]] ), Vanuatu ( [[#Handmer--2019|Handmer and Nalau, 2019]] ) and Jamaica ( [[#Carby--2017|Carby, 2017]] ). However, the role of migration and remittances is still poorly understood; it is difficult to quantify the informal flows and understand the extent to which they support effective adaptation ( ''limited evidence, high agreement)'' ( [[#Campbell--2014a|Campbell, 2014a]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ; [[#Handmer--2019|Handmer and Nalau, 2019]] ) ''.''

In Old Harbour Bay, Jamaica’s largest fishing village, a high number of community members engaged in the fishing industry, particularly vendors and scalers, do not own the material assets needed to fully benefit from these livelihood activities ( [[#Baptiste--2016|Baptiste and Kinlocke, 2016]] ). Developing a broader asset portfolio by increasing access to such assets via adaptation finance investments could reduce vulnerability across the community. This could function as an effective livelihood-based adaptation strategy for the most vulnerable such as women, who are part-time employed and in peripheral roles in the fishing industry ( [[#Baptiste--2016|Baptiste and Kinlocke, 2016]] ). In Belize and the Dominican Republic, many coastal fishers, for example, use informal credit from food stores or captains to enable them to withstand financial losses that are often incurred during bad weather and extreme events ( [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and McLean, 2020]] ).

In Vanuatu, discussions are ongoing on increasing insurance availability for TCs and droughts, but standardisation of housing designs to get insurance can become difficult where the costs make it prohibitive and run counter to traditional building designs and materials ( [[#Baarsch--2016|Baarsch and Kelman, 2016]] ). Empirical evidence from Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and St. Lucia indicates that there are also other factors why people do not take insurance, including ‘the cost of premiums (44%), lack of trust in insurance companies (27%), having never considered insurance (26%), a lack of need for insurance (25%) and a lack of knowledge of insurance (22%)’ ( [[#Lashley--2013|Lashley and Warner, 2013]] , p. 108). Increasing trust could be addressed by seeking out domestic banks or credit unions with whom people are already engaging with, while also using social marketing campaigns to raise awareness of weather-related insurance to address knowledge gaps and lack of awareness of these tools ( [[#Lashley--2013|Lashley and Warner, 2013]] ). In Dominica, many coastal fishers are suspicious of insurance schemes given past experiences of not being paid out on time or having to disclose catch data ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ). Yet, insurance is not capable of addressing all kinds of losses and damages accruing from climate impacts and should be used as an adaptation strategy in combination with other strategies ( [[#Lashley--2013|Lashley and Warner, 2013]] ).

Insurance cover is a critical question in small islands. For example, in Vanuatu, some companies do not ‘cover storm damage from the sea or high tides…which is not helpful for properties damaged by a tropical cyclone’s storm surge’ ( [[#Baarsch--2016|Baarsch and Kelman, 2016]] , p. 6). There is also limited access to insurance schemes due to lower demand in small markets ( [[#Petzold--2019|Petzold and Magnan, 2019]] ) especially when many people do not have high cash-based incomes and likely cannot pay insurance premiums ( [[#Baarsch--2016|Baarsch and Kelman, 2016]] ). In St. Lucia and Grenada (via the Caribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility), discussions are ongoing with regard to national-level parametric insurance, underpinned by financing from the US State Department, to help fishing communities recover more quickly following the passage of TCs in the future ( [[#Sainsbury--2019|Sainsbury et al., 2019]] ; [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ). Likewise, [[#Reguero--2020|Reguero et al. (2020)]] have suggested a resilience insurance mechanism that could in theory reduce climate-related losses and damages through investments in nature-based adaptation projects (e.g., coral reef restoration and potentially mangrove restoration).

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=== 15.6.4 Education and Awareness-Raising ===

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A significant barrier to effective climate adaptation is the lack of education and awareness around climate change both among the general public, for example, in the Bahamas ( [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] ) and among decision makers in the more remote rural communities ( [[#Nunn--2013|Nunn, 2013]] ; [[#Mycoo--2015|Mycoo, 2015]] ). Increasing knowledge on adaptation options and needs can increase adaptive capacity that is underpinned by ‘the ability of individuals to access, understand and apply the knowledge needed to inform their decision-making processes’ ( [[#Cvitanovic--2016|Cvitanovic et al., 2016]] p. 54). This should, however, also be seen as a collective effort ( [[#Hayward--2019|Hayward et al., 2019]] ).

