Editing IPCC:AR6/WGII/Chapter-17 (section)

=== 17.4.2 Enabling Condition 1: Governance ===

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Governance is an inclusive concept of the range of means for deciding, managing, implementing and monitoring climate change responses. It can involve contributions of various levels of government (global, international, regional, sub-national and local) along with those from the private sector, of non-governmental organisations and of civil society. The importance of supportive governance arrangements is re-iterated widely across regional and sectoral chapters in this report, in multiple different contexts ( ''very high confidence'' ).

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==== 17.4.2.1 Legal, Policy and Regulatory Instruments ====

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===== 17.4.2.1.1 Climate legislation =====

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Legal systems play an important governance role in facilitating responses to climate change across all levels of society ( ''high confidence'' ) ( [[#Ruhl--2010|Ruhl, 2010]] ; [[#McDonald--2014|McDonald and Styles, 2014]] ; [[#Mehling--2015|Mehling, 2015]] ). Laws can facilitate climate action in multiple ways, including through: (i) mandating and guiding the behaviour of governance structures and actors, (ii) fostering coordination between different levels of government, (iii) enforcing climate responses, (iv) its symbolic value and (iv) aligning scientific evidence and societal norms ( [[#Mehling--2015|Mehling, 2015]] ; [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ). Laws also can embed climate change planning within the administrative structure of a state, rendering policy less vulnerable to revocation ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ). Extensive revision to laws has occurred in the last decade: a survey of 164 countries showed that over 1200 climate-related national laws and policies have been published, with approximately 44% being acts of parliament ( [[#Nachmany--2017|Nachmany et al., 2017]] ).

National climate change laws are important for transposing ratified international commitments into domestic regimes, such as the Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biodiversity, as well as voluntary agreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. In turn, the enactment of domestic laws can yield useful experiences and foster engagements that positively influence and support the development of international commitments ( [[#Townshend--2013|Townshend and Matthews, 2013]] ; [[#Mehling--2015|Mehling, 2015]] ). Strong and consistent regulatory frameworks also support the flow of climate finance to developing countries that have such frameworks ( [[#Nachmany--2017|Nachmany et al., 2017]] ). The successful implementation of national and sub-national climate change and related policies and strategies are often contingent upon the underlying legislative framework empowering, mandating or guiding their review, implementation and enforcement ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova and Matikainen, 2017]] ; [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ) ( ''medium confidence'' ).

Existing legal systems also pose potential barriers to adaptation, as described in [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-9|Chapter 9]] (Africa) and [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-8|Chapter 8]] (Poverty, Livelihoods and Sustainable Development). Laws may reinforce governance arrangements and regulations that do not support responses to climate change, and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequalities (Craig, 2010; [[#Arnold--2013|Arnold and Gunderson, 2013]] ; [[#Wenta--2019|Wenta et al., 2019]] ). In such cases, laws may require review and revision or replacement, and at the same be written in ways that foster adaptive management (Craig, 2010; [[#Ruhl--2010|Ruhl, 2010]] ; [[#Cosens--2017|Cosens et al., 2017]] ).

Even though there is no agreed definition of or typology for climate change laws ( [[#Mehling--2015|Mehling, 2015]] ), studies have tended to classify climate change laws as being ‘framework’ or ‘sectoral’ (see Table 17.5 for examples). Framework laws offer a comprehensive, unifying basis for climate change policy, addressing multiple aspects or areas of climate change mitigation or adaptation (or both) in a holistic and overarching manner ( [[#Townshend--2011|Townshend et al., 2011]] ; [[#Fankhauser--2014|Fankhauser et al., 2014]] ; [[#Nachmany--2015|Nachmany et al., 2015]] ; [[#Clare--2017b|Clare et al., 2017b]] ); they are powerful levers for setting national and sub-national agendas, creating climate change institutional structures, enabling policy implementation and driving the passage of additional sectoral legislation and regulations ( [[#Clare--2017b|Clare et al., 2017b]] ). Prior to 2010, national framework laws tended to have a mitigation focus, while more recent laws or amendments thereto have an increased adaptation focus ( [[#Rumble--2019b|Rumble, 2019b]] ). No evidence indicates whether general or specific framework laws yield better outcomes; however, reviews of more recent examples of framework laws in Africa suggest a trend towards more specificity in the required content of adaptation strategies and duties ( [[#Rumble--2019b|Rumble, 2019b]] ).