Workshops and training are seen as crucial at the local scale to build communities’ capacity to take action and to integrate climate change considerations to the broader development processes ( [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ), although purely workshop-based short-term capacity building in adaptation has been questioned ( [[#Conway--2014|Conway and Mustelin, 2014]] ; [[#Lubell--2019|Lubell and Niles, 2019]] ). More interactive community engagement strategies could include ‘participatory three-dimensional modelling (P3DM), participatory video, development of photo journals, and civil society plans’ ( [[#Beckford--2018|Beckford, 2018]] , p. 46) that enables broader engagement. In Fiji, Laje Rotuma youth ecocamps have been used to engage younger Fijians to understand adaptation and increasing environmental stewardship with good outcomes ( [[#McNaught--2014|McNaught et al., 2014]] ). In Palau, Camp Ebiil provides a culturally based platform for younger generations to learn about nature and culture in an interactive camp ( [[#Singeo--2011|Singeo, 2011]] ). Vanuatu’s Volunteer Rainfall Observer Network, in turn, engages volunteers to record their rainfall observations, demonstrating the use of IKLK that can be integrated with contemporary weather forecasting ( [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al., 2014]] ). Likewise, initiatives such as ePOP ''Petites Ondes Participatives'' aim to develop a citizen network to share environmental information (e.g., via mini-videos on smartphones). Across the Pacific, projects such as the European Union Pacific Technical Vocational Education and Training on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Adaptation Project (EU PacTVET) have sought to increase the capacity of Pacific islanders in disaster risk management and climate adaptation ( [[#Hemstock--2018|Hemstock et al., 2018]] ).

In Fiji, a study on adaptive behaviour and intention to invest in more adaptive portfolios found that the intent for adaptive behaviour increased with the supply of climate information ( [[#Di%20Falco--2018|Di Falco and Sharma, 2018]] ). In the Pacific, high-performing CBA initiatives included climate awareness raising that equipped people with knowledge to understand occurring environmental changes and what to do ( [[#McNamara--2020|McNamara et al., 2020]] ). Lack of information can increase community vulnerability. Remote indigenous farming communities in St. Vincent, in the Caribbean, for example, have already observed decreased rainfall and increases in temperatures, but they have been largely excluded from agricultural training that includes information in how to improve agricultural strategies in times of climatic shocks and how to prepare for changing climatic conditions ( [[#Smith--2016|Smith and Rhiney, 2016]] ). In the Bahamas, cultural background, income and education levels impact the extent to which people are aware of climate risks ( [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] ). In Dominica, access to information critical to fisheries is noted as a significant challenge, including data collection, its management and human resources in building capacity to process and use this information for evidence-based decision-making ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ).

The Caribbean Climate Online Risk and Adaptation tool has been developed to assist the tourism industry in producing ‘climate-sensitive developments’ ( [[#Mackay--2017|Mackay and Spencer, 2017]] , p. 55). Although some authors conclude on the low climate awareness/understanding among small islanders ( [[#Middelbeek--2014|Middelbeek et al., 2014]] ; [[#Betzold--2015|Betzold, 2015]] ; [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] ), others indicate that many Caribbean islanders are acutely aware of past storm events (i.e., social memory) and have a certain degree of self-reliance, which creates the capability to multitask and cope with limited resources ( [[#Petzold--2019|Petzold and Magnan, 2019]] ). There is, however, a disconnect between knowledge, attitudes and practices—knowledge sharing and learning need to be improved along with the take-up of an evidence-based decision-making approach ( [[#Lashley--2013|Lashley and Warner, 2013]] ; [[#Petzold--2018|Petzold et al., 2018]] ; [[#Saxena--2018|Saxena et al., 2018]] ).