A sectoral approach to climate change legislation grafts climate-related provisions into existing laws, such as environmental impact assessment, flood insurance and infrastructure planning, collectively creating an aggregated legal landscape ( [[#Townshend--2011|Townshend et al., 2011]] ; [[#Gerrard--2012|Gerrard and Fischer, 2012]] ; [[#Nachmany--2015|Nachmany et al., 2015]] ; [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ; [[#Rumble--2019a|Rumble, 2019a]] ). This approach is particularly relevant to adaptation challenges which intersect with numerous bodies of law that are dedicated to other societal concerns ( [[#Gerrard--2012|Gerrard and Fischer, 2012]] ). However, integrating such considerations can be challenging in certain areas of law, particularly those relating to property rights, water rights and endangered species protection ( [[#Gerrard--2012|Gerrard and Fischer, 2012]] ). The incorporation of adaptive management principles (including monitoring, periodic evaluation, and response modification) within existing laws can enhance their enabling role and foster greater resilience ( [[#Godden--2012|Godden, 2012]] ; [[#Arnold--2013|Arnold and Gunderson, 2013]] ; [[#McDonald--2014|McDonald and Styles, 2014]] ).

The legal regime for adaptation is too embryonic for assessment of good practice design and content, although similarities can be seen in the framework laws and draft bills across several countries. Some studies highlight the importance of domestic ‘whole of legal system’ analysis prior to development of modifying law. This can identify the range of existing legislative instruments that can directly intersect with climate change, along with related contextual factors such as national circumstances, governance frameworks, and political and economic realities as well as national administrative culture ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ). This helps any new climate change laws to be absorbed into, and harmonise with, the established legal system of each country ( [[#Scotford--2017|Scotford et al., 2017]] ). Efforts are underway to assist countries in such assessments and the identification of areas for legislative reform, for example through the Commonwealth and UN Environment’s Law and Climate Change Toolkit. Similarly, databases such as the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the Sabin Center on Climate Change Law are expanding the knowledge base of national climate legislation developments.

'''Table 17.5 |''' Selected examples of framework and sectoral law approaches adopted by different nations that represent a variety of regional contexts.

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Example

! Legal approach

! Description

! References

|-
| United Kingdom Climate Change Act 2008

| Framework

| Provides for development of climate change impact reports and programmes for adaptation. Dedicated institutional structure with advisory body, adaptation planning provision, reporting/information obligations, climate change mainstreaming, climate change trusts or financial arrangements.

| Averchenkova et al. (2021)

|-
| Kenya Climate Change Act 2016

| Framework

| Modelled on the United Kingdom Climate Change Act. Provides for development of climate change impact reports and programmes for adaptation. Dedicated institutional structure with advisory body, adaptation planning provision, reporting/information obligations, climate change mainstreaming, climate change trusts or financial arrangements.

| [[#Rumble--2019b|Rumble (2019b)]]

|-
| Mexican General Law on Climate Change 2012

| Framework

| Imposes positive duties upon government to implement ‘adaptation actions’—conservation, sustainable use and rehabilitation of beaches and coasts; water programmes for watersheds; the establishment of protected areas and biological corridors; the development of risk atlases; human settlement and urban development programmes; and prevention programmes targeting diseases exacerbated by climate change. Includes development of economic instruments, including fiscal incentives, credits, bonds, civil liability insurance and market-based instruments.

| Averchenkova and Guzman Luna (2018)

|-
| New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012

| Sectoral

| Incorporates adaptive management principles by regulating the issuance of marine consents with conditions allowing change based on ecological change and indicators.