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=== 15.6.5 Culture ===

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Culture can be defined as ‘material and non-material symbols that express collective meaning’ ( [[#Adger--2014|Adger et al., 2014]] , p. 762) and includes worldviews and values, how individuals and communities relate to their environment, and what they perceive to be at risk and in need of adaptation ( [[#McNaught--2014|McNaught et al., 2014]] ; [[#Nunn--2014|Nunn et al., 2014]] ; [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki, 2016]] ; [[#Nunn--2017b|Nunn et al., 2017b]] ; [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson, 2017]] ; [[#Neef--2018|Neef et al., 2018]] ; [[#Oakes--2019|Oakes, 2019]] ). In small islands, culture plays an important role in individual and community decision-making on adaptation both as an enabling factor and as a barrier ( ''robust evidence, high agreement'' ) ( [[#Nunn--2017b|Nunn et al., 2017b]] ; [[#Parsons--2017|Parsons et al., 2017]] ; [[#Neef--2018|Neef et al., 2018]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2020|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020]] ). The concept of ''Vai Nui'' as the interconnectedness of Pacific Islanders continues to support the collective agency to plan and undertake adaptation efforts in the region ( [[#Hayward--2019|Hayward et al., 2019]] ). In Samoa, the principles of ''Fa‘asamoa'' (the Samoan way of life) impacts on how decisions are made, including the role of the ''aiga'' (extended family) that is a web of local, national and transnational kinship networks ( [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ). Traditional village council structures and land stewardship enable an expanded range of coastal adaptation options in Samoa, including potential relocation, but at the same time may limit participation of all social groups in adaptation decision-making ( [[#Crichton--2020|Crichton et al., 2020]] ). In Dominica, in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria (2017), social capital in the form of transboundary nearby island networks enabled some communities to recover faster from the disaster including access to more livelihood opportunities and assets ( [[#Turner--2020|Turner et al., 2020]] ).

Yet, culture is often overlooked in adaptation policies and plans. For example, in the National Communications of 16 SIDS, only one country (Cook Islands) reported adaptation actions that addressed social issues, culture and heritage ( [[#Robinson--2018b|Robinson, 2018b]] ). Externally driven adaptation efforts in rural small island communities that exclude community priorities, ignore or undervalue IKLK, and are based on secular Western/global worldviews ( [[#Donner--2014|Donner and Webber, 2014]] ; [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ; [[#McNamara--2016|McNamara et al., 2016]] ; [[#Nunn--2017b|Nunn et al., 2017b]] ; [[#Schwebel--2017|Schwebel, 2017]] ; [[#Mallin--2018|Mallin, 2018]] ; [[#Nunn--2019|Nunn and McNamara, 2019]] ; [[#Piggott-McKellar--2019b|Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019b]] ) are often less successful ( ''high agreement, medium evidence'' ). The World Bank Kiribati Adaptation Program (KAP), for example, builds mainly on Western knowledge and science despite consultations with the Kiribati communities ( [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ). Yet, in many contexts, most land and knowledge are embedded in traditional governance and culture while adaptation plans and decisions are made elsewhere on how that land should be used and what knowledge is used ( ''high agreement'' ) ( [[#Nunn--2013|Nunn, 2013]] ; [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ; [[#Charan--2017|Charan et al., 2017]] ; [[#Nalau--2018a|Nalau et al., 2018a]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ; [[#McGinn--2020|McGinn and Solofa, 2020]] ).

In Kiribati, communities often use different timescales to evaluate the need for adaptation. I-Kiribati culture’s core concept of time is short term and medium term ( [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ), which should be considered in adaptation policy and planning processes especially at the household and community level ( [[#Donner--2014|Donner and Webber, 2014]] ). Key stakeholders, especially community leaders, should be included and empowered to help design and sustain adaptation ( [[#Baldacchino--2018|Baldacchino, 2018]] ; [[#Weiler--2018|Weiler et al., 2018]] ). Focusing on values-as-relations (e.g., island communities’ relationship with the environment and each other) could diversify the values considered in adaptation decision-making processes ( [[#Parsons--2019|Parsons and Nalau, 2019]] ). Indeed, those Pacific islands with a more island-centric approach to climate adaptation tend to have overall more successful adaptation policies in place ( [[#Schwebel--2017|Schwebel, 2017]] ).