| [[#Godden--2012|Godden (2012)]]

|-
| Seychelles Conservation and Climate Adaptation Trust of Seychelles Act 18 of 2015

| Sectoral

| Provides for the establishment of a dedicated trust fund for conservation measures and climate change adaptation measures.

| [[#Etongo--2021|Etongo et al. (2021)]]

|-
| Commonwealth of Dominica Climate Resilience Act 16 of 2018

| Sectoral

| Promotes disaster recovery and resilience building. Establishes the Dominica Climate Resilience Policy Board and sets out its functions and duties. Requires the development of a Climate Resilience and Recovery Plan.

| [[#Government%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%20of%20Dominica--2018|Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (2018)]]

|-
| Swedish National Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation (Government Proposition 2017/18:163)

| Sectoral

| Amends Sweden’s Planning and Building Act (2010: 900) by requiring municipalities to assess the risk of damage to the built environment from climate risks as well as how such risks may change in the future; requires detailed plans for measures to address land permeability when issuing a land permit; adopts the Swedish National Climate Strategy into law.

| [[#Government%20of%20Sweden--2017|Government of Sweden (2017)]]

|-
| Argentinian Glaciers Preservation Law N 32.016 (2010)

| Sectoral

| Provides for minimum budgets to protect the national glacial water sources that supply the Mendoza oasis. Establishes that all of Argentina’s glaciers and its periglacial environment are to be protected, irrespective of size.

| [[#Warner--2019|Warner et al. (2019)]]

|-
| Netherlands Delta Act on Water Safety and Fresh Water Supply

| Sectoral

| Protects the Netherlands from risks such as sea level rise and extreme rainfall. Establishes a Delta Programme to secure fresh water supply and address climate risks/sea level rise; a Delta Fund to operate the programme and a commissioner.

| [[#Van%20Alphen--2016|Van Alphen (2016)]]

|}

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===== 17.4.2.1.2 Climate change policies, strategies and plans =====

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Climate change policies and plans are important in the translation of national commitments and legal requirements into specific on the ground strategies and guidelines, which enable actions across multiple spheres and scales of government and non-government institutions and actors.

Substantial developments in adaptation policy have occurred since AR5 ( ''high confidence'' ). Perhaps the most significant is the NDCs required under the Paris Agreement, where 184 out of 197 parties to the UNFCCC have already submitted their first plans ( [[#UNDP%20and%20UNFCCC--2019|UNDP and UNFCCC, 2019]] ). The NDCs have allowed countries to articulate their priorities and ambition with respect to climate action, and it has been suggested that these can in turn lead to cascading policies (and laws) that drive and enable adaptation and climate risk management. Analysis of the first NDCs submitted in the lead-up to and after the Paris Agreement showed that adaptation priorities were more often articulated by developing countries and least developed countries, while developed countries and emerging economies focused mostly on mitigation (Pauw et al., 2019). As of 2019, over 90 developing nations are at various stages of preparing National Adaptation Plans and 112 nations have indicated their intention to revise their NDCs for the 2020 update ( [[#UNDP%20and%20UNFCCC--2019|UNDP and UNFCCC, 2019]] ).

Several other international agreements, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the UN Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, have had significant impacts on the adaptation and risk-management decision-making processes. For example, the Sendai Framework articulates the need for improved understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of exposure, vulnerability and hazard characteristics; accountability for disaster risk management; preparedness to ‘Build Back Better’; recognition of stakeholders and their roles; mobilisation of risk-sensitive investment to avoid the creation of new risk resilience of health infrastructure, cultural heritage and workplaces; strengthening of international cooperation and partnership; and risk-informed donor policies and programmes, including financial support and loans from international financial institutions.