The cultural context and sources of knowledge are myriad and diverse in small islands. Community members often use both IKLK as well as Western scientific-based weather forecasts to take actions to prepare for extreme weather events ( [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al., 2014]] ; [[#Johnston--2015|Johnston, 2015]] ; [[#Janif--2016|Janif et al., 2016]] ; [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson, 2017]] ; [[#Kelman--2017|Kelman et al., 2017]] ), with specific examples from Niue, Tonga, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands ''(high agreement, high evidence)'' ( [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al., 2014]] ; [[#Chambers--2017|Chambers et al., 2017]] ; [[#Chambers--2019|Chambers et al., 2019]] ) ''.'' In Samoa, people keep particular areas reserved for disaster times such as TC seasons ( [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ), while in Vanuatu, IKLK indicators for TCs include mango trees flowering early and turtles going further inland to lay their eggs ( [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al., 2014]] ). IKLK are, however, not evenly distributed within communities due to IKLK being traditional intellectual property of particular roles in the villages (e.g., weathermen in Vanuatu), and not available to other community members or external actors directly ( [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al., 2014]] ; [[#Prance--2015|Prance, 2015]] ). In Tongoa Island, Vanuatu, communities are finding, however, that their IKLK-based seasonal calendars are out of sync given the changes in climatic conditions ( [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson, 2017]] ), while erosion of IKLK remains a concern across most small island nations ( [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie, 2015]] ; [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson, 2017]] ; [[#Beckford--2018|Beckford, 2018]] ).

Not all IKLK and other knowledge are necessarily helpful and IKLK can lead to maladaptation ( [[#Mercer--2012|Mercer et al., 2012]] ; [[#Beckford--2018|Beckford, 2018]] ). Elders from the Chuuk State (Federated States of Micronesia; [[#Elders%20from%20Atafu%20Atoll--2012|Elders from Atafu Atoll, 2012]] ), for instance, assign blame for changeable weather patterns, destructive typhoons and loss of biodiversity to people’s failure to maintain and employ their IKLK. Fatalism (belief that disasters are God’s will) is still reported as a major cultural barrier to adaptation. In Maldives, fatalism decreases direct adaptation action and influences perceptions of climate risks ( [[#Shakeela--2015|Shakeela and Becken, 2015]] ) while indigenous communities in St. Vincent do not prepare for hurricanes or climatic shocks for the same reason ( [[#Smith--2016|Smith and Rhiney, 2016]] ). In Oceania, Christianity and the church play an important role in how issues, such as climate change, are communicated and thought about ( [[#Rubow--2016|Rubow and Bird, 2016]] ; [[#Nunn--2017b|Nunn et al., 2017b]] ), including the Noah and flood story used as a justification that there is no need to worry about SLR ( [[#Rubow--2016|Rubow and Bird, 2016]] ). New emerging forms of eco-theology (theology that connects humans with land, sea and sky), however, situate climate change as part of environmental stewardship ( [[#Rubow--2016|Rubow and Bird, 2016]] ) making churches active partners in caring for the environment.

Many studies also now demonstrate the value in considering multiple systems of knowledge through collaborative and co-production projects and strategies, which allow for culturally situated knowledge, values and practices to be positioned at the heart of sustainable climate change adaptation ''(high agreement)'' ( [[#Chambers--2017|Chambers et al., 2017]] ; [[#Plotz--2017|Plotz et al., 2017]] ; [[#Beckford--2018|Beckford, 2018]] ; [[#Malsale--2018|Malsale et al., 2018]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al., 2018]] ; [[#Suliman--2019|Suliman et al., 2019]] ) ''.'' In the Caribbean context, [[#Beckford--2018|Beckford (2018)]] suggests the establishment of the Caribbean Local and Traditional Knowledge Network, a shared regional platform, makes IKLK more available for climate adaptation and community resilience projects where appropriate. Likewise, indigenous research methodologies are emerging that introduce more culturally grounded concepts and methods into how research is conducted and that decolonise mainstream research in the Pacific Islands ( [[#Suaalii-Sauni--2014|Suaalii-Sauni and Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014]] ).