Specific adaptation policies have been formulated at national, regional/state and local levels across 68 countries and 136 coastal cities ( [[#Olazabal--2019a|Olazabal et al., 2019a]] ). At the national level, the quantity and complexity of adaptation policies have increased since AR5, with most policies coming into force since 2009 ( [[#Nachmany--2018|Nachmany and Setzer, 2018]] ). Adaptation is addressed in the executive climate policies of at least 170 countries ( [[#Nachmany--2019a|Nachmany et al., 2019a]] ). Documented sub-national adaptation policies are more prevalent in developed countries and emerging economies, as compared with low- and middle-income ones ( [[#Olazabal--2019b|Olazabal et al., 2019b]] ). For example, by 2017, 26% of large and medium-sized European cities had an adaptation plan or a joint adaptation–mitigation plan in place ( [[#Reckien--2018a|Reckien et al., 2018a]] ).

Adaptation policies often comprise multiple goals and instruments, which develop over time, especially where jurisdiction over policy issues is shared among agencies or levels of government ( [[#Río--2013|Río and Howlett, 2013]] ). The increase in the number and complexity of policy instruments across geared towards adaptation raises questions of coherence and alignment between the selected policy mixes and their effectiveness ( [[#England--2018|England et al., 2018]] ; [[#Ranabhat--2018|Ranabhat et al., 2018]] ; [[#Lesnikowski--2019|Lesnikowski et al., 2019]] ).

Evaluation of national adaptation plans (NAPs) has only recently been undertaken. [[#Woodruff--2019|Woodruff and Regan (2019)]] compared national adaptation plans from 38 countries and concluded that most were strong in identifying vulnerabilities and identifying potential adaptation options but were weaker in articulating implementation pathways and monitoring of progress; plans written by multi-agency teams were nearly always of higher quality. [[#Garschagen--2021|Garschagen et al. (2021)]] showed that, while most NAPs consider future changes in climate hazard, many do not consider how vulnerability and exposure might change, concluding that this limits the potential effectiveness of the plans. Morgan et al. (2019) showed that NAPs that are consistent with the Paris Agreement can enable development pathways that promote synergies between environmental, social and economic goals.

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===== 17.4.2.1.3 Impact of legal and policy instruments =====

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Commitment to act, and guidance on how to do so, from international and national governance levels can drive national and sub-national adaptation ( [[#Reckien--2013|Reckien et al., 2013]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2018a|Reckien et al., 2018a]] ). For example, more local plans have been developed in European countries where it is obligatory for local municipalities to develop climate change plans ( [[#Reckien--2018a|Reckien et al., 2018a]] ). Local government have also drawn on non-binding national climate frameworks, as well as international frameworks (such as European law) or international networks (such as Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy) to guide their actions ( [[#Reckien--2013|Reckien et al., 2013]] ; [[#De%20Gregorio%20Hurtado--2015|De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015]] ; [[#Reckien--2015|Reckien et al., 2015]] ; [[#Heidrich--2016|Heidrich et al., 2016]] ; [[#Reckien--2018a|Reckien et al., 2018a]] ).

However, a national framework is not always sufficient to trigger climate change action on the lower level, in particular when the national guiding document fails to clearly formulate how it should be used and ‘translated down’ to lower governance levels ( [[#De%20Gregorio%20Hurtado--2015|De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015]] ). Guidance on how to apply a national framework at lower governance levels can assist in their uptake.

In the case of climate change legislation, research on the impact of adaptation laws is limited, save for a few studies ( [[#Averchenkova--2017|Averchenkova and Matikainen, 2017]] ), because many framework laws, particularly those with more of an adaptation focus, have only been published recently ( [[#Rumble--2019b|Rumble, 2019b]] ). Reviews of the implementation of the risk assessment and adaptation components of the UK’s Climate Change Act 2008 suggest that they had a weaker implementation record compared with mitigation provisions ( [[#Fankhauser--2018|Fankhauser et al., 2018]] ), potentially because implementation of adaptation is more complex as compared with mitigation as shown for the local level ( [[#Reckien--2019|Reckien et al., 2019]] ). However, the UK Act is considered to have made action on climate change more predictable, more structured and more evidence based ( [[#Averchenkova--2021|Averchenkova et al., 2021]] ).

There are numerous examples of regulatory and project-based innovations by local governments. Their impact, however, is uneven, with much depending on the implementation capacity of local governments and other socio-institutional barriers, including those relating to mandate and joint project implementation, cross-departmental working, planning cycles, concerns relating to legal liability and compensation, political appetite and cost ( [[#Godden--2012|Godden, 2012]] ; [[#Taylor--2016a|Taylor, 2016a]] ). Notwithstanding implementation challenges, evidence is emerging that overarching framework laws play a foundational and distinctive role in supporting effective climate governance, including adaptation governance ( [[#Fankhauser--2018|Fankhauser et al., 2018]] ), and are drivers of subsequent activity ( [[#Townshend--2011|Townshend et al., 2011]] ; [[#Fankhauser--2014|Fankhauser et al., 2014]] ; [[#Clare--2017b|Clare et al., 2017b]] ), especially when formulated with clear guidance for all related actors, including lower level of governance ( [[#De%20Gregorio%20Hurtado--2015|De Gregorio Hurtado et al., 2015]] ). This may explain the rapid increase in both local and national climate change laws, now with an increased emphasis on regulatory provisions to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability.

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===== 17.4.2.1.4 Regulations and standards =====

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The presence and articulation of regulations and standards that address climate risk, such as building codes and land use zoning are key enabling factors for effective decision-making ( [[#Kim--2020|Kim et al., 2020]] ). Regulations and standards provide a framework for common understanding of when and under what conditions action should be taken specifically in relation to the construction and maintenance of the built environment, infrastructure and environmental and social practice ( [[#Grynning--2020|Grynning et al., 2020]] ). Regulations and standards for climate action emerge primarily from two settings: first, as an addition or augmentation to existing regulations and standards that emerged initially to address existing potential climate extremes and stresses (e.g., size of culverts in response to maximum rainfall and runoff conditions); and second, new regulations and standards that were developed in direct response to new or emergent climate risks (e.g., regulations in response to new presence of mean monthly high tide flooding) ( [[#Qiao--2018|Qiao et al., 2018]] ). Commonly agreed upon social norms and conventions also can be described as regulatory and providing a set of standards.

The regional and sectoral chapters of this report provide significant evidence of how regulations and standards enhance or hinder opportunities for climate risk management and adaptation. Relevant regulations and standards are especially evident in the oceans and coastal domains ( [[IPCC:Wg2:Chapter:Chapter-3|Chapter 3]] and CCP2, in cities and infrastructure (Chapter 6), and the water (Chapter 4) and food sectors (Chapter 5). Europe and North and South America (Chapters 12, 13 and 14) have the most frequent documented occurrences of examples of regulations and standards. Regulations and standards focused on building codes to protect against extreme event and loss, water regulations and agreements to protect water supply and lessen drought impacts, and health codes to limit heat exposure are the most frequent examples of such practices. Deficiencies of regulations and standards have been noted with respect to their capacity to manage species migrating from climate change, and to provide opportunities for transformative adaptation. The evidence from the sectors and chapters illustrate that more comprehensive regulations and standards lead to positive adaptation outcomes.

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===== 17.4.2.1.5 Environmental and social governance =====

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Environmental and social governance refers to voluntary or non-legally required actions taken by participating parties to achieve a commonly defined goal ( [[#Bodin--2017|Bodin, 2017]] ; [[#DeCaro--2017|DeCaro et al., 2017]] ; [[#Partzsch--2020|Partzsch, 2020]] ). While not explicitly described in the sectoral and regional chapters of this report, the maintenance and exercise of environmental and social governance decision-making strategies do enable adaptation practice and have become especially important when formal legal and policy regimes are not yet present. As formal regulation promotes clear and common understanding of climate risks and mechanisms to develop context specific appropriate solutions, voluntary code-making and self-regulation can forestall the need for legal action or can function as precursors to the formulation and implementation of legislation, laws and regulations.