Despite widespread international evidence that the impacts of climate change and disaster events often negatively affect women (and gender minorities) more than men ( [[#McSherry--2014|McSherry et al., 2014]] ; [[#Aipira--2017|Aipira et al., 2017]] ; [[#Gaillard--2017|Gaillard et al., 2017]] ), attention to gender equality as a concept is still only ‘embryonic in climate change adaptation in the Pacific’, and although recognised in some policies and project designs, it is not well supported by on-the-ground actions or well monitored ( [[#Aipira--2017|Aipira et al., 2017]] , p. 237). Many Pacific small island climate change adaptation policies do not mainstream gender across the activities ( [[#Aipira--2017|Aipira et al., 2017]] ), with women’s groups being excluded from climate grants due to patriarchal formal and informal governance structures, lack of resources, less access to educational and training schemes and no track record (or receiving grants or meeting grant milestones) ( [[#McLeod--2018|McLeod et al., 2018]] ). However, Pacific women identify several strategies that enable them to adapt to climate change more effectively. These include the recognition and support of women’s IKLK by governments, researchers and NGOs; increasing women’s access to climate change funding and support from organisations to allow them to meet the requirements of international climate change grants; and specific education and training to women’s groups to allow them to develop strategic action plans, mission statements, learn financial reporting requirements as well as general leadership and institutional training ( [[#McLeod--2018|McLeod et al., 2018]] ). These and other measures could enable a broader representation and participation in adaptation processes despite cultural constraints (Table 15.7 on Enabling Conditions).

'''Table 15.7 |''' Enabling conditions and factors for adaptation in small islands.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! colspan="3"|
|-
! Enabler

! Example

! Reference

|-
| colspan="3"| ''Knowledge (indigenous, local, external)''

|-
| rowspan="3"| IKLK in developing adaptation strategies (soft protective structures; disaster preparedness)

| Using IKLK in identifying Indigenous vegetation (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation) to reduce erosion (Samoa, Vanuatu)

| [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban (2018)]] ; [[#Nalau--2018b|Nalau et al. (2018b)]]

|-
| Pacific storm prediction, disaster preparedness

| [[#Chand--2014|Chand et al. (2014)]] ; [[#Kuruppu--2015|Kuruppu and Willie (2015)]] ; [[#Granderson--2017|Granderson (2017)]]

|-
| Shared resource governance and understanding of linkages between sectors and ecosystems based on IKLK (e.g., Lomani Gau village initiative (Fiji)

| [[#Remling--2016|Remling and Veitayaki (2016)]]

|-
| rowspan="2"| Increased access to climate information

| Increased access to climate information increasing individuals will and capacity to support/take adaptive actions (Fiji)

| [[#Di%20Falco--2019|Di Falco and Sharma-Khushal (2019)]]

|-
| Dissemination of adaptation skills and significance to youth (e.g., ecocamps in Fiji)

| McNaught et al. (2014)

|-
| Increased access to climate information

| Pacific women’s improved participation in adaptation processes via training, access to information and decision-making

Improved climate data quality, management and associated observation, modelling and information services

Caribbean: improved climate data quality, management and associated observation, modelling and information services

Provision of user-tailored products and services through knowledge co-production processes

| [[#McLeod--2018|McLeod et al. (2018)]]

[[#Martin--2015|Martin et al. (2015)]] ; [[#Hermes--2019|Hermes et al. (2019)]]

[[#Trotman--2018|Trotman et al. (2018)]]

[[#SPREP--2016a|SPREP (2016a)]]

|-
| colspan="3"| ''Economy and finance''

|-
| Economic diversification and shifting to CRDPs

| Tourism system transitions/cooperation from tourism sector

| [[#Loehr--2019|Loehr (2019)]] ; [[#Mahadew--2019|Mahadew and Appadoo (2019)]] ; [[#Loehr--2020|Loehr et al. (2020)]] ; [[#Sheller--2020|Sheller (2020)]]

|-
| Finance models for adaptation

| Innovative financing models that enable adaptation (e.g., Seychelles)