Social and environmental governance has long been presented within climate risk decision-making, although more typically in the domain of climate mitigation ( [[#Wright--2016|Wright and Nyberg, 2016]] ; [[#Vandenbergh--2017|Vandenbergh and Gilligan, 2017]] ). Corporate climate decision-making emphasises the importance of profit motives in shaping decisions; however, reputational factors as appropriate environmental stewards can also be important when linked to sensitivity of other stakeholders such as investors, lenders, customers and employees ( [[#Vandenbergh--2017|Vandenbergh and Gilligan, 2017]] ). [[#Pulver--2011|Pulver (2011)]] notes that climate issues influence corporate decision-making more strongly in organisations that are networked with other organisations that also consider these issues and through direct experience with climate-related events and associated organisational learning.

Since AR5, more case studies of social and environmental governance within the domain of climate adaptation have become evident, especially within the context of adaptive management experimentation ( [[#Vella--2016|Vella et al., 2016]] ; [[#Beunen--2019|Beunen and Patterson, 2019]] ; [[#Blühdorn--2019|Blühdorn and Deflorian, 2019]] ). Environmental and social governance strategies for climate adaptation are diverse and reflect context-specific conditions of the decision-making process, including the role of the state, the individual and private interests, formality/informality, social responsibility, sources of financing, and transparency. Environmental and social governance enables the testing and definition of implementation solutions, enhancing the opportunities for defining successful adaptation ( [[#Surminski--2013|Surminski, 2013]] ). Several models and approaches to adaptive governance to promote adaptation and resilience in response to extreme weather events have been observed. These include polycentric and multilayered institutions, participation and collaboration, self-organisation and networks, and learning and innovation ( [[#Djalante--2011|Djalante et al., 2011]] ).

The effectiveness of social and environmental governance varies by sector. For example, in the private business sector, Aragòn-Correa et al. (2019) assess the effects of mandatory and voluntary regulatory pressure on firms’ environmental strategies. In summary, they find that analyses of the effects of voluntary pressure demonstrate that by themselves they are unlikely to bring about significant improvement in environmental outcomes. Professional organisations, however, have made progress in addressing sectoral standards relative to the adaptation process. This includes the development of new industry guidelines, codes, standards and specifications, in addition to the implementation of infrastructure inventories that incorporate evaluation of vulnerabilities and identification of priority at-risk areas (Chapter 14). Voluntary pressures by themselves are not likely to result in positive outcomes and instead should be coupled with mandatory regulatory pressure to achieve the environmental response desired ( [[#Bianco--2020|Bianco, 2020]] ).

Since AR5, another key development in environmental and social governance has been the establishment of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which aimed to develop guidelines for companies to voluntarily report the financial implications of two broad categories of climate risk: the transition risks of shifting to a lower-carbon economy and the physical risks of climate change itself ( [[#TCFD--2017|TCFD, 2017]] ). As of 2019, ~1340 companies with a market capitalisation of USD 12.6 trillion and financial institutions responsible for assets of USD 150 trillion have expressed support for the TCFD ( [[#TCFD--2020|TCFD, 2020]] ). An analysis of reports to the TCFD in 2016 showed that 83% of companies report on physical risks of climate change, and of these, 82% reported on strategies to adapt to some of the identified risks ( [[#Goldstein--2019|Goldstein et al., 2019]] ). The same analysis also noted that: (i) the total of estimates of assets at risk were two orders of magnitude lower than generally accepted estimates of total financial risk; (ii) a minority of companies consider risks outside of their own operations or in their value chains; (iii) most underestimate or do not estimate the costs of adaptation; and (iv) many assume linear impacts and responses, neglecting the potential for tipping points or acceleration in risk and potentially transformative adaptation requirements. At this stage, TCFD has influenced many companies’ thinking and comprehension of physical climate risk, but it appears too early to assess whether this has driven substantive responses to manage these risks.

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