Parametric fisheries insurance products to increase fishery resilience funded by Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (Grenada and Saint Lucia)

| [[#Rambarran--2018|Rambarran (2018)]]

[[#CCRIF--2019|CCRIF (2019)]]

|-
| Transregional trade agreements/associated pressure

| Revised sociopolitical arrangements for better fisheries management (Solomon Islands)

| Keen et al. (2018)

|-
| Economic viability via revenue from sale of new land

| Maldives land raising on Hulhumalé

‘Safe island development programme’ after 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in the Maldives

| [[#Bisaro--2019|Bisaro et al. (2019)]]

[[#Shaig--2008|Shaig (2008)]]

|-
| Government subsidies

| Tuamotu’s government subsidy of raised houses

| [[#Magnan--2018|Magnan et al. (2018)]]

|-
| Co-investments and cooperation between agencies (donors, governments)

| Tuvalu use of beach nourishment in collaboration with JICA

| [[#Onaka--2017|Onaka et al. (2017)]]

|-
| Diversification of livelihoods as basis for economic activity

| Coastal fishers’ diversification of livelihoods into the tourism sector (Vanuatu and Madagascar)

Fishermen varying fishing practices and locations depending on environmental conditions (e.g., Dominican Republic)

| [[#Blair--2018|Blair and Momtaz (2018)]]

[[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and McLean (2020)]]

|-
| colspan="3"| ''Governance''

|-
| Changed governance arrangements resulting in improved coordination

| Improved governance arrangements: cross-sectoral and cross-agency coordination (e.g., Vanuatu)

| [[#Webb--2015|Webb et al. (2015)]] ; [[#Nalau--2016|Nalau et al. (2016)]]

|-
| rowspan="2"| Changed governance arrangements resulting in improved coordination

| Agency explicitly tasked with coordinating sectors and services for climate resilience across government (Dominica)

| Turner et al. (2020)

|-
| Efficient and coordinated distribution of climate adaptation support across national projects and departments (e.g., Samoa)

| [[#McGinn--2020|McGinn and Solofa (2020)]]

|-
| New strict/explicit building codes

| Caribbean infrastructure (esp. housing and hotels) now must be built to withstand strong hurricanes

| [[#Mycoo--2018a|Mycoo (2018a)]]

|-
| Localising climate adaptation plans, frameworks and policies

| Pacific Adaptive Capacity Framework

Framework for the Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP)

Island-centric adaptation policy and planning

| [[#Warrick--2017|Warrick et al. (2017)]]

[[#SPC--2016|SPC (2016)]]

[[#Schwebel--2017|Schwebel (2017)]]

|-
| colspan="3"| ''Social and cultural''

|-
| rowspan="3"| Social networks and capacity in disaster recovery

| Support of social networks in hurricane recovery, access to livelihood opportunities (e.g., Dominica)

| Turner et al. (2020)

|-
| Increased indigenous resilience and adaptive capacity via social networks and capital (e.g., Samoa)

| [[#Petzold--2015|Petzold and Ratter (2015)]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al. (2018)]]

|-
| Informal credit for fishermen at food stores during and after disasters (e.g., Belize and Dominican Republic)

| [[#Karlsson--2020|Karlsson and McLean (2020)]]

|-
| Social networks and traditional familiarity with barter/microfinance

| Community-level fundraising (e.g., Samoa, Solomons, Jamaica)

| [[#Birk--2014|Birk and Rasmussen (2014)]] ; [[#Carby--2017|Carby (2017)]] ; [[#Crichton--2018|Crichton and Esteban (2018)]] ; [[#Parsons--2018|Parsons et al. (2018)]] ; [[#Nunn--2019a|Nunn and Kumar (2019a)]]

|-
| Maintenance of home community

| Circular migration between Tuvalu and overseas

| Marino and [[#Lazrus--2015|Lazrus (2015)]]

|-
| Empowerment of the migrating individuals

| Relocations of villages (Fiji)

| Marino and Lazrus 2015)

|}

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